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Groups > linux.kernel > #1668160 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200 |
| Last post | 2017-06-19 13:10 +0200 |
| Articles | 15 — 2 participants |
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[RFC v2 00/12] powerpc: Memory Protection Keys Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> - 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200
[RFC v2 09/12] powerpc: Deliver SEGV signal on pkey violation. Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> - 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200
[RFC v2 07/12] powerpc: Macro the mask used for checking DSI exception Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> - 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200
[RFC v2 04/12] powerpc: store and restore the pkey state across context switches. Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> - 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200
[RFC v2 05/12] powerpc: Implementation for sys_mprotect_pkey() system call. Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> - 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200
[RFC v2 11/12]Documentation: Documentation updates. Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> - 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200
[RFC v2 01/12] powerpc: Free up four 64K PTE bits in 4K backed hpte pages. Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> - 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200
[RFC v2 10/12] powerpc: Read AMR only if pkey-violation caused the exception. Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> - 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200
Re: [RFC v2 10/12] powerpc: Read AMR only if pkey-violation caused the exception. Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> - 2017-06-19 13:10 +0200
Re: [RFC v2 10/12] powerpc: Read AMR only if pkey-violation caused the exception. Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> - 2017-06-19 20:00 +0200
[RFC v2 03/12] powerpc: Implement sys_pkey_alloc and sys_pkey_free system call. Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> - 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200
Re: [RFC v2 03/12] powerpc: Implement sys_pkey_alloc and sys_pkey_free system call. Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> - 2017-06-19 14:20 +0200
[RFC v2 06/12] powerpc: Program HPTE key protection bits. Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> - 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200
[RFC v2 02/12] powerpc: Free up four 64K PTE bits in 64K backed hpte pages. Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> - 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200
Re: [RFC v2 12/12]selftest: Updated protection key selftest Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> - 2017-06-19 13:10 +0200
| From | Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200 |
| Subject | [RFC v2 00/12] powerpc: Memory Protection Keys |
| Message-ID | <tTd3X-1kp-3@gated-at.bofh.it> |
Memory protection keys enable applications to protect its address space from inadvertent access or corruption from itself. The overall idea: A process allocates a key and associates it with a address range within its address space. The process than can dynamically set read/write permissions on the key without involving the kernel. Any code that violates the permissions off the address space; as defined by its associated key, will receive a segmentation fault. This patch series enables the feature on PPC64. It is enabled on HPTE 64K-page platform. ISA3.0 section 5.7.13 describes the detailed specifications. Testing: This patch series has passed all the protection key tests available in the selftests directory. The tests are updated to work on both x86 and powerpc. version v2: (1) documentation and selftest added (2) fixed a bug in 4k hpte backed 64k pte where page invalidation was not done correctly, and initialization of second-part-of-the-pte was not done correctly if the pte was not yet Hashed with a hpte. Reported by Aneesh. (3) Fixed ABI breakage caused in siginfo structure. Reported by Anshuman. Outstanding known issue: Calls to sys_swapcontext with a made-up context will end up with a crap AMR if done by code who didn't know about that register. -- Reported by Ben. version v1: Initial version Thanks-to: Dave Hansen, Aneesh, Paul Mackerras, Michael Ellermen Ram Pai (12): Free up four 64K PTE bits in 4K backed hpte pages. Free up four 64K PTE bits in 64K backed hpte pages. Implement sys_pkey_alloc and sys_pkey_free system call. store and restore the pkey state across context switches. Implementation for sys_mprotect_pkey() system call. Program HPTE key protection bits. Macro the mask used for checking DSI exception Handle exceptions caused by violation of pkey protection. Deliver SEGV signal on pkey violation. Read AMR only if pkey-violation caused the exception. Documentation updates. Updated protection key selftest Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt | 110 ++ Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt | 85 -- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 15 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-4k.h | 20 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-64k.h | 48 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash.h | 15 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h | 10 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu.h | 10 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h | 84 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/mman.h | 29 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 12 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h | 159 +++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/processor.h | 5 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h | 10 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/systbl.h | 3 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/unistd.h | 6 +- arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 3 +- arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 3 + arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 5 + arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 18 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 18 + arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c | 14 + arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c | 14 + arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c | 49 + arch/powerpc/mm/Makefile | 1 + arch/powerpc/mm/dump_linuxpagetables.c | 3 +- arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c | 25 +- arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_4k.c | 14 +- arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_64k.c | 93 +- arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c | 35 +- arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage-hash64.c | 16 +- arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context_book3s64.c | 5 + arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c | 267 +++++ include/linux/mm.h | 32 +- include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 365 +++++++ tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 1451 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h | 219 ---- tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c | 1395 ------------------------ 42 files changed, 2828 insertions(+), 1844 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt delete mode 100644 Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c delete mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h delete mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c -- 1.8.3.1
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| From | Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200 |
| Subject | [RFC v2 09/12] powerpc: Deliver SEGV signal on pkey violation. |
| Message-ID | <tTd3Y-1kp-5@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1668160 |
The value of the AMR register at the time of exception
is made available in gp_regs[PT_AMR] of the siginfo.
This field can be used to reprogram the permission bits of
any valid pkey.
Similarly the value of the pkey, whose protection got violated,
is made available at si_pkey field of the siginfo structure.
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h | 1 +
arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 3 ++-
arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 5 ++++
arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 8 ++++++
arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c | 14 ++++++++++
arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c | 14 ++++++++++
arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c | 4 +++
8 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h
index 1c09f8f..a41afd3 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ struct paca_struct {
struct dtl_entry *dispatch_log_end;
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 */
u64 dscr_default; /* per-CPU default DSCR */
+ u64 paca_amr; /* value of amr at exception */
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64
/*
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h
index 8036b38..7ec2428 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h
@@ -108,8 +108,9 @@ struct pt_regs {
#define PT_DAR 41
#define PT_DSISR 42
#define PT_RESULT 43
-#define PT_DSCR 44
#define PT_REGS_COUNT 44
+#define PT_DSCR 44
+#define PT_AMR 45
#define PT_FPR0 48 /* each FP reg occupies 2 slots in this space */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index 709e234..17f5d8a 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ int main(void)
OFFSET(PACAHWCPUID, paca_struct, hw_cpu_id);
OFFSET(PACAKEXECSTATE, paca_struct, kexec_state);
OFFSET(PACA_DSCR_DEFAULT, paca_struct, dscr_default);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ OFFSET(PACA_AMR, paca_struct, paca_amr);
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
OFFSET(ACCOUNT_STARTTIME, paca_struct, accounting.starttime);
OFFSET(ACCOUNT_STARTTIME_USER, paca_struct, accounting.starttime_user);
OFFSET(ACCOUNT_USER_TIME, paca_struct, accounting.utime);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
index 3fd0528..8db9ef8 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
@@ -493,6 +493,10 @@ EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(data_access_common)
ld r12,_MSR(r1)
ld r3,PACA_EXGEN+EX_DAR(r13)
lwz r4,PACA_EXGEN+EX_DSISR(r13)
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ mfspr r5,SPRN_AMR
+ std r5,PACA_AMR(r13)
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
li r5,0x300
std r3,_DAR(r1)
std r4,_DSISR(r1)
@@ -561,6 +565,10 @@ EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(instruction_access_common)
ld r12,_MSR(r1)
ld r3,_NIP(r1)
andis. r4,r12,0x5820
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ mfspr r5,SPRN_AMR
+ std r5,PACA_AMR(r13)
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
li r5,0x400
std r3,_DAR(r1)
std r4,_DSISR(r1)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c
index 97bb138..059766a 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c
@@ -500,6 +500,11 @@ static int save_user_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, struct mcontext __user *frame,
(unsigned long) &frame->tramp[2]);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ if (__put_user(get_paca()->paca_amr, &frame->mc_gregs[PT_AMR]))
+ return 1;
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
return 0;
}
@@ -661,6 +666,9 @@ static long restore_user_regs(struct pt_regs *regs,
long err;
unsigned int save_r2 = 0;
unsigned long msr;
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ unsigned long amr;
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
int i;
#endif
@@ -750,6 +758,12 @@ static long restore_user_regs(struct pt_regs *regs,
return 1;
#endif /* CONFIG_SPE */
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ err |= __get_user(amr, &sr->mc_gregs[PT_AMR]);
+ if (!err && amr != get_paca()->paca_amr)
+ write_amr(amr);
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c
index c83c115..35df2e4 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c
@@ -174,6 +174,10 @@ static long setup_sigcontext(struct sigcontext __user *sc,
if (set != NULL)
err |= __put_user(set->sig[0], &sc->oldmask);
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ err |= __put_user(get_paca()->paca_amr, &sc->gp_regs[PT_AMR]);
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
return err;
}
@@ -327,6 +331,9 @@ static long restore_sigcontext(struct task_struct *tsk, sigset_t *set, int sig,
unsigned long save_r13 = 0;
unsigned long msr;
struct pt_regs *regs = tsk->thread.regs;
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ unsigned long amr;
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
int i;
#endif
@@ -406,6 +413,13 @@ static long restore_sigcontext(struct task_struct *tsk, sigset_t *set, int sig,
tsk->thread.fp_state.fpr[i][TS_VSRLOWOFFSET] = 0;
}
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ err |= __get_user(amr, &sc->gp_regs[PT_AMR]);
+ if (!err && amr != get_paca()->paca_amr)
+ write_amr(amr);
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
return err;
}
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
index d4e545d..cc4bde8b 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/pkeys.h>
#include <linux/stddef.h>
#include <linux/unistd.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
@@ -247,6 +248,49 @@ void user_single_step_siginfo(struct task_struct *tsk,
info->si_addr = (void __user *)regs->nip;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+static void fill_sig_info_pkey(int si_code, siginfo_t *info, unsigned long addr)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+
+ /* Fault not from Protection Keys: nothing to do */
+ if (si_code != SEGV_PKUERR)
+ return;
+
+ down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+ /*
+ * we could be racing with pkey_mprotect().
+ * If pkey_mprotect() wins the key value could
+ * get modified...xxx
+ */
+ vma = find_vma(current->mm, addr);
+ up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+
+ /*
+ * force_sig_info_fault() is called from a number of
+ * contexts, some of which have a VMA and some of which
+ * do not. The Pkey-fault handing happens after we have a
+ * valid VMA, so we should never reach this without a
+ * valid VMA.
+ */
+ if (!vma) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "Pkey fault with no VMA passed in");
+ info->si_pkey = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We could report the incorrect key because of the reason
+ * explained above.
