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Groups > linux.kernel > #1607734 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-03-23 18:30 +0100 |
| Last post | 2017-03-23 21:20 +0100 |
| Articles | 4 — 2 participants |
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[PATCH v5 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2017-03-23 18:30 +0100
[PATCH v5 4/4] arm64/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2017-03-23 18:30 +0100
Re: [PATCH v5 4/4] arm64/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2017-03-23 21:40 +0100
Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-03-23 21:20 +0100
| From | Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-23 18:30 +0100 |
| Subject | [PATCH v5 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall |
| Message-ID | <toeIF-5py-3@gated-at.bofh.it> |
This patch ensures a syscall does not return to user-mode with a kernel
address limit. If that happened, a process can corrupt kernel-mode
memory and elevate privileges.
For example, it would mitigation this bug:
- https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
The CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE option is also
added so each architecture can optimize this change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
---
Based on next-20170322
---
arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 +
include/linux/syscalls.h | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
init/Kconfig | 7 +++++++
kernel/sys.c | 7 +++++++
4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index a2dcef0aacc7..b73f5b87bc99 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ config S390
select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_BH
select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQ
select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQRESTORE
+ select ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
select ARCH_SAVE_PAGE_KEYS if HIBERNATION
select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
select ARCH_SUPPORTS_NUMA_BALANCING
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 980c3c9b06f8..f9ff80fa92ff 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -191,6 +191,27 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, x, __VA_ARGS__) \
__SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
+
+/*
+ * Called before coming back to user-mode. Returning to user-mode with an
+ * address limit different than USER_DS can allow to overwrite kernel memory.
+ */
+static inline void verify_pre_usermode_state(void) {
+ BUG_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS));
+}
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
+#define __CHECK_USER_CALLER() \
+ bool user_caller = segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)
+#define __VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE() \
+ if (user_caller) verify_pre_usermode_state()
+#else
+#define __CHECK_USER_CALLER()
+#define __VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE()
+asmlinkage void asm_verify_pre_usermode_state(void);
+#endif
+
+
#define __PROTECT(...) asmlinkage_protect(__VA_ARGS__)
#define __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, name, ...) \
asmlinkage long sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__)) \
@@ -199,7 +220,10 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__)); \
asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__)) \
{ \
- long ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__)); \
+ long ret; \
+ __CHECK_USER_CALLER(); \
+ ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__)); \
+ __VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE(); \
__MAP(x,__SC_TEST,__VA_ARGS__); \
__PROTECT(x, ret,__MAP(x,__SC_ARGS,__VA_ARGS__)); \
return ret; \
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index c859c993c26f..c4efc3a95e4a 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1929,6 +1929,13 @@ config PROFILING
config TRACEPOINTS
bool
+#
+# Set by each architecture that want to optimize how verify_pre_usermode_state
+# is called.
+#
+config ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
+ bool
+
source "arch/Kconfig"
endmenu # General setup
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 196c7134bee6..4ae278fcc290 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2459,3 +2459,10 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info)
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
+asmlinkage void asm_verify_pre_usermode_state(void)
+{
+ verify_pre_usermode_state();
+}
+#endif
--
2.12.1.500.gab5fba24ee-goog
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| From | Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-23 18:30 +0100 |
| Subject | [PATCH v5 4/4] arm64/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state |
| Message-ID | <toeIG-5py-25@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1607734 |
Implement specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state for user-mode returns for arm64. --- Based on next-20170322 --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 15 +++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index f2b0b528037d..0e86d87259f4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ config ARM64 select ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION select ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS select ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL + select ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE select ARM_AMBA select ARM_ARCH_TIMER select ARM_GIC diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 43512d4d7df2..6d598e7051c3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -744,6 +744,10 @@ ENDPROC(cpu_switch_to) ret_fast_syscall: disable_irq // disable interrupts str x0, [sp, #S_X0] // returned x0 + ldr x2, [tsk, #TSK_TI_ADDR_LIMIT] // check addr limit change + mov x1, #TASK_SIZE_64 + cmp x2, x1 + b.ne addr_limit_fail ldr x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS] // re-check for syscall tracing and x2, x1, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK cbnz x2, ret_fast_syscall_trace @@ -771,6 +775,11 @@ work_pending: */ ret_to_user: disable_irq // disable interrupts + ldr x2, [tsk, #TSK_TI_ADDR_LIMIT] // check addr limit change + mov x1, #TASK_SIZE_64 + cmp x2, x1 + b.ne addr_limit_fail + ldr x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS] and x2, x1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK cbnz x2, work_pending @@ -779,6 +788,12 @@ finish_ret_to_user: kernel_exit 0 ENDPROC(ret_to_user) +addr_limit_fail: + stp x0, lr, [sp,#-16]! + bl asm_verify_pre_usermode_state + ldp x0, lr, [sp],#16 + ret lr + /* * This is how we return from a fork. */ -- 2.12.1.500.gab5fba24ee-goog
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| From | Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-23 21:40 +0100 |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v5 4/4] arm64/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state |
| Message-ID | <tohGy-7w7-15@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1607736 |
On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 10:25 AM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> wrote: > Implement specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state for user-mode > returns for arm64. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Not sure why it was not there anymore. -- Thomas
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| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-23 21:20 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <tohnc-7os-11@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1607734 |
On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 10:25 AM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> wrote: > This patch ensures a syscall does not return to user-mode with a kernel > address limit. If that happened, a process can corrupt kernel-mode > memory and elevate privileges. > > For example, it would mitigation this bug: > > - https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 > > The CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE option is also > added so each architecture can optimize this change. > > Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Awesome. :) I've tested this on x86 and arm with the LKDTM patch I'll post in a moment. [ 46.977823] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CORRUPT_USER_DS [ 46.978966] lkdtm: setting bad task size limit [ 46.980302] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 46.981219] kernel BUG at ./include/linux/syscalls.h:200! Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> (Also note, your Signed-off-by lines are missing in patches 2-4) -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
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