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[PATCH 4.13 00/52] 4.13.3-stable review

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  [PATCH 4.13 00/52] 4.13.3-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 11:20 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 14/52] thunderbolt: Remove superfluous check Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 11:20 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 16/52] thunderbolt: Allow clearing the key Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 11:20 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 30/52] xfs: fix recovery failure when log record header wraps log end Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 11:20 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 04/52] vhost_net: correctly check tx avail during rx busy polling Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 11:20 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 20/52] x86/mm, mm/hwpoison: Clear PRESENT bit for kernel 1:1 mappings of poison pages Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 11:20 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 35/52] xfs: evict all inodes involved with log redo item Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 11:20 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 21/52] ovl: fix false positive ESTALE on lookup Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 11:20 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 37/52] xfs: open-code xfs_buf_item_dirty() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 11:20 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 11/52] ip_tunnel: fix setting ttl and tos value in collect_md mode Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 11:20 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 01/52] Revert "net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting" Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 11:20 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 12/52] f2fs: let fill_super handle roll-forward errors Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 11:20 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 15/52] thunderbolt: Make key root-only accessible Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 11:20 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 47/52] xfs: fix incorrect log_flushed on fsync Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 11:20 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 40/52] xfs: refactor buffer logging into buffer dirtying helper Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 11:20 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 52/52] md/raid5: release/flush io in raid5_do_work() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 11:20 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 08/52] ipv6: fix typo in fib6_net_exit() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 50/52] xfs: use kmem_free to free return value of kmem_zalloc Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 28/52] xfs: Add infrastructure needed for error propagation during buffer IO failure Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 24/52] libnvdimm, btt: check memory allocation failure Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 38/52] xfs: remove unnecessary dirty bli format check for ordered bufs Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 46/52] xfs: disable per-inode DAX flag Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 23/52] idr: remove WARN_ON_ONCE() when trying to replace negative ID Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 31/52] xfs: always verify the log tail during recovery Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 41/52] xfs: dont log dirty ranges for ordered buffers Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 43/52] xfs: move bmbt owner change to last step of extent swap Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 48/52] xfs: dont set v3 xflags for v2 inodes Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 13/52] f2fs: check hot_data for roll-forward recovery Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 33/52] xfs: handle -EFSCORRUPTED during head/tail verification Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 39/52] xfs: ordered buffer log items are never formatted Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 10/52] tcp: fix a request socket leak Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 34/52] xfs: stop searching for free slots in an inode chunk when there are none Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 09/52] sctp: fix missing wake ups in some situations Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 42/52] xfs: skip bmbt block ino validation during owner change Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 51/52] md/raid1/10: reset bio allocated from mempool Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 36/52] xfs: check for race with xfs_reclaim_inode() in xfs_ifree_cluster() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 25/52] libnvdimm: fix integer overflow static analysis warning Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 32/52] xfs: fix log recovery corruption error due to tail overwrite Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 29/52] xfs: Properly retry failed inode items in case of error during buffer writeback Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 03/52] gianfar: Fix Tx flow control deactivation Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 02/52] Revert "net: fix percpu memory leaks" Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 17/52] x86/fsgsbase/64: Fully initialize FS and GS state in start_thread_common Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.13 06/52] udp: drop head states only when all skb references are gone Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-18 12:10 +0200
    Re: [PATCH 4.13 00/52] 4.13.3-stable review Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> - 2017-09-18 21:30 +0200
    Re: [PATCH 4.13 00/52] 4.13.3-stable review Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com> - 2017-09-18 22:20 +0200
      Re: [PATCH 4.13 00/52] 4.13.3-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-09-19 08:40 +0200

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#1733969 — [PATCH 4.13 38/52] xfs: remove unnecessary dirty bli format check for ordered bufs

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>

commit 6453c65d3576bc3e602abb5add15f112755c08ca upstream.

xfs_buf_item_unlock() historically checked the dirty state of the
buffer by manually checking the buffer log formats for dirty
segments. The introduction of ordered buffers invalidated this check
because ordered buffers have dirty bli's but no dirty (logged)
segments. The check was updated to accommodate ordered buffers by
looking at the bli state first and considering the blf only if the
bli is clean.

This logic is safe but unnecessary. There is no valid case where the
bli is clean yet the blf has dirty segments. The bli is set dirty
whenever the blf is logged (via xfs_trans_log_buf()) and the blf is
cleared in the only place BLI_DIRTY is cleared (xfs_trans_binval()).

Remove the conditional blf dirty checks and replace with an assert
that should catch any discrepencies between bli and blf dirty
states. Refactor the old blf dirty check into a helper function to
be used by the assert.

Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c |   62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.h |    1 
 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c
@@ -575,26 +575,18 @@ xfs_buf_item_unlock(
 {
 	struct xfs_buf_log_item	*bip = BUF_ITEM(lip);
 	struct xfs_buf		*bp = bip->bli_buf;
-	bool			clean;
-	bool			aborted;
-	int			flags;
+	bool			aborted = !!(lip->li_flags & XFS_LI_ABORTED);
+	bool			hold = !!(bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_HOLD);
+	bool			dirty = !!(bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_DIRTY);
+	bool			ordered = !!(bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_ORDERED);
 
 	/* Clear the buffer's association with this transaction. */
 	bp->b_transp = NULL;
 
 	/*
-	 * If this is a transaction abort, don't return early.  Instead, allow
-	 * the brelse to happen.  Normally it would be done for stale
-	 * (cancelled) buffers at unpin time, but we'll never go through the
-	 * pin/unpin cycle if we abort inside commit.
-	 */
-	aborted = (lip->li_flags & XFS_LI_ABORTED) ? true : false;
-	/*
-	 * Before possibly freeing the buf item, copy the per-transaction state
-	 * so we can reference it safely later after clearing it from the
-	 * buffer log item.
+	 * The per-transaction state has been copied above so clear it from the
+	 * bli.
 	 */
-	flags = bip->bli_flags;
 	bip->bli_flags &= ~(XFS_BLI_LOGGED | XFS_BLI_HOLD | XFS_BLI_ORDERED);
 
 	/*
@@ -602,7 +594,7 @@ xfs_buf_item_unlock(
 	 * unlock the buffer and free the buf item when the buffer is unpinned
 	 * for the last time.
 	 */
-	if (flags & XFS_BLI_STALE) {
+	if (bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_STALE) {
 		trace_xfs_buf_item_unlock_stale(bip);
 		ASSERT(bip->__bli_format.blf_flags & XFS_BLF_CANCEL);
 		if (!aborted) {
@@ -620,20 +612,11 @@ xfs_buf_item_unlock(
 	 * regardless of whether it is dirty or not. A dirty abort implies a
 	 * shutdown, anyway.
 	 *
-	 * Ordered buffers are dirty but may have no recorded changes, so ensure
-	 * we only release clean items here.
+	 * The bli dirty state should match whether the blf has logged segments
+	 * except for ordered buffers, where only the bli should be dirty.
 	 */
-	clean = (flags & XFS_BLI_DIRTY) ? false : true;
-	if (clean) {
-		int i;
-		for (i = 0; i < bip->bli_format_count; i++) {
-			if (!xfs_bitmap_empty(bip->bli_formats[i].blf_data_map,
-				     bip->bli_formats[i].blf_map_size)) {
-				clean = false;
-				break;
-			}
-		}
-	}
+	ASSERT((!ordered && dirty == xfs_buf_item_dirty_format(bip)) ||
+	       (ordered && dirty && !xfs_buf_item_dirty_format(bip)));
 
 	/*
 	 * Clean buffers, by definition, cannot be in the AIL. However, aborted
@@ -652,11 +635,11 @@ xfs_buf_item_unlock(
 			ASSERT(XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(lip->li_mountp));
 			xfs_trans_ail_remove(lip, SHUTDOWN_LOG_IO_ERROR);
 			xfs_buf_item_relse(bp);
-		} else if (clean)
+		} else if (!dirty)
 			xfs_buf_item_relse(bp);
 	}
 
-	if (!(flags & XFS_BLI_HOLD))
+	if (!hold)
 		xfs_buf_relse(bp);
 }
 
@@ -945,6 +928,25 @@ xfs_buf_item_log(
 }
 
 
+/*
+ * Return true if the buffer has any ranges logged/dirtied by a transaction,
+ * false otherwise.
+ */
+bool
+xfs_buf_item_dirty_format(
+	struct xfs_buf_log_item	*bip)
+{
+	int			i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < bip->bli_format_count; i++) {
+		if (!xfs_bitmap_empty(bip->bli_formats[i].blf_data_map,
+			     bip->bli_formats[i].blf_map_size))
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 STATIC void
 xfs_buf_item_free(
 	xfs_buf_log_item_t	*bip)
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.h
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.h
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ typedef struct xfs_buf_log_item {
 int	xfs_buf_item_init(struct xfs_buf *, struct xfs_mount *);
 void	xfs_buf_item_relse(struct xfs_buf *);
 void	xfs_buf_item_log(xfs_buf_log_item_t *, uint, uint);
+bool	xfs_buf_item_dirty_format(struct xfs_buf_log_item *);
 void	xfs_buf_attach_iodone(struct xfs_buf *,
 			      void(*)(struct xfs_buf *, xfs_log_item_t *),
 			      xfs_log_item_t *);

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#1733970 — [PATCH 4.13 46/52] xfs: disable per-inode DAX flag

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

commit 742d84290739ae908f1b61b7d17ea382c8c0073a upstream.

