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[PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.50-stable review

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  [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.50-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-02-16 19:00 +0100
    [PATCH 4.4 07/20] netlabel: out of bound access in cipso_v4_validate() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-02-16 19:10 +0100
    [PATCH 4.4 13/20] mlx4: Invoke softirqs after napi_reschedule Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-02-16 19:10 +0100
    [PATCH 4.4 14/20] sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-02-16 19:10 +0100
      Re: [PATCH 4.4 14/20] sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> - 2017-02-21 17:10 +0100
        Re: [PATCH 4.4 14/20] sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf Marcelo <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> - 2017-02-21 18:00 +0100
          Re: [PATCH 4.4 14/20] sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> - 2017-02-21 21:00 +0100
    [PATCH 4.4 03/20] ipv6: pointer math error in ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-02-16 19:10 +0100
    [PATCH 4.4 02/20] ipv6: fix ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-02-16 19:10 +0100
    [PATCH 4.4 09/20] ipv6: tcp: add a missing tcp_v6_restore_cb() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-02-16 19:10 +0100
    [PATCH 4.4 01/20] can: Fix kernel panic at security_sock_rcv_skb Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-02-16 19:10 +0100
    [PATCH 4.4 04/20] tcp: fix 0 divide in __tcp_select_window() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-02-16 19:10 +0100
    [PATCH 4.4 19/20] l2tp: do not use udp_ioctl() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-02-16 19:10 +0100
    [PATCH 4.4 08/20] ip6_gre: fix ip6gre_err() invalid reads Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-02-16 19:10 +0100
    [PATCH 4.4 20/20] tcp: fix mark propagation with fwmark_reflect enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-02-16 19:10 +0100
    [PATCH 4.4 17/20] packet: round up linear to header len Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-02-16 19:10 +0100
    [PATCH 4.4 11/20] tun: read vnet_hdr_sz once Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-02-16 19:20 +0100
    Re: [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.50-stable review Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> - 2017-02-17 11:40 +0100
    Re: [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.50-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-02-18 00:50 +0100

#1582770 — [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.50-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.50 release.
There are 20 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat Feb 18 17:52:49 UTC 2017.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.50-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 4.4.50-rc1

Pau Espin Pedrol <pespin.shar@gmail.com>
    tcp: fix mark propagation with fwmark_reflect enabled

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    l2tp: do not use udp_ioctl()

WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
    ping: fix a null pointer dereference

Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
    packet: round up linear to header len

Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
    net: introduce device min_header_len

WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
    sit: fix a double free on error path

Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
    sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf

Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
    mlx4: Invoke softirqs after napi_reschedule

Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
    macvtap: read vnet_hdr_size once

Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
    tun: read vnet_hdr_sz once

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    tcp: avoid infinite loop in tcp_splice_read()

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    ipv6: tcp: add a missing tcp_v6_restore_cb()

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    ip6_gre: fix ip6gre_err() invalid reads

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    netlabel: out of bound access in cipso_v4_validate()

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    ipv4: keep skb->dst around in presence of IP options

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    net: use a work queue to defer net_disable_timestamp() work

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    tcp: fix 0 divide in __tcp_select_window()

Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
    ipv6: pointer math error in ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim()

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    ipv6: fix ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim()

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    can: Fix kernel panic at security_sock_rcv_skb


-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                   |  4 +--
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_rx.c |  5 +++-
 drivers/net/loopback.c                     |  1 +
 drivers/net/macvtap.c                      |  4 +--
 drivers/net/tun.c                          | 10 +++++---
 include/linux/can/core.h                   |  7 +++--
 include/linux/netdevice.h                  |  4 +++
 include/net/cipso_ipv4.h                   |  4 +++
 net/can/af_can.c                           | 12 +++++++--
 net/can/af_can.h                           |  3 ++-
 net/can/bcm.c                              |  4 +--
 net/can/gw.c                               |  2 +-
 net/can/raw.c                              |  4 +--
 net/core/dev.c                             | 31 ++++++++++------------
 net/ethernet/eth.c                         |  1 +
 net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c                      |  4 +++
 net/ipv4/ip_output.c                       |  1 +
 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c                     |  9 ++++++-
 net/ipv4/ping.c                            |  2 ++
 net/ipv4/tcp.c                             |  6 +++++
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c                      |  6 +++--
 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c                         | 41 ++++++++++++++++--------------
 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c                      | 34 ++++++++++++++++---------
 net/ipv6/sit.c                             |  1 +
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c                        | 25 ++++++++++--------
 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h                       |  1 +
 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c                         | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-
 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c                        |  2 +-
 net/packet/af_packet.c                     |  7 ++---
 net/sctp/socket.c                          |  3 ++-
 30 files changed, 175 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)

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#1582777 — [PATCH 4.4 07/20] netlabel: out of bound access in cipso_v4_validate()