+ *
+ * si_pkey should be thought off as a strong hint, but not
+ * an absolutely guarantee because of the race explained
+ * above.
+ */
+ info->si_pkey = vma_pkey(vma);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
void _exception(int signr, struct pt_regs *regs, int code, unsigned long addr)
{
siginfo_t info;
@@ -274,6 +318,11 @@ void _exception(int signr, struct pt_regs *regs, int code, unsigned long addr)
info.si_signo = signr;
info.si_code = code;
info.si_addr = (void __user *) addr;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ fill_sig_info_pkey(code, &info, addr);
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
force_sig_info(signr, &info, current);
}
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
index c31624f..dd448d2 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
@@ -453,6 +453,10 @@ int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE,
flags & FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION,
0)) {
+
+ /* our caller may not have saved the amr. Lets save it */
+ get_paca()->paca_amr = read_amr();
+
code = SEGV_PKUERR;
goto bad_area;
}
--
1.8.3.1
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| From | Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200 |
| Subject | [RFC v2 07/12] powerpc: Macro the mask used for checking DSI exception |
| Message-ID | <tTd3Y-1kp-9@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1668160 |
Replace the magic number used to check for DSI exception with a meaningful value. Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h | 9 ++++++++- arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 2 +- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h index 7e50e47..2dcb8a1 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h @@ -272,16 +272,23 @@ #define SPRN_DAR 0x013 /* Data Address Register */ #define SPRN_DBCR 0x136 /* e300 Data Breakpoint Control Reg */ #define SPRN_DSISR 0x012 /* Data Storage Interrupt Status Register */ +#define DSISR_BIT32 0x80000000 /* not defined */ #define DSISR_NOHPTE 0x40000000 /* no translation found */ +#define DSISR_PAGEATTR_CONFLT 0x20000000 /* page attribute conflict */ +#define DSISR_BIT35 0x10000000 /* not defined */ #define DSISR_PROTFAULT 0x08000000 /* protection fault */ #define DSISR_BADACCESS 0x04000000 /* bad access to CI or G */ #define DSISR_ISSTORE 0x02000000 /* access was a store */ #define DSISR_DABRMATCH 0x00400000 /* hit data breakpoint */ -#define DSISR_NOSEGMENT 0x00200000 /* SLB miss */ #define DSISR_KEYFAULT 0x00200000 /* Key fault */ +#define DSISR_BIT43 0x00100000 /* not defined */ #define DSISR_UNSUPP_MMU 0x00080000 /* Unsupported MMU config */ #define DSISR_SET_RC 0x00040000 /* Failed setting of R/C bits */ #define DSISR_PGDIRFAULT 0x00020000 /* Fault on page directory */ +#define DSISR_PAGE_FAULT_MASK (DSISR_BIT32 | \ + DSISR_PAGEATTR_CONFLT | \ + DSISR_BADACCESS | \ + DSISR_BIT43) #define SPRN_TBRL 0x10C /* Time Base Read Lower Register (user, R/O) */ #define SPRN_TBRU 0x10D /* Time Base Read Upper Register (user, R/O) */ #define SPRN_CIR 0x11B /* Chip Information Register (hyper, R/0) */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S index ae418b8..3fd0528 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S @@ -1411,7 +1411,7 @@ USE_TEXT_SECTION() .balign IFETCH_ALIGN_BYTES do_hash_page: #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 - andis. r0,r4,0xa410 /* weird error? */ + andis. r0,r4,DSISR_PAGE_FAULT_MASK@h bne- handle_page_fault /* if not, try to insert a HPTE */ andis. r0,r4,DSISR_DABRMATCH@h bne- handle_dabr_fault -- 1.8.3.1
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| From | Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200 |
| Subject | [RFC v2 04/12] powerpc: store and restore the pkey state across context switches. |
| Message-ID | <tTd3Y-1kp-7@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1668160 |
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/processor.h | 5 +++++
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/processor.h
index a2123f2..1f714df 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -310,6 +310,11 @@ struct thread_struct {
struct thread_vr_state ckvr_state; /* Checkpointed VR state */
unsigned long ckvrsave; /* Checkpointed VRSAVE */
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM */
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ unsigned long amr;
+ unsigned long iamr;
+ unsigned long uamor;
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_32_HANDLER
void* kvm_shadow_vcpu; /* KVM internal data */
#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_32_HANDLER */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
index baae104..37d001a 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
@@ -1096,6 +1096,11 @@ static inline void save_sprs(struct thread_struct *t)
t->tar = mfspr(SPRN_TAR);
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ t->amr = mfspr(SPRN_AMR);
+ t->iamr = mfspr(SPRN_IAMR);
+ t->uamor = mfspr(SPRN_UAMOR);
+#endif
}
static inline void restore_sprs(struct thread_struct *old_thread,
@@ -1131,6 +1136,14 @@ static inline void restore_sprs(struct thread_struct *old_thread,
mtspr(SPRN_TAR, new_thread->tar);
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ if (old_thread->amr != new_thread->amr)
+ mtspr(SPRN_AMR, new_thread->amr);
+ if (old_thread->iamr != new_thread->iamr)
+ mtspr(SPRN_IAMR, new_thread->iamr);
+ if (old_thread->uamor != new_thread->uamor)
+ mtspr(SPRN_UAMOR, new_thread->uamor);
+#endif
}
struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev,
@@ -1686,6 +1699,11 @@ void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long start, unsigned long sp)
current->thread.tm_texasr = 0;
current->thread.tm_tfiar = 0;
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM */
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ current->thread.amr = 0x0ul;
+ current->thread.iamr = 0x0ul;
+ current->thread.uamor = 0x0ul;
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(start_thread);
--
1.8.3.1
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| From | Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200 |
| Subject | [RFC v2 05/12] powerpc: Implementation for sys_mprotect_pkey() system call. |
| Message-ID | <tTd3Y-1kp-15@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1668160 |
This system call, associates the pkey with PTE of all
pages corresponding to the given address range.
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h | 22 ++++++-
arch/powerpc/include/asm/mman.h | 29 +++++----
arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h | 21 ++++++-
arch/powerpc/include/asm/systbl.h | 1 +
arch/powerpc/include/asm/unistd.h | 4 +-
arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 +
arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
include/linux/mm.h | 1 +
8 files changed, 154 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
index 87e9a89..bc845cd 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#define _RPAGE_RSV2 0x0800000000000000UL
#define _RPAGE_RSV3 0x0400000000000000UL
#define _RPAGE_RSV4 0x0200000000000000UL
+#define _RPAGE_RSV5 0x00040UL
#define _PAGE_PTE 0x4000000000000000UL /* distinguishes PTEs from pointers */
#define _PAGE_PRESENT 0x8000000000000000UL /* pte contains a translation */
@@ -56,6 +57,20 @@
/* Max physical address bit as per radix table */
#define _RPAGE_PA_MAX 57
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+#define H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 _RPAGE_RSV1
+#define H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 _RPAGE_RSV2
+#define H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 _RPAGE_RSV3
+#define H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 _RPAGE_RSV4
+#define H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT4 _RPAGE_RSV5
+#else /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+#define H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 0
+#define H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 0
+#define H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 0
+#define H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 0
+#define H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT4 0
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
/*
* Max physical address bit we will use for now.
*
@@ -122,7 +137,12 @@
#define PAGE_PROT_BITS (_PAGE_SAO | _PAGE_NON_IDEMPOTENT | _PAGE_TOLERANT | \
H_PAGE_4K_PFN | _PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_ACCESSED | \
_PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_EXEC | \
- _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY)
+ _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY | \
+ H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 | \
+ H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 | \
+ H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 | \
+ H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 | \
+ H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT4)
/*
* We define 2 sets of base prot bits, one for basic pages (ie,
* cacheable kernel and user pages) and one for non cacheable
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mman.h
index 30922f6..14cc1aa 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -13,24 +13,31 @@
#include <asm/cputable.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/pkeys.h>
#include <asm/cpu_has_feature.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+
/*
* This file is included by linux/mman.h, so we can't use cacl_vm_prot_bits()
* here. How important is the optimization?
*/
-static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot,
- unsigned long pkey)
-{
- return (prot & PROT_SAO) ? VM_SAO : 0;
-}
-#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey)
+#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \
+ ((prot) & PROT_SAO ? VM_SAO : 0) | \
+ pkey_to_vmflag_bits(key))
+#define arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags) __pgprot( \
+ ((vm_flags) & VM_SAO ? _PAGE_SAO : 0) | \
+ vmflag_to_page_pkey_bits(vm_flags))
+
+#else /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
+#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \
+ ((prot) & PROT_SAO ? VM_SAO : 0))
+#define arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags) __pgprot( \
+ ((vm_flags) & VM_SAO ? _PAGE_SAO : 0))
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
-static inline pgprot_t arch_vm_get_page_prot(unsigned long vm_flags)
-{
- return (vm_flags & VM_SAO) ? __pgprot(_PAGE_SAO) : __pgprot(0);
-}
-#define arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags) arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags)
static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot)
{
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h
index 7bc8746..0f3dca8 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h
@@ -14,6 +14,19 @@
VM_PKEY_BIT3 | \
VM_PKEY_BIT4)
+#define pkey_to_vmflag_bits(key) (((key & 0x1UL) ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0x0UL) | \
+ ((key & 0x2UL) ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0x0UL) | \
+ ((key & 0x4UL) ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0x0UL) | \
+ ((key & 0x8UL) ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0x0UL) | \
+ ((key & 0x10UL) ? VM_PKEY_BIT4 : 0x0UL))
+
+#define vmflag_to_page_pkey_bits(vm_flags) \
+ (((vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT0) ? H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT4 : 0x0UL)| \
+ ((vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT1) ? H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0x0UL) | \
+ ((vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT2) ? H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0x0UL) | \
+ ((vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT3) ? H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0x0UL) | \
+ ((vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT4) ? H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0x0UL))
+
/*
* Bits are in BE format.
* NOTE: key 31, 1, 0 are not used.
