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Re: [PATCH] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs

Started byPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
First post2017-03-10 21:10 +0100
Last post2017-03-10 21:30 +0100
Articles 3 — 2 participants

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  Re: [PATCH] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> - 2017-03-10 21:10 +0100
    Re: [PATCH] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> - 2017-03-10 21:20 +0100
      Re: [PATCH] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> - 2017-03-10 21:30 +0100

#1598063 — Re: [PATCH] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs

FromPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date2017-03-10 21:10 +0100
SubjectRe: [PATCH] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs
Message-ID<tjz1o-t8-11@gated-at.bofh.it>
On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 10:58 AM, Antonio Murdaca <amurdaca@redhat.com> wrote:
> This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for cgroupfs. For instance,
> this allows to label the "release_agent" file within each
> cgroup mount and limit writes to it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Antonio Murdaca <runcom@redhat.com>
> ---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

Now that the merge window is behind us, let's get this merged, but
could you update it to use the selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel policy
capability?  See 2651225b5ebcdde ("selinux: wrap cgroup seclabel
support with its own policy capability") for more information.

Also, how goes the testing?

> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 9a8f12f..5a3138e 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -808,6 +808,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
>
>         if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
>             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
> +           !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
> +           !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2") ||
>             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
>                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
>
> --
> 2.9.3
>
> _______________________________________________
> Selinux mailing list
> Selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
> To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@tycho.nsa.gov.
> To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@tycho.nsa.gov.

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

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#1598064

FromStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date2017-03-10 21:20 +0100
Message-ID<tjzb3-yL-3@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1598063
On Fri, 2017-03-10 at 15:01 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 10:58 AM, Antonio Murdaca <amurdaca@redhat.com
> > wrote:
> > 
> > This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for cgroupfs. For
> > instance,
> > this allows to label the "release_agent" file within each
> > cgroup mount and limit writes to it.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Antonio Murdaca <runcom@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >  security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++
> >  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
> 
> Now that the merge window is behind us, let's get this merged, but
> could you update it to use the selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel
> policy
> capability?  See 2651225b5ebcdde ("selinux: wrap cgroup seclabel
> support with its own policy capability") for more information.

I don't think that is necessary.  This change unlike the other one
should not yield any difference in behavior with existing policy; it
just allows one to specify fine-grained labeling for cgroup nodes in
future policy.  It doesn't affect any userspace interface.


> Also, how goes the testing?
> 
> > 
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > index 9a8f12f..5a3138e 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > @@ -808,6 +808,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct
> > super_block *sb,
> > 
> >         if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
> >             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
> > +           !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
> > +           !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2") ||
> >             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
> >                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
> > 
> > --
> > 2.9.3
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > Selinux mailing list
> > Selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
> > To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@tycho.nsa.gov.
> > To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@tyc
> > ho.nsa.gov.
> 

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#1598071

FromPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date2017-03-10 21:30 +0100
Message-ID<tjzkJ-Cj-1@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1598064
On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 3:17 PM, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> On Fri, 2017-03-10 at 15:01 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 10:58 AM, Antonio Murdaca <amurdaca@redhat.com
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> > This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for cgroupfs. For
>> > instance,
>> > this allows to label the "release_agent" file within each
>> > cgroup mount and limit writes to it.
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Antonio Murdaca <runcom@redhat.com>
>> > ---
>> >  security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++
>> >  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>>
>> Now that the merge window is behind us, let's get this merged, but
>> could you update it to use the selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel
>> policy
>> capability?  See 2651225b5ebcdde ("selinux: wrap cgroup seclabel
>> support with its own policy capability") for more information.
>
> I don't think that is necessary.  This change unlike the other one
> should not yield any difference in behavior with existing policy; it
> just allows one to specify fine-grained labeling for cgroup nodes in
> future policy.  It doesn't affect any userspace interface.

Yes, I thought about that, and if the policy capability was already
present in a released kernel then I wouldn't worry about it much, but
since the policy capability still only lives in the v4.11-rcX kernels
I'd prefer to see this code wrapped with the policy capability ...
even if all it really does is give me that warm fuzzy feeling.

>> Also, how goes the testing?
>>
>> >
>> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> > index 9a8f12f..5a3138e 100644
>> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> > @@ -808,6 +808,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct
>> > super_block *sb,
>> >
>> >         if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
>> >             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
>> > +           !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
>> > +           !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2") ||
>> >             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
>> >                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
>> >
>> > --
>> > 2.9.3
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > Selinux mailing list
>> > Selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
>> > To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@tycho.nsa.gov.
>> > To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@tyc
>> > ho.nsa.gov.
>>



-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

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