Currently flag switching can be used to easily crash the kernel.  Disable
the per-inode DAX flag until that is sorted out.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
@@ -1008,11 +1008,12 @@ xfs_diflags_to_linux(
 		inode->i_flags |= S_NOATIME;
 	else
 		inode->i_flags &= ~S_NOATIME;
+#if 0	/* disabled until the flag switching races are sorted out */
 	if (xflags & FS_XFLAG_DAX)
 		inode->i_flags |= S_DAX;
 	else
 		inode->i_flags &= ~S_DAX;
-
+#endif
 }
 
 static int

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#1733971 — [PATCH 4.13 23/52] idr: remove WARN_ON_ONCE() when trying to replace negative ID

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

commit a47f68d6a944113bdc8097db6f933c2e17c27bf9 upstream.

IDR only supports non-negative IDs.  There used to be a 'WARN_ON_ONCE(id <
0)' in idr_replace(), but it was intentionally removed by commit
2e1c9b286765 ("idr: remove WARN_ON_ONCE() on negative IDs").

Then it was added back by commit 0a835c4f090a ("Reimplement IDR and IDA
using the radix tree").  However it seems that adding it back was a
mistake, given that some users such as drm_gem_handle_delete()
(DRM_IOCTL_GEM_CLOSE) pass in a value from userspace to idr_replace(),
allowing the WARN_ON_ONCE to be triggered.  drm_gem_handle_delete()
actually just wants idr_replace() to return an error code if the ID is
not allocated, including in the case where the ID is invalid (negative).

So once again remove the bogus WARN_ON_ONCE().

This bug was found by syzkaller, which encountered the following
warning:

    WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 3008 at lib/idr.c:157 idr_replace+0x1d8/0x240 lib/idr.c:157
    Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...

    CPU: 3 PID: 3008 Comm: syzkaller218828 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc4-next-20170811 #2
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    Call Trace:
     fixup_bug+0x40/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:190
     do_trap_no_signal arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:224 [inline]
     do_trap+0x260/0x390 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:273
     do_error_trap+0x120/0x390 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:310
     do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:323
     invalid_op+0x1e/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:930
    RIP: 0010:idr_replace+0x1d8/0x240 lib/idr.c:157
    RSP: 0018:ffff8800394bf9f8 EFLAGS: 00010297
    RAX: ffff88003c6c60c0 RBX: 1ffff10007297f43 RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8800394bfa78
    RBP: ffff8800394bfae0 R08: ffffffff82856487 R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: ffff8800394bf9a8 R11: ffff88006c8bae28 R12: ffffffffffffffff
    R13: ffff8800394bfab8 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8800394bfbc8
     drm_gem_handle_delete+0x33/0xa0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem.c:297
     drm_gem_close_ioctl+0xa1/0xe0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem.c:671
     drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e7/0x2e0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:729
     drm_ioctl+0x72e/0xa50 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:825
     vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:45 [inline]
     do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:685
     SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:700 [inline]
     SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:691
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe

Here is a C reproducer:

    #include <fcntl.h>
    #include <stddef.h>
    #include <stdint.h>
    #include <sys/ioctl.h>
    #include <drm/drm.h>

    int main(void)
    {
            int cardfd = open("/dev/dri/card0", O_RDONLY);

            ioctl(cardfd, DRM_IOCTL_GEM_CLOSE,
                  &(struct drm_gem_close) { .handle = -1 } );
    }

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170906235306.20534-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 0a835c4f090a ("Reimplement IDR and IDA using the radix tree")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 lib/idr.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/lib/idr.c
+++ b/lib/idr.c
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ void *idr_replace(struct idr *idr, void
 	void __rcu **slot = NULL;
 	void *entry;
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(id < 0))
+	if (id < 0)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(radix_tree_is_internal_node(ptr)))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

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#1733972 — [PATCH 4.13 31/52] xfs: always verify the log tail during recovery

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>

commit 5297ac1f6d7cbf45464a49b9558831f271dfc559 upstream.

Log tail verification currently only occurs when torn writes are
detected at the head of the log. This was introduced because a
change in the head block due to torn writes can lead to a change in
the tail block (each log record header references the current tail)
and the tail block should be verified before log recovery proceeds.

Tail corruption is possible outside of torn write scenarios,
however. For example, partial log writes can be detected and cleared
during the initial head/tail block discovery process. If the partial
write coincides with a tail overwrite, the log tail is corrupted and
recovery fails.

To facilitate correct handling of log tail overwites, update log
recovery to always perform tail verification. This is necessary to
detect potential tail overwrite conditions when torn writes may not
have occurred. This changes normal (i.e., no torn writes) recovery
behavior slightly to detect and return CRC related errors near the
tail before actual recovery starts.

Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c |   26 +++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c
@@ -1183,31 +1183,11 @@ xlog_verify_head(
 			ASSERT(0);
 			return 0;
 		}
-
-		/*
-		 * Now verify the tail based on the updated head. This is
-		 * required because the torn writes trimmed from the head could
-		 * have been written over the tail of a previous record. Return
-		 * any errors since recovery cannot proceed if the tail is
-		 * corrupt.
-		 *
-		 * XXX: This leaves a gap in truly robust protection from torn
-		 * writes in the log. If the head is behind the tail, the tail
-		 * pushes forward to create some space and then a crash occurs
-		 * causing the writes into the previous record's tail region to
-		 * tear, log recovery isn't able to recover.
-		 *
-		 * How likely is this to occur? If possible, can we do something
-		 * more intelligent here? Is it safe to push the tail forward if
-		 * we can determine that the tail is within the range of the
-		 * torn write (e.g., the kernel can only overwrite the tail if
-		 * it has actually been pushed forward)? Alternatively, could we
-		 * somehow prevent this condition at runtime?
-		 */
-		error = xlog_verify_tail(log, *head_blk, *tail_blk);
 	}
+	if (error)
+		return error;
 
-	return error;
+	return xlog_verify_tail(log, *head_blk, *tail_blk);
 }
 
 /*

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#1733973 — [PATCH 4.13 41/52] xfs: dont log dirty ranges for ordered buffers

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>

commit 8dc518dfa7dbd079581269e51074b3c55a65a880 upstream.

Ordered buffers are attached to transactions and pushed through the
logging infrastructure just like normal buffers with the exception
that they are not actually written to the log. Therefore, we don't
need to log dirty ranges of ordered buffers. xfs_trans_log_buf() is
called on ordered buffers to set up all of the dirty state on the
transaction, buffer and log item and prepare the buffer for I/O.

Now that xfs_trans_dirty_buf() is available, call it from
xfs_trans_ordered_buf() so the latter is now mutually exclusive with
xfs_trans_log_buf(). This reflects the implementation of ordered
buffers and helps eliminate confusion over the need to log ranges of
ordered buffers just to set up internal log state.

Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Henderson <allison.henderson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c  |    6 ++----
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ialloc.c |    2 --
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c     |   26 ++++++++++++++------------
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c
@@ -4464,12 +4464,10 @@ xfs_btree_block_change_owner(
 	 * though, so everything is consistent in memory.
 	 */
 	if (bp) {
-		if (cur->bc_tp) {
+		if (cur->bc_tp)
 			xfs_trans_ordered_buf(cur->bc_tp, bp);
-			xfs_btree_log_block(cur, bp, XFS_BB_OWNER);
-		} else {
+		else
 			xfs_buf_delwri_queue(bp, bbcoi->buffer_list);
-		}
 	} else {
 		ASSERT(cur->bc_flags & XFS_BTREE_ROOT_IN_INODE);
 		ASSERT(level == cur->bc_nlevels - 1);
--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ialloc.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ialloc.c
@@ -378,8 +378,6 @@ xfs_ialloc_inode_init(
 				 * transaction and pin the log appropriately.
 				 */
 				xfs_trans_ordered_buf(tp, fbuf);
-				xfs_trans_log_buf(tp, fbuf, 0,
-						  BBTOB(fbuf->b_length) - 1);
 			}
 		} else {
 			fbuf->b_flags |= XBF_DONE;
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c
@@ -560,16 +560,12 @@ xfs_trans_log_buf(
 	struct xfs_buf_log_item	*bip = bp->b_fspriv;
 
 	ASSERT(first <= last && last < BBTOB(bp->b_length));
+	ASSERT(!(bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_ORDERED));
 
 	xfs_trans_dirty_buf(tp, bp);
 
-	/*
-	 * If we have an ordered buffer we are not logging any dirty range but
-	 * it still needs to be marked dirty and that it has been logged.
-	 */
 	trace_xfs_trans_log_buf(bip);
-	if (!(bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_ORDERED))
-		xfs_buf_item_log(bip, first, last);
+	xfs_buf_item_log(bip, first, last);
 }
 
