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Re: Use ChatGPT for digging around in the wikidata [Pragmatic KG realism ] (Re: From Biota to Bluewhale: No TBox and ABox Discipline?)

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  Re: Use ChatGPT for digging around in the wikidata [Pragmatic KG realism ] (Re: From Biota to Bluewhale: No TBox and ABox Discipline?) Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2025-11-08 09:42 -0800
    Re: Use ChatGPT for digging around in the wikidata [Pragmatic KG realism ] (Re: From Biota to Bluewhale: No TBox and ABox Discipline?) Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2025-11-08 10:01 -0800
      individuals = Ur-Elements, usually not part of ZFC (Was: Use ChatGPT for digging around in the wikidata [Pragmatic KG realism ]) Mild Shock <janburse@fastmail.fm> - 2025-11-08 20:13 +0100
        Re: individuals = Ur-Elements, usually not part of ZFC (Was: Use ChatGPT for digging around in the wikidata [Pragmatic KG realism ]) Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2025-11-08 12:00 -0800
          i = Individuals , o = Proposition, see Alonzo Church (Was: individuals = Ur-Elements, usually not part of ZFC) Mild Shock <janburse@fastmail.fm> - 2025-11-08 21:23 +0100

#341878 — Re: Use ChatGPT for digging around in the wikidata [Pragmatic KG realism ] (Re: From Biota to Bluewhale: No TBox and ABox Discipline?)

> Mild Shock schrieb:

>> Its mainly a probem of what quantifiers are allowed.
>> Do you only allow quantifying over individuals, or
>> also over classes?
>>

Class/set distinction is a usual thing, like for example
in Russell's Principia Mathematica or in Metamath, and
often it's readily demonstrable inconsistencies thusly,
then whether those are simply examples or blind edicts,
has that classes and sets can't really be different
when one is just "elt" and the other "members",
in a theory of one relation that's a set theory.

It's a usual idea to start with an object that's
both bottom and top, and fill in the middle,
instead of presuming to add the top.


Then there are ideas like deconstructive accounts of
arithmetic, so that increment and ... and division and ...
are two separate options, sort of _not_ Presburger arithmetic
after Peano arithmetic, making for a sort of "long subtraction",
say, it's a usual sort of account since the Middle Egyptians
built arithmetic about division (thirds usually) while the
Greeks had their "magnitudes", yet the tools the constructions
make for both doubling and halving as primary.


It's a usual idea to suggest that the nested intervals
argument for uncountability doesn't apply to the rationals
since they don't have the least-upper-bound property and
though they're infinitely divisible that though the
antidiagonal argument can make for a rational antidiagonal
that they're countable.

Then, it's sort of at issue that one might look into
the "quasicontinuous" or other ideas about Dana Scott and
Jimmie Lawson more about box and circle modalities
that timidly sort of Bishop and Cheng and partially-ordered-ring
with rather-restricted-transfer-principle yet Jordan measure
and here "sweep", or, like "rationals are HUGE" off the
old "FOM" list, this kind of thing, about the three continuous
domains the line-reals field-reals signal-reals bit.

Then, where class/set distinction is a usual thing and like
Russell says "it's much easier to write set-theoretic results
in terms of classes instead of sets" then that these days the
things like the Lean have "auto" and this kind of thing,
makes for readily demonstrable inconsistencies. Then Russell's
"isolation" and "significance" that are sort of his bane since
he's basically axiomatized himself right, so comes off as a
very-much hypocritical flake, while at least a formalist a
few days a week, anyways set-theory is just a theory-of-one-relation,
in set theory's case "elt", there are others, like part theory
and particularly ordering theory, since ordinals and cardinals
aren't the same thing.

They're each things - just not the same thing, numbering and counting.

