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[PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout() return value

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  [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout() return value Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> - 2017-01-17 16:40 +0100
    Re: [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout()  return value "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-17 17:20 +0100
      Re: [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout()  return value "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-17 17:30 +0100
        Re: [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout()  return value Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> - 2017-01-17 17:40 +0100
          Re: [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout()  return value "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-17 18:40 +0100
            Re: [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout()  return value Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> - 2017-01-17 19:10 +0100
              Re: [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout()  return value Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> - 2017-01-17 22:20 +0100
                RE: [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout()  return value linux-kernel-dev <linux-kernel-dev@beckhoff.com> - 2017-01-18 07:40 +0100
                  Re: [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout()  return value "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-18 21:10 +0100
                    [PATCH 1/7] test_firmware: move misc_device down "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-23 17:20 +0100
                    [PATCH 4/7] tools: firmware: rename fallback mechanism script "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-23 17:20 +0100
                    [PATCH 7/7] firmware: firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in __fw_load_abort() "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-23 17:20 +0100
                      Re: [PATCH 7/7] firmware: firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in  __fw_load_abort() Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-01-25 12:00 +0100
                        Re: [PATCH 7/7] firmware: firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in  __fw_load_abort() "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-25 14:40 +0100
                          Re: [PATCH 7/7] firmware: firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in  __fw_load_abort() "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-25 14:50 +0100
                            Re: [PATCH 7/7] firmware: firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in  __fw_load_abort() Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-01-25 15:50 +0100
                              [PATCH v2] firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in __fw_load_abort() "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-25 16:30 +0100
                                Re: [PATCH v2] firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in  __fw_load_abort() Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-01-25 16:50 +0100
                                  Re: [PATCH v2] firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in  __fw_load_abort() "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-25 19:40 +0100
                                  [PATCH v3] firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in __fw_load_abort() "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-25 19:40 +0100
                    [PATCH 5/7] tools: firmware: add fallback cancelation testing "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-23 17:20 +0100
                    [PATCH 6/7] test_firmware: add test custom fallback trigger "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-23 17:20 +0100
                    [PATCH 2/7] test_firmware: use device attribute groups "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-23 17:20 +0100
                    [PATCH 3/7] tools: firmware: check for distro fallback udev cancel rule "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-23 17:20 +0100
                    [PATCH 0/7] firmware: expand test units for fallback mechanism "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-23 17:20 +0100
              Re: [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout()  return value "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> - 2017-01-17 22:40 +0100

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#1560722 — [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout() return value

Commit 5d47ec02c37e ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait()
return value") made the assumption that any error returned from
fw_state_wait_timeout() means FW load has to be aborted.  This is
incorrect, FW load only has to be aborted when load timed out or
has been interrupted.  Otherwise, if wait exited because of a wake
up, the waking thread (in firmware_loading_store()) had already 
performed the clean up - deleted fw_buf from the pending list and 
set fw_priv->buf to NULL.

Example NULL dereference which occurs because requsted firmware
could not be found by UMH:

nfp 0000:02:00.0: Direct firmware load for AMDA0081-0001.cat failed with error -2
nfp 0000:02:00.0: Falling back to user helper
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000038
IP: _request_firmware+0x7fd/0x910
PGD 0

Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 4 PID: 1981 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O    4.10.0-rc3-perf-00404-g575a284323c2 #78
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge T630/0W9WXC, BIOS 1.2.10 03/10/2015
task: ffff919b81a99a80 task.stack: ffffb3bac5668000
RIP: 0010:_request_firmware+0x7fd/0x910
RSP: 0018:ffffb3bac566b978 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff919b9b2becc0 RCX: ffff919b9b2bece8
RDX: ffff919b81a99a80 RSI: 0000000000000206 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffb3bac566b9e0 R08: ffff919b9f30f4b8 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: 00000120d2b47b48 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffb3bac566ba18
R13: ffff919b823f4780 R14: ffff919b907c5000 R15: 0000000000003a98
FS:  00007fae4d803740(0000) GS:ffff919b9f300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 00000008507b8000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Call Trace:
request_firmware+0x37/0x50
...