 
@@ -722,12 +718,11 @@ xfs_trans_inode_alloc_buf(
 }
 
 /*
- * Mark the buffer as ordered for this transaction. This means
- * that the contents of the buffer are not recorded in the transaction
- * but it is tracked in the AIL as though it was. This allows us
- * to record logical changes in transactions rather than the physical
- * changes we make to the buffer without changing writeback ordering
- * constraints of metadata buffers.
+ * Mark the buffer as ordered for this transaction. This means that the contents
+ * of the buffer are not recorded in the transaction but it is tracked in the
+ * AIL as though it was. This allows us to record logical changes in
+ * transactions rather than the physical changes we make to the buffer without
+ * changing writeback ordering constraints of metadata buffers.
  */
 void
 xfs_trans_ordered_buf(
@@ -739,9 +734,16 @@ xfs_trans_ordered_buf(
 	ASSERT(bp->b_transp == tp);
 	ASSERT(bip != NULL);
 	ASSERT(atomic_read(&bip->bli_refcount) > 0);
+	ASSERT(!xfs_buf_item_dirty_format(bip));
 
 	bip->bli_flags |= XFS_BLI_ORDERED;
 	trace_xfs_buf_item_ordered(bip);
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't log a dirty range of an ordered buffer but it still needs
+	 * to be marked dirty and that it has been logged.
+	 */
+	xfs_trans_dirty_buf(tp, bp);
 }
 
 /*

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#1733976 — [PATCH 4.13 43/52] xfs: move bmbt owner change to last step of extent swap

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>

commit 6fb10d6d22094bc4062f92b9ccbcee2f54033d04 upstream.

The extent swap operation currently resets bmbt block owners before
the inode forks are swapped. The bmbt buffers are marked as ordered
so they do not have to be physically logged in the transaction.

This use of ordered buffers is not safe as bmbt buffers may have
been previously physically logged. The bmbt owner change algorithm
needs to be updated to physically log buffers that are already dirty
when/if they are encountered. This means that an extent swap will
eventually require multiple rolling transactions to handle large
btrees. In addition, all inode related changes must be logged before
the bmbt owner change scan begins and can roll the transaction for
the first time to preserve fs consistency via log recovery.

In preparation for such fixes to the bmbt owner change algorithm,
refactor the bmbt scan out of the extent fork swap code to the last
operation before the transaction is committed. Update
xfs_swap_extent_forks() to only set the inode log flags when an
owner change scan is necessary. Update xfs_swap_extents() to trigger
the owner change based on the inode log flags. Note that since the
owner change now occurs after the extent fork swap, the inode btrees
must be fixed up with the inode number of the current inode (similar
to log recovery).

Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c |   44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c
@@ -1840,29 +1840,18 @@ xfs_swap_extent_forks(
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Before we've swapped the forks, lets set the owners of the forks
-	 * appropriately. We have to do this as we are demand paging the btree
-	 * buffers, and so the validation done on read will expect the owner
-	 * field to be correctly set. Once we change the owners, we can swap the
-	 * inode forks.
+	 * Btree format (v3) inodes have the inode number stamped in the bmbt
+	 * block headers. We can't start changing the bmbt blocks until the
+	 * inode owner change is logged so recovery does the right thing in the
+	 * event of a crash. Set the owner change log flags now and leave the
+	 * bmbt scan as the last step.
 	 */
 	if (ip->i_d.di_version == 3 &&
-	    ip->i_d.di_format == XFS_DINODE_FMT_BTREE) {
+	    ip->i_d.di_format == XFS_DINODE_FMT_BTREE)
 		(*target_log_flags) |= XFS_ILOG_DOWNER;
-		error = xfs_bmbt_change_owner(tp, ip, XFS_DATA_FORK,
-					      tip->i_ino, NULL);
-		if (error)
-			return error;
-	}
-
 	if (tip->i_d.di_version == 3 &&
-	    tip->i_d.di_format == XFS_DINODE_FMT_BTREE) {
+	    tip->i_d.di_format == XFS_DINODE_FMT_BTREE)
 		(*src_log_flags) |= XFS_ILOG_DOWNER;
-		error = xfs_bmbt_change_owner(tp, tip, XFS_DATA_FORK,
-					      ip->i_ino, NULL);
-		if (error)
-			return error;
-	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Swap the data forks of the inodes
@@ -2092,6 +2081,25 @@ xfs_swap_extents(
 	xfs_trans_log_inode(tp, tip, target_log_flags);
 
 	/*
+	 * The extent forks have been swapped, but crc=1,rmapbt=0 filesystems
+	 * have inode number owner values in the bmbt blocks that still refer to
+	 * the old inode. Scan each bmbt to fix up the owner values with the
+	 * inode number of the current inode.
+	 */
+	if (src_log_flags & XFS_ILOG_DOWNER) {
+		error = xfs_bmbt_change_owner(tp, ip, XFS_DATA_FORK,
+					      ip->i_ino, NULL);
+		if (error)
+			goto out_trans_cancel;
+	}
+	if (target_log_flags & XFS_ILOG_DOWNER) {
+		error = xfs_bmbt_change_owner(tp, tip, XFS_DATA_FORK,
+					      tip->i_ino, NULL);
+		if (error)
+			goto out_trans_cancel;
+	}
+
+	/*
 	 * If this is a synchronous mount, make sure that the
 	 * transaction goes to disk before returning to the user.
 	 */

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#1733977 — [PATCH 4.13 48/52] xfs: dont set v3 xflags for v2 inodes

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

commit dd60687ee541ca3f6df8758f38e6f22f57c42a37 upstream.

Reject attempts to set XFLAGS that correspond to di_flags2 inode flags
if the inode isn't a v3 inode, because di_flags2 only exists on v3.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c |   38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
@@ -931,16 +931,15 @@ xfs_ioc_fsgetxattr(
 	return 0;
 }
 
-STATIC void
-xfs_set_diflags(
+STATIC uint16_t
+xfs_flags2diflags(
 	struct xfs_inode	*ip,
 	unsigned int		xflags)
 {
-	unsigned int		di_flags;
-	uint64_t		di_flags2;
-
 	/* can't set PREALLOC this way, just preserve it */
-	di_flags = (ip->i_d.di_flags & XFS_DIFLAG_PREALLOC);
+	uint16_t		di_flags =
+		(ip->i_d.di_flags & XFS_DIFLAG_PREALLOC);
+
 	if (xflags & FS_XFLAG_IMMUTABLE)
 		di_flags |= XFS_DIFLAG_IMMUTABLE;
 	if (xflags & FS_XFLAG_APPEND)
@@ -970,19 +969,24 @@ xfs_set_diflags(
 		if (xflags & FS_XFLAG_EXTSIZE)
 			di_flags |= XFS_DIFLAG_EXTSIZE;
 	}
-	ip->i_d.di_flags = di_flags;
 
-	/* diflags2 only valid for v3 inodes. */
-	if (ip->i_d.di_version < 3)
-		return;
+	return di_flags;
+}
+
+STATIC uint64_t
+xfs_flags2diflags2(
+	struct xfs_inode	*ip,
+	unsigned int		xflags)
+{
+	uint64_t		di_flags2 =
+		(ip->i_d.di_flags2 & XFS_DIFLAG2_REFLINK);
 
-	di_flags2 = (ip->i_d.di_flags2 & XFS_DIFLAG2_REFLINK);
 	if (xflags & FS_XFLAG_DAX)
 		di_flags2 |= XFS_DIFLAG2_DAX;
 	if (xflags & FS_XFLAG_COWEXTSIZE)
 		di_flags2 |= XFS_DIFLAG2_COWEXTSIZE;
 
-	ip->i_d.di_flags2 = di_flags2;
+	return di_flags2;
 }
 
 STATIC void
@@ -1023,6 +1027,7 @@ xfs_ioctl_setattr_xflags(
 	struct fsxattr		*fa)
 {
 	struct xfs_mount	*mp = ip->i_mount;
+	uint64_t		di_flags2;
 
 	/* Can't change realtime flag if any extents are allocated. */
 	if ((ip->i_d.di_nextents || ip->i_delayed_blks) &&
@@ -1053,7 +1058,14 @@ xfs_ioctl_setattr_xflags(
 	    !capable(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	xfs_set_diflags(ip, fa->fsx_xflags);
+	/* diflags2 only valid for v3 inodes. */
+	di_flags2 = xfs_flags2diflags2(ip, fa->fsx_xflags);
+	if (di_flags2 && ip->i_d.di_version < 3)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ip->i_d.di_flags = xfs_flags2diflags(ip, fa->fsx_xflags);
+	ip->i_d.di_flags2 = di_flags2;
+
 	xfs_diflags_to_linux(ip);
 	xfs_trans_ichgtime(tp, ip, XFS_ICHGTIME_CHG);
 	xfs_trans_log_inode(tp, ip, XFS_ILOG_CORE);

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#1733979 — [PATCH 4.13 13/52] f2fs: check hot_data for roll-forward recovery

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

commit 125c9fb1ccb53eb2ea9380df40f3c743f3fb2fed upstream.