[toc] | [next] | [standalone]

#341879

On 11/08/2025 09:42 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> Mild Shock schrieb:
>
>>> Its mainly a probem of what quantifiers are allowed.
>>> Do you only allow quantifying over individuals, or
>>> also over classes?
>>>
>
> Class/set distinction is a usual thing, like for example
> in Russell's Principia Mathematica or in Metamath, and
> often it's readily demonstrable inconsistencies thusly,
> then whether those are simply examples or blind edicts,
> has that classes and sets can't really be different
> when one is just "elt" and the other "members",
> in a theory of one relation that's a set theory.
>
> It's a usual idea to start with an object that's
> both bottom and top, and fill in the middle,
> instead of presuming to add the top.
>
>
> Then there are ideas like deconstructive accounts of
> arithmetic, so that increment and ... and division and ...
> are two separate options, sort of _not_ Presburger arithmetic
> after Peano arithmetic, making for a sort of "long subtraction",
> say, it's a usual sort of account since the Middle Egyptians
> built arithmetic about division (thirds usually) while the
> Greeks had their "magnitudes", yet the tools the constructions
> make for both doubling and halving as primary.
>
>
> It's a usual idea to suggest that the nested intervals
> argument for uncountability doesn't apply to the rationals
> since they don't have the least-upper-bound property and
> though they're infinitely divisible that though the
> antidiagonal argument can make for a rational antidiagonal
> that they're countable.
>
> Then, it's sort of at issue that one might look into
> the "quasicontinuous" or other ideas about Dana Scott and
> Jimmie Lawson more about box and circle modalities
> that timidly sort of Bishop and Cheng and partially-ordered-ring
> with rather-restricted-transfer-principle yet Jordan measure
> and here "sweep", or, like "rationals are HUGE" off the
> old "FOM" list, this kind of thing, about the three continuous
> domains the line-reals field-reals signal-reals bit.
>
> Then, where class/set distinction is a usual thing and like
> Russell says "it's much easier to write set-theoretic results
> in terms of classes instead of sets" then that these days the
> things like the Lean have "auto" and this kind of thing,
> makes for readily demonstrable inconsistencies. Then Russell's
> "isolation" and "significance" that are sort of his bane since
> he's basically axiomatized himself right, so comes off as a
> very-much hypocritical flake, while at least a formalist a
> few days a week, anyways set-theory is just a theory-of-one-relation,
> in set theory's case "elt", there are others, like part theory
> and particularly ordering theory, since ordinals and cardinals
> aren't the same thing.
>
> They're each things - just not the same thing, numbering and counting.
>
>

It's like defining "Falting purity",
Scholze defines it "Scholze is clean" while
Falting defines it "Scholze is dirty".

(And Friedman's like "the rationals are still HUGE".)

Before getting into the rigamarole of Large Cardinals,
which are neither sets nor cardinals in set theory,
one needs address Russell's retro-thesis or the great
idea of a ruliality of course, a regularity or Well-Foundedness,
that at least Zermelo and Fraenkel also have Well-Ordering,
then when Voevodsky for the illative/univalent/Martin's Axiom
have a Well-Dispersion, Russell for being right is at least
twice wrong. "ZFC plus two Large Cardinal Axioms, one
for the illative and the other saying it's all not wrong."

Since, looking at von Neumann ordinals as containing their
lessers yet not themselves, the set of those would be
the Russell paradox, that Russell made fiat into existence
while having sub-marined Frege's otherwise what it is, then
that Russell basically cadged Frege and also Peirce, while
Whitehead is just a plain fictionalist, has that Zorn or Ono
and also Martin each their axioms as they may be bring all
their distinctness results now instead of uniqueness results.


If you look at my video essays like "paradox-free reason"
and "rulial foundations" after "Foundations briefly" it
may help understand why inductive ignorance isn't so
invincible after all.

"Not ultimately untrue", say. Making for a bit of quantifier
disambiguation or what Feferman said, or box and circle like
Scott, the Berkeley-school tease about that Tarski's quite broken,
with Goedel starting "model-relativist monotonic entailment
sure ain't complete".


