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Groups > linux.kernel > #1722244 > unrolled thread

tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection

Started byMike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
First post2017-08-29 11:00 +0200
Last post2017-08-31 21:30 +0200
Articles 9 on this page of 29 — 2 participants

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Contents

  tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement  fast refcount overflow protection Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> - 2017-08-29 11:00 +0200
    Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement  fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-08-29 18:00 +0200
      Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm:  Implement fast refcount overflow protection Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> - 2017-08-29 20:20 +0200
        Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement  fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-08-29 20:50 +0200
          Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm:  Implement fast refcount overflow protection Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> - 2017-08-30 07:10 +0200
            Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement  fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-08-30 18:40 +0200
              Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm:  Implement fast refcount overflow protection Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> - 2017-08-30 19:20 +0200
                Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement  fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-08-30 19:40 +0200
                  Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm:  Implement fast refcount overflow protection Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> - 2017-08-30 20:00 +0200
                    Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement  fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-08-30 21:20 +0200
                      Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement  fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-08-30 21:50 +0200
                        Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm:  Implement fast refcount overflow protection Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> - 2017-08-31 04:20 +0200
                          Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement  fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-08-31 04:30 +0200
                            Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm:  Implement fast refcount overflow protection Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> - 2017-08-31 05:20 +0200
                              Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement  fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-08-31 06:10 +0200
                                Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement  fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-08-31 06:20 +0200
                                  Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm:  Implement fast refcount overflow protection Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> - 2017-08-31 06:40 +0200
                                  Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm:  Implement fast refcount overflow protection Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> - 2017-08-31 16:00 +0200
                                    Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement  fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-08-31 19:10 +0200
                                      Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm:  Implement fast refcount overflow protection Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> - 2017-08-31 19:30 +0200
                                        Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement  fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-08-31 20:50 +0200
                                          Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm:  Implement fast refcount overflow protection Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> - 2017-09-01 09:00 +0200
                                            Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm:  Implement fast refcount overflow protection Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> - 2017-09-01 15:20 +0200
                                              Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement  fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-09-01 19:20 +0200
                                                Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm:  Implement fast refcount overflow protection Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> - 2017-09-01 20:00 +0200
                                                  Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement  fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-09-01 21:00 +0200
                                                    Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm:  Implement fast refcount overflow protection Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> - 2017-09-01 21:30 +0200
                                                    Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement  fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-09-01 21:50 +0200
                                    Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement  fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-08-31 21:30 +0200

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#1724491

FromKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date2017-08-31 20:50 +0200
Message-ID<ukCHp-Qu-29@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1724444
On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 10:19 AM, Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> wrote:
> On Thu, 2017-08-31 at 10:00 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> Oh! So it's gcc-version sensitive? That's alarming. Is this mapping correct:
>>
>> 4.8.5: WARN, eventual kernel hang
>> 6.3.1, 7.0.1: WARN, but continues working
>
> Yeah, that's correct.  I find that troubling, simply because this gcc
> version has been through one hell of a lot of kernels with me.  Yeah, I
> know, that doesn't exempt it from having bugs, but color me suspicious.

I still can't hit this with a 4.8.5 build. :(

With _RATELIMIT removed, this should, in theory, report whatever goes
negative first...

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
index c076f710de4c..d4fc6b91c0e6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ bool ex_handler_refcount(const struct
exception_table_entry *fixup,
                bool zero = regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF;

                refcount_error_report(regs, zero ? "hit zero" : "overflow");
+       } else if (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_SF) {
+               refcount_error_report(regs, "result was negative");
+       } else {
+               refcount_error_report(regs, "unknown state");
        }

        return true;
diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index bdd18afa19a4..966ade491543 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_fail);
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT
 void refcount_error_report(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *err)
 {
-       WARN_RATELIMIT(1, "refcount_t %s at %pB in %s[%d], uid/euid: %u/%u\n",
+       WARN(1, "refcount_t %s at %pB in %s[%d], uid/euid: %u/%u\n",
                err, (void *)instruction_pointer(regs),
                current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
                from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, current_uid()),

And if it is still a refcount_inc(), and only on gcc 4.8.5, then I
think we need to study the resulting assembly...

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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#1724811 — Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection

FromMike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Date2017-09-01 09:00 +0200
SubjectRe: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
Message-ID<ukO5P-dZ-3@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1724491
On Thu, 2017-08-31 at 11:45 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 10:19 AM, Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> wrote:
> > On Thu, 2017-08-31 at 10:00 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >>
> >> Oh! So it's gcc-version sensitive? That's alarming. Is this mapping correct:
> >>
> >> 4.8.5: WARN, eventual kernel hang
> >> 6.3.1, 7.0.1: WARN, but continues working
> >
> > Yeah, that's correct.  I find that troubling, simply because this gcc
> > version has been through one hell of a lot of kernels with me.  Yeah, I
> > know, that doesn't exempt it from having bugs, but color me suspicious.
> 
> I still can't hit this with a 4.8.5 build. :(
> 
> With _RATELIMIT removed, this should, in theory, report whatever goes
> negative first...

I applied the other patch you posted, and built with gcc-6.3.1 to
remove the gcc-4.8.5 aspect.  Look below the resulting splat.