@@ -42,6 +55,12 @@
#define mm_set_pkey_is_reserved(mm, pkey) (PKEY_INITIAL_ALLOCAION & \
pkeybit_mask(pkey))
+
+static inline int vma_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ return (vma->vm_flags & ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS) >> VM_PKEY_SHIFT;
+}
+
static inline bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey)
{
/* a reserved key is never considered as 'explicitly allocated' */
@@ -114,7 +133,7 @@ static inline int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
return __arch_set_user_pkey_access(tsk, pkey, init_val);
}
-static inline pkey_mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm)
+static inline void pkey_mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) = PKEY_INITIAL_ALLOCAION;
/* -1 means unallocated or invalid */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/systbl.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/systbl.h
index 22dd776..b33b551 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/systbl.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/systbl.h
@@ -390,3 +390,4 @@
SYSCALL(statx)
SYSCALL(pkey_alloc)
SYSCALL(pkey_free)
+SYSCALL(pkey_mprotect)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/unistd.h
index e0273bc..daf1ba9 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/unistd.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/unistd.h
@@ -12,12 +12,10 @@
#include <uapi/asm/unistd.h>
-#define NR_syscalls 386
+#define NR_syscalls 387
#define __NR__exit __NR_exit
-#define __IGNORE_pkey_mprotect
-
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
#include <linux/types.h>
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h b/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
index 7993a07..71ae45e 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
@@ -396,5 +396,6 @@
#define __NR_statx 383
#define __NR_pkey_alloc 384
#define __NR_pkey_free 385
+#define __NR_pkey_mprotect 386
#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_POWERPC_UNISTD_H_ */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
index b97366e..11a32b3 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
@@ -15,6 +15,17 @@
#include <linux/pkeys.h> /* PKEY_* */
#include <uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h>
+#define pkeyshift(pkey) ((arch_max_pkey()-pkey-1) * AMR_BITS_PER_PKEY)
+
+static inline bool pkey_allows_readwrite(int pkey)
+{
+ int pkey_shift = pkeyshift(pkey);
+
+ if (!(read_uamor() & (0x3UL << pkey_shift)))
+ return true;
+
+ return !(read_amr() & ((AMR_AD_BIT|AMR_WD_BIT) << pkey_shift));
+}
/*
* set the access right in AMR IAMR and UAMOR register
@@ -68,7 +79,60 @@ int __arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
- return -1;
+ bool need_to_set_mm_pkey = false;
+ int execute_only_pkey = mm->context.execute_only_pkey;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Do we need to assign a pkey for mm's execute-only maps? */
+ if (execute_only_pkey == -1) {
+ /* Go allocate one to use, which might fail */
+ execute_only_pkey = mm_pkey_alloc(mm);
+ if (execute_only_pkey < 0)
+ return -1;
+ need_to_set_mm_pkey = true;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We do not want to go through the relatively costly
+ * dance to set AMR if we do not need to. Check it
+ * first and assume that if the execute-only pkey is
+ * readwrite-disabled than we do not have to set it
+ * ourselves.
+ */
+ if (!need_to_set_mm_pkey &&
+ !pkey_allows_readwrite(execute_only_pkey))
+ return execute_only_pkey;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up AMR so that it denies access for everything
+ * other than execution.
+ */
+ ret = __arch_set_user_pkey_access(current, execute_only_pkey,
+ (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE));
+ /*
+ * If the AMR-set operation failed somehow, just return
+ * 0 and effectively disable execute-only support.
+ */
+ if (ret) {
+ mm_set_pkey_free(mm, execute_only_pkey);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* We got one, store it and use it from here on out */
+ if (need_to_set_mm_pkey)
+ mm->context.execute_only_pkey = execute_only_pkey;
+ return execute_only_pkey;
+}
+
+static inline bool vma_is_pkey_exec_only(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ /* Do this check first since the vm_flags should be hot */
+ if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC)) != VM_EXEC)
+ return false;
+ if (vma_pkey(vma) != vma->vm_mm->context.execute_only_pkey)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
}
/*
@@ -84,5 +148,30 @@ int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot,
if (pkey != -1)
return pkey;
- return 0;
+ /*
+ * Look for a protection-key-drive execute-only mapping
+ * which is now being given permissions that are not
+ * execute-only. Move it back to the default pkey.
+ */
+ if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma) &&
+ (prot & (PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE))) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * The mapping is execute-only. Go try to get the
+ * execute-only protection key. If we fail to do that,
+ * fall through as if we do not have execute-only
+ * support.
+ */
+ if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
+ pkey = execute_only_pkey(vma->vm_mm);
+ if (pkey > 0)
+ return pkey;
+ }
+ /*
+ * This is a vanilla, non-pkey mprotect (or we failed to
+ * setup execute-only), inherit the pkey from the VMA we
+ * are working on.
+ */
+ return vma_pkey(vma);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 34ddac7..5399031 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ extern int overcommit_kbytes_handler(struct ctl_table *, int, void __user *,
#define VM_PKEY_BIT3 VM_HIGH_ARCH_3
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
#elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
+#define VM_PKEY_SHIFT VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0
#define VM_PKEY_BIT0 VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 /* A protection key is a 5-bit value */
#define VM_PKEY_BIT1 VM_HIGH_ARCH_1
#define VM_PKEY_BIT2 VM_HIGH_ARCH_2
--
1.8.3.1
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| From | Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200 |
| Subject | [RFC v2 11/12]Documentation: Documentation updates. |
| Message-ID | <tTd3Y-1kp-21@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1668160 |
The Documentaton file is moved from x86 into the generic area, since this feature is now supported by more than one archs. Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> --- Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt | 85 -------------------------- 2 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt delete mode 100644 Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt diff --git a/Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt b/Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b49e6bb --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU aka PKEYs) is a CPU feature +found in new generation of intel CPUs on PowerPC CPUs. + +Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing page-based +protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables +when an application changes protection domains. + + +On Intel: + +It works by dedicating 4 previously ignored bits in each page table +entry to a "protection key", giving 16 possible keys. + +There is also a new user-accessible register (PKRU) with two separate +bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key. Being a CPU +register, PKRU is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each +thread a different set of protections from every other thread. + +There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and writing +to the new register. The feature is only available in 64-bit mode, +even though there is theoretically space in the PAE PTEs. These +permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on +instruction fetches. + + +On PowerPC: + +It works by dedicating 5 page table entry to a "protection key", +giving 32 possible keys. + +There is a user-accessible register (AMR) with two separate bits +(Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key. Being a CPU +register, AMR is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each +thread a different set of protections from every other thread. +NOTE: Disabling read permission does not disable +write and vice-versa. + +The feature is available on 64-bit HPTE mode only. + +'mtspr 0xd, mem' reads the AMR register +'mfspr mem, 0xd' writes into the AMR register. + +Permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on +instruction fetches. + +=========================== Syscalls =========================== + +There are 3 system calls which directly interact with pkeys: + + int pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_access_rights) + int pkey_free(int pkey); + int pkey_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t len, + unsigned long prot, int pkey); + +Before a pkey can be used, it must first be allocated with +pkey_alloc(). An application calls the WRPKRU instruction +directly in order to change access permissions to memory covered +with a key. In this example WRPKRU is wrapped by a C function +called pkey_set(). + + int real_prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE; + pkey = pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DENY_WRITE); + ptr = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); + ret = pkey_mprotect(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, real_prot, pkey); + ... application runs here + +Now, if the application needs to update the data at 'ptr', it can +gain access, do the update, then remove its write access: + + pkey_set(pkey, 0); // clear PKEY_DENY_WRITE + *ptr = foo; // assign something + pkey_set(pkey, PKEY_DENY_WRITE); // set PKEY_DENY_WRITE again + +Now when it frees the memory, it will also free the pkey since it +is no longer in use: + + munmap(ptr, PAGE_SIZE); + pkey_free(pkey); + +(Note: pkey_set() is a wrapper for the RDPKRU and WRPKRU instructions. + An example implementation can be found in + tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c) + +=========================== Behavior =========================== + +The kernel attempts to make protection keys consistent with the +behavior of a plain mprotect(). For instance if you do this: + + mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_NONE); + something(ptr); + +you can expect the same effects with protection keys when doing this: + + pkey = pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE | PKEY_DISABLE_READ); + pkey_mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, pkey); + something(ptr); + +That should be true whether something() is a direct access to 'ptr' +like: + + *ptr = foo; + +or when the kernel does the access on the application's behalf like +with a read(): + + read(fd, ptr, 1); + +The kernel will send a SIGSEGV in both cases, but si_code will be set +to SEGV_PKERR when violating protection keys versus SEGV_ACCERR when +the plain mprotect() permissions are violated. diff --git a/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt b/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt deleted file mode 100644 index b643045..0000000 --- a/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,85 +0,0 @@ -Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU aka PKEYs) is a CPU feature -which will be found on future Intel CPUs. - -Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing page-based -protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables -when an application changes protection domains. It works by -dedicating 4 previously ignored bits in each page table entry to a -"protection key", giving 16 possible keys. - -There is also a new user-accessible register (PKRU) with two separate -bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key. Being a CPU -register, PKRU is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each -thread a different set of protections from every other thread. - -There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and writing -to the new register. The feature is only available in 64-bit mode, -even though there is theoretically space in the PAE PTEs. These -permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on -instruction fetches. - -=========================== Syscalls =========================== - -There are 3 system calls which directly interact with pkeys: - - int pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_access_rights) - int pkey_free(int pkey); - int pkey_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t len, - unsigned long prot, int pkey); - -Before a pkey can be used, it must first be allocated with -pkey_alloc(). An application calls the WRPKRU instruction -directly in order to change access permissions to memory covered -with a key. In this example WRPKRU is wrapped by a C function -called pkey_set(). - - int real_prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE; - pkey = pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DENY_WRITE); - ptr = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); - ret = pkey_mprotect(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, real_prot, pkey); - ... application runs here - -Now, if the application needs to update the data at 'ptr', it can -gain access, do the update, then remove its write access: - - pkey_set(pkey, 0); // clear PKEY_DENY_WRITE - *ptr = foo; // assign something - pkey_set(pkey, PKEY_DENY_WRITE); // set PKEY_DENY_WRITE again - -Now when it frees the memory, it will also free the pkey since it -is no longer in use: - - munmap(ptr, PAGE_SIZE); - pkey_free(pkey); - -(Note: pkey_set() is a wrapper for the RDPKRU and WRPKRU instructions. - An example implementation can be found in - tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c) - -=========================== Behavior =========================== - -The kernel attempts to make protection keys consistent with the -behavior of a plain mprotect(). For instance if you do this: - - mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_NONE); - something(ptr); - -you can expect the same effects with protection keys when doing this: - - pkey = pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE | PKEY_DISABLE_READ); - pkey_mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, pkey); - something(ptr); - -That should be true whether something() is a direct access to 'ptr' -like: - - *ptr = foo; - -or when the kernel does the access on the application's behalf like -with a read(): - - read(fd, ptr, 1); - -The kernel will send a SIGSEGV in both cases, but si_code will be set -to SEGV_PKERR when violating protection keys versus SEGV_ACCERR when -the plain mprotect() permissions are violated. -- 1.8.3.1
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| From | Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200 |
| Subject | [RFC v2 01/12] powerpc: Free up four 64K PTE bits in 4K backed hpte pages. |
| Message-ID | <tTd3Y-1kp-11@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1668160 |
Rearrange 64K PTE bits to free up bits 3, 4, 5 and 6
in the 4K backed hpte pages. These bits continue to be used
for 64K backed hpte pages in this patch, but will be freed
up in the next patch.