It's a continuum mechanics, ....

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]

#341881 — individuals = Ur-Elements, usually not part of ZFC (Was: Use ChatGPT for digging around in the wikidata [Pragmatic KG realism ])

Hi,

I was not pointing at class / set distinction.
Lets lump sum class and set into pne thing,
distinct from the inviduals, which usual don't

exist in ZFC. To have individuals lets say
we have ur-elements. So its ZFCU. So what
does the ABox talk about? What does the TBox

talk about. And how do they talk?

Bye

P.S.: One definition is that the ABox talks
about "concrete entities".

Ross Finlayson schrieb:
> On 11/08/2025 09:42 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> Mild Shock schrieb:
>>
>>>> Its mainly a probem of what quantifiers are allowed.
>>>> Do you only allow quantifying over individuals, or
>>>> also over classes?
>>>>
>>
>> Class/set distinction is a usual thing, like for example
>> in Russell's Principia Mathematica or in Metamath, and
>> often it's readily demonstrable inconsistencies thusly,
>> then whether those are simply examples or blind edicts,
>> has that classes and sets can't really be different
>> when one is just "elt" and the other "members",
>> in a theory of one relation that's a set theory.
>>
>> It's a usual idea to start with an object that's
>> both bottom and top, and fill in the middle,
>> instead of presuming to add the top.
>>
>>
>> Then there are ideas like deconstructive accounts of
>> arithmetic, so that increment and ... and division and ...
>> are two separate options, sort of _not_ Presburger arithmetic
>> after Peano arithmetic, making for a sort of "long subtraction",
>> say, it's a usual sort of account since the Middle Egyptians
>> built arithmetic about division (thirds usually) while the
>> Greeks had their "magnitudes", yet the tools the constructions
>> make for both doubling and halving as primary.
>>
>>
>> It's a usual idea to suggest that the nested intervals
>> argument for uncountability doesn't apply to the rationals
>> since they don't have the least-upper-bound property and
>> though they're infinitely divisible that though the
>> antidiagonal argument can make for a rational antidiagonal
>> that they're countable.
>>
>> Then, it's sort of at issue that one might look into
>> the "quasicontinuous" or other ideas about Dana Scott and
>> Jimmie Lawson more about box and circle modalities
>> that timidly sort of Bishop and Cheng and partially-ordered-ring
>> with rather-restricted-transfer-principle yet Jordan measure
>> and here "sweep", or, like "rationals are HUGE" off the
>> old "FOM" list, this kind of thing, about the three continuous
>> domains the line-reals field-reals signal-reals bit.
>>
>> Then, where class/set distinction is a usual thing and like
>> Russell says "it's much easier to write set-theoretic results
>> in terms of classes instead of sets" then that these days the
>> things like the Lean have "auto" and this kind of thing,
>> makes for readily demonstrable inconsistencies. Then Russell's
>> "isolation" and "significance" that are sort of his bane since
>> he's basically axiomatized himself right, so comes off as a
>> very-much hypocritical flake, while at least a formalist a
>> few days a week, anyways set-theory is just a theory-of-one-relation,
>> in set theory's case "elt", there are others, like part theory
>> and particularly ordering theory, since ordinals and cardinals
>> aren't the same thing.
>>
>> They're each things - just not the same thing, numbering and counting.
>>
>>
> 
> It's like defining "Falting purity",
> Scholze defines it "Scholze is clean" while
> Falting defines it "Scholze is dirty".
> 
> (And Friedman's like "the rationals are still HUGE".)
> 
> Before getting into the rigamarole of Large Cardinals,
> which are neither sets nor cardinals in set theory,
> one needs address Russell's retro-thesis or the great
> idea of a ruliality of course, a regularity or Well-Foundedness,
> that at least Zermelo and Fraenkel also have Well-Ordering,
> then when Voevodsky for the illative/univalent/Martin's Axiom
> have a Well-Dispersion, Russell for being right is at least
> twice wrong. "ZFC plus two Large Cardinal Axioms, one
> for the illative and the other saying it's all not wrong."
> 
> Since, looking at von Neumann ordinals as containing their
> lessers yet not themselves, the set of those would be
> the Russell paradox, that Russell made fiat into existence
> while having sub-marined Frege's otherwise what it is, then
> that Russell basically cadged Frege and also Peirce, while
> Whitehead is just a plain fictionalist, has that Zorn or Ono
> and also Martin each their axioms as they may be bring all
> their distinctness results now instead of uniqueness results.
> 
> 
> If you look at my video essays like "paradox-free reason"
> and "rulial foundations" after "Foundations briefly" it
> may help understand why inductive ignorance isn't so
> invincible after all.
> 
> "Not ultimately untrue", say. Making for a bit of quantifier
> disambiguation or what Feferman said, or box and circle like
> Scott, the Berkeley-school tease about that Tarski's quite broken,
> with Goedel starting "model-relativist monotonic entailment
> sure ain't complete".
> 
> 
> It's a continuum mechanics, ....
> 
> 