[    1.293962] NET: Registered protocol family 10
[    1.294635] refcount_t silent saturation at in6_dev_get+0x25/0x104 in swapper/0[1], uid/euid: 0/0
[    1.295616] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    1.296120] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/panic.c:612 refcount_error_report+0x94/0x9e
[    1.296950] Modules linked in:
[    1.297276] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.13.0.g152d54a-tip-default #53
[    1.299179] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
[    1.300743] task: ffff88013ab84040 task.stack: ffffc9000062c000
[    1.301825] RIP: 0010:refcount_error_report+0x94/0x9e
[    1.302804] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000062fc10 EFLAGS: 00010282
[    1.303791] RAX: 0000000000000055 RBX: ffffffff81a34274 RCX: ffffffff81c605e8
[    1.304991] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000096 RDI: 0000000000000246
[    1.306189] RBP: ffffc9000062fd58 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000175
[    1.307392] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88013ab84040
[    1.308583] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: ffffffff81a256c8
[    1.309768] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88013fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    1.311052] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    1.312100] CR2: 00007f4631fe8df0 CR3: 0000000137d09003 CR4: 00000000001606f0
[    1.313301] Call Trace:
[    1.314012]  ex_handler_refcount+0x63/0x70
[    1.314893]  fixup_exception+0x32/0x40
[    1.315737]  do_trap+0x8c/0x170
[    1.316519]  do_error_trap+0x70/0xd0
[    1.317340]  ? in6_dev_get+0x23/0x104
[    1.318172]  ? netlink_broadcast_filtered+0x2bd/0x430
[    1.319156]  ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xce/0x5d0
[    1.320098]  ? set_debug_rodata+0x11/0x11
[    1.320964]  invalid_op+0x1e/0x30
[    1.322520] RIP: 0010:in6_dev_get+0x25/0x104
[    1.323631] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000062fe00 EFLAGS: 00010202
[    1.324614] RAX: ffff880137de2400 RBX: ffff880137df4600 RCX: ffff880137de24f0
[    1.325793] RDX: ffff88013a5e4000 RSI: 00000000fffffe00 RDI: ffff88013a5e4000
[    1.326964] RBP: 00000000000000d1 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff880137de7600
[    1.328150] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8801398a4df8 R12: 0000000000000000
[    1.329374] R13: ffffffff82137872 R14: 014200ca00000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[    1.330547]  ? set_debug_rodata+0x11/0x11
[    1.331392]  ip6_route_init_special_entries+0x2a/0x89
[    1.332369]  addrconf_init+0x9e/0x203
[    1.333173]  inet6_init+0x1af/0x365
[    1.333956]  ? af_unix_init+0x4e/0x4e
[    1.334753]  do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x190
[    1.335555]  ? set_debug_rodata+0x11/0x11
[    1.336369]  kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20e
[    1.337230]  ? rest_init+0xd0/0xd0
[    1.337999]  kernel_init+0xa/0xf7
[    1.338744]  ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
[    1.339500] Code: 48 8b 95 80 00 00 00 41 55 49 8d 8c 24 f0 0a 00 00 45 8b 84 24 10 09 00 00 41 89 c1 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 60 7a a3 81 e8 07 de 05 00 <0f> ff 58 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56 
[    1.342243] ---[ end trace b5d40c0fccce776c ]---

Back yours out, and...

# tracer: nop
#
#                              _-----=> irqs-off
#                             / _----=> need-resched
#                            | / _---=> hardirq/softirq
#                            || / _--=> preempt-depth
#                            ||| /     delay
#           TASK-PID   CPU#  ||||    TIMESTAMP  FUNCTION
#              | |       |   ||||       |         |
       swapper/0-1     [000] ...1     1.974114: in6_dev_getx: refs.counter:-1073741824
       swapper/0-1     [000] ...1     1.974116: in6_dev_getx: refs.counter:-1073741824

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h |    9 +++++++++
 include/net/addrconf.h          |   12 ++++++++++++
 net/ipv6/route.c                |    4 ++--
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h
@@ -55,6 +55,15 @@ static __always_inline void refcount_inc
 		: : "cc", "cx");
 }
 
+static __always_inline void refcount_inc_x(refcount_t *r)
+{
+	trace_printk("refs.counter:%d\n", r->refs.counter);
+	asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "incl %0\n\t"
+		REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO
+		: [counter] "+m" (r->refs.counter)
+		: : "cc", "cx");
+}
+
 static __always_inline void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r)
 {
 	asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "decl %0\n\t"
--- a/include/net/addrconf.h
+++ b/include/net/addrconf.h
@@ -321,6 +321,18 @@ static inline struct inet6_dev *in6_dev_
 	return idev;
 }
 
+static inline struct inet6_dev *in6_dev_getx(const struct net_device *dev)
+{
+	struct inet6_dev *idev;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	idev = rcu_dereference(dev->ip6_ptr);
+	if (idev)
+		refcount_inc_x(&idev->refcnt);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return idev;
+}
+
 static inline struct neigh_parms *__in6_dev_nd_parms_get_rcu(const struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct inet6_dev *idev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -4044,9 +4044,9 @@ void __init ip6_route_init_special_entri
 	init_net.ipv6.ip6_null_entry->rt6i_idev = in6_dev_get(init_net.loopback_dev);
   #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MULTIPLE_TABLES
 	init_net.ipv6.ip6_prohibit_entry->dst.dev = init_net.loopback_dev;
-	init_net.ipv6.ip6_prohibit_entry->rt6i_idev = in6_dev_get(init_net.loopback_dev);
+	init_net.ipv6.ip6_prohibit_entry->rt6i_idev = in6_dev_getx(init_net.loopback_dev);
 	init_net.ipv6.ip6_blk_hole_entry->dst.dev = init_net.loopback_dev;
-	init_net.ipv6.ip6_blk_hole_entry->rt6i_idev = in6_dev_get(init_net.loopback_dev);
+	init_net.ipv6.ip6_blk_hole_entry->rt6i_idev = in6_dev_getx(init_net.loopback_dev);
   #endif
 }
 

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#1725042 — Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection

FromMike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Date2017-09-01 15:20 +0200
SubjectRe: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
Message-ID<ukU1A-5iT-9@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1724811
On Fri, 2017-09-01 at 08:57 +0200, Mike Galbraith wrote:
> On Thu, 2017-08-31 at 11:45 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 10:19 AM, Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> wrote:
> > > On Thu, 2017-08-31 at 10:00 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > >>
> > >> Oh! So it's gcc-version sensitive? That's alarming. Is this mapping correct:
> > >>
> > >> 4.8.5: WARN, eventual kernel hang
> > >> 6.3.1, 7.0.1: WARN, but continues working
> > >
> > > Yeah, that's correct.  I find that troubling, simply because this gcc
> > > version has been through one hell of a lot of kernels with me.  Yeah, I
> > > know, that doesn't exempt it from having bugs, but color me suspicious.
> > 
> > I still can't hit this with a 4.8.5 build. :(
> > 
> > With _RATELIMIT removed, this should, in theory, report whatever goes
> > negative first...
> 
> I applied the other patch you posted, and built with gcc-6.3.1 to
> remove the gcc-4.8.5 aspect.  Look below the resulting splat.