The patch does the following change to the 64K PTE format
H_PAGE_BUSY moves from bit 3 to bit 9
H_PAGE_F_SECOND which occupied bit 4 moves to the second part
of the pte.
H_PAGE_F_GIX which occupied bit 5, 6 and 7 also moves to the
second part of the pte.
the four bits((H_PAGE_F_SECOND|H_PAGE_F_GIX) that represent a slot
is initialized to 0xF indicating an invalid slot. If a hpte
gets cached in a 0xF slot(i.e 7th slot of secondary), it is
released immediately. In other words, even though 0xF is a
valid slot we discard and consider it as an invalid
slot;i.e hpte_soft_invalid(). This gives us an opportunity to not
depend on a bit in the primary PTE in order to determine the
validity of a slot.
When we release a hpte in the 0xF slot we also release a
legitimate primary slot and unmap that entry. This is to
ensure that we do get a legimate non-0xF slot the next time we
retry for a slot.
Though treating 0xF slot as invalid reduces the number of available
slots and may have an effect on the performance, the probabilty
of hitting a 0xF is extermely low.
Compared to the current scheme, the above described scheme reduces
the number of false hash table updates significantly and has the
added advantage of releasing four valuable PTE bits for other
purpose.
This idea was jointly developed by Paul Mackerras, Aneesh, Michael
Ellermen and myself.
4K PTE format remain unchanged currently.
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-4k.h | 20 +++++++
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-64k.h | 32 +++++++----
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash.h | 15 +++--
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h | 5 ++
arch/powerpc/mm/dump_linuxpagetables.c | 3 +-
arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_4k.c | 14 ++---
arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_64k.c | 81 ++++++++++++---------------
arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c | 30 +++++++---
8 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-4k.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-4k.h
index b4b5e6b..5ef1d81 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-4k.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-4k.h
@@ -16,6 +16,18 @@
#define H_PUD_TABLE_SIZE (sizeof(pud_t) << H_PUD_INDEX_SIZE)
#define H_PGD_TABLE_SIZE (sizeof(pgd_t) << H_PGD_INDEX_SIZE)
+
+/*
+ * Only supported by 4k linux page size
+ */
+#define H_PAGE_F_SECOND _RPAGE_RSV2 /* HPTE is in 2ndary HPTEG */
+#define H_PAGE_F_GIX (_RPAGE_RSV3 | _RPAGE_RSV4 | _RPAGE_RPN44)
+#define H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT 56
+
+#define H_PAGE_BUSY _RPAGE_RSV1 /* software: PTE & hash are busy */
+#define H_PAGE_HASHPTE _RPAGE_RPN43 /* PTE has associated HPTE */
+
+
/* PTE flags to conserve for HPTE identification */
#define _PAGE_HPTEFLAGS (H_PAGE_BUSY | H_PAGE_HASHPTE | \
H_PAGE_F_SECOND | H_PAGE_F_GIX)
@@ -48,6 +60,14 @@ static inline int hash__hugepd_ok(hugepd_t hpd)
}
#endif
+static inline unsigned long set_hidx_slot(pte_t *ptep, real_pte_t rpte,
+ unsigned int subpg_index, unsigned long slot)
+{
+ return (slot << H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT) &
+ (H_PAGE_F_SECOND | H_PAGE_F_GIX);
+}
+
+
#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
static inline char *get_hpte_slot_array(pmd_t *pmdp)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-64k.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-64k.h
index 9732837..0eb3c89 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-64k.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-64k.h
@@ -10,23 +10,25 @@
* 64k aligned address free up few of the lower bits of RPN for us
* We steal that here. For more deatils look at pte_pfn/pfn_pte()
*/
-#define H_PAGE_COMBO _RPAGE_RPN0 /* this is a combo 4k page */
-#define H_PAGE_4K_PFN _RPAGE_RPN1 /* PFN is for a single 4k page */
+#define H_PAGE_COMBO _RPAGE_RPN0 /* this is a combo 4k page */
+#define H_PAGE_4K_PFN _RPAGE_RPN1 /* PFN is for a single 4k page */
+#define H_PAGE_F_SECOND _RPAGE_RSV2 /* HPTE is in 2ndary HPTEG */
+#define H_PAGE_F_GIX (_RPAGE_RSV3 | _RPAGE_RSV4 | _RPAGE_RPN44)
+#define H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT 56
+
+
+#define H_PAGE_BUSY _RPAGE_RPN42 /* software: PTE & hash are busy */
+#define H_PAGE_HASHPTE _RPAGE_RPN43 /* PTE has associated HPTE */
+
/*
* We need to differentiate between explicit huge page and THP huge
* page, since THP huge page also need to track real subpage details
*/
#define H_PAGE_THP_HUGE H_PAGE_4K_PFN
-/*
- * Used to track subpage group valid if H_PAGE_COMBO is set
- * This overloads H_PAGE_F_GIX and H_PAGE_F_SECOND
- */
-#define H_PAGE_COMBO_VALID (H_PAGE_F_GIX | H_PAGE_F_SECOND)
-
/* PTE flags to conserve for HPTE identification */
-#define _PAGE_HPTEFLAGS (H_PAGE_BUSY | H_PAGE_F_SECOND | \
- H_PAGE_F_GIX | H_PAGE_HASHPTE | H_PAGE_COMBO)
+#define _PAGE_HPTEFLAGS (H_PAGE_BUSY | H_PAGE_HASHPTE | H_PAGE_COMBO)
+
/*
* we support 16 fragments per PTE page of 64K size.
*/
@@ -74,6 +76,16 @@ static inline unsigned long __rpte_to_hidx(real_pte_t rpte, unsigned long index)
return (pte_val(rpte.pte) >> H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT) & 0xf;
}
+static inline unsigned long set_hidx_slot(pte_t *ptep, real_pte_t rpte,
+ unsigned int subpg_index, unsigned long slot)
+{
+ unsigned long *hidxp = (unsigned long *)(ptep + PTRS_PER_PTE);
+
+ rpte.hidx &= ~(0xfUL << (subpg_index << 2));
+ *hidxp = rpte.hidx | (slot << (subpg_index << 2));
+ return 0x0UL;
+}
+
#define __rpte_to_pte(r) ((r).pte)
extern bool __rpte_sub_valid(real_pte_t rpte, unsigned long index);
/*
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash.h
index 4e957b0..e7cf03a 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash.h
@@ -8,11 +8,8 @@
*
*/
#define H_PTE_NONE_MASK _PAGE_HPTEFLAGS
-#define H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT 56
-#define H_PAGE_BUSY _RPAGE_RSV1 /* software: PTE & hash are busy */
-#define H_PAGE_F_SECOND _RPAGE_RSV2 /* HPTE is in 2ndary HPTEG */
-#define H_PAGE_F_GIX (_RPAGE_RSV3 | _RPAGE_RSV4 | _RPAGE_RPN44)
-#define H_PAGE_HASHPTE _RPAGE_RPN43 /* PTE has associated HPTE */
+
+#define INIT_HIDX (~0x0UL)
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES
#include <asm/book3s/64/hash-64k.h>
@@ -160,6 +157,14 @@ static inline int hash__pte_none(pte_t pte)
return (pte_val(pte) & ~H_PTE_NONE_MASK) == 0;
}
+static inline bool hpte_soft_invalid(unsigned long slot)
+{
+ return ((slot & 0xfUL) == 0xfUL);
+}
+
+unsigned long get_hidx_gslot(unsigned long vpn, unsigned long shift,
+ int ssize, real_pte_t rpte, unsigned int subpg_index);
+
/* This low level function performs the actual PTE insertion
* Setting the PTE depends on the MMU type and other factors. It's
* an horrible mess that I'm not going to try to clean up now but
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h
index 6981a52..cfb8169 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h
@@ -435,6 +435,11 @@ extern int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access,
extern int __hash_page_64K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access,
unsigned long vsid, pte_t *ptep, unsigned long trap,
unsigned long flags, int ssize);
+extern unsigned long set_hidx_slot(pte_t *ptep, real_pte_t rpte,
+ unsigned int subpg_index, unsigned long slot);
+extern unsigned long get_hidx_slot(unsigned long vpn, unsigned long shift,
+ int ssize, real_pte_t rpte, unsigned int subpg_index);
+
struct mm_struct;
unsigned int hash_page_do_lazy_icache(unsigned int pp, pte_t pte, int trap);
extern int hash_page_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea,
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/dump_linuxpagetables.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/dump_linuxpagetables.c
index 44fe483..b832ed3 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/dump_linuxpagetables.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/dump_linuxpagetables.c
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ struct flag_info {
.val = H_PAGE_4K_PFN,
.set = "4K_pfn",
}, {
-#endif
+#else
.mask = H_PAGE_F_GIX,
.val = H_PAGE_F_GIX,
.set = "f_gix",
@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ struct flag_info {
.val = H_PAGE_F_SECOND,
.set = "f_second",
}, {
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES */
#endif
.mask = _PAGE_SPECIAL,
.val = _PAGE_SPECIAL,
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_4k.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_4k.c
index 6fa450c..c673829 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_4k.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_4k.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
pte_t *ptep, unsigned long trap, unsigned long flags,
int ssize, int subpg_prot)
{
+ real_pte_t rpte;
unsigned long hpte_group;
unsigned long rflags, pa;
unsigned long old_pte, new_pte;
@@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
* need to add in 0x1 if it's a read-only user page
*/
rflags = htab_convert_pte_flags(new_pte);
+ rpte = __real_pte(__pte(old_pte), ptep);
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_NOEXECUTE) &&
!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_COHERENT_ICACHE))
@@ -64,13 +66,10 @@ int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
/*
* There MIGHT be an HPTE for this pte
*/
- hash = hpt_hash(vpn, shift, ssize);
- if (old_pte & H_PAGE_F_SECOND)
- hash = ~hash;
- slot = (hash & htab_hash_mask) * HPTES_PER_GROUP;
- slot += (old_pte & H_PAGE_F_GIX) >> H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT;
+ unsigned long gslot = get_hidx_gslot(vpn, shift,
+ ssize, rpte, 0);
- if (mmu_hash_ops.hpte_updatepp(slot, rflags, vpn, MMU_PAGE_4K,
+ if (mmu_hash_ops.hpte_updatepp(gslot, rflags, vpn, MMU_PAGE_4K,
MMU_PAGE_4K, ssize, flags) == -1)
old_pte &= ~_PAGE_HPTEFLAGS;
}
@@ -118,8 +117,7 @@ int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
return -1;
}
new_pte = (new_pte & ~_PAGE_HPTEFLAGS) | H_PAGE_HASHPTE;
- new_pte |= (slot << H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT) &
- (H_PAGE_F_SECOND | H_PAGE_F_GIX);
+ new_pte |= set_hidx_slot(ptep, rpte, 0, slot);
}
*ptep = __pte(new_pte & ~H_PAGE_BUSY);
return 0;
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_64k.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_64k.c
index 1a68cb1..3702a3c 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_64k.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_64k.c
@@ -15,34 +15,13 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <asm/machdep.h>
#include <asm/mmu.h>
+
/*
* index from 0 - 15
*/
bool __rpte_sub_valid(real_pte_t rpte, unsigned long index)
{
- unsigned long g_idx;
- unsigned long ptev = pte_val(rpte.pte);
-
- g_idx = (ptev & H_PAGE_COMBO_VALID) >> H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT;
- index = index >> 2;
- if (g_idx & (0x1 << index))
- return true;
- else
- return false;
-}
-/*
- * index from 0 - 15
- */
-static unsigned long mark_subptegroup_valid(unsigned long ptev, unsigned long index)
-{
- unsigned long g_idx;
-
- if (!(ptev & H_PAGE_COMBO))
- return ptev;
- index = index >> 2;
- g_idx = 0x1 << index;
-
- return ptev | (g_idx << H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT);
+ return !(hpte_soft_invalid(rpte.hidx >> (index << 2)));
}
int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
@@ -50,10 +29,9 @@ int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
int ssize, int subpg_prot)
{
real_pte_t rpte;
- unsigned long *hidxp;
unsigned long hpte_group;
unsigned int subpg_index;
- unsigned long rflags, pa, hidx;
+ unsigned long rflags, pa;
unsigned long old_pte, new_pte, subpg_pte;
unsigned long vpn, hash, slot;
unsigned long shift = mmu_psize_defs[MMU_PAGE_4K].shift;
@@ -116,28 +94,23 @@ int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
* On hash insert failure we use old pte value and we don't
* want slot information there if we have a insert failure.
