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Re: [PATCH v2] integrity: track mtime in addition to i_version for assessment

Started byBruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
First post2017-07-19 23:30 +0200
Last post2017-07-19 23:30 +0200
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  Re: [PATCH v2] integrity: track mtime in addition to i_version for  assessment Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> - 2017-07-19 23:30 +0200

#1692206 — Re: [PATCH v2] integrity: track mtime in addition to i_version for assessment

FromBruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Date2017-07-19 23:30 +0200
SubjectRe: [PATCH v2] integrity: track mtime in addition to i_version for assessment
Message-ID<u54HF-5TE-55@gated-at.bofh.it>
On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 01:56:50PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Wed, 2017-07-12 at 10:35 -0400, Bruce Fields wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 08:20:21AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > Right, currently the only way of knowing is by looking at the IMA
> > > measurement list to see if modified files are re-measured or, as you
> > > said, by looking at the code.
> > 
> > Who's actually using this, and do they do any kind of checks, or
> > document the filesystem-specific limitations?
> 
> Knowing who is using it and how it is being used is the big question.
>  I only hear about it when there are problems.
> 
> Over the years, there have been a number of Linux Security Summit
> (LSS) talks, which have been mostly about embedded systems or locked
> down systems, not so much for generic systems.
> 
> Examples include:

Thanks, I skimmed a couple.  Hard to tell, but it sounds like they need
this to work.  I wonder if they're getting this right.  It'd be easy
enough to test for.

--b.

> 
> - Design and Implementation of a Security Architecture for Critical
> Infrastructure Industrial Control Systems - David Safford, GE 2016
> 
> - IMA/EVM: Real Applications for Embedded Networking Systems - Petko
> Manolov, Konsulko Group, and Mark Baushke, Juniper Networks 2015
> 
> - CC3: An Identity Attested Linux Security Supervisor Architecture
>  - Greg Wettstein, IDfusion 2015
> 
> - The Linux Integrity Subsystem and TPM-based Network Endpoint
> Assessment - Andreas Steffen, HSR University of Applied Sciences
> Rapperswil, Switzerland 2012
> 
> Mimi

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