Grr, that one has a in6_dev_getx() line missing for the first
increment, where things go pear shaped.

With that added, looking at counter both before, and after incl, with a
trace_printk() in the exception handler showing it doing its saturate
thing, irqs disabled across the whole damn refcount_inc(), and even
booting box nr_cpus=1 for extra credit...

HTH can that first refcount_inc() get there?

# tracer: nop
#
#                              _-----=> irqs-off
#                             / _----=> need-resched
#                            | / _---=> hardirq/softirq
#                            || / _--=> preempt-depth
#                            ||| /     delay
#           TASK-PID   CPU#  ||||    TIMESTAMP  FUNCTION
#              | |       |   ||||       |         |
         systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937284: in6_dev_getx: PRE refs.counter:3
         systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937295: ex_handler_refcount: *(int *)regs->cx = -1073741824
         systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937296: in6_dev_getx: POST refs.counter:-1073741824
         systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937296: in6_dev_getx: PRE refs.counter:-1073741824
         systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937297: ex_handler_refcount: *(int *)regs->cx = -1073741824
         systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937297: in6_dev_getx: POST refs.counter:-1073741824
         systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937297: in6_dev_getx: PRE refs.counter:-1073741824
         systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937298: ex_handler_refcount: *(int *)regs->cx = -1073741824
         systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937299: in6_dev_getx: POST refs.counter:-1073741824

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h |   14 ++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/mm/extable.c           |    1 +
 include/net/addrconf.h          |   12 ++++++++++++
 net/ipv6/route.c                |    6 +++---
 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h
@@ -55,6 +55,20 @@ static __always_inline void refcount_inc
 		: : "cc", "cx");
 }
 
+static __always_inline void refcount_inc_x(refcount_t *r)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+	trace_printk("PRE refs.counter:%d\n", r->refs.counter);
+	asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "incl %0\n\t"
+		REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO
+		: [counter] "+m" (r->refs.counter)
+		: : "cc", "cx");
+	trace_printk("POST refs.counter:%d\n", r->refs.counter);
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+
 static __always_inline void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r)
 {
 	asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "decl %0\n\t"
--- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ bool ex_handler_refcount(const struct ex
 {
 	/* First unconditionally saturate the refcount. */
 	*(int *)regs->cx = INT_MIN / 2;
+	trace_printk("*(int *)regs->cx = %d\n", *(int *)regs->cx);
 
 	/*
 	 * Strictly speaking, this reports the fixup destination, not
--- a/include/net/addrconf.h
+++ b/include/net/addrconf.h
@@ -321,6 +321,18 @@ static inline struct inet6_dev *in6_dev_
 	return idev;
 }
 
+static inline struct inet6_dev *in6_dev_getx(const struct net_device *dev)
+{
+	struct inet6_dev *idev;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	idev = rcu_dereference(dev->ip6_ptr);
+	if (idev)
+		refcount_inc_x(&idev->refcnt);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return idev;
+}
+
 static inline struct neigh_parms *__in6_dev_nd_parms_get_rcu(const struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct inet6_dev *idev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -4041,12 +4041,12 @@ void __init ip6_route_init_special_entri
 	 * the loopback reference in rt6_info will not be taken, do it
 	 * manually for init_net */
 	init_net.ipv6.ip6_null_entry->dst.dev = init_net.loopback_dev;
-	init_net.ipv6.ip6_null_entry->rt6i_idev = in6_dev_get(init_net.loopback_dev);
+	init_net.ipv6.ip6_null_entry->rt6i_idev = in6_dev_getx(init_net.loopback_dev);
   #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MULTIPLE_TABLES
 	init_net.ipv6.ip6_prohibit_entry->dst.dev = init_net.loopback_dev;
-	init_net.ipv6.ip6_prohibit_entry->rt6i_idev = in6_dev_get(init_net.loopback_dev);
+	init_net.ipv6.ip6_prohibit_entry->rt6i_idev = in6_dev_getx(init_net.loopback_dev);
 	init_net.ipv6.ip6_blk_hole_entry->dst.dev = init_net.loopback_dev;
-	init_net.ipv6.ip6_blk_hole_entry->rt6i_idev = in6_dev_get(init_net.loopback_dev);
+	init_net.ipv6.ip6_blk_hole_entry->rt6i_idev = in6_dev_getx(init_net.loopback_dev);
   #endif
 }
 

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#1725245

FromKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date2017-09-01 19:20 +0200
Message-ID<ukXLP-86R-9@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1725042
On Fri, Sep 1, 2017 at 6:09 AM, Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> wrote:
> On Fri, 2017-09-01 at 08:57 +0200, Mike Galbraith wrote:
>> On Thu, 2017-08-31 at 11:45 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> > On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 10:19 AM, Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> wrote:
>> > > On Thu, 2017-08-31 at 10:00 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> > >>
>> > >> Oh! So it's gcc-version sensitive? That's alarming. Is this mapping correct:
>> > >>
>> > >> 4.8.5: WARN, eventual kernel hang
>> > >> 6.3.1, 7.0.1: WARN, but continues working
>> > >
>> > > Yeah, that's correct.  I find that troubling, simply because this gcc
>> > > version has been through one hell of a lot of kernels with me.  Yeah, I
>> > > know, that doesn't exempt it from having bugs, but color me suspicious.
>> >
>> > I still can't hit this with a 4.8.5 build. :(
>> >
>> > With _RATELIMIT removed, this should, in theory, report whatever goes
>> > negative first...
>>
>> I applied the other patch you posted, and built with gcc-6.3.1 to
>> remove the gcc-4.8.5 aspect.  Look below the resulting splat.
>
> Grr, that one has a in6_dev_getx() line missing for the first
> increment, where things go pear shaped.
>
> With that added, looking at counter both before, and after incl, with a
> trace_printk() in the exception handler showing it doing its saturate
> thing, irqs disabled across the whole damn refcount_inc(), and even
> booting box nr_cpus=1 for extra credit...
>
> HTH can that first refcount_inc() get there?
>
> # tracer: nop
> #
> #                              _-----=> irqs-off
> #                             / _----=> need-resched
> #                            | / _---=> hardirq/softirq
> #                            || / _--=> preempt-depth
> #                            ||| /     delay
> #           TASK-PID   CPU#  ||||    TIMESTAMP  FUNCTION
> #              | |       |   ||||       |         |
>          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937284: in6_dev_getx: PRE refs.counter:3
>          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937295: ex_handler_refcount: *(int *)regs->cx = -1073741824
>          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937296: in6_dev_getx: POST refs.counter:-1073741824