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>


[ Upstream commit d71b7896886345c53ef1d84bda2bc758554f5d61 ]

syzkaller found another out of bound access in ip_options_compile(),
or more exactly in cipso_v4_validate()

Fixes: 20e2a8648596 ("cipso: handle CIPSO options correctly when NetLabel is disabled")
Fixes: 446fda4f2682 ("[NetLabel]: CIPSOv4 engine")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov  <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/net/cipso_ipv4.h |    4 ++++
 net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c    |    4 ++++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/include/net/cipso_ipv4.h
+++ b/include/net/cipso_ipv4.h
@@ -309,6 +309,10 @@ static inline int cipso_v4_validate(cons
 	}
 
 	for (opt_iter = 6; opt_iter < opt_len;) {
+		if (opt_iter + 1 == opt_len) {
+			err_offset = opt_iter;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		tag_len = opt[opt_iter + 1];
 		if ((tag_len == 0) || (tag_len > (opt_len - opt_iter))) {
 			err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -1657,6 +1657,10 @@ int cipso_v4_validate(const struct sk_bu
 				goto validate_return_locked;
 			}
 
+		if (opt_iter + 1 == opt_len) {
+			err_offset = opt_iter;
+			goto validate_return_locked;
+		}
 		tag_len = tag[1];
 		if (tag_len > (opt_len - opt_iter)) {
 			err_offset = opt_iter + 1;

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#1582778 — [PATCH 4.4 13/20] mlx4: Invoke softirqs after napi_reschedule

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>


[ Upstream commit bd4ce941c8d5b862b2f83364be5dbe8fc8ab48f8 ]

mlx4 may schedule napi from a workqueue. Afterwards, softirqs are not run
in a deterministic time frame and the following message may be logged:
NOHZ: local_softirq_pending 08

The problem is the same as what was described in commit ec13ee80145c
("virtio_net: invoke softirqs after __napi_schedule") and this patch
applies the same fix to mlx4.

Fixes: 07841f9d94c1 ("net/mlx4_en: Schedule napi when RX buffers allocation fails")
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_rx.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_rx.c
@@ -502,8 +502,11 @@ void mlx4_en_recover_from_oom(struct mlx
 		return;
 
 	for (ring = 0; ring < priv->rx_ring_num; ring++) {
-		if (mlx4_en_is_ring_empty(priv->rx_ring[ring]))
+		if (mlx4_en_is_ring_empty(priv->rx_ring[ring])) {
+			local_bh_disable();
 			napi_reschedule(&priv->rx_cq[ring]->napi);
+			local_bh_enable();
+		}
 	}
 }
 

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#1582780 — [PATCH 4.4 14/20] sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>


[ Upstream commit 2dcab598484185dea7ec22219c76dcdd59e3cb90 ]

Alexander Popov reported that an application may trigger a BUG_ON in
sctp_wait_for_sndbuf if the socket tx buffer is full, a thread is
waiting on it to queue more data and meanwhile another thread peels off
the association being used by the first thread.

This patch replaces the BUG_ON call with a proper error handling. It
will return -EPIPE to the original sendmsg call, similarly to what would
have been done if the association wasn't found in the first place.

Acked-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sctp/socket.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -6960,7 +6960,8 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct s
 		 */
 		release_sock(sk);
 		current_timeo = schedule_timeout(current_timeo);
-		BUG_ON(sk != asoc->base.sk);
+		if (sk != asoc->base.sk)
+			goto do_error;
 		lock_sock(sk);
 
 		*timeo_p = current_timeo;

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#1585476 — Re: [PATCH 4.4 14/20] sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf

[Multipart message — attachments visible in raw view] — view raw

On Thu, 2017-02-16 at 09:53 -0800, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> 
> ------------------
> 
> From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
> 
> 
> [ Upstream commit 2dcab598484185dea7ec22219c76dcdd59e3cb90 ]
[...]
> --- a/net/sctp/socket.c
> +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
> @@ -6960,7 +6960,8 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct s
>  		 */
>  		release_sock(sk);
>  		current_timeo = schedule_timeout(current_timeo);
> -		BUG_ON(sk != asoc->base.sk);
> +		if (sk != asoc->base.sk)
> +			goto do_error;

This function normally returns with sk still locked, but in this case
it returns with sk unlocked.  Perhaps this check should be moved after
the lock_sock(sk)?

Ben.

>  		lock_sock(sk);
>  
>  		*timeo_p = current_timeo;
> 
> 
-- 
Ben Hutchings
73.46% of all statistics are made up.

