Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]
Groups > linux.kernel > #1690765 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-07-19 00:30 +0200 |
| Last post | 2017-07-19 11:30 +0200 |
| Articles | 3 — 3 participants |
Back to article view | Back to linux.kernel
This discussion starts older than the indexed window; earlier articles aren't shown. The article labeled Started by
below is the oldest one visible, not the original post.
[PATCH v3 03/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-07-19 00:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v3 03/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> - 2017-07-19 02:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH v3 03/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> - 2017-07-19 11:30 +0200
| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-07-19 00:30 +0200 |
| Subject | [PATCH v3 03/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook |
| Message-ID | <u4Ja9-8f4-1@gated-at.bofh.it> |
The AppArmor bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds
hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details
are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via
prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored
via bprm->called_set_creds).
Here, all the comments describe how secureexec is actually calculated
during bprm_set_creds, so this actually does it, drops the bprm flag that
was being used internally by AppArmor, and drops the bprm_secureexec hook.
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
security/apparmor/domain.c | 22 +---------------------
security/apparmor/include/domain.h | 1 -
security/apparmor/include/file.h | 3 ---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 1 -
4 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 878407e023e3..1a1b1ec89d9d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -485,14 +485,11 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*
* Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec
* (unless policy specified "unsafe exec")
- *
- * bprm->unsafe is used to cache the AA_X_UNSAFE permission
- * to avoid having to recompute in secureexec
*/
if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
AA_DEBUG("scrubbing environment variables for %s profile=%s\n",
name, new_profile->base.hname);
- bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED;
+ bprm->secureexec = 1;
}
apply:
/* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */
@@ -521,23 +518,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
}
/**
- * apparmor_bprm_secureexec - determine if secureexec is needed
- * @bprm: binprm for exec (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: %1 if secureexec is needed else %0
- */
-int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- /* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds
- * and stored in bprm->unsafe.
- */
- if (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED)
- return 1;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
* apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
* @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
*/
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
index 30544729878a..2495af293587 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct aa_domain {
};
int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
index 38f821bf49b6..076ac4501d97 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -66,9 +66,6 @@ struct path;
#define AA_X_INHERIT 0x4000
#define AA_X_UNCONFINED 0x8000
-/* AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED - is passed in the bprm->unsafe field */
-#define AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED 0x8000
-
/* need to make conditional which ones are being set */
struct path_cond {
kuid_t uid;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 8f3c0f7aca5a..291c7126350f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -624,7 +624,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
};
--
2.7.4
[toc] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-07-19 02:10 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v3 03/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook |
| Message-ID | <u4KIV-PC-11@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1690765 |
On 07/18/2017 03:25 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> The AppArmor bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds
> hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details
> are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via
> prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored
> via bprm->called_set_creds).
>
> Here, all the comments describe how secureexec is actually calculated
> during bprm_set_creds, so this actually does it, drops the bprm flag that
> was being used internally by AppArmor, and drops the bprm_secureexec hook.
>
> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> security/apparmor/domain.c | 22 +---------------------
> security/apparmor/include/domain.h | 1 -
> security/apparmor/include/file.h | 3 ---
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 1 -
> 4 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 26 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> index 878407e023e3..1a1b1ec89d9d 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> @@ -485,14 +485,11 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> *
> * Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec
> * (unless policy specified "unsafe exec")
> - *
> - * bprm->unsafe is used to cache the AA_X_UNSAFE permission
> - * to avoid having to recompute in secureexec
> */
> if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
> AA_DEBUG("scrubbing environment variables for %s profile=%s\n",
> name, new_profile->base.hname);
> - bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED;
> + bprm->secureexec = 1;
> }
> apply:
> /* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */
> @@ -521,23 +518,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> }
>
> /**
> - * apparmor_bprm_secureexec - determine if secureexec is needed
> - * @bprm: binprm for exec (NOT NULL)
> - *
> - * Returns: %1 if secureexec is needed else %0
> - */
> -int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> -{
> - /* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds
> - * and stored in bprm->unsafe.
> - */
> - if (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED)
> - return 1;
> -
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -/**
> * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
> * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
> */
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
> index 30544729878a..2495af293587 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
> +++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
> @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct aa_domain {
> };
>
> int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
> -int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
> void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
> void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
>
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
> index 38f821bf49b6..076ac4501d97 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h
> +++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
> @@ -66,9 +66,6 @@ struct path;
> #define AA_X_INHERIT 0x4000
> #define AA_X_UNCONFINED 0x8000
>
> -/* AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED - is passed in the bprm->unsafe field */
> -#define AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED 0x8000
> -
> /* need to make conditional which ones are being set */
> struct path_cond {
> kuid_t uid;
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 8f3c0f7aca5a..291c7126350f 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -624,7 +624,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
> - LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec),
>
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
> };
>
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-07-19 11:30 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v3 03/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook |
| Message-ID | <u4TsU-6zb-69@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1690765 |
On Tue, 18 Jul 2017, Kees Cook wrote: > The AppArmor bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds > hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details > are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via > prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored > via bprm->called_set_creds). > > Here, all the comments describe how secureexec is actually calculated > during bprm_set_creds, so this actually does it, drops the bprm flag that > was being used internally by AppArmor, and drops the bprm_secureexec hook. > > Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> -- James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
[toc] | [prev] | [standalone]
Back to top | Article view | linux.kernel
csiph-web