Fixes: 5d47ec02c37e ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return value")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
---
v2:
 - improve commit message.
---
 drivers/base/firmware_class.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
index 4497d263209f..ce142e6b2c72 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
@@ -1020,7 +1020,7 @@ static int _request_firmware_load(struct firmware_priv *fw_priv,
 	}
 
 	retval = fw_state_wait_timeout(&buf->fw_st, timeout);
-	if (retval < 0) {
+	if (retval == -ETIMEDOUT || retval == -ERESTARTSYS) {
 		mutex_lock(&fw_lock);
 		fw_load_abort(fw_priv);
 		mutex_unlock(&fw_lock);
-- 
2.11.0

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#1560755 — Re: [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout() return value

On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 03:35:05PM +0000, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> Commit 5d47ec02c37e ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait()
> return value") made the assumption that any error returned from
> fw_state_wait_timeout() means FW load has to be aborted.  This is
> incorrect, FW load only has to be aborted when load timed out or
> has been interrupted.  Otherwise, if wait exited because of a wake
> up, the waking thread (in firmware_loading_store()) had already 
> performed the clean up - deleted fw_buf from the pending list and 
> set fw_priv->buf to NULL.
> 
> Example NULL dereference which occurs because requsted firmware
> could not be found by UMH:
> 
> nfp 0000:02:00.0: Direct firmware load for AMDA0081-0001.cat failed with error -2
> nfp 0000:02:00.0: Falling back to user helper
> BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000038
> IP: _request_firmware+0x7fd/0x910
> PGD 0
> 
> Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
> CPU: 4 PID: 1981 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O    4.10.0-rc3-perf-00404-g575a284323c2 #78
> Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge T630/0W9WXC, BIOS 1.2.10 03/10/2015
> task: ffff919b81a99a80 task.stack: ffffb3bac5668000
> RIP: 0010:_request_firmware+0x7fd/0x910
> RSP: 0018:ffffb3bac566b978 EFLAGS: 00010246
> RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff919b9b2becc0 RCX: ffff919b9b2bece8
> RDX: ffff919b81a99a80 RSI: 0000000000000206 RDI: 0000000000000000
> RBP: ffffb3bac566b9e0 R08: ffff919b9f30f4b8 R09: 0000000000000002
> R10: 00000120d2b47b48 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffb3bac566ba18
> R13: ffff919b823f4780 R14: ffff919b907c5000 R15: 0000000000003a98
> FS:  00007fae4d803740(0000) GS:ffff919b9f300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 00000008507b8000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
> Call Trace:
> request_firmware+0x37/0x50
> ...
> 
> Fixes: 5d47ec02c37e ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return value")
> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
> ---
> v2:
>  - improve commit message.
> ---
>  drivers/base/firmware_class.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
> index 4497d263209f..ce142e6b2c72 100644
> --- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
> +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
> @@ -1020,7 +1020,7 @@ static int _request_firmware_load(struct firmware_priv *fw_priv,
>  	}
>  
>  	retval = fw_state_wait_timeout(&buf->fw_st, timeout);
> -	if (retval < 0) {
> +	if (retval == -ETIMEDOUT || retval == -ERESTARTSYS) {
>  		mutex_lock(&fw_lock);
>  		fw_load_abort(fw_priv);
>  		mutex_unlock(&fw_lock);

This is a bit messy, two other similar issues were reported before
and upon review I suggested Patrick Bruenn's fix with a better commit
log seems best fit. Patrick sent a patch Jan 4, 2017 but never followed up
despite my feedback on a small change on the commit log message [0]. Can you
try that and if that fixes it can you adjust the commit log accordingly? Please
note the preferred solution would be:

diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
index b9ac348e8d33..c530f8b4af01 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
@@ -542,6 +542,8 @@ static struct firmware_priv *to_firmware_priv(struct device *dev)
 
 static void __fw_load_abort(struct firmware_buf *buf)
 {
+	if (!buf)
+		return;
 	/*
 	 * There is a small window in which user can write to 'loading'
 	 * between loading done and disappearance of 'loading'

[0] https://http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170104174227.GO13946@wotan.suse.de

  Luis

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#1560768 — Re: [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout() return value