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#1585530 — Re: [PATCH 4.4 14/20] sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf

Em 21 de fevereiro de 2017 13:08:44 BRT, Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> escreveu:
>On Thu, 2017-02-16 at 09:53 -0800, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>> 4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me
>know.
>> 
>> ------------------
>> 
>> From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
>> 
>> 
>> [ Upstream commit 2dcab598484185dea7ec22219c76dcdd59e3cb90 ]
>[...]
>> --- a/net/sctp/socket.c
>> +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
>> @@ -6960,7 +6960,8 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct s
>>  		 */
>>  		release_sock(sk);
>>  		current_timeo = schedule_timeout(current_timeo);
>> -		BUG_ON(sk != asoc->base.sk);
>> +		if (sk != asoc->base.sk)
>> +			goto do_error;
>
>This function normally returns with sk still locked, but in this case
>it returns with sk unlocked.  Perhaps this check should be moved after
>the lock_sock(sk)?
>

Looks like so. Will check more in a few. Thanks Ben

>Ben.
>
>>  		lock_sock(sk);
>>  
>>  		*timeo_p = current_timeo;
>> 
>> 

-- 
Enviado de meu dispositivo Android com K-9 mail. Desculpe-me pela brevidade.

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#1585696 — Re: [PATCH 4.4 14/20] sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf

On Tue, Feb 21, 2017 at 1:56 PM, Marcelo <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> Em 21 de fevereiro de 2017 13:08:44 BRT, Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> escreveu:
>>On Thu, 2017-02-16 at 09:53 -0800, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>>> 4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me
>>know.
>>>
>>> ------------------
>>>
>>> From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
>>>
>>>
>>> [ Upstream commit 2dcab598484185dea7ec22219c76dcdd59e3cb90 ]
>>[...]
>>> --- a/net/sctp/socket.c
>>> +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
>>> @@ -6960,7 +6960,8 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct s
>>>               */
>>>              release_sock(sk);
>>>              current_timeo = schedule_timeout(current_timeo);
>>> -            BUG_ON(sk != asoc->base.sk);
>>> +            if (sk != asoc->base.sk)
>>> +                    goto do_error;
>>
>>This function normally returns with sk still locked, but in this case
>>it returns with sk unlocked.  Perhaps this check should be moved after
>>the lock_sock(sk)?
>>
>
> Looks like so. Will check more in a few. Thanks Ben

Yes, we need to move the check to after the lock_sock(sk) call.

There is also another problem: consider a thread A sending a packet to
a new asoc (which creates a new asoc during sctp_sendsmg), and while
waiting for more sndbuf space, it gets peeled off by another thread.
This would cause a double-free of the asoc as sctp_sendmsg() will free
this asoc thinking it errored out but it actually now belongs to
another thread.

Testing both patches now, should be ready by tomorrow.

  Marcelo

>
>>Ben.
>>
>>>              lock_sock(sk);
>>>
>>>              *timeo_p = current_timeo;
>>>
>>>
>
> --
> Enviado de meu dispositivo Android com K-9 mail. Desculpe-me pela brevidade.

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#1582785 — [PATCH 4.4 03/20] ipv6: pointer math error in ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim()

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>


[ Upstream commit 63117f09c768be05a0bf465911297dc76394f686 ]

Casting is a high precedence operation but "off" and "i" are in terms of
bytes so we need to have some parenthesis here.

Fixes: fbfa743a9d2a ("ipv6: fix ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim()")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ __u16 ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim(struct s
 				if (i + sizeof(*tel) > optlen)
 					break;
 
-				tel = (struct ipv6_tlv_tnl_enc_lim *) skb->data + off + i;
+				tel = (struct ipv6_tlv_tnl_enc_lim *)(skb->data + off + i);
 				/* return index of option if found and valid */
 				if (tel->type == IPV6_TLV_TNL_ENCAP_LIMIT &&
 				    tel->length == 1)

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#1582787 — [PATCH 4.4 02/20] ipv6: fix ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim()

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>


[ Upstream commit fbfa743a9d2a0ffa24251764f10afc13eb21e739 ]

This function suffers from multiple issues.

First one is that pskb_may_pull() may reallocate skb->head,
so the 'raw' pointer needs either to be reloaded or not used at all.

Second issue is that NEXTHDR_DEST handling does not validate
that the options are present in skb->data, so we might read
garbage or access non existent memory.

With help from Willem de Bruijn.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov  <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c |   34 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
@@ -479,18 +479,19 @@ ip6_tnl_dev_uninit(struct net_device *de
 
 __u16 ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim(struct sk_buff *skb, __u8 *raw)
 {
-	const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h = (const struct ipv6hdr *) raw;
-	__u8 nexthdr = ipv6h->nexthdr;
-	__u16 off = sizeof(*ipv6h);
+	const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h = (const struct ipv6hdr *)raw;
+	unsigned int nhoff = raw - skb->data;
+	unsigned int off = nhoff + sizeof(*ipv6h);
+	u8 next, nexthdr = ipv6h->nexthdr;
 
 	while (ipv6_ext_hdr(nexthdr) && nexthdr != NEXTHDR_NONE) {
-		__u16 optlen = 0;
 		struct ipv6_opt_hdr *hdr;
-		if (raw + off + sizeof(*hdr) > skb->data &&
-		    !pskb_may_pull(skb, raw - skb->data + off + sizeof (*hdr)))
+		u16 optlen;
+
+		if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, off + sizeof(*hdr)))
 			break;
 