*/
- old_pte &= ~(H_PAGE_HASHPTE | H_PAGE_F_GIX | H_PAGE_F_SECOND);
- new_pte &= ~(H_PAGE_HASHPTE | H_PAGE_F_GIX | H_PAGE_F_SECOND);
+ old_pte &= ~(H_PAGE_HASHPTE);
+ new_pte &= ~(H_PAGE_HASHPTE);
goto htab_insert_hpte;
}
/*
* Check for sub page valid and update
*/
if (__rpte_sub_valid(rpte, subpg_index)) {
- int ret;
- hash = hpt_hash(vpn, shift, ssize);
- hidx = __rpte_to_hidx(rpte, subpg_index);
- if (hidx & _PTEIDX_SECONDARY)
- hash = ~hash;
- slot = (hash & htab_hash_mask) * HPTES_PER_GROUP;
- slot += hidx & _PTEIDX_GROUP_IX;
+ unsigned long gslot = get_hidx_gslot(vpn, shift,
+ ssize, rpte, subpg_index);
- ret = mmu_hash_ops.hpte_updatepp(slot, rflags, vpn,
+ int ret = mmu_hash_ops.hpte_updatepp(gslot, rflags, vpn,
MMU_PAGE_4K, MMU_PAGE_4K,
ssize, flags);
/*
- *if we failed because typically the HPTE wasn't really here
+ * if we failed because typically the HPTE wasn't really here
* we try an insertion.
*/
if (ret == -1)
@@ -148,6 +121,15 @@ int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
}
htab_insert_hpte:
+
+ /*
+ * initialize all hidx entries to a invalid value,
+ * the first time the PTE is about to allocate
+ * a 4K hpte
+ */
+ if (!(old_pte & H_PAGE_COMBO))
+ rpte.hidx = INIT_HIDX;
+
/*
* handle H_PAGE_4K_PFN case
*/
@@ -177,10 +159,20 @@ int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
rflags, HPTE_V_SECONDARY,
MMU_PAGE_4K, MMU_PAGE_4K,
ssize);
- if (slot == -1) {
- if (mftb() & 0x1)
+
+ if (unlikely(hpte_soft_invalid(slot))) {
+ slot = slot & _PTEIDX_GROUP_IX;
+ mmu_hash_ops.hpte_invalidate(hpte_group+slot, vpn,
+ MMU_PAGE_4K, MMU_PAGE_4K,
+ ssize, flags);
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(slot == -1 || hpte_soft_invalid(slot))) {
+
+ if (hpte_soft_invalid(slot) || (mftb() & 0x1))
hpte_group = ((hash & htab_hash_mask) *
HPTES_PER_GROUP) & ~0x7UL;
+
mmu_hash_ops.hpte_remove(hpte_group);
/*
* FIXME!! Should be try the group from which we removed ?
@@ -204,11 +196,9 @@ int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
* Since we have H_PAGE_BUSY set on ptep, we can be sure
* nobody is undating hidx.
*/
- hidxp = (unsigned long *)(ptep + PTRS_PER_PTE);
- rpte.hidx &= ~(0xfUL << (subpg_index << 2));
- *hidxp = rpte.hidx | (slot << (subpg_index << 2));
- new_pte = mark_subptegroup_valid(new_pte, subpg_index);
- new_pte |= H_PAGE_HASHPTE;
+ new_pte |= set_hidx_slot(ptep, rpte, subpg_index, slot);
+ new_pte |= H_PAGE_HASHPTE;
+
/*
* check __real_pte for details on matching smp_rmb()
*/
@@ -322,9 +312,10 @@ int __hash_page_64K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access,
MMU_PAGE_64K, MMU_PAGE_64K, old_pte);
return -1;
}
- new_pte = (new_pte & ~_PAGE_HPTEFLAGS) | H_PAGE_HASHPTE;
+
new_pte |= (slot << H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT) &
- (H_PAGE_F_SECOND | H_PAGE_F_GIX);
+ (H_PAGE_F_SECOND | H_PAGE_F_GIX);
+ new_pte = (new_pte & ~_PAGE_HPTEFLAGS) | H_PAGE_HASHPTE;
}
*ptep = __pte(new_pte & ~H_PAGE_BUSY);
return 0;
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c
index f2095ce..c0f4b46 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c
@@ -975,8 +975,9 @@ void __init hash__early_init_devtree(void)
void __init hash__early_init_mmu(void)
{
+#ifndef CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES
/*
- * We have code in __hash_page_64K() and elsewhere, which assumes it can
+ * We have code in __hash_page_4K() and elsewhere, which assumes it can
* do the following:
* new_pte |= (slot << H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT) & (H_PAGE_F_SECOND | H_PAGE_F_GIX);
*
@@ -987,6 +988,7 @@ void __init hash__early_init_mmu(void)
* with a BUILD_BUG_ON().
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(H_PAGE_F_SECOND != (1ul << (H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT + 3)));
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES */
htab_init_page_sizes();
@@ -1589,29 +1591,39 @@ static inline void tm_flush_hash_page(int local)
}
#endif
+unsigned long get_hidx_gslot(unsigned long vpn, unsigned long shift,
+ int ssize, real_pte_t rpte, unsigned int subpg_index)
+{
+ unsigned long hash, slot, hidx;
+
+ hash = hpt_hash(vpn, shift, ssize);
+ hidx = __rpte_to_hidx(rpte, subpg_index);
+ if (hidx & _PTEIDX_SECONDARY)
+ hash = ~hash;
+ slot = (hash & htab_hash_mask) * HPTES_PER_GROUP;
+ slot += hidx & _PTEIDX_GROUP_IX;
+ return slot;
+}
+
+
/* WARNING: This is called from hash_low_64.S, if you change this prototype,
* do not forget to update the assembly call site !
