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Groups > linux.kernel > #1671164 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-06-20 23:50 +0200 |
| Last post | 2017-06-30 02:10 +0200 |
| Articles | 4 — 4 participants |
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[PATCH] fs: Reorder inode_owner_or_capable() to avoid needless Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-06-20 23:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH] fs: Reorder inode_owner_or_capable() to avoid needless "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> - 2017-06-21 00:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH] fs: Reorder inode_owner_or_capable() to avoid needless Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> - 2017-06-21 17:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH] fs: Reorder inode_owner_or_capable() to avoid needless Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2017-06-30 02:10 +0200
| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-20 23:50 +0200 |
| Subject | [PATCH] fs: Reorder inode_owner_or_capable() to avoid needless |
| Message-ID | <tUzc5-5At-9@gated-at.bofh.it> |
Checking for capabilities should be the last operation when performing
access control tests so that PF_SUPERPRIV is set only when it was required
for success (implying that the capability was needed for the operation).
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
fs/inode.c | 2 +-
fs/namei.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
index db5914783a71..7092debe90cc 100644
--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -2023,7 +2023,7 @@ bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode)
return true;
ns = current_user_ns();
- if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid))
+ if (kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) && ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER))
return true;
return false;
}
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 6571a5f5112e..efe53a5d0737 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ static int may_linkat(struct path *link)
/* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like,
* otherwise, it must be a safe source.
*/
- if (inode_owner_or_capable(inode) || safe_hardlink_source(inode))
+ if (safe_hardlink_source(inode) || inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return 0;
audit_log_link_denied("linkat", link);
--
2.7.4
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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| From | "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-21 00:10 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tUzvt-5W2-45@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1671164 |
Quoting Kees Cook (keescook@chromium.org):
> Checking for capabilities should be the last operation when performing
> access control tests so that PF_SUPERPRIV is set only when it was required
> for success (implying that the capability was needed for the operation).
>
> Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Makes sense, thanks.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
> fs/inode.c | 2 +-
> fs/namei.c | 2 +-
> 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
> index db5914783a71..7092debe90cc 100644
> --- a/fs/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/inode.c
> @@ -2023,7 +2023,7 @@ bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode)
> return true;
>
> ns = current_user_ns();
> - if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid))
> + if (kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) && ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER))
> return true;
> return false;
> }
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index 6571a5f5112e..efe53a5d0737 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ static int may_linkat(struct path *link)
> /* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like,
> * otherwise, it must be a safe source.
> */
> - if (inode_owner_or_capable(inode) || safe_hardlink_source(inode))
> + if (safe_hardlink_source(inode) || inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
> return 0;
>
> audit_log_link_denied("linkat", link);
> --
> 2.7.4
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Pixel Security
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| From | Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-21 17:00 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tUPgS-7q0-35@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1671164 |
On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 2:40 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > Checking for capabilities should be the last operation when performing > access control tests so that PF_SUPERPRIV is set only when it was required > for success (implying that the capability was needed for the operation). > Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
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| From | Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-30 02:10 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tXRFx-6oX-45@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1671164 |
On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 02:40:24PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > Checking for capabilities should be the last operation when performing > access control tests so that PF_SUPERPRIV is set only when it was required > for success (implying that the capability was needed for the operation). Applied
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