-		hdr = (struct ipv6_opt_hdr *) (raw + off);
+		hdr = (struct ipv6_opt_hdr *)(skb->data + off);
 		if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT) {
 			struct frag_hdr *frag_hdr = (struct frag_hdr *) hdr;
 			if (frag_hdr->frag_off)
@@ -501,20 +502,29 @@ __u16 ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim(struct s
 		} else {
 			optlen = ipv6_optlen(hdr);
 		}
+		/* cache hdr->nexthdr, since pskb_may_pull() might
+		 * invalidate hdr
+		 */
+		next = hdr->nexthdr;
 		if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_DEST) {
-			__u16 i = off + 2;
+			u16 i = 2;
+
+			/* Remember : hdr is no longer valid at this point. */
+			if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, off + optlen))
+				break;
+
 			while (1) {
 				struct ipv6_tlv_tnl_enc_lim *tel;
 
 				/* No more room for encapsulation limit */
-				if (i + sizeof (*tel) > off + optlen)
+				if (i + sizeof(*tel) > optlen)
 					break;
 
-				tel = (struct ipv6_tlv_tnl_enc_lim *) &raw[i];
+				tel = (struct ipv6_tlv_tnl_enc_lim *) skb->data + off + i;
 				/* return index of option if found and valid */
 				if (tel->type == IPV6_TLV_TNL_ENCAP_LIMIT &&
 				    tel->length == 1)
-					return i;
+					return i + off - nhoff;
 				/* else jump to next option */
 				if (tel->type)
 					i += tel->length + 2;
@@ -522,7 +532,7 @@ __u16 ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim(struct s
 					i++;
 			}
 		}
-		nexthdr = hdr->nexthdr;
+		nexthdr = next;
 		off += optlen;
 	}
 	return 0;

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#1582788 — [PATCH 4.4 09/20] ipv6: tcp: add a missing tcp_v6_restore_cb()

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>


[ Upstream commit ebf6c9cb23d7e56eec8575a88071dec97ad5c6e2 ]

Dmitry reported use-after-free in ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl()

A similar bug was fixed in commit 8ce48623f0cf ("ipv6: tcp: restore
IP6CB for pktoptions skbs"), but I missed another spot.

tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock() can indeed set np->pktoptions from ireq->pktopts

Fixes: 971f10eca186 ("tcp: better TCP_SKB_CB layout to reduce cache line misses")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c |   24 +++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -974,6 +974,16 @@ drop:
 	return 0; /* don't send reset */
 }
 
+static void tcp_v6_restore_cb(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	/* We need to move header back to the beginning if xfrm6_policy_check()
+	 * and tcp_v6_fill_cb() are going to be called again.
+	 * ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() also expects IP6CB to be there.
+	 */
+	memmove(IP6CB(skb), &TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h6,
+		sizeof(struct inet6_skb_parm));
+}
+
 static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 					 struct request_sock *req,
 					 struct dst_entry *dst,
@@ -1163,8 +1173,10 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock
 						      sk_gfp_atomic(sk, GFP_ATOMIC));
 			consume_skb(ireq->pktopts);
 			ireq->pktopts = NULL;
-			if (newnp->pktoptions)
+			if (newnp->pktoptions) {
+				tcp_v6_restore_cb(newnp->pktoptions);
 				skb_set_owner_r(newnp->pktoptions, newsk);
+			}
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -1179,16 +1191,6 @@ out:
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static void tcp_v6_restore_cb(struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-	/* We need to move header back to the beginning if xfrm6_policy_check()
-	 * and tcp_v6_fill_cb() are going to be called again.
-	 * ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() also expects IP6CB to be there.
-	 */
-	memmove(IP6CB(skb), &TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h6,
-		sizeof(struct inet6_skb_parm));
-}
-
 /* The socket must have it's spinlock held when we get
  * here, unless it is a TCP_LISTEN socket.
  *

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#1582793 — [PATCH 4.4 01/20] can: Fix kernel panic at security_sock_rcv_skb

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>


[ Upstream commit f1712c73714088a7252d276a57126d56c7d37e64 ]

Zhang Yanmin reported crashes [1] and provided a patch adding a
synchronize_rcu() call in can_rx_unregister()

The main problem seems that the sockets themselves are not RCU
protected.

If CAN uses RCU for delivery, then sockets should be freed only after
one RCU grace period.

Recent kernels could use sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE), but let's
ease stable backports with the following fix instead.