We need to check HOT_DATA to truncate any previous data block when doing
roll-forward recovery.

Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/f2fs/recovery.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static int check_index_in_prev_nodes(str
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Get the previous summary */
-	for (i = CURSEG_WARM_DATA; i <= CURSEG_COLD_DATA; i++) {
+	for (i = CURSEG_HOT_DATA; i <= CURSEG_COLD_DATA; i++) {
 		struct curseg_info *curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, i);
 		if (curseg->segno == segno) {
 			sum = curseg->sum_blk->entries[blkoff];

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#1733980 — [PATCH 4.13 33/52] xfs: handle -EFSCORRUPTED during head/tail verification

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>

commit a4c9b34d6a17081005ec459b57b8effc08f4c731 upstream.

Torn write and tail overwrite detection both trigger only on
-EFSBADCRC errors. While this is the most likely failure scenario
for each condition, -EFSCORRUPTED is still possible in certain cases
depending on what ends up on disk when a torn write or partial tail
overwrite occurs. For example, an invalid log record h_len can lead
to an -EFSCORRUPTED error when running the log recovery CRC pass.

Therefore, update log head and tail verification to trigger the
associated head/tail fixups in the event of -EFSCORRUPTED errors
along with -EFSBADCRC. Also, -EFSCORRUPTED can currently be returned
from xlog_do_recovery_pass() before rhead_blk is initialized if the
first record encountered happens to be corrupted. This leads to an
incorrect 'first_bad' return value. Initialize rhead_blk earlier in
the function to address that problem as well.

Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c |    7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c
@@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ xlog_verify_tail(
 	first_bad = 0;
 	error = xlog_do_recovery_pass(log, head_blk, *tail_blk,
 				      XLOG_RECOVER_CRCPASS, &first_bad);
-	while (error == -EFSBADCRC && first_bad) {
+	while ((error == -EFSBADCRC || error == -EFSCORRUPTED) && first_bad) {
 		int	tail_distance;
 
 		/*
@@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@ xlog_verify_head(
 	 */
 	error = xlog_do_recovery_pass(log, *head_blk, tmp_rhead_blk,
 				      XLOG_RECOVER_CRCPASS, &first_bad);
-	if (error == -EFSBADCRC) {
+	if ((error == -EFSBADCRC || error == -EFSCORRUPTED) && first_bad) {
 		/*
 		 * We've hit a potential torn write. Reset the error and warn
 		 * about it.
@@ -5257,7 +5257,7 @@ xlog_do_recovery_pass(
 	LIST_HEAD		(buffer_list);
 
 	ASSERT(head_blk != tail_blk);
-	rhead_blk = 0;
+	blk_no = rhead_blk = tail_blk;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < XLOG_RHASH_SIZE; i++)
 		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&rhash[i]);
@@ -5335,7 +5335,6 @@ xlog_do_recovery_pass(
 	}
 
 	memset(rhash, 0, sizeof(rhash));
-	blk_no = rhead_blk = tail_blk;
 	if (tail_blk > head_blk) {
 		/*
 		 * Perform recovery around the end of the physical log.

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#1733981 — [PATCH 4.13 39/52] xfs: ordered buffer log items are never formatted

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>

commit e9385cc6fb7edf23702de33a2dc82965d92d9392 upstream.

Ordered buffers pass through the logging infrastructure without ever
being written to the log. The way this works is that the ordered
buffer status is transferred to the log vector at commit time via
the ->iop_size() callback. In xlog_cil_insert_format_items(),
ordered log vectors bypass ->iop_format() processing altogether.

Therefore it is unnecessary for xfs_buf_item_format() to handle
ordered buffers. Remove the unnecessary logic and assert that an
ordered buffer never reaches this point.

Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c |   12 ++----------
 fs/xfs/xfs_trace.h    |    1 -
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c
@@ -323,6 +323,8 @@ xfs_buf_item_format(
 	ASSERT((bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_STALE) ||
 	       (xfs_blft_from_flags(&bip->__bli_format) > XFS_BLFT_UNKNOWN_BUF
 	        && xfs_blft_from_flags(&bip->__bli_format) < XFS_BLFT_MAX_BUF));
+	ASSERT(!(bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_ORDERED) ||
+	       (bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_STALE));
 
 
 	/*
@@ -347,16 +349,6 @@ xfs_buf_item_format(
 		bip->bli_flags &= ~XFS_BLI_INODE_BUF;
 	}
 
-	if ((bip->bli_flags & (XFS_BLI_ORDERED|XFS_BLI_STALE)) ==
-							XFS_BLI_ORDERED) {
-		/*
-		 * The buffer has been logged just to order it.  It is not being
-		 * included in the transaction commit, so don't format it.
-		 */
-		trace_xfs_buf_item_format_ordered(bip);
-		return;
-	}
-
 	for (i = 0; i < bip->bli_format_count; i++) {
 		xfs_buf_item_format_segment(bip, lv, &vecp, offset,
 					    &bip->bli_formats[i]);
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_trace.h
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_trace.h
@@ -517,7 +517,6 @@ DEFINE_BUF_ITEM_EVENT(xfs_buf_item_size)
 DEFINE_BUF_ITEM_EVENT(xfs_buf_item_size_ordered);
 DEFINE_BUF_ITEM_EVENT(xfs_buf_item_size_stale);
 DEFINE_BUF_ITEM_EVENT(xfs_buf_item_format);
-DEFINE_BUF_ITEM_EVENT(xfs_buf_item_format_ordered);
 DEFINE_BUF_ITEM_EVENT(xfs_buf_item_format_stale);
 DEFINE_BUF_ITEM_EVENT(xfs_buf_item_ordered);
 DEFINE_BUF_ITEM_EVENT(xfs_buf_item_pin);

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#1733983 — [PATCH 4.13 10/52] tcp: fix a request socket leak

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>


[ Upstream commit 1f3b359f1004bd34b7b0bad70b93e3c7af92a37b ]

While the cited commit fixed a possible deadlock, it added a leak
of the request socket, since reqsk_put() must be called if the BPF
filter decided the ACK packet must be dropped.

Fixes: d624d276d1dd ("tcp: fix possible deadlock in TCP stack vs BPF filter")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c |    6 +++---
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c |    6 +++---
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -1722,9 +1722,9 @@ process:
 		 */
 		sock_hold(sk);
 		refcounted = true;
-		if (tcp_filter(sk, skb))
-			goto discard_and_relse;
-		nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
+		nsk = NULL;
+		if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb))
+			nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
 		if (!nsk) {
 			reqsk_put(req);
 			goto discard_and_relse;
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -1456,9 +1456,9 @@ process:
 		}
 		sock_hold(sk);
 		refcounted = true;
-		if (tcp_filter(sk, skb))
-			goto discard_and_relse;
-		nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
+		nsk = NULL;
+		if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb))
+			nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
 		if (!nsk) {
 			reqsk_put(req);
 			goto discard_and_relse;

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#1733984 — [PATCH 4.13 34/52] xfs: stop searching for free slots in an inode chunk when there are none

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>

commit 2d32311cf19bfb8c1d2b4601974ddd951f9cfd0b upstream.

In a filesystem without finobt, the Space manager selects an AG to alloc a new
inode, where xfs_dialloc_ag_inobt() will search the AG for the free slot chunk.

When the new inode is in the same AG as its parent, the btree will be searched
starting on the parent's record, and then retried from the top if no slot is
available beyond the parent's record.

To exit this loop though, xfs_dialloc_ag_inobt() relies on the fact that the
btree must have a free slot available, once its callers relied on the
agi->freecount when deciding how/where to allocate this new inode.

In the case when the agi->freecount is corrupted, showing available inodes in an
AG, when in fact there is none, this becomes an infinite loop.

Add a way to stop the loop when a free slot is not found in the btree, making
the function to fall into the whole AG scan which will then, be able to detect
the corruption and shut the filesystem down.

As pointed by Brian, this might impact performance, giving the fact we
don't reset the search distance anymore when we reach the end of the
tree, giving it fewer tries before falling back to the whole AG search, but
it will only affect searches that start within 10 records to the end of the tree.

Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ialloc.c |   55 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ialloc.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ialloc.c
@@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ xfs_dialloc_ag_inobt(
 	int			error;
 	int			offset;
 	int			i, j;
+	int			searchdistance = 10;
 
 	pag = xfs_perag_get(mp, agno);
 
@@ -1159,7 +1160,6 @@ xfs_dialloc_ag_inobt(
 	if (pagno == agno) {
 		int		doneleft;	/* done, to the left */
 		int		doneright;	/* done, to the right */
-		int		searchdistance = 10;
 
 		error = xfs_inobt_lookup(cur, pagino, XFS_LOOKUP_LE, &i);
 		if (error)
@@ -1220,21 +1220,9 @@ xfs_dialloc_ag_inobt(
 		/*
 		 * Loop until we find an inode chunk with a free inode.
 		 */
-		while (!doneleft || !doneright) {
+		while (--searchdistance > 0 && (!doneleft || !doneright)) {
 			int	useleft;  /* using left inode chunk this time */
 
-			if (!--searchdistance) {
-				/*
-				 * Not in range - save last search
-				 * location and allocate a new inode
-				 */
-				xfs_btree_del_cursor(tcur, XFS_BTREE_NOERROR);
-				pag->pagl_leftrec = trec.ir_startino;
-				pag->pagl_rightrec = rec.ir_startino;
-				pag->pagl_pagino = pagino;
-				goto newino;
-			}
-
 			/* figure out the closer block if both are valid. */
 			if (!doneleft && !doneright) {
 				useleft = pagino -
@@ -1278,26 +1266,37 @@ xfs_dialloc_ag_inobt(
 				goto error1;
 		}
 
-		/*
-		 * We've reached the end of the btree. because
-		 * we are only searching a small chunk of the
-		 * btree each search, there is obviously free
-		 * inodes closer to the parent inode than we
-		 * are now. restart the search again.
-		 */
-		pag->pagl_pagino = NULLAGINO;
-		pag->pagl_leftrec = NULLAGINO;
-		pag->pagl_rightrec = NULLAGINO;
-		xfs_btree_del_cursor(tcur, XFS_BTREE_NOERROR);
-		xfs_btree_del_cursor(cur, XFS_BTREE_NOERROR);
-		goto restart_pagno;
+		if (searchdistance <= 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Not in range - save last search
+			 * location and allocate a new inode
+			 */
+			xfs_btree_del_cursor(tcur, XFS_BTREE_NOERROR);
+			pag->pagl_leftrec = trec.ir_startino;
+			pag->pagl_rightrec = rec.ir_startino;
+			pag->pagl_pagino = pagino;
+
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * We've reached the end of the btree. because
+			 * we are only searching a small chunk of the
+			 * btree each search, there is obviously free
+			 * inodes closer to the parent inode than we
+			 * are now. restart the search again.
+			 */
+			pag->pagl_pagino = NULLAGINO;
+			pag->pagl_leftrec = NULLAGINO;
+			pag->pagl_rightrec = NULLAGINO;
+			xfs_btree_del_cursor(tcur, XFS_BTREE_NOERROR);
+			xfs_btree_del_cursor(cur, XFS_BTREE_NOERROR);
+			goto restart_pagno;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/*
 	 * In a different AG from the parent.
 	 * See if the most recently allocated block has any free.
 	 */
-newino:
 	if (agi->agi_newino != cpu_to_be32(NULLAGINO)) {
 		error = xfs_inobt_lookup(cur, be32_to_cpu(agi->agi_newino),
 					 XFS_LOOKUP_EQ, &i);

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#1733985 — [PATCH 4.13 09/52] sctp: fix missing wake ups in some situations

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>


[ Upstream commit 7906b00f5cd1cd484fced7fcda892176e3202c8a ]

Commit fb586f25300f ("sctp: delay calls to sk_data_ready() as much as
possible") minimized the number of wake ups that are triggered in case
the association receives a packet with multiple data chunks on it and/or
when io_events are enabled and then commit 0970f5b36659 ("sctp: signal
sk_data_ready earlier on data chunks reception") moved the wake up to as
soon as possible. It thus relies on the state machine running later to
clean the flag that the event was already generated.

The issue is that there are 2 call paths that calls
sctp_ulpq_tail_event() outside of the state machine, causing the flag to
linger and possibly omitting a needed wake up in the sequence.

One of the call paths is when enabling SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENTS via
setsockopt(SCTP_EVENTS), as noticed by Harald Welte. The other is when
partial reliability triggers removal of chunks from the send queue when
the application calls sendmsg().

This commit fixes it by not setting the flag in case the socket is not
owned by the user, as it won't be cleaned later. This works for
user-initiated calls and also for rx path processing.

Fixes: fb586f25300f ("sctp: delay calls to sk_data_ready() as much as possible")
Reported-by: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sctp/ulpqueue.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/sctp/ulpqueue.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ulpqueue.c
@@ -265,7 +265,8 @@ int sctp_ulpq_tail_event(struct sctp_ulp
 		sctp_ulpq_clear_pd(ulpq);
 
 	if (queue == &sk->sk_receive_queue && !sp->data_ready_signalled) {
-		sp->data_ready_signalled = 1;
+		if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
+			sp->data_ready_signalled = 1;
 		sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
 	}
 	return 1;

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#1733986 — [PATCH 4.13 42/52] xfs: skip bmbt block ino validation during owner change

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>

commit 99c794c639a65cc7b74f30a674048fd100fe9ac8 upstream.

Extent swap uses xfs_btree_visit_blocks() to fix up bmbt block
owners on v5 (!rmapbt) filesystems. The bmbt scan uses
xfs_btree_lookup_get_block() to read bmbt blocks which verifies the
current owner of the block against the parent inode of the bmbt.
This works during extent swap because the bmbt owners are updated to
the opposite inode number before the inode extent forks are swapped.

The modified bmbt blocks are marked as ordered buffers which allows
everything to commit in a single transaction. If the transaction
commits to the log and the system crashes such that recovery of the
extent swap is required, log recovery restarts the bmbt scan to fix
up any bmbt blocks that may have not been written back before the
crash. The log recovery bmbt scan occurs after the inode forks have
been swapped, however. This causes the bmbt block owner verification
to fail, leads to log recovery failure and requires xfs_repair to
zap the log to recover.

Define a new invalid inode owner flag to inform the btree block
lookup mechanism that the current inode may be invalid with respect
to the current owner of the bmbt block. Set this flag on the cursor
used for change owner scans to allow this operation to work at
runtime and during log recovery.

Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Fixes: bb3be7e7c ("xfs: check for bogus values in btree block headers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap_btree.c |    1 +
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c      |    1 +
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.h      |    3 ++-
 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap_btree.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap_btree.c
@@ -858,6 +858,7 @@ xfs_bmbt_change_owner(
 	cur = xfs_bmbt_init_cursor(ip->i_mount, tp, ip, whichfork);
 	if (!cur)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	cur->bc_private.b.flags |= XFS_BTCUR_BPRV_INVALID_OWNER;
 
 	error = xfs_btree_change_owner(cur, new_owner, buffer_list);
 	xfs_btree_del_cursor(cur, error ? XFS_BTREE_ERROR : XFS_BTREE_NOERROR);
--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c
@@ -1791,6 +1791,7 @@ xfs_btree_lookup_get_block(
 
 	/* Check the inode owner since the verifiers don't. */
 	if (xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&cur->bc_mp->m_sb) &&
+	    !(cur->bc_private.b.flags & XFS_BTCUR_BPRV_INVALID_OWNER) &&
 	    (cur->bc_flags & XFS_BTREE_LONG_PTRS) &&
 	    be64_to_cpu((*blkp)->bb_u.l.bb_owner) !=
 			cur->bc_private.b.ip->i_ino)
--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.h
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.h
@@ -233,7 +233,8 @@ typedef struct xfs_btree_cur
 			short		forksize;	/* fork's inode space */
 			char		whichfork;	/* data or attr fork */
 			char		flags;		/* flags */
-#define	XFS_BTCUR_BPRV_WASDEL	1			/* was delayed */
+#define	XFS_BTCUR_BPRV_WASDEL		(1<<0)		/* was delayed */
+#define	XFS_BTCUR_BPRV_INVALID_OWNER	(1<<1)		/* for ext swap */
 		} b;
 	}		bc_private;	/* per-btree type data */
 } xfs_btree_cur_t;

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#1733987 — [PATCH 4.13 51/52] md/raid1/10: reset bio allocated from mempool

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>

commit 208410b546207cfc4c832635fa46419cfa86b4cd upstream.

Data allocated from mempool doesn't always get initialized, this happens when
the data is reused instead of fresh allocation. In the raid1/10 case, we must
reinitialize the bios.

