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| Started by | Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-03-09 22:30 +0100 |
| Last post | 2017-03-09 22:40 +0100 |
| Articles | 2 — 2 participants |
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[PATCH v3] security/Kconfig: further restrict HARDENED_USERCOPY Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com> - 2017-03-09 22:30 +0100
Re: [PATCH v3] security/Kconfig: further restrict HARDENED_USERCOPY Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-03-09 22:40 +0100
| From | Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-09 22:30 +0100 |
| Subject | [PATCH v3] security/Kconfig: further restrict HARDENED_USERCOPY |
| Message-ID | <tjdNf-2mg-3@gated-at.bofh.it> |
It doesn't make sense to have HARDENED_USERCOPY when either /dev/kmem is
enabled or /dev/mem can be used to read kernel memory (i.e.
!STRICT_DEVMEM).
v2: add !MMU depend as well
v3: drop !MMU, s/ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED/DEVMEM, which makes the above
commit message actually match the logic again
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>
CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
CC: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
---
security/Kconfig | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 3ff1bf9..4619cee 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY
bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
+ depends on !DEVKMEM
+ depends on !DEVMEM || STRICT_DEVMEM
select BUG
help
This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
--
2.7.4
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| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-09 22:40 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <tjdWV-2rg-11@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1596393 |
On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 1:19 PM, Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com> wrote: > It doesn't make sense to have HARDENED_USERCOPY when either /dev/kmem is > enabled or /dev/mem can be used to read kernel memory (i.e. > !STRICT_DEVMEM). > > v2: add !MMU depend as well > v3: drop !MMU, s/ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED/DEVMEM, which makes the above > commit message actually match the logic again > > Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com> > CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> > CC: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Awesome, thanks! I'll add this to the usercopy tree. -Kees > --- > security/Kconfig | 2 ++ > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig > index 3ff1bf9..4619cee 100644 > --- a/security/Kconfig > +++ b/security/Kconfig > @@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY > bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" > depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY > depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR > + depends on !DEVKMEM > + depends on !DEVMEM || STRICT_DEVMEM > select BUG > help > This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when > -- > 2.7.4 > -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
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