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Groups > linux.kernel > #1595106 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-03-08 13:20 +0100 |
| Last post | 2017-03-10 23:00 +0100 |
| Articles | 4 — 3 participants |
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[PATCH] f2fs: don't allow rename unencrypted file to encrypted directory Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> - 2017-03-08 13:20 +0100
Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH] f2fs: don't allow rename unencrypted file to encrypted directory Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com> - 2017-03-08 16:30 +0100
Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH] f2fs: don't allow rename unencrypted file to encrypted directory Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> - 2017-03-09 02:40 +0100
Re: [PATCH] f2fs: don't allow rename unencrypted file to encrypted directory kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> - 2017-03-10 23:00 +0100
| From | Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-08 13:20 +0100 |
| Subject | [PATCH] f2fs: don't allow rename unencrypted file to encrypted directory |
| Message-ID | <tiIJs-6r7-27@gated-at.bofh.it> |
In commit d9cdc9033181 ("ext4 crypto: enforce context consistency") we
declared that:
2) All files or directories in a directory must be protected using the
same key as their containing directory.
But in f2fs_cross_rename there is a vulnerability that allow to cross
rename unencrypted file into encrypted directory, it needs to be refused.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
---
fs/f2fs/namei.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/namei.c b/fs/f2fs/namei.c
index 25c073f6c7d4..8de684b84cb9 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/namei.c
@@ -855,6 +855,10 @@ static int f2fs_cross_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(new_dir)))
return -ENOKEY;
+ if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(old_dir) && !f2fs_encrypted_inode(new_inode) ||
+ f2fs_encrypted_inode(new_dir) && !f2fs_encrypted_inode(old_inode))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if ((f2fs_encrypted_inode(old_dir) || f2fs_encrypted_inode(new_dir)) &&
(old_dir != new_dir) &&
(!fscrypt_has_permitted_context(new_dir, old_inode) ||
--
2.8.2.295.g3f1c1d0
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| From | Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-08 16:30 +0100 |
| Subject | Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH] f2fs: don't allow rename unencrypted file to encrypted directory |
| Message-ID | <tiLHk-8qM-37@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1595106 |
On 3/8/2017 20:08, Chao Yu wrote:
> In commit d9cdc9033181 ("ext4 crypto: enforce context consistency") we
> declared that:
>
> 2) All files or directories in a directory must be protected using the
> same key as their containing directory.
>
> But in f2fs_cross_rename there is a vulnerability that allow to cross
> rename unencrypted file into encrypted directory, it needs to be refused.
fscrypt_has_permitted_context has do the checking as this patch,
168 /* no restrictions if the parent directory is not encrypted */
169 if (!parent->i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted(parent))
170 return 1;
171 /* if the child directory is not encrypted, this is always a problem */
172 if (!parent->i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted(child))
173 return 0;
So, the cross rename unencrypted file into encrypted directory is permitted right now.
I have a encrypted directory "ncry", "new" is unencrypted file.
[root@nfstestnic f2fs]# renameat2 -x encry/hello new
Operation not permitted
[root@nfstestnic f2fs]# renameat2 -x encry/hello new
Operation not permitted
How do you test it?
thanks,
Kinglong Mee
>
> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
> ---
> fs/f2fs/namei.c | 4 ++++
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/namei.c b/fs/f2fs/namei.c
> index 25c073f6c7d4..8de684b84cb9 100644
> --- a/fs/f2fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/f2fs/namei.c
> @@ -855,6 +855,10 @@ static int f2fs_cross_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
> !fscrypt_has_encryption_key(new_dir)))
> return -ENOKEY;
>
> + if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(old_dir) && !f2fs_encrypted_inode(new_inode) ||
> + f2fs_encrypted_inode(new_dir) && !f2fs_encrypted_inode(old_inode))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> if ((f2fs_encrypted_inode(old_dir) || f2fs_encrypted_inode(new_dir)) &&
> (old_dir != new_dir) &&
> (!fscrypt_has_permitted_context(new_dir, old_inode) ||
>
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| From | Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-09 02:40 +0100 |
| Subject | Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH] f2fs: don't allow rename unencrypted file to encrypted directory |
| Message-ID | <tiVdE-6ny-15@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1595274 |
On 2017/3/8 21:35, Kinglong Mee wrote:
> On 3/8/2017 20:08, Chao Yu wrote:
>> In commit d9cdc9033181 ("ext4 crypto: enforce context consistency") we
>> declared that:
>>
>> 2) All files or directories in a directory must be protected using the
>> same key as their containing directory.