Reported-by: Jonathan G. Underwood <jonathan.underwood@gmail.com>
Fixes: f0250618361d(md: raid10: don't use bio's vec table to manage resync pages)
Fixes: 98d30c5812c3(md: raid1: don't use bio's vec table to manage resync pages)
Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/md/raid1.c  |   19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 drivers/md/raid10.c |   35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/md/raid1.c
+++ b/drivers/md/raid1.c
@@ -2564,6 +2564,23 @@ static int init_resync(struct r1conf *co
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static struct r1bio *raid1_alloc_init_r1buf(struct r1conf *conf)
+{
+	struct r1bio *r1bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r1buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+	struct resync_pages *rps;
+	struct bio *bio;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = conf->poolinfo->raid_disks; i--; ) {
+		bio = r1bio->bios[i];
+		rps = bio->bi_private;
+		bio_reset(bio);
+		bio->bi_private = rps;
+	}
+	r1bio->master_bio = NULL;
+	return r1bio;
+}
+
 /*
  * perform a "sync" on one "block"
  *
@@ -2649,7 +2666,7 @@ static sector_t raid1_sync_request(struc
 
 	bitmap_cond_end_sync(mddev->bitmap, sector_nr,
 		mddev_is_clustered(mddev) && (sector_nr + 2 * RESYNC_SECTORS > conf->cluster_sync_high));
-	r1_bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r1buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+	r1_bio = raid1_alloc_init_r1buf(conf);
 
 	raise_barrier(conf, sector_nr);
 
--- a/drivers/md/raid10.c
+++ b/drivers/md/raid10.c
@@ -2798,6 +2798,35 @@ static int init_resync(struct r10conf *c
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static struct r10bio *raid10_alloc_init_r10buf(struct r10conf *conf)
+{
+	struct r10bio *r10bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r10buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+	struct rsync_pages *rp;
+	struct bio *bio;
+	int nalloc;
+	int i;
+
+	if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_SYNC, &conf->mddev->recovery) ||
+	    test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RESHAPE, &conf->mddev->recovery))
+		nalloc = conf->copies; /* resync */
+	else
+		nalloc = 2; /* recovery */
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nalloc; i++) {
+		bio = r10bio->devs[i].bio;
+		rp = bio->bi_private;
+		bio_reset(bio);
+		bio->bi_private = rp;
+		bio = r10bio->devs[i].repl_bio;
+		if (bio) {
+			rp = bio->bi_private;
+			bio_reset(bio);
+			bio->bi_private = rp;
+		}
+	}
+	return r10bio;
+}
+
 /*
  * perform a "sync" on one "block"
  *
@@ -3027,7 +3056,7 @@ static sector_t raid10_sync_request(stru
 				atomic_inc(&mreplace->nr_pending);
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 
-			r10_bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r10buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+			r10_bio = raid10_alloc_init_r10buf(conf);
 			r10_bio->state = 0;
 			raise_barrier(conf, rb2 != NULL);
 			atomic_set(&r10_bio->remaining, 0);
@@ -3236,7 +3265,7 @@ static sector_t raid10_sync_request(stru
 		}
 		if (sync_blocks < max_sync)
 			max_sync = sync_blocks;
-		r10_bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r10buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+		r10_bio = raid10_alloc_init_r10buf(conf);
 		r10_bio->state = 0;
 
 		r10_bio->mddev = mddev;
@@ -4360,7 +4389,7 @@ static sector_t reshape_request(struct m
 
 read_more:
 	/* Now schedule reads for blocks from sector_nr to last */
-	r10_bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r10buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+	r10_bio = raid10_alloc_init_r10buf(conf);
 	r10_bio->state = 0;
 	raise_barrier(conf, sectors_done != 0);
 	atomic_set(&r10_bio->remaining, 0);

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#1733988 — [PATCH 4.13 36/52] xfs: check for race with xfs_reclaim_inode() in xfs_ifree_cluster()

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>

commit f2e9ad212def50bcf4c098c6288779dd97fff0f0 upstream.

After xfs_ifree_cluster() finds an inode in the radix tree and verifies
that the inode number is what it expected, xfs_reclaim_inode() can swoop
in and free it. xfs_ifree_cluster() will then happily continue working
on the freed inode. Most importantly, it will mark the inode stale,
which will probably be overwritten when the inode slab object is
reallocated, but if it has already been reallocated then we can end up
with an inode spuriously marked stale.

In 8a17d7ddedb4 ("xfs: mark reclaimed inodes invalid earlier") we added
a second check to xfs_iflush_cluster() to detect this race, but the
similar RCU lookup in xfs_ifree_cluster() needs the same treatment.

Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c |   10 +++++-----
 fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c  |   23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c
@@ -1124,11 +1124,11 @@ reclaim:
 	 * Because we use RCU freeing we need to ensure the inode always appears
 	 * to be reclaimed with an invalid inode number when in the free state.
 	 * We do this as early as possible under the ILOCK so that
-	 * xfs_iflush_cluster() can be guaranteed to detect races with us here.
-	 * By doing this, we guarantee that once xfs_iflush_cluster has locked
-	 * XFS_ILOCK that it will see either a valid, flushable inode that will
-	 * serialise correctly, or it will see a clean (and invalid) inode that
-	 * it can skip.
+	 * xfs_iflush_cluster() and xfs_ifree_cluster() can be guaranteed to
+	 * detect races with us here. By doing this, we guarantee that once
+	 * xfs_iflush_cluster() or xfs_ifree_cluster() has locked XFS_ILOCK that
+	 * it will see either a valid inode that will serialise correctly, or it
+	 * will see an invalid inode that it can skip.
 	 */
 	spin_lock(&ip->i_flags_lock);
 	ip->i_flags = XFS_IRECLAIM;
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c
@@ -2359,11 +2359,24 @@ retry:
 			 * already marked stale. If we can't lock it, back off
 			 * and retry.
 			 */
-			if (ip != free_ip &&
-			    !xfs_ilock_nowait(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL)) {
-				rcu_read_unlock();
-				delay(1);
-				goto retry;
+			if (ip != free_ip) {
+				if (!xfs_ilock_nowait(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL)) {
+					rcu_read_unlock();
+					delay(1);
+					goto retry;
+				}
+
+				/*
+				 * Check the inode number again in case we're
+				 * racing with freeing in xfs_reclaim_inode().
+				 * See the comments in that function for more
+				 * information as to why the initial check is
+				 * not sufficient.
+				 */
+				if (ip->i_ino != inum + i) {
+					xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL);
+					continue;
+				}
 			}
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 

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#1733989 — [PATCH 4.13 25/52] libnvdimm: fix integer overflow static analysis warning

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>

commit 58738c495e15badd2015e19ff41f1f1ed55200bc upstream.

Dan reports:
    The patch 62232e45f4a2: "libnvdimm: control (ioctl) messages for
    nvdimm_bus and nvdimm devices" from Jun 8, 2015, leads to the
    following static checker warning:

            drivers/nvdimm/bus.c:1018 __nd_ioctl()
            warn: integer overflows 'buf_len'

    From a casual review, this seems like it might be a real bug.  On
    the first iteration we load some data into in_env[].  On the second
    iteration we read a use controlled "in_size" from nd_cmd_in_size().
    It can go up to UINT_MAX - 1.  A high number means we will fill the
    whole in_env[] buffer.  But we potentially keep looping and adding
    more to in_len so now it can be any value.

    It simple enough to change, but it feels weird that we keep looping
    even though in_env is totally full.  Shouldn't we just return an
    error if we don't have space for desc->in_num.

We keep looping because the size of the total input is allowed to be
bigger than the 'envelope' which is a subset of the payload that tells
us how much data to expect. For safety explicitly check that buf_len
does not overflow which is what the checker flagged.

Fixes: 62232e45f4a2: "libnvdimm: control (ioctl) messages for nvdimm_bus..."
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/nvdimm/bus.c |   17 +++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c
+++ b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c
@@ -905,19 +905,20 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus
 		int read_only, unsigned int ioctl_cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
 	struct nvdimm_bus_descriptor *nd_desc = nvdimm_bus->nd_desc;
-	size_t buf_len = 0, in_len = 0, out_len = 0;
 	static char out_env[ND_CMD_MAX_ENVELOPE];
 	static char in_env[ND_CMD_MAX_ENVELOPE];
 	const struct nd_cmd_desc *desc = NULL;
 	unsigned int cmd = _IOC_NR(ioctl_cmd);
-	unsigned int func = cmd;
-	void __user *p = (void __user *) arg;
 	struct device *dev = &nvdimm_bus->dev;
-	struct nd_cmd_pkg pkg;
+	void __user *p = (void __user *) arg;
 	const char *cmd_name, *dimm_name;
+	u32 in_len = 0, out_len = 0;
+	unsigned int func = cmd;
 	unsigned long cmd_mask;
-	void *buf;
+	struct nd_cmd_pkg pkg;
 	int rc, i, cmd_rc;
+	u64 buf_len = 0;
+	void *buf;
 
 	if (nvdimm) {
 		desc = nd_cmd_dimm_desc(cmd);
@@ -977,7 +978,7 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus
 
 	if (cmd == ND_CMD_CALL) {
 		func = pkg.nd_command;
-		dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s, idx: %llu, in: %zu, out: %zu, len %zu\n",
+		dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s, idx: %llu, in: %u, out: %u, len %llu\n",
 				__func__, dimm_name, pkg.nd_command,
 				in_len, out_len, buf_len);
 
@@ -1007,9 +1008,9 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus
 		out_len += out_size;
 	}
 
-	buf_len = out_len + in_len;
+	buf_len = (u64) out_len + (u64) in_len;
 	if (buf_len > ND_IOCTL_MAX_BUFLEN) {
-		dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s cmd: %s buf_len: %zu > %d\n", __func__,
+		dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s cmd: %s buf_len: %llu > %d\n", __func__,
 				dimm_name, cmd_name, buf_len,
 				ND_IOCTL_MAX_BUFLEN);
 		return -EINVAL;

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#1733990 — [PATCH 4.13 32/52] xfs: fix log recovery corruption error due to tail overwrite

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>

commit 4a4f66eac4681378996a1837ad1ffec3a2e2981f upstream.