O_o

Can you paste the disassembly of in6_dev_getx? I can't understand how
we're landing in the exception handler.

>          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937296: in6_dev_getx: PRE refs.counter:-1073741824
>          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937297: ex_handler_refcount: *(int *)regs->cx = -1073741824
>          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937297: in6_dev_getx: POST refs.counter:-1073741824
>          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937297: in6_dev_getx: PRE refs.counter:-1073741824
>          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937298: ex_handler_refcount: *(int *)regs->cx = -1073741824
>          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937299: in6_dev_getx: POST refs.counter:-1073741824
>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h |   14 ++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/mm/extable.c           |    1 +
>  include/net/addrconf.h          |   12 ++++++++++++
>  net/ipv6/route.c                |    6 +++---
>  4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h
> @@ -55,6 +55,20 @@ static __always_inline void refcount_inc
>                 : : "cc", "cx");
>  }
>
> +static __always_inline void refcount_inc_x(refcount_t *r)
> +{
> +       unsigned long flags;
> +
> +       local_irq_save(flags);
> +       trace_printk("PRE refs.counter:%d\n", r->refs.counter);
> +       asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "incl %0\n\t"
> +               REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO
> +               : [counter] "+m" (r->refs.counter)
> +               : : "cc", "cx");

Does this need an explicit "memory" added to the clobbers line here?
This isn't present in the atomic_inc() implementation, but maybe
something confuses gcc in this case into ignoring the "+m" marking?

> +       trace_printk("POST refs.counter:%d\n", r->refs.counter);
> +       local_irq_restore(flags);
> +}
> +
>  static __always_inline void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r)
>  {
>         asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "decl %0\n\t"
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
> @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ bool ex_handler_refcount(const struct ex
>  {
>         /* First unconditionally saturate the refcount. */
>         *(int *)regs->cx = INT_MIN / 2;
> +       trace_printk("*(int *)regs->cx = %d\n", *(int *)regs->cx);

Just for fun, can you print out *(int *)regs->cx before the assignment too?

>
>         /*
>          * Strictly speaking, this reports the fixup destination, not
> --- a/include/net/addrconf.h
> +++ b/include/net/addrconf.h
> @@ -321,6 +321,18 @@ static inline struct inet6_dev *in6_dev_
>         return idev;
>  }
>
> +static inline struct inet6_dev *in6_dev_getx(const struct net_device *dev)
> +{
> +       struct inet6_dev *idev;
> +
> +       rcu_read_lock();
> +       idev = rcu_dereference(dev->ip6_ptr);
> +       if (idev)
> +               refcount_inc_x(&idev->refcnt);
> +       rcu_read_unlock();
> +       return idev;
> +}
> +
>  static inline struct neigh_parms *__in6_dev_nd_parms_get_rcu(const struct net_device *dev)
>  {
>         struct inet6_dev *idev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
> --- a/net/ipv6/route.c
> +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
> @@ -4041,12 +4041,12 @@ void __init ip6_route_init_special_entri
>          * the loopback reference in rt6_info will not be taken, do it
>          * manually for init_net */
>         init_net.ipv6.ip6_null_entry->dst.dev = init_net.loopback_dev;
> -       init_net.ipv6.ip6_null_entry->rt6i_idev = in6_dev_get(init_net.loopback_dev);
> +       init_net.ipv6.ip6_null_entry->rt6i_idev = in6_dev_getx(init_net.loopback_dev);
>    #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MULTIPLE_TABLES
>         init_net.ipv6.ip6_prohibit_entry->dst.dev = init_net.loopback_dev;
> -       init_net.ipv6.ip6_prohibit_entry->rt6i_idev = in6_dev_get(init_net.loopback_dev);
> +       init_net.ipv6.ip6_prohibit_entry->rt6i_idev = in6_dev_getx(init_net.loopback_dev);
>         init_net.ipv6.ip6_blk_hole_entry->dst.dev = init_net.loopback_dev;
> -       init_net.ipv6.ip6_blk_hole_entry->rt6i_idev = in6_dev_get(init_net.loopback_dev);
> +       init_net.ipv6.ip6_blk_hole_entry->rt6i_idev = in6_dev_getx(init_net.loopback_dev);
>    #endif
>  }
>

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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#1725269 — Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection

FromMike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Date2017-09-01 20:00 +0200
SubjectRe: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
Message-ID<ukYoy-8lL-9@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1725245
On Fri, 2017-09-01 at 10:12 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 1, 2017 at 6:09 AM, Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> wrote:
> > On Fri, 2017-09-01 at 08:57 +0200, Mike Galbraith wrote:
> >> On Thu, 2017-08-31 at 11:45 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> > On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 10:19 AM, Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> wrote:
> >> > > On Thu, 2017-08-31 at 10:00 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> > >>
> >> > >> Oh! So it's gcc-version sensitive? That's alarming. Is this mapping correct:
> >> > >>
> >> > >> 4.8.5: WARN, eventual kernel hang
> >> > >> 6.3.1, 7.0.1: WARN, but continues working
> >> > >
> >> > > Yeah, that's correct.  I find that troubling, simply because this gcc
> >> > > version has been through one hell of a lot of kernels with me.  Yeah, I
> >> > > know, that doesn't exempt it from having bugs, but color me suspicious.
> >> >
> >> > I still can't hit this with a 4.8.5 build. :(
> >> >
> >> > With _RATELIMIT removed, this should, in theory, report whatever goes
> >> > negative first...
> >>
> >> I applied the other patch you posted, and built with gcc-6.3.1 to
> >> remove the gcc-4.8.5 aspect.  Look below the resulting splat.
> >
> > Grr, that one has a in6_dev_getx() line missing for the first
> > increment, where things go pear shaped.
> >
> > With that added, looking at counter both before, and after incl, with a
> > trace_printk() in the exception handler showing it doing its saturate
> > thing, irqs disabled across the whole damn refcount_inc(), and even
> > booting box nr_cpus=1 for extra credit...
> >
> > HTH can that first refcount_inc() get there?
> >
> > # tracer: nop
> > #
> > #                              _-----=> irqs-off
> > #                             / _----=> need-resched
> > #                            | / _---=> hardirq/softirq
> > #                            || / _--=> preempt-depth
> > #                            ||| /     delay
> > #           TASK-PID   CPU#  ||||    TIMESTAMP  FUNCTION
> > #              | |       |   ||||       |         |
> >          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937284: in6_dev_getx: PRE refs.counter:3
> >          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937295: ex_handler_refcount: *(int *)regs->cx = -1073741824
> >          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937296: in6_dev_getx: POST refs.counter:-1073741824
> 
> O_o
> 
> Can you paste the disassembly of in6_dev_getx? I can't understand how
> we're landing in the exception handler.

I was hoping you'd say that.

   0xffffffff816b2f72 <+0>:     push   %rbp
   0xffffffff816b2f73 <+1>:     mov    %rsp,%rbp
   0xffffffff816b2f76 <+4>:     push   %r12
   0xffffffff816b2f78 <+6>:     push   %rbx
   0xffffffff816b2f79 <+7>:     incl   %gs:0x7e95a2d0(%rip)        # 0xd250 <__preempt_count>
   0xffffffff816b2f80 <+14>:    mov    0x308(%rdi),%rbx
   0xffffffff816b2f87 <+21>:    test   %rbx,%rbx
   0xffffffff816b2f8a <+24>:    je     0xffffffff816b2feb <in6_dev_getx+121>
   0xffffffff816b2f8c <+26>:    callq  *0xffffffff81c35a00
   0xffffffff816b2f93 <+33>:    mov    %rax,%r12
   0xffffffff816b2f96 <+36>:    callq  *0xffffffff81c35a10
   0xffffffff816b2f9d <+43>:    mov    0x769ad4(%rip),%rsi        # 0xffffffff81e1ca78 <trace_printk_fmt.21733>
   0xffffffff816b2fa4 <+50>:    mov    0xf0(%rbx),%edx
   0xffffffff816b2faa <+56>:    mov    $0xffffffff816b2f8c,%rdi
   0xffffffff816b2fb1 <+63>:    callq  0xffffffff81171fc0 <__trace_bprintk>
   0xffffffff816b2fb6 <+68>:    lock incl 0xf0(%rbx)
   0xffffffff816b2fbd <+75>:    js     0xffffffff816b2fbf <in6_dev_getx+77>
   0xffffffff816b2fbf <+77>:    lea    0xf0(%rbx),%rcx
   0xffffffff816b2fc6 <+84>:    (bad)  
   0xffffffff816b2fc8 <+86>:    mov    0x769a99(%rip),%rsi        # 0xffffffff81e1ca68 <trace_printk_fmt.21744>
   0xffffffff816b2fcf <+93>:    mov    0xf0(%rbx),%edx
   0xffffffff816b2fd5 <+99>:    mov    $0xffffffff816b2f8c,%rdi
   0xffffffff816b2fdc <+106>:   callq  0xffffffff81171fc0 <__trace_bprintk>
   0xffffffff816b2fe1 <+111>:   mov    %r12,%rdi
   0xffffffff816b2fe4 <+114>:   callq  *0xffffffff81c35a08
   0xffffffff816b2feb <+121>:   decl   %gs:0x7e95a25e(%rip)        # 0xd250 <__preempt_count>
   0xffffffff816b2ff2 <+128>:   mov    %rbx,%rax
   0xffffffff816b2ff5 <+131>:   pop    %rbx
   0xffffffff816b2ff6 <+132>:   pop    %r12
   0xffffffff816b2ff8 <+134>:   pop    %rbp
   0xffffffff816b2ff9 <+135>:   retq

I don't get the section business at all, +75 looks to me like we're
gonna trap no matter what.. as we appear to be doing.

> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h
> > @@ -55,6 +55,20 @@ static __always_inline void refcount_inc
> >                 : : "cc", "cx");
> >  }
> >
> > +static __always_inline void refcount_inc_x(refcount_t *r)
> > +{
> > +       unsigned long flags;
> > +
> > +       local_irq_save(flags);
> > +       trace_printk("PRE refs.counter:%d\n", r->refs.counter);
> > +       asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "incl %0\n\t"
> > +               REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO
> > +               : [counter] "+m" (r->refs.counter)
> > +               : : "cc", "cx");
> 
> Does this need an explicit "memory" added to the clobbers line here?
> This isn't present in the atomic_inc() implementation, but maybe
> something confuses gcc in this case into ignoring the "+m" marking?

I thought about adding that (hail mary), but resisted.

> > +       trace_printk("POST refs.counter:%d\n", r->refs.counter);
> > +       local_irq_restore(flags);
> > +}
> > +
> >  static __always_inline void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r)
> >  {
> >         asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "decl %0\n\t"
> > --- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
> > @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ bool ex_handler_refcount(const struct ex
> >  {
> >         /* First unconditionally saturate the refcount. */
> >         *(int *)regs->cx = INT_MIN / 2;
> > +       trace_printk("*(int *)regs->cx = %d\n", *(int *)regs->cx);
> 
> Just for fun, can you print out *(int *)regs->cx before the assignment too?