*/
void flush_hash_page(unsigned long vpn, real_pte_t pte, int psize, int ssize,
unsigned long flags)
{
- unsigned long hash, index, shift, hidx, slot;
+ unsigned long hash, index, shift, hidx, gslot;
int local = flags & HPTE_LOCAL_UPDATE;
DBG_LOW("flush_hash_page(vpn=%016lx)\n", vpn);
pte_iterate_hashed_subpages(pte, psize, vpn, index, shift) {
- hash = hpt_hash(vpn, shift, ssize);
- hidx = __rpte_to_hidx(pte, index);
- if (hidx & _PTEIDX_SECONDARY)
- hash = ~hash;
- slot = (hash & htab_hash_mask) * HPTES_PER_GROUP;
- slot += hidx & _PTEIDX_GROUP_IX;
+ gslot = get_hidx_gslot(vpn, shift, ssize, pte, index);
DBG_LOW(" sub %ld: hash=%lx, hidx=%lx\n", index, slot, hidx);
/*
* We use same base page size and actual psize, because we don't
* use these functions for hugepage
*/
- mmu_hash_ops.hpte_invalidate(slot, vpn, psize, psize,
+ mmu_hash_ops.hpte_invalidate(gslot, vpn, psize, psize,
ssize, local);
} pte_iterate_hashed_end();
--
1.8.3.1
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200 |
| Subject | [RFC v2 10/12] powerpc: Read AMR only if pkey-violation caused the exception. |
| Message-ID | <tTd3Y-1kp-17@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1668160 |
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> --- arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S index 8db9ef8..a4de1b4 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S @@ -493,13 +493,15 @@ EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(data_access_common) ld r12,_MSR(r1) ld r3,PACA_EXGEN+EX_DAR(r13) lwz r4,PACA_EXGEN+EX_DSISR(r13) + std r3,_DAR(r1) + std r4,_DSISR(r1) #ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS + andis. r0,r4,DSISR_KEYFAULT@h /* save AMR only if its a key fault */ + beq+ 1f mfspr r5,SPRN_AMR std r5,PACA_AMR(r13) #endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */ - li r5,0x300 - std r3,_DAR(r1) - std r4,_DSISR(r1) +1: li r5,0x300 BEGIN_MMU_FTR_SECTION b do_hash_page /* Try to handle as hpte fault */ MMU_FTR_SECTION_ELSE @@ -565,13 +567,15 @@ EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(instruction_access_common) ld r12,_MSR(r1) ld r3,_NIP(r1) andis. r4,r12,0x5820 + std r3,_DAR(r1) + std r4,_DSISR(r1) #ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS + andis. r0,r4,DSISR_KEYFAULT@h /* save AMR only if its a key fault */ + beq+ 1f mfspr r5,SPRN_AMR std r5,PACA_AMR(r13) #endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */ - li r5,0x400 - std r3,_DAR(r1) - std r4,_DSISR(r1) +1: li r5,0x400 BEGIN_MMU_FTR_SECTION b do_hash_page /* Try to handle as hpte fault */ MMU_FTR_SECTION_ELSE -- 1.8.3.1
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-19 13:10 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [RFC v2 10/12] powerpc: Read AMR only if pkey-violation caused the exception. |
| Message-ID | <tU2Jc-1RM-21@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1668167 |
Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> writes: > Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> > --- > arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 16 ++++++++++------ > 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S > index 8db9ef8..a4de1b4 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S > @@ -493,13 +493,15 @@ EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(data_access_common) > ld r12,_MSR(r1) > ld r3,PACA_EXGEN+EX_DAR(r13) > lwz r4,PACA_EXGEN+EX_DSISR(r13) > + std r3,_DAR(r1) > + std r4,_DSISR(r1) > #ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS > + andis. r0,r4,DSISR_KEYFAULT@h /* save AMR only if its a key fault */ > + beq+ 1f This seems to be incremental on top of one of your other patches. But I don't see why, can you please just squash this into whatever patch adds this code in the first place. cheers
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-19 20:00 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [RFC v2 10/12] powerpc: Read AMR only if pkey-violation caused the exception. |
| Message-ID | <tU97Y-5OJ-9@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1669010 |
On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 09:06:13PM +1000, Michael Ellerman wrote: > Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> writes: > > > Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> > > --- > > arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 16 ++++++++++------ > > 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S > > index 8db9ef8..a4de1b4 100644 > > --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S > > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S > > @@ -493,13 +493,15 @@ EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(data_access_common) > > ld r12,_MSR(r1) > > ld r3,PACA_EXGEN+EX_DAR(r13) > > lwz r4,PACA_EXGEN+EX_DSISR(r13) > > + std r3,_DAR(r1) > > + std r4,_DSISR(r1) > > #ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS > > + andis. r0,r4,DSISR_KEYFAULT@h /* save AMR only if its a key fault */ > > + beq+ 1f > > This seems to be incremental on top of one of your other patches. > > But I don't see why, can you please just squash this into whatever patch > adds this code in the first place. It was an optimization added later. But yes it can be squashed into an earlier patch. RP
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| From | Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200 |
| Subject | [RFC v2 03/12] powerpc: Implement sys_pkey_alloc and sys_pkey_free system call. |
| Message-ID | <tTd3Y-1kp-19@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1668160 |
Sys_pkey_alloc() allocates and returns available pkey
Sys_pkey_free() frees up the pkey.
Total 32 keys are supported on powerpc. However pkey 0,1 and 31
are reserved. So effectively we have 29 pkeys.
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
---
arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 15 ++++
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu.h | 10 +++
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h | 62 ++++++++++++++
arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h | 124 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/powerpc/include/asm/systbl.h | 2 +
arch/powerpc/include/asm/unistd.h | 4 +-
arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 2 +
arch/powerpc/mm/Makefile | 1 +
arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context_book3s64.c | 5 ++
arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/mm.h | 31 ++++---
include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 2 +-
12 files changed, 331 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h
create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index f7c8f99..b6960617 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -871,6 +871,21 @@ config SECCOMP
If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
+config PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ prompt "PowerPC Memory Protection Keys"
+ def_bool y
+ # Note: only available in 64-bit mode
+ depends on PPC64 && PPC_64K_PAGES
+ select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+ select ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
+ ---help---
+ Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing
+ page-based protections, but without requiring modification of the
+ page tables when an application changes protection domains.
+
+ For details, see Documentation/powerpc/protection-keys.txt
+
+ If unsure, say y.
endmenu
config ISA_DMA_API
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu.h
index 77529a3..0c0a2a8 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu.h
@@ -108,6 +108,16 @@ struct patb_entry {
#ifdef CONFIG_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU
struct list_head iommu_group_mem_list;
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ /*
+ * Each bit represents one protection key.
+ * bit set -> key allocated
+ * bit unset -> key available for allocation
+ */
+ u32 pkey_allocation_map;
+ s16 execute_only_pkey; /* key holding execute-only protection */
+#endif
} mm_context_t;
/*
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
index 85bc987..87e9a89 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
@@ -428,6 +428,68 @@ static inline void huge_ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
pte_update(mm, addr, ptep, 0, _PAGE_PRIVILEGED, 1);
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+
+#include <asm/reg.h>
+static inline u64 read_amr(void)
+{
+ return mfspr(SPRN_AMR);
+}
+static inline void write_amr(u64 value)
+{
+ mtspr(SPRN_AMR, value);
+}
+static inline u64 read_iamr(void)
+{
+ return mfspr(SPRN_IAMR);
+}
+static inline void write_iamr(u64 value)
+{
+ mtspr(SPRN_IAMR, value);
+}
+static inline u64 read_uamor(void)
+{
+ return mfspr(SPRN_UAMOR);
+}
+static inline void write_uamor(u64 value)
+{
+ mtspr(SPRN_UAMOR, value);
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
+static inline u64 read_amr(void)
+{
+ WARN(1, "%s called with MEMORY PROTECTION KEYS disabled\n", __func__);
+ return -1;
+}
+static inline void write_amr(u64 value)
+{
+ WARN(1, "%s called with MEMORY PROTECTION KEYS disabled\n", __func__);
+}
+static inline u64 read_uamor(void)
+{
+ WARN(1, "%s called with MEMORY PROTECTION KEYS disabled\n", __func__);
+ return -1;
+}
+static inline void write_uamor(u64 value)
+{
+ WARN(1, "%s called with MEMORY PROTECTION KEYS disabled\n", __func__);
+}
+static inline u64 read_iamr(void)
+{
+ WARN(1, "%s called with MEMORY PROTECTION KEYS disabled\n", __func__);
+ return -1;
+}
+static inline void write_iamr(u64 value)
+{
+ WARN(1, "%s called with MEMORY PROTECTION KEYS disabled\n", __func__);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
+
#define __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_GET_AND_CLEAR
static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7bc8746
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+#ifndef _ASM_PPC64_PKEYS_H
+#define _ASM_PPC64_PKEYS_H
+
+
+#define arch_max_pkey() 32
+
+#define AMR_AD_BIT 0x1UL
+#define AMR_WD_BIT 0x2UL
+#define IAMR_EX_BIT 0x1UL
+#define AMR_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
+#define ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS (VM_PKEY_BIT0 | \
+ VM_PKEY_BIT1 | \
+ VM_PKEY_BIT2 | \
+ VM_PKEY_BIT3 | \
+ VM_PKEY_BIT4)
+
+/*
+ * Bits are in BE format.
+ * NOTE: key 31, 1, 0 are not used.
+ * key 0 is used by default. It give read/write/execute permission.
+ * key 31 is reserved by the hypervisor.
+ * key 1 is recommended to be not used.
+ * PowerISA(3.0) page 1015, programming note.
+ */
+#define PKEY_INITIAL_ALLOCAION 0xc0000001
+
+#define pkeybit_mask(pkey) (0x1 << (arch_max_pkey() - pkey - 1))
+
+#define mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) (mm->context.pkey_allocation_map)
+
+#define mm_set_pkey_allocated(mm, pkey) { \
+ mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) |= pkeybit_mask(pkey); \
+}
+
+#define mm_set_pkey_free(mm, pkey) { \
+ mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) &= ~pkeybit_mask(pkey); \
+}
+
+#define mm_set_pkey_is_allocated(mm, pkey) \
+ (mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) & pkeybit_mask(pkey))
+
+#define mm_set_pkey_is_reserved(mm, pkey) (PKEY_INITIAL_ALLOCAION & \
+ pkeybit_mask(pkey))
+
+static inline bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey)
+{
+ /* a reserved key is never considered as 'explicitly allocated' */
+ return (!mm_set_pkey_is_reserved(mm, pkey) &&
+ mm_set_pkey_is_allocated(mm, pkey));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a positive, 5-bit key on success, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static inline int mm_pkey_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ /*
+ * Note: this is the one and only place we make sure
+ * that the pkey is valid as far as the hardware is
+ * concerned. The rest of the kernel trusts that
+ * only good, valid pkeys come out of here.
+ */
+ u32 all_pkeys_mask = (u32)(~(0x0));
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Are we out of pkeys? We must handle this specially
+ * because ffz() behavior is undefined if there are no
+ * zeros.
+ */
+ if (mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) == all_pkeys_mask)
+ return -1;
+
+ ret = arch_max_pkey() -
+ ffz((u32)mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm))
+ - 1;
+ mm_set_pkey_allocated(mm, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static inline int mm_pkey_free(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey)
+{
+ if (!mm_pkey_is_allocated(mm, pkey))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ mm_set_pkey_free(mm, pkey);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Try to dedicate one of the protection keys to be used as an
+ * execute-only protection key.