If we consider the case where the tail (T) of the log is pinned long
enough for the head (H) to push and block behind the tail, we can
end up blocked in the following state without enough free space (f)
in the log to satisfy a transaction reservation:

	0	phys. log	N
	[-------HffT---H'--T'---]

The last good record in the log (before H) refers to T. The tail
eventually pushes forward (T') leaving more free space in the log
for writes to H. At this point, suppose space frees up in the log
for the maximum of 8 in-core log buffers to start flushing out to
the log. If this pushes the head from H to H', these next writes
overwrite the previous tail T. This is safe because the items logged
from T to T' have been written back and removed from the AIL.

If the next log writes (H -> H') happen to fail and result in
partial records in the log, the filesystem shuts down having
overwritten T with invalid data. Log recovery correctly locates H on
the subsequent mount, but H still refers to the now corrupted tail
T. This results in log corruption errors and recovery failure.

Since the tail overwrite results from otherwise correct runtime
behavior, it is up to log recovery to try and deal with this
situation. Update log recovery tail verification to run a CRC pass
from the first record past the tail to the head. This facilitates
error detection at T and moves the recovery tail to the first good
record past H' (similar to truncating the head on torn write
detection). If corruption is detected beyond the range possibly
affected by the max number of iclogs, the log is legitimately
corrupted and log recovery failure is expected.

Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c |  108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c
@@ -1029,61 +1029,106 @@ out_error:
 }
 
 /*
- * Check the log tail for torn writes. This is required when torn writes are
- * detected at the head and the head had to be walked back to a previous record.
- * The tail of the previous record must now be verified to ensure the torn
- * writes didn't corrupt the previous tail.
+ * Calculate distance from head to tail (i.e., unused space in the log).
+ */
+static inline int
+xlog_tail_distance(
+	struct xlog	*log,
+	xfs_daddr_t	head_blk,
+	xfs_daddr_t	tail_blk)
+{
+	if (head_blk < tail_blk)
+		return tail_blk - head_blk;
+
+	return tail_blk + (log->l_logBBsize - head_blk);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the log tail. This is particularly important when torn or incomplete
+ * writes have been detected near the front of the log and the head has been
+ * walked back accordingly.
+ *
+ * We also have to handle the case where the tail was pinned and the head
+ * blocked behind the tail right before a crash. If the tail had been pushed
+ * immediately prior to the crash and the subsequent checkpoint was only
+ * partially written, it's possible it overwrote the last referenced tail in the
+ * log with garbage. This is not a coherency problem because the tail must have
+ * been pushed before it can be overwritten, but appears as log corruption to
+ * recovery because we have no way to know the tail was updated if the
+ * subsequent checkpoint didn't write successfully.
  *
- * Return an error if CRC verification fails as recovery cannot proceed.
+ * Therefore, CRC check the log from tail to head. If a failure occurs and the
+ * offending record is within max iclog bufs from the head, walk the tail
+ * forward and retry until a valid tail is found or corruption is detected out
+ * of the range of a possible overwrite.
  */
 STATIC int
 xlog_verify_tail(
 	struct xlog		*log,
 	xfs_daddr_t		head_blk,
-	xfs_daddr_t		tail_blk)
+	xfs_daddr_t		*tail_blk,
+	int			hsize)
 {
 	struct xlog_rec_header	*thead;
 	struct xfs_buf		*bp;
 	xfs_daddr_t		first_bad;
-	int			count;
 	int			error = 0;
 	bool			wrapped;
-	xfs_daddr_t		tmp_head;
+	xfs_daddr_t		tmp_tail;
+	xfs_daddr_t		orig_tail = *tail_blk;
 
 	bp = xlog_get_bp(log, 1);
 	if (!bp)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	/*
-	 * Seek XLOG_MAX_ICLOGS + 1 records past the current tail record to get
-	 * a temporary head block that points after the last possible
-	 * concurrently written record of the tail.
+	 * Make sure the tail points to a record (returns positive count on
+	 * success).
 	 */
-	count = xlog_seek_logrec_hdr(log, head_blk, tail_blk,
-				     XLOG_MAX_ICLOGS + 1, bp, &tmp_head, &thead,
-				     &wrapped);
-	if (count < 0) {
-		error = count;
+	error = xlog_seek_logrec_hdr(log, head_blk, *tail_blk, 1, bp,
+			&tmp_tail, &thead, &wrapped);
+	if (error < 0)
 		goto out;
-	}
+	if (*tail_blk != tmp_tail)
+		*tail_blk = tmp_tail;
 
 	/*
-	 * If the call above didn't find XLOG_MAX_ICLOGS + 1 records, we ran
-	 * into the actual log head. tmp_head points to the start of the record
-	 * so update it to the actual head block.
+	 * Run a CRC check from the tail to the head. We can't just check
+	 * MAX_ICLOGS records past the tail because the tail may point to stale
+	 * blocks cleared during the search for the head/tail. These blocks are
+	 * overwritten with zero-length records and thus record count is not a
+	 * reliable indicator of the iclog state before a crash.
 	 */
-	if (count < XLOG_MAX_ICLOGS + 1)
-		tmp_head = head_blk;
-
-	/*
-	 * We now have a tail and temporary head block that covers at least
-	 * XLOG_MAX_ICLOGS records from the tail. We need to verify that these
-	 * records were completely written. Run a CRC verification pass from
-	 * tail to head and return the result.
-	 */
-	error = xlog_do_recovery_pass(log, tmp_head, tail_blk,
+	first_bad = 0;
+	error = xlog_do_recovery_pass(log, head_blk, *tail_blk,
 				      XLOG_RECOVER_CRCPASS, &first_bad);
+	while (error == -EFSBADCRC && first_bad) {
+		int	tail_distance;
+
+		/*
+		 * Is corruption within range of the head? If so, retry from
+		 * the next record. Otherwise return an error.
+		 */
+		tail_distance = xlog_tail_distance(log, head_blk, first_bad);
+		if (tail_distance > BTOBB(XLOG_MAX_ICLOGS * hsize))
+			break;
+
+		/* skip to the next record; returns positive count on success */
+		error = xlog_seek_logrec_hdr(log, head_blk, first_bad, 2, bp,
+				&tmp_tail, &thead, &wrapped);
+		if (error < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		*tail_blk = tmp_tail;
+		first_bad = 0;
+		error = xlog_do_recovery_pass(log, head_blk, *tail_blk,
+					      XLOG_RECOVER_CRCPASS, &first_bad);
+	}
 
+	if (!error && *tail_blk != orig_tail)
+		xfs_warn(log->l_mp,
+		"Tail block (0x%llx) overwrite detected. Updated to 0x%llx",
+			 orig_tail, *tail_blk);
 out:
 	xlog_put_bp(bp);
 	return error;
@@ -1187,7 +1232,8 @@ xlog_verify_head(
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	return xlog_verify_tail(log, *head_blk, *tail_blk);
+	return xlog_verify_tail(log, *head_blk, tail_blk,
+				be32_to_cpu((*rhead)->h_size));
 }
 
 /*

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#1733991 — [PATCH 4.13 29/52] xfs: Properly retry failed inode items in case of error during buffer writeback

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>

commit d3a304b6292168b83b45d624784f973fdc1ca674 upstream.

When a buffer has been failed during writeback, the inode items into it
are kept flush locked, and are never resubmitted due the flush lock, so,
if any buffer fails to be written, the items in AIL are never written to
disk and never unlocked.

This causes unmount operation to hang due these items flush locked in AIL,
but this also causes the items in AIL to never be written back, even when
the IO device comes back to normal.

I've been testing this patch with a DM-thin device, creating a
filesystem larger than the real device.

When writing enough data to fill the DM-thin device, XFS receives ENOSPC
errors from the device, and keep spinning on xfsaild (when 'retry
forever' configuration is set).

At this point, the filesystem can not be unmounted because of the flush locked
items in AIL, but worse, the items in AIL are never retried at all
(once xfs_inode_item_push() will skip the items that are flush locked),
even if the underlying DM-thin device is expanded to the proper size.

This patch fixes both cases, retrying any item that has been failed
previously, using the infra-structure provided by the previous patch.

Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c   |   28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.h   |    3 +++
 fs/xfs/xfs_inode_item.c |   47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h      |    1 +
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans_ail.c  |    3 ++-
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans_priv.h |   31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c
@@ -1234,3 +1234,31 @@ xfs_buf_iodone(
 	xfs_trans_ail_delete(ailp, lip, SHUTDOWN_CORRUPT_INCORE);
 	xfs_buf_item_free(BUF_ITEM(lip));
 }
+
+/*
+ * Requeue a failed buffer for writeback
+ *
+ * Return true if the buffer has been re-queued properly, false otherwise
+ */
+bool
+xfs_buf_resubmit_failed_buffers(
+	struct xfs_buf		*bp,
+	struct xfs_log_item	*lip,
+	struct list_head	*buffer_list)
+{
+	struct xfs_log_item	*next;
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear XFS_LI_FAILED flag from all items before resubmit
+	 *
+	 * XFS_LI_FAILED set/clear is protected by xa_lock, caller  this
+	 * function already have it acquired
+	 */
+	for (; lip; lip = next) {
+		next = lip->li_bio_list;
+		xfs_clear_li_failed(lip);
+	}
+
+	/* Add this buffer back to the delayed write list */
+	return xfs_buf_delwri_queue(bp, buffer_list);
+}
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.h
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.h
@@ -70,6 +70,9 @@ void	xfs_buf_attach_iodone(struct xfs_bu
 			      xfs_log_item_t *);
 void	xfs_buf_iodone_callbacks(struct xfs_buf *);
 void	xfs_buf_iodone(struct xfs_buf *, struct xfs_log_item *);
+bool	xfs_buf_resubmit_failed_buffers(struct xfs_buf *,
+					struct xfs_log_item *,
+					struct list_head *);
 
 extern kmem_zone_t	*xfs_buf_item_zone;
 
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_inode_item.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_inode_item.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include "xfs_error.h"
 #include "xfs_trace.h"
 #include "xfs_trans_priv.h"
+#include "xfs_buf_item.h"
 #include "xfs_log.h"
 
 
@@ -475,6 +476,23 @@ xfs_inode_item_unpin(
 		wake_up_bit(&ip->i_flags, __XFS_IPINNED_BIT);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Callback used to mark a buffer with XFS_LI_FAILED when items in the buffer
+ * have been failed during writeback
+ *
+ * This informs the AIL that the inode is already flush locked on the next push,
+ * and acquires a hold on the buffer to ensure that it isn't reclaimed before
+ * dirty data makes it to disk.
+ */
+STATIC void
+xfs_inode_item_error(
+	struct xfs_log_item	*lip,
+	struct xfs_buf		*bp)
+{
+	ASSERT(xfs_isiflocked(INODE_ITEM(lip)->ili_inode));
+	xfs_set_li_failed(lip, bp);
+}
+
 STATIC uint
 xfs_inode_item_push(
 	struct xfs_log_item	*lip,
@@ -484,13 +502,28 @@ xfs_inode_item_push(
 {
 	struct xfs_inode_log_item *iip = INODE_ITEM(lip);
 	struct xfs_inode	*ip = iip->ili_inode;
-	struct xfs_buf		*bp = NULL;
+	struct xfs_buf		*bp = lip->li_buf;
 	uint			rval = XFS_ITEM_SUCCESS;
 	int			error;
 
 	if (xfs_ipincount(ip) > 0)
 		return XFS_ITEM_PINNED;
 
+	/*
+	 * The buffer containing this item failed to be written back
+	 * previously. Resubmit the buffer for IO.
+	 */
+	if (lip->li_flags & XFS_LI_FAILED) {
+		if (!xfs_buf_trylock(bp))
+			return XFS_ITEM_LOCKED;
+
+		if (!xfs_buf_resubmit_failed_buffers(bp, lip, buffer_list))
+			rval = XFS_ITEM_FLUSHING;
+
+		xfs_buf_unlock(bp);
+		return rval;
+	}
+
 	if (!xfs_ilock_nowait(ip, XFS_ILOCK_SHARED))
 		return XFS_ITEM_LOCKED;
 
@@ -622,7 +655,8 @@ static const struct xfs_item_ops xfs_ino
 	.iop_unlock	= xfs_inode_item_unlock,
 	.iop_committed	= xfs_inode_item_committed,
 	.iop_push	= xfs_inode_item_push,
-	.iop_committing = xfs_inode_item_committing
+	.iop_committing = xfs_inode_item_committing,
+	.iop_error	= xfs_inode_item_error
 };
 
 
@@ -710,7 +744,8 @@ xfs_iflush_done(
 		 * the AIL lock.
 		 */
 		iip = INODE_ITEM(blip);
-		if (iip->ili_logged && blip->li_lsn == iip->ili_flush_lsn)
+		if ((iip->ili_logged && blip->li_lsn == iip->ili_flush_lsn) ||
+		    lip->li_flags & XFS_LI_FAILED)
 			need_ail++;
 
 		blip = next;
@@ -718,7 +753,8 @@ xfs_iflush_done(
 
 	/* make sure we capture the state of the initial inode. */
 	iip = INODE_ITEM(lip);
-	if (iip->ili_logged && lip->li_lsn == iip->ili_flush_lsn)
+	if ((iip->ili_logged && lip->li_lsn == iip->ili_flush_lsn) ||
+	    lip->li_flags & XFS_LI_FAILED)
 		need_ail++;
 
 	/*
@@ -739,6 +775,9 @@ xfs_iflush_done(
 			if (INODE_ITEM(blip)->ili_logged &&
 			    blip->li_lsn == INODE_ITEM(blip)->ili_flush_lsn)
 				mlip_changed |= xfs_ail_delete_one(ailp, blip);
+			else {
+				xfs_clear_li_failed(blip);
+			}
 		}
 
 		if (mlip_changed) {
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef struct xfs_log_item {
 	struct xfs_ail			*li_ailp;	/* ptr to AIL */
 	uint				li_type;	/* item type */
 	uint				li_flags;	/* misc flags */
+	struct xfs_buf			*li_buf;	/* real buffer pointer */
 	struct xfs_log_item		*li_bio_list;	/* buffer item list */
 	void				(*li_cb)(struct xfs_buf *,
 						 struct xfs_log_item *);
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_trans_ail.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_trans_ail.c
@@ -687,12 +687,13 @@ xfs_trans_ail_update_bulk(
 bool
 xfs_ail_delete_one(
 	struct xfs_ail		*ailp,
-	struct xfs_log_item 	*lip)
+	struct xfs_log_item	*lip)
 {
 	struct xfs_log_item	*mlip = xfs_ail_min(ailp);
 
 	trace_xfs_ail_delete(lip, mlip->li_lsn, lip->li_lsn);
 	xfs_ail_delete(ailp, lip);
+	xfs_clear_li_failed(lip);
 	lip->li_flags &= ~XFS_LI_IN_AIL;
 	lip->li_lsn = 0;
 
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_trans_priv.h
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_trans_priv.h
@@ -164,4 +164,35 @@ xfs_trans_ail_copy_lsn(
 	*dst = *src;
 }
 #endif
+
+static inline void
+xfs_clear_li_failed(
+	struct xfs_log_item	*lip)
+{
+	struct xfs_buf	*bp = lip->li_buf;
+
+	ASSERT(lip->li_flags & XFS_LI_IN_AIL);
+	lockdep_assert_held(&lip->li_ailp->xa_lock);
+
+	if (lip->li_flags & XFS_LI_FAILED) {
+		lip->li_flags &= ~XFS_LI_FAILED;
+		lip->li_buf = NULL;
+		xfs_buf_rele(bp);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void
+xfs_set_li_failed(
+	struct xfs_log_item	*lip,
+	struct xfs_buf		*bp)
+{
+	lockdep_assert_held(&lip->li_ailp->xa_lock);
+
+	if (!(lip->li_flags & XFS_LI_FAILED)) {
+		xfs_buf_hold(bp);
+		lip->li_flags |= XFS_LI_FAILED;
+		lip->li_buf = bp;
+	}
+}
+
 #endif	/* __XFS_TRANS_PRIV_H__ */

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#1733992 — [PATCH 4.13 03/52] gianfar: Fix Tx flow control deactivation

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Claudiu Manoil <claudiu.manoil@nxp.com>


[ Upstream commit 5d621672bc1a1e5090c1ac5432a18c79e0e13e03 ]

The wrong register is checked for the Tx flow control bit,
it should have been maccfg1 not maccfg2.
This went unnoticed for so long probably because the impact is
hardly visible, not to mention the tangled code from adjust_link().
First, link flow control (i.e. handling of Rx/Tx link level pause frames)
is disabled by default (needs to be enabled via 'ethtool -A').
Secondly, maccfg2 always returns 0 for tx_flow_oldval (except for a few
old boards), which results in Tx flow control remaining always on
once activated.

Fixes: 45b679c9a3ccd9e34f28e6ec677b812a860eb8eb ("gianfar: Implement PAUSE frame generation support")
Signed-off-by: Claudiu Manoil <claudiu.manoil@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.c
@@ -3687,7 +3687,7 @@ static noinline void gfar_update_link_st
 		u32 tempval1 = gfar_read(&regs->maccfg1);
 		u32 tempval = gfar_read(&regs->maccfg2);
 		u32 ecntrl = gfar_read(&regs->ecntrl);
-		u32 tx_flow_oldval = (tempval & MACCFG1_TX_FLOW);
+		u32 tx_flow_oldval = (tempval1 & MACCFG1_TX_FLOW);
 
 		if (phydev->duplex != priv->oldduplex) {
 			if (!(phydev->duplex))

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