Sure, tomorrow.

	-Mike

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#1725282

FromKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date2017-09-01 21:00 +0200
Message-ID<ukZkD-vv-55@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1725269
On Fri, Sep 1, 2017 at 10:52 AM, Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> wrote:
> On Fri, 2017-09-01 at 10:12 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Fri, Sep 1, 2017 at 6:09 AM, Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> wrote:
>> > On Fri, 2017-09-01 at 08:57 +0200, Mike Galbraith wrote:
>> >> On Thu, 2017-08-31 at 11:45 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> >> > On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 10:19 AM, Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> wrote:
>> >> > > On Thu, 2017-08-31 at 10:00 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> >> > >>
>> >> > >> Oh! So it's gcc-version sensitive? That's alarming. Is this mapping correct:
>> >> > >>
>> >> > >> 4.8.5: WARN, eventual kernel hang
>> >> > >> 6.3.1, 7.0.1: WARN, but continues working
>> >> > >
>> >> > > Yeah, that's correct.  I find that troubling, simply because this gcc
>> >> > > version has been through one hell of a lot of kernels with me.  Yeah, I
>> >> > > know, that doesn't exempt it from having bugs, but color me suspicious.
>> >> >
>> >> > I still can't hit this with a 4.8.5 build. :(
>> >> >
>> >> > With _RATELIMIT removed, this should, in theory, report whatever goes
>> >> > negative first...
>> >>
>> >> I applied the other patch you posted, and built with gcc-6.3.1 to
>> >> remove the gcc-4.8.5 aspect.  Look below the resulting splat.
>> >
>> > Grr, that one has a in6_dev_getx() line missing for the first
>> > increment, where things go pear shaped.
>> >
>> > With that added, looking at counter both before, and after incl, with a
>> > trace_printk() in the exception handler showing it doing its saturate
>> > thing, irqs disabled across the whole damn refcount_inc(), and even
>> > booting box nr_cpus=1 for extra credit...
>> >
>> > HTH can that first refcount_inc() get there?
>> >
>> > # tracer: nop
>> > #
>> > #                              _-----=> irqs-off
>> > #                             / _----=> need-resched
>> > #                            | / _---=> hardirq/softirq
>> > #                            || / _--=> preempt-depth
>> > #                            ||| /     delay
>> > #           TASK-PID   CPU#  ||||    TIMESTAMP  FUNCTION
>> > #              | |       |   ||||       |         |
>> >          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937284: in6_dev_getx: PRE refs.counter:3
>> >          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937295: ex_handler_refcount: *(int *)regs->cx = -1073741824
>> >          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937296: in6_dev_getx: POST refs.counter:-1073741824
>>
>> O_o
>>
>> Can you paste the disassembly of in6_dev_getx? I can't understand how
>> we're landing in the exception handler.
>
> I was hoping you'd say that.
>
>    0xffffffff816b2f72 <+0>:     push   %rbp
>    0xffffffff816b2f73 <+1>:     mov    %rsp,%rbp
>    0xffffffff816b2f76 <+4>:     push   %r12
>    0xffffffff816b2f78 <+6>:     push   %rbx
>    0xffffffff816b2f79 <+7>:     incl   %gs:0x7e95a2d0(%rip)        # 0xd250 <__preempt_count>
>    0xffffffff816b2f80 <+14>:    mov    0x308(%rdi),%rbx
>    0xffffffff816b2f87 <+21>:    test   %rbx,%rbx
>    0xffffffff816b2f8a <+24>:    je     0xffffffff816b2feb <in6_dev_getx+121>
>    0xffffffff816b2f8c <+26>:    callq  *0xffffffff81c35a00
>    0xffffffff816b2f93 <+33>:    mov    %rax,%r12
>    0xffffffff816b2f96 <+36>:    callq  *0xffffffff81c35a10
>    0xffffffff816b2f9d <+43>:    mov    0x769ad4(%rip),%rsi        # 0xffffffff81e1ca78 <trace_printk_fmt.21733>
>    0xffffffff816b2fa4 <+50>:    mov    0xf0(%rbx),%edx
>    0xffffffff816b2faa <+56>:    mov    $0xffffffff816b2f8c,%rdi
>    0xffffffff816b2fb1 <+63>:    callq  0xffffffff81171fc0 <__trace_bprintk>
>    0xffffffff816b2fb6 <+68>:    lock incl 0xf0(%rbx)
>    0xffffffff816b2fbd <+75>:    js     0xffffffff816b2fbf <in6_dev_getx+77>
>    0xffffffff816b2fbf <+77>:    lea    0xf0(%rbx),%rcx
>    0xffffffff816b2fc6 <+84>:    (bad)
>    0xffffffff816b2fc8 <+86>:    mov    0x769a99(%rip),%rsi        # 0xffffffff81e1ca68 <trace_printk_fmt.21744>
>    0xffffffff816b2fcf <+93>:    mov    0xf0(%rbx),%edx
>    0xffffffff816b2fd5 <+99>:    mov    $0xffffffff816b2f8c,%rdi
>    0xffffffff816b2fdc <+106>:   callq  0xffffffff81171fc0 <__trace_bprintk>
>    0xffffffff816b2fe1 <+111>:   mov    %r12,%rdi
>    0xffffffff816b2fe4 <+114>:   callq  *0xffffffff81c35a08
>    0xffffffff816b2feb <+121>:   decl   %gs:0x7e95a25e(%rip)        # 0xd250 <__preempt_count>
>    0xffffffff816b2ff2 <+128>:   mov    %rbx,%rax
>    0xffffffff816b2ff5 <+131>:   pop    %rbx
>    0xffffffff816b2ff6 <+132>:   pop    %r12
>    0xffffffff816b2ff8 <+134>:   pop    %rbp
>    0xffffffff816b2ff9 <+135>:   retq
>
> I don't get the section business at all, +75 looks to me like we're
> gonna trap no matter what.. as we appear to be doing.

