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Groups > linux.kernel > #1612332 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-03-29 23:00 +0200 |
| Last post | 2017-03-29 23:00 +0200 |
| Articles | 1 — 1 participant |
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Re: [PATCH] sgi-xp: use designated initializers Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-03-29 23:00 +0200
| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-29 23:00 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH] sgi-xp: use designated initializers |
| Message-ID | <tqsRc-3S4-29@gated-at.bofh.it> |
On Tue, Jan 3, 2017 at 3:19 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > On Wed, Dec 21, 2016 at 8:24 AM, Robin Holt <robinmholt@gmail.com> wrote: >> On Fri, Dec 16, 2016 at 7:01 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >>> Prepare to mark sensitive kernel structures for randomization by making >>> sure they're using designated initializers. These were identified during >>> allyesconfig builds of x86, arm, and arm64, with most initializer fixes >>> extracted from grsecurity. >> >> I guess I don't understand the context enough here to give you a >> Signed-off-by. Can you give us more background on this randomization? > > Sure thing! The randomization is on the order of function pointers in > all-pointer structures (like struct xpc_interface). As long as the > memory containing the structure isn't shared externally, this > randomization should have no operational effect. The reason explicit > no-op functions were added was to avoid ugly casts, etc. Friendly ping ... any chance this can land in -next soon? >> From what I see in the code here, I can see you are providing >> equivalent functionality and I would give it a signed-off-by, but I am >> not sure this randomization of which you speak is not going to cause >> problems for XP, XPC, XPNET, and XPMEM (out of tree GPL kernel >> module). > > Ah, hm, does this module share the structure without being built > against the kernel? (If built with the kernel, the randomization > plugin will keep things in the right order.) Regardless of your answer, this randomization can be turned off. Switching to designated initializers here is mainly just a clean up. Thanks! -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
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