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]

#341884 — Re: individuals = Ur-Elements, usually not part of ZFC (Was: Use ChatGPT for digging around in the wikidata [Pragmatic KG realism ])

On 11/08/2025 11:13 AM, Mild Shock wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I was not pointing at class / set distinction.
> Lets lump sum class and set into pne thing,
> distinct from the inviduals, which usual don't
>
> exist in ZFC. To have individuals lets say
> we have ur-elements. So its ZFCU. So what
> does the ABox talk about? What does the TBox
>
> talk about. And how do they talk?
>
> Bye
>
> P.S.: One definition is that the ABox talks
> about "concrete entities".
>
> Ross Finlayson schrieb:
>> On 11/08/2025 09:42 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> Mild Shock schrieb:
>>>
>>>>> Its mainly a probem of what quantifiers are allowed.
>>>>> Do you only allow quantifying over individuals, or
>>>>> also over classes?
>>>>>
>>>
>>> Class/set distinction is a usual thing, like for example
>>> in Russell's Principia Mathematica or in Metamath, and
>>> often it's readily demonstrable inconsistencies thusly,
>>> then whether those are simply examples or blind edicts,
>>> has that classes and sets can't really be different
>>> when one is just "elt" and the other "members",
>>> in a theory of one relation that's a set theory.
>>>
>>> It's a usual idea to start with an object that's
>>> both bottom and top, and fill in the middle,
>>> instead of presuming to add the top.
>>>
>>>
>>> Then there are ideas like deconstructive accounts of
>>> arithmetic, so that increment and ... and division and ...
>>> are two separate options, sort of _not_ Presburger arithmetic
>>> after Peano arithmetic, making for a sort of "long subtraction",
>>> say, it's a usual sort of account since the Middle Egyptians
>>> built arithmetic about division (thirds usually) while the
>>> Greeks had their "magnitudes", yet the tools the constructions
>>> make for both doubling and halving as primary.
>>>
>>>
>>> It's a usual idea to suggest that the nested intervals
>>> argument for uncountability doesn't apply to the rationals
>>> since they don't have the least-upper-bound property and
>>> though they're infinitely divisible that though the
>>> antidiagonal argument can make for a rational antidiagonal
>>> that they're countable.
>>>
>>> Then, it's sort of at issue that one might look into
>>> the "quasicontinuous" or other ideas about Dana Scott and
>>> Jimmie Lawson more about box and circle modalities
>>> that timidly sort of Bishop and Cheng and partially-ordered-ring
>>> with rather-restricted-transfer-principle yet Jordan measure
>>> and here "sweep", or, like "rationals are HUGE" off the
>>> old "FOM" list, this kind of thing, about the three continuous
>>> domains the line-reals field-reals signal-reals bit.
>>>
>>> Then, where class/set distinction is a usual thing and like
>>> Russell says "it's much easier to write set-theoretic results
>>> in terms of classes instead of sets" then that these days the
>>> things like the Lean have "auto" and this kind of thing,
>>> makes for readily demonstrable inconsistencies. Then Russell's
>>> "isolation" and "significance" that are sort of his bane since
>>> he's basically axiomatized himself right, so comes off as a
>>> very-much hypocritical flake, while at least a formalist a
>>> few days a week, anyways set-theory is just a theory-of-one-relation,
>>> in set theory's case "elt", there are others, like part theory
>>> and particularly ordering theory, since ordinals and cardinals
>>> aren't the same thing.
>>>
>>> They're each things - just not the same thing, numbering and counting.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> It's like defining "Falting purity",
>> Scholze defines it "Scholze is clean" while
>> Falting defines it "Scholze is dirty".
>>
>> (And Friedman's like "the rationals are still HUGE".)
>>
>> Before getting into the rigamarole of Large Cardinals,
>> which are neither sets nor cardinals in set theory,
>> one needs address Russell's retro-thesis or the great
>> idea of a ruliality of course, a regularity or Well-Foundedness,
>> that at least Zermelo and Fraenkel also have Well-Ordering,
>> then when Voevodsky for the illative/univalent/Martin's Axiom
>> have a Well-Dispersion, Russell for being right is at least
>> twice wrong. "ZFC plus two Large Cardinal Axioms, one
>> for the illative and the other saying it's all not wrong."
>>
>> Since, looking at von Neumann ordinals as containing their
>> lessers yet not themselves, the set of those would be
>> the Russell paradox, that Russell made fiat into existence
>> while having sub-marined Frege's otherwise what it is, then
>> that Russell basically cadged Frege and also Peirce, while
>> Whitehead is just a plain fictionalist, has that Zorn or Ono
>> and also Martin each their axioms as they may be bring all
>> their distinctness results now instead of uniqueness results.
>>
>>
>> If you look at my video essays like "paradox-free reason"
>> and "rulial foundations" after "Foundations briefly" it
>> may help understand why inductive ignorance isn't so
>> invincible after all.
>>
>> "Not ultimately untrue", say. Making for a bit of quantifier
>> disambiguation or what Feferman said, or box and circle like
>> Scott, the Berkeley-school tease about that Tarski's quite broken,
>> with Goedel starting "model-relativist monotonic entailment
>> sure ain't complete".
>>
>>
>> It's a continuum mechanics, ....
>>
>>
>