[1]
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [<ffffffff81495e25>] selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb+0x65/0x2a0

Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 [<ffffffff81485d8c>] security_sock_rcv_skb+0x4c/0x60
 [<ffffffff81d55771>] sk_filter+0x41/0x210
 [<ffffffff81d12913>] sock_queue_rcv_skb+0x53/0x3a0
 [<ffffffff81f0a2b3>] raw_rcv+0x2a3/0x3c0
 [<ffffffff81f06eab>] can_rcv_filter+0x12b/0x370
 [<ffffffff81f07af9>] can_receive+0xd9/0x120
 [<ffffffff81f07beb>] can_rcv+0xab/0x100
 [<ffffffff81d362ac>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xd8c/0x11f0
 [<ffffffff81d36734>] __netif_receive_skb+0x24/0xb0
 [<ffffffff81d37f67>] process_backlog+0x127/0x280
 [<ffffffff81d36f7b>] net_rx_action+0x33b/0x4f0
 [<ffffffff810c88d4>] __do_softirq+0x184/0x440
 [<ffffffff81f9e86c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30
 <EOI>
 [<ffffffff810c76fb>] do_softirq.part.18+0x3b/0x40
 [<ffffffff810c8bed>] do_softirq+0x1d/0x20
 [<ffffffff81d30085>] netif_rx_ni+0xe5/0x110
 [<ffffffff8199cc87>] slcan_receive_buf+0x507/0x520
 [<ffffffff8167ef7c>] flush_to_ldisc+0x21c/0x230
 [<ffffffff810e3baf>] process_one_work+0x24f/0x670
 [<ffffffff810e44ed>] worker_thread+0x9d/0x6f0
 [<ffffffff810e4450>] ? rescuer_thread+0x480/0x480
 [<ffffffff810ebafc>] kthread+0x12c/0x150
 [<ffffffff81f9ccef>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70

Reported-by: Zhang Yanmin <yanmin.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/can/core.h |    7 +++----
 net/can/af_can.c         |   12 ++++++++++--
 net/can/af_can.h         |    3 ++-
 net/can/bcm.c            |    4 ++--
 net/can/gw.c             |    2 +-
 net/can/raw.c            |    4 ++--
 6 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/can/core.h
+++ b/include/linux/can/core.h
@@ -45,10 +45,9 @@ struct can_proto {
 extern int  can_proto_register(const struct can_proto *cp);
 extern void can_proto_unregister(const struct can_proto *cp);
 
-extern int  can_rx_register(struct net_device *dev, canid_t can_id,
-			    canid_t mask,
-			    void (*func)(struct sk_buff *, void *),
-			    void *data, char *ident);
+int can_rx_register(struct net_device *dev, canid_t can_id, canid_t mask,
+		    void (*func)(struct sk_buff *, void *),
+		    void *data, char *ident, struct sock *sk);
 
 extern void can_rx_unregister(struct net_device *dev, canid_t can_id,
 			      canid_t mask,
--- a/net/can/af_can.c
+++ b/net/can/af_can.c
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static struct hlist_head *find_rcv_list(
  * @func: callback function on filter match
  * @data: returned parameter for callback function
  * @ident: string for calling module identification
+ * @sk: socket pointer (might be NULL)
  *
  * Description:
  *  Invokes the callback function with the received sk_buff and the given
@@ -468,7 +469,7 @@ static struct hlist_head *find_rcv_list(
  */
 int can_rx_register(struct net_device *dev, canid_t can_id, canid_t mask,
 		    void (*func)(struct sk_buff *, void *), void *data,
-		    char *ident)
+		    char *ident, struct sock *sk)
 {
 	struct receiver *r;
 	struct hlist_head *rl;
@@ -496,6 +497,7 @@ int can_rx_register(struct net_device *d
 		r->func    = func;
 		r->data    = data;
 		r->ident   = ident;
+		r->sk      = sk;
 
 		hlist_add_head_rcu(&r->list, rl);
 		d->entries++;
@@ -520,8 +522,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(can_rx_register);
 static void can_rx_delete_receiver(struct rcu_head *rp)
 {
 	struct receiver *r = container_of(rp, struct receiver, rcu);
+	struct sock *sk = r->sk;
 
 	kmem_cache_free(rcv_cache, r);
+	if (sk)
+		sock_put(sk);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -596,8 +601,11 @@ void can_rx_unregister(struct net_device
 	spin_unlock(&can_rcvlists_lock);
 
 	/* schedule the receiver item for deletion */
-	if (r)
+	if (r) {
+		if (r->sk)
+			sock_hold(r->sk);
 		call_rcu(&r->rcu, can_rx_delete_receiver);
+	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(can_rx_unregister);
 
--- a/net/can/af_can.h
+++ b/net/can/af_can.h
@@ -50,13 +50,14 @@
 
 struct receiver {
 	struct hlist_node list;
-	struct rcu_head rcu;
 	canid_t can_id;
 	canid_t mask;
 	unsigned long matches;
 	void (*func)(struct sk_buff *, void *);
 	void *data;
 	char *ident;
+	struct sock *sk;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
 };
 
