Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]
Groups > linux.kernel > #1622150 > unrolled thread
| Started by | joeyli <jlee@suse.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-04-12 15:50 +0200 |
| Last post | 2017-04-12 15:50 +0200 |
| Articles | 1 — 1 participant |
Back to article view | Back to linux.kernel
This discussion starts older than the indexed window; earlier articles aren't shown. The article labeled Started by
below is the oldest one visible, not the original post.
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down joeyli <jlee@suse.com> - 2017-04-12 15:50 +0200
| From | joeyli <jlee@suse.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-04-12 15:50 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down |
| Message-ID | <tvqOK-554-9@gated-at.bofh.it> |
On Sat, Apr 08, 2017 at 05:28:15AM +0200, poma wrote: > On 06.04.2017 22:25, Jiri Kosina wrote: > > On Thu, 6 Apr 2017, Rafael J. Wysocki wrote: > > > >>>>> Your swap partition may be located on an NVDIMM or be encrypted. > >>>> > >>>> An NVDIMM should be considered the same as any other persistent storage. > >>>> > >>>> It may be encrypted, but where's the key stored, how easy is it to retrieve > >>>> and does the swapout code know this? > >>>> > >>>>> Isn't this a bit overly drastic? > >>>> > >>>> Perhaps, but if it's on disk and it's not encrypted, then maybe not. > >>> > >>> Right. > >>> > >>> Swap encryption is not mandatory and I'm not sure how the hibernate > >>> code can verify whether or not it is in use. > >> > >> BTW, SUSE has patches adding secure boot support to the hibernate code > >> and Jiri promised me to post them last year even. :-) > > > > Oh, thanks for a friendly ping :) Adding Joey Lee to CC. > > > > Rafael J., are you talking about HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION ? > > Ref. > https://github.com/joeyli/linux-s4sign/commits/s4sign-hmac-v2-v4.2-rc8 > https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/8/11/47 > https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1330335 > I am working on switch to HMAC-SHA512. On the other hand, some mechanisms keep signing/encryption key in memory. e.g. dm-crypt or hibernation verification. Kees Cook suggested that we should add kernel memory reads as a thread model of securelevel to prevent leaking those keys by /dev/kmem, bpf, kdump or hibernation... We still need time to implement it. Thanks a lot! Joey Lee
Back to top | Article view | linux.kernel
csiph-web