Individuation of continua about identity, equality, and
tautology being different, as Mitch and Ross used to talk about
on sci.logic, then for discernibles and indiscernibles, has
that there's a Great Context the Universe and things in it
are as of relation, as one may read from the initial post and
furthermore since I've been not inconstantly saying so for decades,
since I had all these ideas and their resolutions already decades ago,
then has that ur-elements are as of a heno-theory, since adherents
to model-theory and as equi-interpretable with proof-theory for
conscientious structuralists, have otherwise you might as well
restrict your discussion to elements as by elt, or make more
for the Great Course why you might as well start with quantifier
disambiguation, and getting rid of your Montague for Herbrand,
unless otherwise you'd rather remain a waffling, hypocritical flake.


I'd aver you got your ideas of "T-theory" and "A-theory" backward.

You're going to eventually need at least one pure idealism,
and aver that mathematics is discovered not invented,
and that there's a real theory of Truth, and just like
everybody else an unqualified "Amicus Plato", since otherwise
your rope-climbing is a fraudulent fakir's.


The Fakir: ideally not a faker.


There's no universe in ZFC, either quit or don't.

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#341886 — i = Individuals , o = Proposition, see Alonzo Church (Was: individuals = Ur-Elements, usually not part of ZFC)

Hi,

Alonzo Church, Kurz Gödel, John von Neumann etc..
they had no problem going higher order. Their logical
world consisted of Type-0, Type-1, etc.. objects.