 #define CAN_SFF_RCV_ARRAY_SZ (1 << CAN_SFF_ID_BITS)
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -1179,7 +1179,7 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_h
 				err = can_rx_register(dev, op->can_id,
 						      REGMASK(op->can_id),
 						      bcm_rx_handler, op,
-						      "bcm");
+						      "bcm", sk);
 
 				op->rx_reg_dev = dev;
 				dev_put(dev);
@@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_h
 		} else
 			err = can_rx_register(NULL, op->can_id,
 					      REGMASK(op->can_id),
-					      bcm_rx_handler, op, "bcm");
+					      bcm_rx_handler, op, "bcm", sk);
 		if (err) {
 			/* this bcm rx op is broken -> remove it */
 			list_del(&op->list);
--- a/net/can/gw.c
+++ b/net/can/gw.c
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static inline int cgw_register_filter(st
 {
 	return can_rx_register(gwj->src.dev, gwj->ccgw.filter.can_id,
 			       gwj->ccgw.filter.can_mask, can_can_gw_rcv,
-			       gwj, "gw");
+			       gwj, "gw", NULL);
 }
 
 static inline void cgw_unregister_filter(struct cgw_job *gwj)
--- a/net/can/raw.c
+++ b/net/can/raw.c
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static int raw_enable_filters(struct net
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 		err = can_rx_register(dev, filter[i].can_id,
 				      filter[i].can_mask,
-				      raw_rcv, sk, "raw");
+				      raw_rcv, sk, "raw", sk);
 		if (err) {
 			/* clean up successfully registered filters */
 			while (--i >= 0)
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static int raw_enable_errfilter(struct n
 
 	if (err_mask)
 		err = can_rx_register(dev, 0, err_mask | CAN_ERR_FLAG,
-				      raw_rcv, sk, "raw");
+				      raw_rcv, sk, "raw", sk);
 
 	return err;
 }

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#1582794 — [PATCH 4.4 04/20] tcp: fix 0 divide in __tcp_select_window()

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>


[ Upstream commit 06425c308b92eaf60767bc71d359f4cbc7a561f8 ]

syszkaller fuzzer was able to trigger a divide by zero, when
TCP window scaling is not enabled.

SO_RCVBUF can be used not only to increase sk_rcvbuf, also
to decrease it below current receive buffers utilization.

If mss is negative or 0, just return a zero TCP window.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov  <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -2383,9 +2383,11 @@ u32 __tcp_select_window(struct sock *sk)
 	int full_space = min_t(int, tp->window_clamp, allowed_space);
 	int window;
 
-	if (mss > full_space)
+	if (unlikely(mss > full_space)) {
 		mss = full_space;
-
+		if (mss <= 0)
+			return 0;
+	}
 	if (free_space < (full_space >> 1)) {
 		icsk->icsk_ack.quick = 0;
 

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#1582795 — [PATCH 4.4 19/20] l2tp: do not use udp_ioctl()

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>


[ Upstream commit 72fb96e7bdbbdd4421b0726992496531060f3636 ]

udp_ioctl(), as its name suggests, is used by UDP protocols,
but is also used by L2TP :(

L2TP should use its own handler, because it really does not
look the same.

SIOCINQ for instance should not assume UDP checksum or headers.

Thanks to Andrey and syzkaller team for providing the report
and a nice reproducer.

While crashes only happen on recent kernels (after commit
7c13f97ffde6 ("udp: do fwd memory scheduling on dequeue")), this
probably needs to be backported to older kernels.

Fixes: 7c13f97ffde6 ("udp: do fwd memory scheduling on dequeue")
Fixes: 85584672012e ("udp: Fix udp_poll() and ioctl()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h |    1 +
 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c   |   27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c  |    2 +-
 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h
@@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ int l2tp_xmit_skb(struct l2tp_session *s
 int l2tp_nl_register_ops(enum l2tp_pwtype pw_type,
 			 const struct l2tp_nl_cmd_ops *ops);
 void l2tp_nl_unregister_ops(enum l2tp_pwtype pw_type);
+int l2tp_ioctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, unsigned long arg);
 
 /* Session reference counts. Incremented when code obtains a reference
  * to a session.
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
 
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
 #include <linux/icmp.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
@@ -555,6 +556,30 @@ out:
 	return err ? err : copied;
 }
 