+ */
+extern int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm);
+static inline int execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ return __execute_only_pkey(mm);
+}
+
+extern int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ int prot, int pkey);
+static inline int arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ int prot, int pkey)
+{
+ return __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(vma, prot, pkey);
+}
+
+extern int __arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
+ unsigned long init_val);
+static inline int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
+ unsigned long init_val)
+{
+ return __arch_set_user_pkey_access(tsk, pkey, init_val);
+}
+
+static inline pkey_mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) = PKEY_INITIAL_ALLOCAION;
+ /* -1 means unallocated or invalid */
+ mm->context.execute_only_pkey = -1;
+}
+
+#endif /*_ASM_PPC64_PKEYS_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/systbl.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/systbl.h
index 1c94708..22dd776 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/systbl.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/systbl.h
@@ -388,3 +388,5 @@
COMPAT_SYS_SPU(pwritev2)
SYSCALL(kexec_file_load)
SYSCALL(statx)
+SYSCALL(pkey_alloc)
+SYSCALL(pkey_free)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/unistd.h
index 9ba11db..e0273bc 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/unistd.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/unistd.h
@@ -12,13 +12,11 @@
#include <uapi/asm/unistd.h>
-#define NR_syscalls 384
+#define NR_syscalls 386
#define __NR__exit __NR_exit
#define __IGNORE_pkey_mprotect
-#define __IGNORE_pkey_alloc
-#define __IGNORE_pkey_free
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h b/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
index b85f142..7993a07 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
@@ -394,5 +394,7 @@
#define __NR_pwritev2 381
#define __NR_kexec_file_load 382
#define __NR_statx 383
+#define __NR_pkey_alloc 384
+#define __NR_pkey_free 385
#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_POWERPC_UNISTD_H_ */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/mm/Makefile
index 7414034..8cc2ff1 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/Makefile
@@ -45,3 +45,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_COPRO_BASE) += copro_fault.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) += mmu_context_iommu.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_PTDUMP) += dump_linuxpagetables.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_HTDUMP) += dump_hashpagetable.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context_book3s64.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context_book3s64.c
index c6dca2a..2da9931 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context_book3s64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context_book3s64.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/pkeys.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/idr.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
@@ -120,6 +121,10 @@ static int hash__init_new_context(struct mm_struct *mm)
subpage_prot_init_new_context(mm);
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ pkey_mm_init(mm);
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
return index;
}
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b97366e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/*
+ * PowerPC Memory Protection Keys management
+ * Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation.
+ * Copyright (c) 2017, IBM Corporation.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
+ * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
+ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
+ * more details.
+ */
+#include <linux/pkeys.h> /* PKEY_* */
+#include <uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h>
+
+
+/*
+ * set the access right in AMR IAMR and UAMOR register
+ * for @pkey to that specified in @init_val.
+ */
+int __arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
+ unsigned long init_val)
+{
+ u64 old_amr, old_uamor, old_iamr;
+ int pkey_shift = (arch_max_pkey()-pkey-1) * AMR_BITS_PER_PKEY;
+ u64 new_amr_bits = 0x0ul;
+ u64 new_iamr_bits = 0x0ul;
+ u64 new_uamor_bits = 0x3ul;
+
+ /* Set the bits we need in AMR: */
+ if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS)
+ new_amr_bits |= AMR_AD_BIT;
+ if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE)
+ new_amr_bits |= AMR_WD_BIT;
+
+ /*
+ * By default execute is disabled.
+ * To enable execute, PKEY_ENABLE_EXECUTE
+ * needs to be specified.
+ */
+ if ((init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE))
+ new_iamr_bits |= IAMR_EX_BIT;
+
+ /* Shift the bits in to the correct place in AMR for pkey: */
+ new_amr_bits <<= pkey_shift;
+ new_iamr_bits <<= pkey_shift;
+ new_uamor_bits <<= pkey_shift;
+
+ /* Get old AMR and mask off any old bits in place: */
+ old_amr = read_amr();
+ old_amr &= ~((u64)(AMR_AD_BIT|AMR_WD_BIT) << pkey_shift);
+
+ old_iamr = read_iamr();
+ old_iamr &= ~(0x3ul << pkey_shift);
+
+ old_uamor = read_uamor();
+ old_uamor &= ~(0x3ul << pkey_shift);
+
+ /* Write old part along with new part: */
+ write_amr(old_amr | new_amr_bits);
+ write_iamr(old_iamr | new_iamr_bits);
+ write_uamor(old_uamor | new_uamor_bits);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This should only be called for *plain* mprotect calls.
+ */
+int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot,
+ int pkey)
+{
+ /*
+ * Is this an mprotect_pkey() call? If so, never
+ * override the value that came from the user.
+ */
+ if (pkey != -1)
+ return pkey;
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 7cb17c6..34ddac7 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -204,26 +204,35 @@ extern int overcommit_kbytes_handler(struct ctl_table *, int, void __user *,
#define VM_MERGEABLE 0x80000000 /* KSM may merge identical pages */
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
-#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0 32 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
-#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1 33 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
-#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2 34 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
-#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3 35 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0 32 /* bit only usable on 64-bit arch */
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1 33 /* bit only usable on 64-bit arch */
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2 34 /* bit only usable on 64-bit arch */
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3 35 /* bit only usable on 64-bit arch */
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4 36 /* bit only usable on 64-bit arch */
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_1 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_2 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_3 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3)
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_4 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4)
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS */
#if defined(CONFIG_X86)
# define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1 /* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */
-#if defined (CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS)
-# define VM_PKEY_SHIFT VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0
-# define VM_PKEY_BIT0 VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 /* A protection key is a 4-bit value */
-# define VM_PKEY_BIT1 VM_HIGH_ARCH_1
-# define VM_PKEY_BIT2 VM_HIGH_ARCH_2
-# define VM_PKEY_BIT3 VM_HIGH_ARCH_3
-#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) \
+ || defined(CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS)
+#define VM_PKEY_SHIFT VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0
+#define VM_PKEY_BIT0 VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 /* A protection key is a 5-bit value */
+#define VM_PKEY_BIT1 VM_HIGH_ARCH_1
+#define VM_PKEY_BIT2 VM_HIGH_ARCH_2
+#define VM_PKEY_BIT3 VM_HIGH_ARCH_3
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
#elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
+#define VM_PKEY_BIT0 VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 /* A protection key is a 5-bit value */
+#define VM_PKEY_BIT1 VM_HIGH_ARCH_1
+#define VM_PKEY_BIT2 VM_HIGH_ARCH_2
+#define VM_PKEY_BIT3 VM_HIGH_ARCH_3
+#define VM_PKEY_BIT4 VM_HIGH_ARCH_4 /* intel does not use this bit */
+ /* but reserved for future expansion */
# define VM_SAO VM_ARCH_1 /* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */
#elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC)
# define VM_GROWSUP VM_ARCH_1
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h
index 8c27db0..b13ecc6 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h
@@ -76,5 +76,5 @@
#define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE 0x2
#define PKEY_ACCESS_MASK (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS |\
PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE)
-
+#define PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE 0x4
#endif /* __ASM_GENERIC_MMAN_COMMON_H */
--
1.8.3.1
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| From | Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-19 14:20 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [RFC v2 03/12] powerpc: Implement sys_pkey_alloc and sys_pkey_free system call. |
| Message-ID | <tU3OW-2xn-15@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1668168 |
Hi Ram,
Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> writes:
> Sys_pkey_alloc() allocates and returns available pkey
> Sys_pkey_free() frees up the pkey.
>
> Total 32 keys are supported on powerpc. However pkey 0,1 and 31
> are reserved. So effectively we have 29 pkeys.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
> ---
> include/linux/mm.h | 31 ++++---
> include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 2 +-
Those changes need to be split out and acked by mm folks.
> diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> index 7cb17c6..34ddac7 100644
> --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> @@ -204,26 +204,35 @@ extern int overcommit_kbytes_handler(struct ctl_table *, int, void __user *,
> #define VM_MERGEABLE 0x80000000 /* KSM may merge identical pages */
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
> -#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0 32 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
> -#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1 33 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
> -#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2 34 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
> -#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3 35 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
> +#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0 32 /* bit only usable on 64-bit arch */
> +#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1 33 /* bit only usable on 64-bit arch */
> +#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2 34 /* bit only usable on 64-bit arch */
> +#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3 35 /* bit only usable on 64-bit arch */
Please don't change the comments, it makes the diff harder to read.
You're actually just adding this AFAICS:
> +#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4 36 /* bit only usable on 64-bit arch */
> #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0)
> #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_1 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1)
> #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_2 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2)
> #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_3 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3)
> +#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_4 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4)
> #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS */
>
> #if defined(CONFIG_X86)
^
> # define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1 /* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */
> -#if defined (CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS)
> -# define VM_PKEY_SHIFT VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0
> -# define VM_PKEY_BIT0 VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 /* A protection key is a 4-bit value */
> -# define VM_PKEY_BIT1 VM_HIGH_ARCH_1
> -# define VM_PKEY_BIT2 VM_HIGH_ARCH_2
> -# define VM_PKEY_BIT3 VM_HIGH_ARCH_3
> -#endif
> +#if defined(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) \
> + || defined(CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS)
> +#define VM_PKEY_SHIFT VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0
> +#define VM_PKEY_BIT0 VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 /* A protection key is a 5-bit value */
^ 4?
> +#define VM_PKEY_BIT1 VM_HIGH_ARCH_1
> +#define VM_PKEY_BIT2 VM_HIGH_ARCH_2
> +#define VM_PKEY_BIT3 VM_HIGH_ARCH_3
> +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
That appears to be inside an #if defined(CONFIG_X86) ?
> #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
^
Should be CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS no?
> +#define VM_PKEY_BIT0 VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 /* A protection key is a 5-bit value */
> +#define VM_PKEY_BIT1 VM_HIGH_ARCH_1
> +#define VM_PKEY_BIT2 VM_HIGH_ARCH_2
> +#define VM_PKEY_BIT3 VM_HIGH_ARCH_3
> +#define VM_PKEY_BIT4 VM_HIGH_ARCH_4 /* intel does not use this bit */
> + /* but reserved for future expansion */
But this hunk is for PPC ?
Is it OK for the other arches & generic code to add another VM_PKEY_BIT4 ?
Do you need to update show_smap_vma_flags() ?
> # define VM_SAO VM_ARCH_1 /* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */
> #elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC)
> # define VM_GROWSUP VM_ARCH_1
> diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h
> index 8c27db0..b13ecc6 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h
> @@ -76,5 +76,5 @@
> #define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE 0x2
> #define PKEY_ACCESS_MASK (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS |\
> PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE)
> -
> +#define PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE 0x4
How you can set that if it's not in PKEY_ACCESS_MASK?