The section stuff is supposed to be a trick to push the error case off
into the .text.unlikely area to avoid needing a jmp over the handler
and with possibly some redundancy removal done by the compiler (though
this appears to be rather limited) if it notices a bunch of error
paths are the same. However, in your disassembly, it's inline (!!) in
the code, as if "pushsection" and "popsection" were entirely ignored.

And when I make my own in6_dev_getx(), I see the same disassembly:

   0xffffffff818a757b <+181>:   lock incl 0x1e0(%rbx)
   0xffffffff818a7582 <+188>:   js     0xffffffff818a7584 <in6_dev_getx+190>
   0xffffffff818a7584 <+190>:   lea    0x1e0(%rbx),%rcx
   0xffffffff818a758b <+197>:   (bad)

Which is VERY different from how it looks in other places!

e.g. from lkdtm_REFCOUNT_INC_SATURATED:

   0xffffffff815657df <+47>:    lock incl -0xc(%rbp)
   0xffffffff815657e3 <+51>:    js     0xffffffff81565cac
...
   0xffffffff81565cac:  lea    -0xc(%rbp),%rcx
   0xffffffff81565cb0:  (bad)

So, at least I can reproduce this in the build now. I must not be
exercising these paths. FWIW, this is with Ubuntu's 6.3.0 gcc.

I'll try to figure out what's going on here...

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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#1725303 — Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection

FromMike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Date2017-09-01 21:30 +0200
SubjectRe: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
Message-ID<ukZND-VC-17@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1725282
On Fri, 2017-09-01 at 11:58 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> 
> The section stuff is supposed to be a trick to push the error case off
> into the .text.unlikely area to avoid needing a jmp over the handler
> and with possibly some redundancy removal done by the compiler (though
> this appears to be rather limited) if it notices a bunch of error
> paths are the same. However, in your disassembly, it's inline (!!) in
> the code, as if "pushsection" and "popsection" were entirely ignored.
> 
> And when I make my own in6_dev_getx(), I see the same disassembly:
> 
>    0xffffffff818a757b <+181>:   lock incl 0x1e0(%rbx)
>    0xffffffff818a7582 <+188>:   js     0xffffffff818a7584 <in6_dev_getx+190>
>    0xffffffff818a7584 <+190>:   lea    0x1e0(%rbx),%rcx
>    0xffffffff818a758b <+197>:   (bad)
> 
> Which is VERY different from how it looks in other places!
> 
> e.g. from lkdtm_REFCOUNT_INC_SATURATED:
> 
>    0xffffffff815657df <+47>:    lock incl -0xc(%rbp)
>    0xffffffff815657e3 <+51>:    js     0xffffffff81565cac
> ...
>    0xffffffff81565cac:  lea    -0xc(%rbp),%rcx
>    0xffffffff81565cb0:  (bad)
> 
> So, at least I can reproduce this in the build now. I must not be
> exercising these paths. FWIW, this is with Ubuntu's 6.3.0 gcc.
> 
> I'll try to figure out what's going on here...

Heh, make in6_dev_getx() __always_inline.

       swapper/0-1     [000] d..1     1.438587: ip6_route_init_special_entries: PRE refs.counter:3
       swapper/0-1     [000] d..1     1.438590: ip6_route_init_special_entries: POST refs.counter:4
       swapper/0-1     [000] d..1     1.438591: ip6_route_init_special_entries: PRE refs.counter:4
       swapper/0-1     [000] d..1     1.438592: ip6_route_init_special_entries: POST refs.counter:5
       swapper/0-1     [000] d..1     1.438592: ip6_route_init_special_entries: PRE refs.counter:5
       swapper/0-1     [000] d..1     1.438593: ip6_route_init_special_entries: POST refs.counter:6