+int l2tp_ioctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+	int amount;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case SIOCOUTQ:
+		amount = sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk);
+		break;
+	case SIOCINQ:
+		spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
+		skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
+		amount = skb ? skb->len : 0;
+		spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
+	}
+
+	return put_user(amount, (int __user *)arg);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(l2tp_ioctl);
+
 static struct proto l2tp_ip_prot = {
 	.name		   = "L2TP/IP",
 	.owner		   = THIS_MODULE,
@@ -563,7 +588,7 @@ static struct proto l2tp_ip_prot = {
 	.bind		   = l2tp_ip_bind,
 	.connect	   = l2tp_ip_connect,
 	.disconnect	   = l2tp_ip_disconnect,
-	.ioctl		   = udp_ioctl,
+	.ioctl		   = l2tp_ioctl,
 	.destroy	   = l2tp_ip_destroy_sock,
 	.setsockopt	   = ip_setsockopt,
 	.getsockopt	   = ip_getsockopt,
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ static struct proto l2tp_ip6_prot = {
 	.bind		   = l2tp_ip6_bind,
 	.connect	   = l2tp_ip6_connect,
 	.disconnect	   = l2tp_ip6_disconnect,
-	.ioctl		   = udp_ioctl,
+	.ioctl		   = l2tp_ioctl,
 	.destroy	   = l2tp_ip6_destroy_sock,
 	.setsockopt	   = ipv6_setsockopt,
 	.getsockopt	   = ipv6_getsockopt,

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#1582798 — [PATCH 4.4 08/20] ip6_gre: fix ip6gre_err() invalid reads

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>


[ Upstream commit 7892032cfe67f4bde6fc2ee967e45a8fbaf33756 ]

Andrey Konovalov reported out of bound accesses in ip6gre_err()

If GRE flags contains GRE_KEY, the following expression
*(((__be32 *)p) + (grehlen / 4) - 1)

accesses data ~40 bytes after the expected point, since
grehlen includes the size of IPv6 headers.

Let's use a "struct gre_base_hdr *greh" pointer to make this
code more readable.

p[1] becomes greh->protocol.
grhlen is the GRE header length.

Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c |   41 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
 #include <net/ip6_fib.h>
 #include <net/ip6_route.h>
 #include <net/ip6_tunnel.h>
+#include <net/gre.h>
 
 
 static bool log_ecn_error = true;
@@ -367,35 +368,37 @@ static void ip6gre_tunnel_uninit(struct
 
 
 static void ip6gre_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
-		u8 type, u8 code, int offset, __be32 info)
+		       u8 type, u8 code, int offset, __be32 info)
 {
-	const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h = (const struct ipv6hdr *)skb->data;
-	__be16 *p = (__be16 *)(skb->data + offset);
-	int grehlen = offset + 4;
+	const struct gre_base_hdr *greh;
+	const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h;
+	int grehlen = sizeof(*greh);
 	struct ip6_tnl *t;
+	int key_off = 0;
 	__be16 flags;
+	__be32 key;
 
-	flags = p[0];
-	if (flags&(GRE_CSUM|GRE_KEY|GRE_SEQ|GRE_ROUTING|GRE_VERSION)) {
-		if (flags&(GRE_VERSION|GRE_ROUTING))
-			return;
-		if (flags&GRE_KEY) {
-			grehlen += 4;
-			if (flags&GRE_CSUM)
-				grehlen += 4;
-		}
+	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, offset + grehlen))
+		return;
+	greh = (const struct gre_base_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
+	flags = greh->flags;
+	if (flags & (GRE_VERSION | GRE_ROUTING))
+		return;
+	if (flags & GRE_CSUM)
+		grehlen += 4;
+	if (flags & GRE_KEY) {
+		key_off = grehlen + offset;
+		grehlen += 4;
 	}
 
-	/* If only 8 bytes returned, keyed message will be dropped here */
-	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, grehlen))
+	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, offset + grehlen))
 		return;
 	ipv6h = (const struct ipv6hdr *)skb->data;
-	p = (__be16 *)(skb->data + offset);
+	greh = (const struct gre_base_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
+	key = key_off ? *(__be32 *)(skb->data + key_off) : 0;
 
 	t = ip6gre_tunnel_lookup(skb->dev, &ipv6h->daddr, &ipv6h->saddr,
-				flags & GRE_KEY ?
-				*(((__be32 *)p) + (grehlen / 4) - 1) : 0,
-				p[1]);
+				 key, greh->protocol);
 	if (!t)
 		return;
 

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#1582808 — [PATCH 4.4 20/20] tcp: fix mark propagation with fwmark_reflect enabled

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pau Espin Pedrol <pespin.shar@gmail.com>

commit bf99b4ded5f8a4767dbb9d180626f06c51f9881f upstream.

Otherwise, RST packets generated by the TCP stack for non-existing
sockets always have mark 0.
The mark from the original packet is assigned to the netns_ipv4/6
socket used to send the response so that it can get copied into the
response skb when the socket sends it.