In Alonzo Church type theory, there is even not
really the notion of formula. Its basically all
terms:

".2 Formulas (as certain terms)
Before we state the definition of a “formula”, a word of caution is in 
order. The reader may be accustomed to thinking of a formula as an 
expression which plays the role of an assertion in a formal language, 
and of a term as an expression which designates an object. Church’s 
terminology is somewhat different, and provides a uniform way of 
discussing expressions of many different types."
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/type-theory-church/

If you draw a line class / set, you can use
the above to make it precise. In set theory
sets itself are also elements of the universe,

so this rendering a set S belongs to i, the
domain of inviduals of the set theory, and
the membership relation ∈ has this signature:

    ∈ : i -> i -> o

And a class c has this signature:

    c : i -> o

But I wonder whether the old grammarians like
Aristoteles Categories, had such distincutions in
mind, especially the impoverishment done by FOL.

LoL

Bye

P.S.: Montague Grammars, if you look at them from
the types viewpoint, require also richer modelling
than only FOL, even if they are used in school

examples to extract FOL. So what is behind ChatGPT
and the semantic web logic wise? What is behind
Knowledge Graphs logic wise?

Ross Finlayson schrieb:
> On 11/08/2025 11:13 AM, Mild Shock wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> I was not pointing at class / set distinction.
>> Lets lump sum class and set into pne thing,
>> distinct from the inviduals, which usual don't
>>
>> exist in ZFC. To have individuals lets say
>> we have ur-elements. So its ZFCU. So what
>> does the ABox talk about? What does the TBox
>>
>> talk about. And how do they talk?
>>
>> Bye
>>
>> P.S.: One definition is that the ABox talks
>> about "concrete entities".
>>
>> Ross Finlayson schrieb:
>>> On 11/08/2025 09:42 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> Mild Shock schrieb:
>>>>
>>>>>> Its mainly a probem of what quantifiers are allowed.
>>>>>> Do you only allow quantifying over individuals, or
>>>>>> also over classes?
>>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Class/set distinction is a usual thing, like for example
>>>> in Russell's Principia Mathematica or in Metamath, and
>>>> often it's readily demonstrable inconsistencies thusly,
>>>> then whether those are simply examples or blind edicts,
>>>> has that classes and sets can't really be different
>>>> when one is just "elt" and the other "members",
>>>> in a theory of one relation that's a set theory.
>>>>
>>>> It's a usual idea to start with an object that's
>>>> both bottom and top, and fill in the middle,
>>>> instead of presuming to add the top.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Then there are ideas like deconstructive accounts of
>>>> arithmetic, so that increment and ... and division and ...
>>>> are two separate options, sort of _not_ Presburger arithmetic
>>>> after Peano arithmetic, making for a sort of "long subtraction",
>>>> say, it's a usual sort of account since the Middle Egyptians
>>>> built arithmetic about division (thirds usually) while the
>>>> Greeks had their "magnitudes", yet the tools the constructions
>>>> make for both doubling and halving as primary.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It's a usual idea to suggest that the nested intervals
>>>> argument for uncountability doesn't apply to the rationals
>>>> since they don't have the least-upper-bound property and
>>>> though they're infinitely divisible that though the
>>>> antidiagonal argument can make for a rational antidiagonal
>>>> that they're countable.
>>>>
>>>> Then, it's sort of at issue that one might look into
>>>> the "quasicontinuous" or other ideas about Dana Scott and
>>>> Jimmie Lawson more about box and circle modalities
>>>> that timidly sort of Bishop and Cheng and partially-ordered-ring
>>>> with rather-restricted-transfer-principle yet Jordan measure
>>>> and here "sweep", or, like "rationals are HUGE" off the
>>>> old "FOM" list, this kind of thing, about the three continuous