	-Mike

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#1725323

FromKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date2017-09-01 21:50 +0200
Message-ID<ul070-15q-31@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1725282
On Fri, Sep 1, 2017 at 11:58 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 1, 2017 at 10:52 AM, Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> wrote:
>> On Fri, 2017-09-01 at 10:12 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> On Fri, Sep 1, 2017 at 6:09 AM, Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> wrote:
>>> > On Fri, 2017-09-01 at 08:57 +0200, Mike Galbraith wrote:
>>> >> On Thu, 2017-08-31 at 11:45 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> >> > On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 10:19 AM, Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> wrote:
>>> >> > > On Thu, 2017-08-31 at 10:00 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> Oh! So it's gcc-version sensitive? That's alarming. Is this mapping correct:
>>> >> > >>
>>> >> > >> 4.8.5: WARN, eventual kernel hang
>>> >> > >> 6.3.1, 7.0.1: WARN, but continues working
>>> >> > >
>>> >> > > Yeah, that's correct.  I find that troubling, simply because this gcc
>>> >> > > version has been through one hell of a lot of kernels with me.  Yeah, I
>>> >> > > know, that doesn't exempt it from having bugs, but color me suspicious.
>>> >> >
>>> >> > I still can't hit this with a 4.8.5 build. :(
>>> >> >
>>> >> > With _RATELIMIT removed, this should, in theory, report whatever goes
>>> >> > negative first...
>>> >>
>>> >> I applied the other patch you posted, and built with gcc-6.3.1 to
>>> >> remove the gcc-4.8.5 aspect.  Look below the resulting splat.
>>> >
>>> > Grr, that one has a in6_dev_getx() line missing for the first
>>> > increment, where things go pear shaped.
>>> >
>>> > With that added, looking at counter both before, and after incl, with a
>>> > trace_printk() in the exception handler showing it doing its saturate
>>> > thing, irqs disabled across the whole damn refcount_inc(), and even
>>> > booting box nr_cpus=1 for extra credit...
>>> >
>>> > HTH can that first refcount_inc() get there?
>>> >
>>> > # tracer: nop
>>> > #
>>> > #                              _-----=> irqs-off
>>> > #                             / _----=> need-resched
>>> > #                            | / _---=> hardirq/softirq
>>> > #                            || / _--=> preempt-depth
>>> > #                            ||| /     delay
>>> > #           TASK-PID   CPU#  ||||    TIMESTAMP  FUNCTION
>>> > #              | |       |   ||||       |         |
>>> >          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937284: in6_dev_getx: PRE refs.counter:3
>>> >          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937295: ex_handler_refcount: *(int *)regs->cx = -1073741824
>>> >          systemd-1     [000] d..1     1.937296: in6_dev_getx: POST refs.counter:-1073741824
>>>
>>> O_o
>>>
>>> Can you paste the disassembly of in6_dev_getx? I can't understand how
>>> we're landing in the exception handler.
>>
>> I was hoping you'd say that.
>>
>>    0xffffffff816b2f72 <+0>:     push   %rbp
>>    0xffffffff816b2f73 <+1>:     mov    %rsp,%rbp
>>    0xffffffff816b2f76 <+4>:     push   %r12
>>    0xffffffff816b2f78 <+6>:     push   %rbx
>>    0xffffffff816b2f79 <+7>:     incl   %gs:0x7e95a2d0(%rip)        # 0xd250 <__preempt_count>
>>    0xffffffff816b2f80 <+14>:    mov    0x308(%rdi),%rbx
>>    0xffffffff816b2f87 <+21>:    test   %rbx,%rbx
>>    0xffffffff816b2f8a <+24>:    je     0xffffffff816b2feb <in6_dev_getx+121>
>>    0xffffffff816b2f8c <+26>:    callq  *0xffffffff81c35a00
>>    0xffffffff816b2f93 <+33>:    mov    %rax,%r12
>>    0xffffffff816b2f96 <+36>:    callq  *0xffffffff81c35a10
>>    0xffffffff816b2f9d <+43>:    mov    0x769ad4(%rip),%rsi        # 0xffffffff81e1ca78 <trace_printk_fmt.21733>
>>    0xffffffff816b2fa4 <+50>:    mov    0xf0(%rbx),%edx
>>    0xffffffff816b2faa <+56>:    mov    $0xffffffff816b2f8c,%rdi
>>    0xffffffff816b2fb1 <+63>:    callq  0xffffffff81171fc0 <__trace_bprintk>
>>    0xffffffff816b2fb6 <+68>:    lock incl 0xf0(%rbx)
>>    0xffffffff816b2fbd <+75>:    js     0xffffffff816b2fbf <in6_dev_getx+77>
>>    0xffffffff816b2fbf <+77>:    lea    0xf0(%rbx),%rcx
>>    0xffffffff816b2fc6 <+84>:    (bad)
>>    0xffffffff816b2fc8 <+86>:    mov    0x769a99(%rip),%rsi        # 0xffffffff81e1ca68 <trace_printk_fmt.21744>
>>    0xffffffff816b2fcf <+93>:    mov    0xf0(%rbx),%edx
>>    0xffffffff816b2fd5 <+99>:    mov    $0xffffffff816b2f8c,%rdi
>>    0xffffffff816b2fdc <+106>:   callq  0xffffffff81171fc0 <__trace_bprintk>
>>    0xffffffff816b2fe1 <+111>:   mov    %r12,%rdi
>>    0xffffffff816b2fe4 <+114>:   callq  *0xffffffff81c35a08
>>    0xffffffff816b2feb <+121>:   decl   %gs:0x7e95a25e(%rip)        # 0xd250 <__preempt_count>
>>    0xffffffff816b2ff2 <+128>:   mov    %rbx,%rax
>>    0xffffffff816b2ff5 <+131>:   pop    %rbx
>>    0xffffffff816b2ff6 <+132>:   pop    %r12
>>    0xffffffff816b2ff8 <+134>:   pop    %rbp
>>    0xffffffff816b2ff9 <+135>:   retq
>>
>> I don't get the section business at all, +75 looks to me like we're
>> gonna trap no matter what.. as we appear to be doing.
>
> The section stuff is supposed to be a trick to push the error case off
> into the .text.unlikely area to avoid needing a jmp over the handler
> and with possibly some redundancy removal done by the compiler (though
> this appears to be rather limited) if it notices a bunch of error
> paths are the same. However, in your disassembly, it's inline (!!) in
> the code, as if "pushsection" and "popsection" were entirely ignored.
>
> And when I make my own in6_dev_getx(), I see the same disassembly:
>
>    0xffffffff818a757b <+181>:   lock incl 0x1e0(%rbx)
>    0xffffffff818a7582 <+188>:   js     0xffffffff818a7584 <in6_dev_getx+190>
>    0xffffffff818a7584 <+190>:   lea    0x1e0(%rbx),%rcx
>    0xffffffff818a758b <+197>:   (bad)
>
> Which is VERY different from how it looks in other places!

Found it.

If the compiler already pushed the entire function into
.text.unlikely, x86-refcount's .pushsection doesn't do any good
(obviously). Durrr.

        .section        .text.unlikely,"ax",@progbits
        .type   in6_dev_getx, @function
in6_dev_getx:
.LFB4673:
        .loc 2 4128 0
        .cfi_startproc
...
        lock; incl 480(%rbx)
        js 111f
        .pushsection .text.unlikely
111:    lea 480(%rbx), %rcx
112:    .byte 0x0f, 0xff
.popsection
113:

I will get this fixed. Thank you again for helping track this down!

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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#1724514

FromKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date2017-08-31 21:30 +0200
Message-ID<ukDk5-1mJ-3@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1724263
On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 6:58 AM, Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> wrote:
> gdb) list *in6_dev_get+0x10
> 0xffffffff8166d3d0 is in in6_dev_get (./include/net/addrconf.h:318).
> 313     {
> 314             struct inet6_dev *idev;
> 315
> 316             rcu_read_lock();
> 317             idev = rcu_dereference(dev->ip6_ptr);
> 318             if (idev)
> 319                     refcount_inc(&idev->refcnt);
> 320             rcu_read_unlock();
> 321             return idev;
> 322

And this is a completely different refcount from the other that
tripped. This one is quite simple, too, though I see it uses
refcount_dec(), which is a path to saturation. I've sent a patch to
try to clarify this further...

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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