Fixes: e110861f8609 ("net: add a sysctl to reflect the fwmark on replies")
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pau Espin Pedrol <pau.espin@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/ipv4/ip_output.c |    1 +
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c  |    1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
@@ -1592,6 +1592,7 @@ void ip_send_unicast_reply(struct sock *
 	sk->sk_protocol = ip_hdr(skb)->protocol;
 	sk->sk_bound_dev_if = arg->bound_dev_if;
 	sk->sk_sndbuf = sysctl_wmem_default;
+	sk->sk_mark = fl4.flowi4_mark;
 	err = ip_append_data(sk, &fl4, ip_reply_glue_bits, arg->iov->iov_base,
 			     len, 0, &ipc, &rt, MSG_DONTWAIT);
 	if (unlikely(err)) {
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -822,6 +822,7 @@ static void tcp_v6_send_response(const s
 	dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(ctl_sk, &fl6, NULL);
 	if (!IS_ERR(dst)) {
 		skb_dst_set(buff, dst);
+		ctl_sk->sk_mark = fl6.flowi6_mark;
 		ip6_xmit(ctl_sk, buff, &fl6, NULL, tclass);
 		TCP_INC_STATS_BH(net, TCP_MIB_OUTSEGS);
 		if (rst)

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#1582809 — [PATCH 4.4 17/20] packet: round up linear to header len

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>


[ Upstream commit 57031eb794906eea4e1c7b31dc1e2429c0af0c66 ]

Link layer protocols may unconditionally pull headers, as Ethernet
does in eth_type_trans. Ensure that the entire link layer header
always lies in the skb linear segment. tpacket_snd has such a check.
Extend this to packet_snd.

Variable length link layer headers complicate the computation
somewhat. Here skb->len may be smaller than dev->hard_header_len.

Round up the linear length to be at least as long as the smallest of
the two.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/packet/af_packet.c |    7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2637,7 +2637,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc
 	int vnet_hdr_len;
 	struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
 	unsigned short gso_type = 0;
-	int hlen, tlen;
+	int hlen, tlen, linear;
 	int extra_len = 0;
 	ssize_t n;
 
@@ -2741,8 +2741,9 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc
 	err = -ENOBUFS;
 	hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev);
 	tlen = dev->needed_tailroom;
-	skb = packet_alloc_skb(sk, hlen + tlen, hlen, len,
-			       __virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr.hdr_len),
+	linear = __virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr.hdr_len);
+	linear = max(linear, min_t(int, len, dev->hard_header_len));
+	skb = packet_alloc_skb(sk, hlen + tlen, hlen, len, linear,
 			       msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
 	if (skb == NULL)
 		goto out_unlock;

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#1582817 — [PATCH 4.4 11/20] tun: read vnet_hdr_sz once

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>


[ Upstream commit e1edab87faf6ca30cd137e0795bc73aa9a9a22ec ]

When IFF_VNET_HDR is enabled, a virtio_net header must precede data.
Data length is verified to be greater than or equal to expected header
length tun->vnet_hdr_sz before copying.

Read this value once and cache locally, as it can be updated between
the test and use (TOCTOU).

Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
CC: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/tun.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/tun.c
+++ b/drivers/net/tun.c
@@ -1108,9 +1108,11 @@ static ssize_t tun_get_user(struct tun_s
 	}
 
 	if (tun->flags & IFF_VNET_HDR) {
-		if (len < tun->vnet_hdr_sz)
+		int vnet_hdr_sz = READ_ONCE(tun->vnet_hdr_sz);
+
+		if (len < vnet_hdr_sz)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		len -= tun->vnet_hdr_sz;
+		len -= vnet_hdr_sz;
 
 		n = copy_from_iter(&gso, sizeof(gso), from);
 		if (n != sizeof(gso))
@@ -1122,7 +1124,7 @@ static ssize_t tun_get_user(struct tun_s
 
 		if (tun16_to_cpu(tun, gso.hdr_len) > len)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		iov_iter_advance(from, tun->vnet_hdr_sz - sizeof(gso));
+		iov_iter_advance(from, vnet_hdr_sz - sizeof(gso));
 	}
 
 	if ((tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) == IFF_TAP) {
@@ -1301,7 +1303,7 @@ static ssize_t tun_put_user(struct tun_s
 		vlan_hlen = VLAN_HLEN;
 
 	if (tun->flags & IFF_VNET_HDR)
-		vnet_hdr_sz = tun->vnet_hdr_sz;
+		vnet_hdr_sz = READ_ONCE(tun->vnet_hdr_sz);
 
 	total = skb->len + vlan_hlen + vnet_hdr_sz;
 

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#1583307

On 02/16/2017 09:53 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.50 release.
> There are 20 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat Feb 18 17:52:49 UTC 2017.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>

Build results:
	total: 149 pass: 149 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 115 pass: 115 fail: 0

Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders.

Guenter

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#1583812

On Fri, Feb 17, 2017 at 11:28:43AM -0800, kernelci.org bot wrote:
> stable-rc boot: 31 boots: 0 failed, 31 passed (v4.4.49-21-g967e7e889dce)

Better than the 4.9 number of boots, but still odd...

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