On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 10:15 AM, Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 03:35:05PM +0000, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
>> Commit 5d47ec02c37e ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait()
>> return value") made the assumption that any error returned from
>> fw_state_wait_timeout() means FW load has to be aborted.  This is
>> incorrect, FW load only has to be aborted when load timed out or
>> has been interrupted.  Otherwise, if wait exited because of a wake
>> up, the waking thread (in firmware_loading_store()) had already
>> performed the clean up - deleted fw_buf from the pending list and
>> set fw_priv->buf to NULL.
>>
>> Example NULL dereference which occurs because requsted firmware
>> could not be found by UMH:
>>
>> nfp 0000:02:00.0: Direct firmware load for AMDA0081-0001.cat failed with error -2
>> nfp 0000:02:00.0: Falling back to user helper
>> BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000038
>> IP: _request_firmware+0x7fd/0x910
>> PGD 0
>>
>> Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
>> CPU: 4 PID: 1981 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O    4.10.0-rc3-perf-00404-g575a284323c2 #78
>> Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge T630/0W9WXC, BIOS 1.2.10 03/10/2015
>> task: ffff919b81a99a80 task.stack: ffffb3bac5668000
>> RIP: 0010:_request_firmware+0x7fd/0x910
>> RSP: 0018:ffffb3bac566b978 EFLAGS: 00010246
>> RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff919b9b2becc0 RCX: ffff919b9b2bece8
>> RDX: ffff919b81a99a80 RSI: 0000000000000206 RDI: 0000000000000000
>> RBP: ffffb3bac566b9e0 R08: ffff919b9f30f4b8 R09: 0000000000000002
>> R10: 00000120d2b47b48 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffb3bac566ba18
>> R13: ffff919b823f4780 R14: ffff919b907c5000 R15: 0000000000003a98
>> FS:  00007fae4d803740(0000) GS:ffff919b9f300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
>> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>> CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 00000008507b8000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
>> Call Trace:
>> request_firmware+0x37/0x50
>> ...
>>
>> Fixes: 5d47ec02c37e ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return value")
>> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
>> ---
>> v2:
>>  - improve commit message.
>> ---
>>  drivers/base/firmware_class.c | 2 +-
>>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
>> index 4497d263209f..ce142e6b2c72 100644
>> --- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
>> +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
>> @@ -1020,7 +1020,7 @@ static int _request_firmware_load(struct firmware_priv *fw_priv,
>>       }
>>
>>       retval = fw_state_wait_timeout(&buf->fw_st, timeout);
>> -     if (retval < 0) {
>> +     if (retval == -ETIMEDOUT || retval == -ERESTARTSYS) {
>>               mutex_lock(&fw_lock);
>>               fw_load_abort(fw_priv);
>>               mutex_unlock(&fw_lock);
>
> This is a bit messy, two other similar issues were reported before
> and upon review I suggested Patrick Bruenn's fix with a better commit
> log seems best fit. Patrick sent a patch Jan 4, 2017 but never followed up
> despite my feedback on a small change on the commit log message [0]. Can you
> try that and if that fixes it can you adjust the commit log accordingly? Please
> note the preferred solution would be:
>
> diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
> index b9ac348e8d33..c530f8b4af01 100644
> --- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
> +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
> @@ -542,6 +542,8 @@ static struct firmware_priv *to_firmware_priv(struct device *dev)
>
>  static void __fw_load_abort(struct firmware_buf *buf)
>  {
> +       if (!buf)
> +               return;
>         /*
>          * There is a small window in which user can write to 'loading'
>          * between loading done and disappearance of 'loading'
>
> [0] https://http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170104174227.GO13946@wotan.suse.de

Actually Patrick did follow up with a new patch today but I just saw
it was not as I recommended above. Patrick can you send a new one with
your good commit log with the above change ? Can you both confirm it
fixes the issue?

 Luis

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#1560778 — Re: [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout() return value

On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 8:21 AM, Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>       retval = fw_state_wait_timeout(&buf->fw_st, timeout);
>>> -     if (retval < 0) {
>>> +     if (retval == -ETIMEDOUT || retval == -ERESTARTSYS) {
>>>               mutex_lock(&fw_lock);
>>>               fw_load_abort(fw_priv);
>>>               mutex_unlock(&fw_lock);
>>
>> This is a bit messy, two other similar issues were reported before
>> and upon review I suggested Patrick Bruenn's fix with a better commit
>> log seems best fit. Patrick sent a patch Jan 4, 2017 but never followed up
>> despite my feedback on a small change on the commit log message [0]. Can you
>> try that and if that fixes it can you adjust the commit log accordingly? Please
>> note the preferred solution would be:
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
>> index b9ac348e8d33..c530f8b4af01 100644
>> --- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
>> +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
>> @@ -542,6 +542,8 @@ static struct firmware_priv *to_firmware_priv(struct device *dev)
>>
>>  static void __fw_load_abort(struct firmware_buf *buf)
>>  {
>> +       if (!buf)
>> +               return;