See:
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pkey_alloc, unsigned long, flags, unsigned long, init_val)
{
int pkey;
int ret;
/* No flags supported yet. */
if (flags)
return -EINVAL;
/* check for unsupported init values */
if (init_val & ~PKEY_ACCESS_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
cheers
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| From | Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200 |
| Subject | [RFC v2 06/12] powerpc: Program HPTE key protection bits. |
| Message-ID | <tTd3Y-1kp-23@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1668160 |
Map the PTE protection key bits to the HPTE key protection bits, while creatiing HPTE entries. Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h | 5 +++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h | 7 +++++++ arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h index cfb8169..3d7872c 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h @@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ #define HPTE_R_PP0 ASM_CONST(0x8000000000000000) #define HPTE_R_TS ASM_CONST(0x4000000000000000) #define HPTE_R_KEY_HI ASM_CONST(0x3000000000000000) +#define HPTE_R_KEY_BIT0 ASM_CONST(0x2000000000000000) +#define HPTE_R_KEY_BIT1 ASM_CONST(0x1000000000000000) #define HPTE_R_RPN_SHIFT 12 #define HPTE_R_RPN ASM_CONST(0x0ffffffffffff000) #define HPTE_R_RPN_3_0 ASM_CONST(0x01fffffffffff000) @@ -104,6 +106,9 @@ #define HPTE_R_C ASM_CONST(0x0000000000000080) #define HPTE_R_R ASM_CONST(0x0000000000000100) #define HPTE_R_KEY_LO ASM_CONST(0x0000000000000e00) +#define HPTE_R_KEY_BIT2 ASM_CONST(0x0000000000000800) +#define HPTE_R_KEY_BIT3 ASM_CONST(0x0000000000000400) +#define HPTE_R_KEY_BIT4 ASM_CONST(0x0000000000000200) #define HPTE_V_1TB_SEG ASM_CONST(0x4000000000000000) #define HPTE_V_VRMA_MASK ASM_CONST(0x4001ffffff000000) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h index 0f3dca8..9b6820d 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h @@ -27,6 +27,13 @@ ((vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT3) ? H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0x0UL) | \ ((vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT4) ? H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0x0UL)) +#define calc_pte_to_hpte_pkey_bits(pteflags) \ + (((pteflags & H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT0) ? HPTE_R_KEY_BIT0 : 0x0UL) | \ + ((pteflags & H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT1) ? HPTE_R_KEY_BIT1 : 0x0UL) | \ + ((pteflags & H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT2) ? HPTE_R_KEY_BIT2 : 0x0UL) | \ + ((pteflags & H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT3) ? HPTE_R_KEY_BIT3 : 0x0UL) | \ + ((pteflags & H_PAGE_PKEY_BIT4) ? HPTE_R_KEY_BIT4 : 0x0UL)) + /* * Bits are in BE format. * NOTE: key 31, 1, 0 are not used. diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c index c0f4b46..7d974cd 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/context_tracking.h> #include <linux/libfdt.h> +#include <linux/pkeys.h> #include <asm/debugfs.h> #include <asm/processor.h> @@ -230,6 +231,10 @@ unsigned long htab_convert_pte_flags(unsigned long pteflags) */ rflags |= HPTE_R_M; +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS + rflags |= calc_pte_to_hpte_pkey_bits(pteflags); +#endif + return rflags; } -- 1.8.3.1
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| From | Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-17 06:00 +0200 |
| Subject | [RFC v2 02/12] powerpc: Free up four 64K PTE bits in 64K backed hpte pages. |
| Message-ID | <tTd3Y-1kp-25@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1668160 |
Rearrange 64K PTE bits to free up bits 3, 4, 5 and 6
in the 64K backed hpte pages. This along with the earlier
patch will entirely free up the four bits from 64K PTE.
This patch does the following change to 64K PTE that is
backed by 64K hpte.
H_PAGE_F_SECOND which occupied bit 4 moves to the second part
of the pte.
H_PAGE_F_GIX which occupied bit 5, 6 and 7 also moves to the
second part of the pte.
since bit 7 is now freed up, we move H_PAGE_BUSY from bit 9
to bit 7. Trying to minimize gaps so that contiguous bits
can be allocated if needed in the future.
The second part of the PTE will hold
(H_PAGE_F_SECOND|H_PAGE_F_GIX) at bit 60,61,62,63.
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-64k.h | 26 ++++++++------------------
arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_64k.c | 16 +++++++---------
arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage-hash64.c | 16 ++++++----------
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-64k.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-64k.h
index 0eb3c89..2fa5c60 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-64k.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-64k.h
@@ -12,12 +12,8 @@
*/
#define H_PAGE_COMBO _RPAGE_RPN0 /* this is a combo 4k page */
#define H_PAGE_4K_PFN _RPAGE_RPN1 /* PFN is for a single 4k page */
-#define H_PAGE_F_SECOND _RPAGE_RSV2 /* HPTE is in 2ndary HPTEG */
-#define H_PAGE_F_GIX (_RPAGE_RSV3 | _RPAGE_RSV4 | _RPAGE_RPN44)
-#define H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT 56
-
-#define H_PAGE_BUSY _RPAGE_RPN42 /* software: PTE & hash are busy */
+#define H_PAGE_BUSY _RPAGE_RPN44 /* software: PTE & hash are busy */
#define H_PAGE_HASHPTE _RPAGE_RPN43 /* PTE has associated HPTE */
/*
@@ -56,24 +52,18 @@ static inline real_pte_t __real_pte(pte_t pte, pte_t *ptep)
unsigned long *hidxp;
rpte.pte = pte;
- rpte.hidx = 0;
- if (pte_val(pte) & H_PAGE_COMBO) {
- /*
- * Make sure we order the hidx load against the H_PAGE_COMBO
- * check. The store side ordering is done in __hash_page_4K
- */
- smp_rmb();
- hidxp = (unsigned long *)(ptep + PTRS_PER_PTE);
- rpte.hidx = *hidxp;
- }
+ /*
+ * The store side ordering is done in __hash_page_4K
+ */
+ smp_rmb();
+ hidxp = (unsigned long *)(ptep + PTRS_PER_PTE);
+ rpte.hidx = *hidxp;
return rpte;
}
static inline unsigned long __rpte_to_hidx(real_pte_t rpte, unsigned long index)
{
- if ((pte_val(rpte.pte) & H_PAGE_COMBO))
- return (rpte.hidx >> (index<<2)) & 0xf;
- return (pte_val(rpte.pte) >> H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT) & 0xf;
+ return ((rpte.hidx >> (index<<2)) & 0xfUL);
}
static inline unsigned long set_hidx_slot(pte_t *ptep, real_pte_t rpte,
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_64k.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_64k.c
index 3702a3c..1c25ec2 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_64k.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_64k.c
@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ int __hash_page_64K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access,
unsigned long vsid, pte_t *ptep, unsigned long trap,
unsigned long flags, int ssize)
{
+ real_pte_t rpte;
unsigned long hpte_group;
unsigned long rflags, pa;
unsigned long old_pte, new_pte;
@@ -247,6 +248,7 @@ int __hash_page_64K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access,
} while (!pte_xchg(ptep, __pte(old_pte), __pte(new_pte)));
rflags = htab_convert_pte_flags(new_pte);
+ rpte = __real_pte(__pte(old_pte), ptep);
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_NOEXECUTE) &&
!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_COHERENT_ICACHE))
@@ -254,16 +256,13 @@ int __hash_page_64K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access,
vpn = hpt_vpn(ea, vsid, ssize);
if (unlikely(old_pte & H_PAGE_HASHPTE)) {
+ unsigned long gslot;
+
/*
* There MIGHT be an HPTE for this pte
*/
- hash = hpt_hash(vpn, shift, ssize);
- if (old_pte & H_PAGE_F_SECOND)
- hash = ~hash;
- slot = (hash & htab_hash_mask) * HPTES_PER_GROUP;
- slot += (old_pte & H_PAGE_F_GIX) >> H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT;
-
- if (mmu_hash_ops.hpte_updatepp(slot, rflags, vpn, MMU_PAGE_64K,
+ gslot = get_hidx_gslot(vpn, shift, ssize, rpte, 0);
+ if (mmu_hash_ops.hpte_updatepp(gslot, rflags, vpn, MMU_PAGE_64K,
MMU_PAGE_64K, ssize,
flags) == -1)
old_pte &= ~_PAGE_HPTEFLAGS;
@@ -313,8 +312,7 @@ int __hash_page_64K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access,
return -1;
}
- new_pte |= (slot << H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT) &
- (H_PAGE_F_SECOND | H_PAGE_F_GIX);
+ set_hidx_slot(ptep, rpte, 0, slot);
new_pte = (new_pte & ~_PAGE_HPTEFLAGS) | H_PAGE_HASHPTE;
}
*ptep = __pte(new_pte & ~H_PAGE_BUSY);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage-hash64.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage-hash64.c
index a84bb44..239ca86 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage-hash64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage-hash64.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ int __hash_page_huge(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
pte_t *ptep, unsigned long trap, unsigned long flags,
int ssize, unsigned int shift, unsigned int mmu_psize)
{
+ real_pte_t rpte;
unsigned long vpn;
unsigned long old_pte, new_pte;
unsigned long rflags, pa, sz;
@@ -61,6 +62,7 @@ int __hash_page_huge(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
} while(!pte_xchg(ptep, __pte(old_pte), __pte(new_pte)));
rflags = htab_convert_pte_flags(new_pte);
+ rpte = __real_pte(__pte(old_pte), ptep);
sz = ((1UL) << shift);
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_COHERENT_ICACHE))
@@ -71,15 +73,10 @@ int __hash_page_huge(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
/* Check if pte already has an hpte (case 2) */
if (unlikely(old_pte & H_PAGE_HASHPTE)) {
/* There MIGHT be an HPTE for this pte */
- unsigned long hash, slot;
+ unsigned long gslot;
- hash = hpt_hash(vpn, shift, ssize);
- if (old_pte & H_PAGE_F_SECOND)
- hash = ~hash;
- slot = (hash & htab_hash_mask) * HPTES_PER_GROUP;
- slot += (old_pte & H_PAGE_F_GIX) >> H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT;
-
- if (mmu_hash_ops.hpte_updatepp(slot, rflags, vpn, mmu_psize,
+ gslot = get_hidx_gslot(vpn, shift, ssize, rpte, 0);
+ if (mmu_hash_ops.hpte_updatepp(gslot, rflags, vpn, mmu_psize,
mmu_psize, ssize, flags) == -1)
old_pte &= ~_PAGE_HPTEFLAGS;
}
@@ -106,8 +103,7 @@ int __hash_page_huge(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
return -1;
}
- new_pte |= (slot << H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT) &
- (H_PAGE_F_SECOND | H_PAGE_F_GIX);
+ new_pte |= set_hidx_slot(ptep, rpte, 0, slot);
}
/*
--
1.8.3.1
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| From | Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-19 13:10 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [RFC v2 12/12]selftest: Updated protection key selftest |
| Message-ID | <tU2Jc-1RM-31@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1668160 |
Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> writes: > Added test support for PowerPC implementation off protection keys. > > Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> > --- > tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 1 + > tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 365 +++++++ > tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 1451 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ > tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile | 2 +- > tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h | 219 ---- > tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c | 1395 ------------------------ Please split the move and the addition of the powerpc code into two separate patches (move first). That way we can actually see what you're doing to add powerpc support. cheers
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