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| Started by | Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-06-08 02:50 +0200 |
| Last post | 2017-06-08 02:50 +0200 |
| Articles | 1 — 1 participant |
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Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2017-06-08 02:50 +0200
| From | Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-06-08 02:50 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using |
| Message-ID | <tPTO9-5uW-7@gated-at.bofh.it> |
On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 07:47:56PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Otherwise, we might be seeding the RNG using bad randomness, which is
> dangerous. The one use of this function from within the kernel -- not
> from userspace -- is being removed (keys/big_key), so that call site
> isn't relevant in assessing this.
The use in keys/big_key is _being_ removed, so this commit is
dependent on that commit landing, correct? (Order matters, because
otherwise we don't want to potentially screw up doing a kernel bisect
and causing their kernel to deadlock during the boot while they are
trying to track down an unreleated problem.)
- Ted
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