>>
>> But in f2fs_cross_rename there is a vulnerability that allow to cross
>> rename unencrypted file into encrypted directory, it needs to be refused.
>
> fscrypt_has_permitted_context has do the checking as this patch,
>
> 168 /* no restrictions if the parent directory is not encrypted */
> 169 if (!parent->i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted(parent))
> 170 return 1;
> 171 /* if the child directory is not encrypted, this is always a problem */
> 172 if (!parent->i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted(child))
> 173 return 0;
>
> So, the cross rename unencrypted file into encrypted directory is permitted right now.
>
> I have a encrypted directory "ncry", "new" is unencrypted file.
>
> [root@nfstestnic f2fs]# renameat2 -x encry/hello new
> Operation not permitted
> [root@nfstestnic f2fs]# renameat2 -x encry/hello new
> Operation not permitted
I've tried this, the same result as yours, so this patch is wrong, please ignore
it, sorry about the noise.
Thanks,
>
> How do you test it?
>
> thanks,
> Kinglong Mee
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
>> ---
>> fs/f2fs/namei.c | 4 ++++
>> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/namei.c b/fs/f2fs/namei.c
>> index 25c073f6c7d4..8de684b84cb9 100644
>> --- a/fs/f2fs/namei.c
>> +++ b/fs/f2fs/namei.c
>> @@ -855,6 +855,10 @@ static int f2fs_cross_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
>> !fscrypt_has_encryption_key(new_dir)))
>> return -ENOKEY;
>>
>> + if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(old_dir) && !f2fs_encrypted_inode(new_inode) ||
>> + f2fs_encrypted_inode(new_dir) && !f2fs_encrypted_inode(old_inode))
>> + return -EPERM;
>> +
>> if ((f2fs_encrypted_inode(old_dir) || f2fs_encrypted_inode(new_dir)) &&
>> (old_dir != new_dir) &&
>> (!fscrypt_has_permitted_context(new_dir, old_inode) ||
>>
>
> .
>
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| From | kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-10 23:00 +0100 |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH] f2fs: don't allow rename unencrypted file to encrypted directory |
| Message-ID | <tjAJQ-1r3-21@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1595106 |
[Multipart message — attachments visible in raw view] — view raw
Hi Chao,
[auto build test WARNING on f2fs/dev]
[also build test WARNING on v4.11-rc1 next-20170309]
[if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Chao-Yu/f2fs-don-t-allow-rename-unencrypted-file-to-encrypted-directory/20170311-052705
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs.git dev
config: i386-randconfig-x005-201710 (attached as .config)
compiler: gcc-6 (Debian 6.2.0-3) 6.2.0 20160901
reproduce:
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
make ARCH=i386
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
fs/f2fs/namei.c: In function 'f2fs_cross_rename':
>> fs/f2fs/namei.c:858:36: warning: suggest parentheses around '&&' within '||' [-Wparentheses]
if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(old_dir) && !f2fs_encrypted_inode(new_inode) ||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
vim +858 fs/f2fs/namei.c
842 struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(old_dir);
843 struct inode *old_inode = d_inode(old_dentry);
844 struct inode *new_inode = d_inode(new_dentry);
845 struct page *old_dir_page, *new_dir_page;
846 struct page *old_page, *new_page;
847 struct f2fs_dir_entry *old_dir_entry = NULL, *new_dir_entry = NULL;
848 struct f2fs_dir_entry *old_entry, *new_entry;
849 int old_nlink = 0, new_nlink = 0;
850 int err = -ENOENT;
851
852 if ((f2fs_encrypted_inode(old_dir) &&
853 !fscrypt_has_encryption_key(old_dir)) ||
854 (f2fs_encrypted_inode(new_dir) &&
855 !fscrypt_has_encryption_key(new_dir)))
856 return -ENOKEY;
857
> 858 if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(old_dir) && !f2fs_encrypted_inode(new_inode) ||
859 f2fs_encrypted_inode(new_dir) && !f2fs_encrypted_inode(old_inode))
860 return -EPERM;
861
862 if ((f2fs_encrypted_inode(old_dir) || f2fs_encrypted_inode(new_dir)) &&
863 (old_dir != new_dir) &&
864 (!fscrypt_has_permitted_context(new_dir, old_inode) ||
865 !fscrypt_has_permitted_context(old_dir, new_inode)))
866 return -EPERM;
---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all Intel Corporation
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