>>>> domains the line-reals field-reals signal-reals bit.
>>>>
>>>> Then, where class/set distinction is a usual thing and like
>>>> Russell says "it's much easier to write set-theoretic results
>>>> in terms of classes instead of sets" then that these days the
>>>> things like the Lean have "auto" and this kind of thing,
>>>> makes for readily demonstrable inconsistencies. Then Russell's
>>>> "isolation" and "significance" that are sort of his bane since
>>>> he's basically axiomatized himself right, so comes off as a
>>>> very-much hypocritical flake, while at least a formalist a
>>>> few days a week, anyways set-theory is just a theory-of-one-relation,
>>>> in set theory's case "elt", there are others, like part theory
>>>> and particularly ordering theory, since ordinals and cardinals
>>>> aren't the same thing.
>>>>
>>>> They're each things - just not the same thing, numbering and counting.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> It's like defining "Falting purity",
>>> Scholze defines it "Scholze is clean" while
>>> Falting defines it "Scholze is dirty".
>>>
>>> (And Friedman's like "the rationals are still HUGE".)
>>>
>>> Before getting into the rigamarole of Large Cardinals,
>>> which are neither sets nor cardinals in set theory,
>>> one needs address Russell's retro-thesis or the great
>>> idea of a ruliality of course, a regularity or Well-Foundedness,
>>> that at least Zermelo and Fraenkel also have Well-Ordering,
>>> then when Voevodsky for the illative/univalent/Martin's Axiom
>>> have a Well-Dispersion, Russell for being right is at least
>>> twice wrong. "ZFC plus two Large Cardinal Axioms, one
>>> for the illative and the other saying it's all not wrong."
>>>
>>> Since, looking at von Neumann ordinals as containing their
>>> lessers yet not themselves, the set of those would be
>>> the Russell paradox, that Russell made fiat into existence
>>> while having sub-marined Frege's otherwise what it is, then
>>> that Russell basically cadged Frege and also Peirce, while
>>> Whitehead is just a plain fictionalist, has that Zorn or Ono
>>> and also Martin each their axioms as they may be bring all
>>> their distinctness results now instead of uniqueness results.
>>>
>>>
>>> If you look at my video essays like "paradox-free reason"
>>> and "rulial foundations" after "Foundations briefly" it
>>> may help understand why inductive ignorance isn't so
>>> invincible after all.
>>>
>>> "Not ultimately untrue", say. Making for a bit of quantifier
>>> disambiguation or what Feferman said, or box and circle like
>>> Scott, the Berkeley-school tease about that Tarski's quite broken,
>>> with Goedel starting "model-relativist monotonic entailment
>>> sure ain't complete".
>>>
>>>
>>> It's a continuum mechanics, ....
>>>
>>>
>>
> 
> Individuation of continua about identity, equality, and
> tautology being different, as Mitch and Ross used to talk about
> on sci.logic, then for discernibles and indiscernibles, has
> that there's a Great Context the Universe and things in it
> are as of relation, as one may read from the initial post and
> furthermore since I've been not inconstantly saying so for decades,
> since I had all these ideas and their resolutions already decades ago,
> then has that ur-elements are as of a heno-theory, since adherents
> to model-theory and as equi-interpretable with proof-theory for
> conscientious structuralists, have otherwise you might as well
> restrict your discussion to elements as by elt, or make more
> for the Great Course why you might as well start with quantifier
> disambiguation, and getting rid of your Montague for Herbrand,
> unless otherwise you'd rather remain a waffling, hypocritical flake.
> 
> 
> I'd aver you got your ideas of "T-theory" and "A-theory" backward.
> 
> You're going to eventually need at least one pure idealism,
> and aver that mathematics is discovered not invented,
> and that there's a real theory of Truth, and just like
> everybody else an unqualified "Amicus Plato", since otherwise
> your rope-climbing is a fraudulent fakir's.
> 
> 
> The Fakir: ideally not a faker.
> 
> 
> There's no universe in ZFC, either quit or don't.
> 
> 

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