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Groups > linux.kernel > #1588104 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-02-25 11:00 +0100 |
| Last post | 2017-02-25 11:00 +0100 |
| Articles | 1 — 1 participant |
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[PATCH] cgroups: censor kernel pointer in debug files Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-02-25 11:00 +0100
| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-02-25 11:00 +0100 |
| Subject | [PATCH] cgroups: censor kernel pointer in debug files |
| Message-ID | <teHiW-5T6-9@gated-at.bofh.it> |
As found in grsecurity, this avoids exposing a kernel pointer through
the cgroup debug entries.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
kernel/cgroup.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c
index 53bbca7c4859..b794bcadefa4 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup.c
@@ -6589,7 +6589,7 @@ static int cgroup_css_links_read(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
struct task_struct *task;
int count = 0;
- seq_printf(seq, "css_set %p\n", cset);
+ seq_printf(seq, "css_set %pK\n", cset);
list_for_each_entry(task, &cset->tasks, cg_list) {
if (count++ > MAX_TASKS_SHOWN_PER_CSS)
--
2.7.4
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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