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Groups > linux.kernel > #1645968 > unrolled thread
| Started by | riel@redhat.com |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-05-19 23:40 +0200 |
| Last post | 2017-05-24 10:40 +0200 |
| Articles | 2 — 2 participants |
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[PATCH 1/5] random,stackprotect: introduce get_random_canary function riel@redhat.com - 2017-05-19 23:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH 1/5] random,stackprotect: introduce get_random_canary function Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2017-05-24 10:40 +0200
| From | riel@redhat.com |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-05-19 23:40 +0200 |
| Subject | [PATCH 1/5] random,stackprotect: introduce get_random_canary function |
| Message-ID | <tIXMS-86v-23@gated-at.bofh.it> |
From: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Introduce the get_random_canary function, which provides a random
unsigned long canary value with the first byte zeroed out on 64
bit architectures, in order to mitigate non-terminated C string
overflows.
Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in the old execshield patches,
and the current PaX/grsecurity code base.
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/random.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index ed5c3838780d..765a992c6774 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -57,6 +57,26 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)
#endif
}
+/*
+ * On 64 bit architectures, protect against non-terminated C string overflows
+ * by zeroing out the first byte of the canary; this leaves 56 bits of entropy.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#define CANARY_MASK 0xffffffffffffff00UL
+#else /* big endian 64 bits */
+#define CANARY_MASK 0x00ffffffffffffffUL
+#endif
+#else /* 32 bits */
+#define CANARY_MASK 0xffffffffUL
+#endif
+static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void)
+{
+ unsigned long val = get_random_long();
+
+ return val & CANARY_MASK;
+}
+
unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
u32 prandom_u32(void);
--
2.9.3
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| From | Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-05-24 10:40 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH 1/5] random,stackprotect: introduce get_random_canary function |
| Message-ID | <tKzZM-8mT-7@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1645968 |
* riel@redhat.com <riel@redhat.com> wrote:
> From: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
>
> Introduce the get_random_canary function, which provides a random
> unsigned long canary value with the first byte zeroed out on 64
> bit architectures, in order to mitigate non-terminated C string
> overflows.
>
> Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in the old execshield patches,
> and the current PaX/grsecurity code base.
>
> Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
> ---
> include/linux/random.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
> index ed5c3838780d..765a992c6774 100644
> --- a/include/linux/random.h
> +++ b/include/linux/random.h
> @@ -57,6 +57,26 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)
> #endif
> }
>
> +/*
> + * On 64 bit architectures, protect against non-terminated C string overflows
s/64 bit/64-bit
> + * by zeroing out the first byte of the canary; this leaves 56 bits of entropy.
> + */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
> +#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
> +#define CANARY_MASK 0xffffffffffffff00UL
> +#else /* big endian 64 bits */
> +#define CANARY_MASK 0x00ffffffffffffffUL
> +#endif
> +#else /* 32 bits */
> +#define CANARY_MASK 0xffffffffUL
> +#endif
> +static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void)
> +{
> + unsigned long val = get_random_long();
> +
> + return val & CANARY_MASK;
> +}
Please separate function definitions from macros by a separate empty line.
Also, a bit of structure and organization would make the macro easier to read:
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
# ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
# define CANARY_MASK 0xffffffffffffff00UL
# else /* big endian, 64 bits: */
# define CANARY_MASK 0x00ffffffffffffffUL
# endif
#else /* 32 bits: */
# define CANARY_MASK 0x00000000ffffffffUL
#endif
Thanks,
Ingo
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