Allow me to try to persuade you one last time :)  My patch makes the
code more logical and easier to follow.  The code says:
in case no wake up happened - finish the wait (otherwise the waking
thread finishes it).  Adding a NULL-check would just paper over the
issue and can cause trouble down the line.  If fw_state_wait_timeout()
returned because someone woke it up - there is no reason to abort the
wait.  The wait is already finished. The buggy commit mixed up return
codes from fw_state_wait_timeout() - mixed "nobody woke us up" with
"we couldn't find the FW", that's why we need to check for specific
error codes.

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#1560847 — Re: [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout() return value

On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 08:30:37AM -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 8:21 AM, Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>       retval = fw_state_wait_timeout(&buf->fw_st, timeout);
> >>> -     if (retval < 0) {
> >>> +     if (retval == -ETIMEDOUT || retval == -ERESTARTSYS) {
> >>>               mutex_lock(&fw_lock);
> >>>               fw_load_abort(fw_priv);
> >>>               mutex_unlock(&fw_lock);
> >>
> >> This is a bit messy, two other similar issues were reported before
> >> and upon review I suggested Patrick Bruenn's fix with a better commit
> >> log seems best fit. Patrick sent a patch Jan 4, 2017 but never followed up
> >> despite my feedback on a small change on the commit log message [0]. Can you
> >> try that and if that fixes it can you adjust the commit log accordingly? Please
> >> note the preferred solution would be:
> >>
> >> diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
> >> index b9ac348e8d33..c530f8b4af01 100644
> >> --- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
> >> +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
> >> @@ -542,6 +542,8 @@ static struct firmware_priv *to_firmware_priv(struct device *dev)
> >>
> >>  static void __fw_load_abort(struct firmware_buf *buf)
> >>  {
> >> +       if (!buf)
> >> +               return;
> 
> Allow me to try to persuade you one last time :)  My patch makes the
> code more logical and easier to follow.  The code says:
> in case no wake up happened - finish the wait (otherwise the waking
> thread finishes it).

Your patch is still wrong, as Patrick great commit log notes a null defer
can also happen on a race with a case of -1 being sent and a -ENOENT error,
so we'd have to adjust for when __fw_state_wait_common() returns also
-ENOENT.

> Adding a NULL-check would just paper over the
> issue and can cause trouble down the line.

We typically bail on errors and use similar code to bail out, and we
typically do these things. Here its no different. The *real* issue
is the fact that we have a waiting timeout which can fail race against
a user imposed error out on the sysfs interface. There is one catch:

We already lock with the big fw_lock and use this to be able to check
for the status of the fw, so once aborted we technically should not have
to abort again. A proper way to address then this would have been to check
for the status of the fw prior to aborting again given we also lock on the
big fw_lock. A problem with this though is the status is part of the buf
which is set to NULL after we are done aborting.

> If fw_state_wait_timeout()
> returned because someone woke it up - there is no reason to abort the
> wait.  The wait is already finished. The buggy commit mixed up return
> codes from fw_state_wait_timeout() - mixed "nobody woke us up" with
> "we couldn't find the FW", that's why we need to check for specific
> error codes.

Nope, sorry I still believe the check on buf is needed. The code not not
ideal, but I welcome further changes to help shape it up, such as the
changes Daniel has been helping with.

Patrick, if you can document what I mentioned about what I said about the catch
in your commit log it could help further reviewers *why* we do it this way.

  Luis

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#1560879 — Re: [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout() return value

On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 9:30 AM, Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 08:30:37AM -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
>> On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 8:21 AM, Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>>       retval = fw_state_wait_timeout(&buf->fw_st, timeout);
>> >>> -     if (retval < 0) {
>> >>> +     if (retval == -ETIMEDOUT || retval == -ERESTARTSYS) {
>> >>>               mutex_lock(&fw_lock);
>> >>>               fw_load_abort(fw_priv);
>> >>>               mutex_unlock(&fw_lock);
>> >>
>> >> This is a bit messy, two other similar issues were reported before
>> >> and upon review I suggested Patrick Bruenn's fix with a better commit
>> >> log seems best fit. Patrick sent a patch Jan 4, 2017 but never followed up
>> >> despite my feedback on a small change on the commit log message [0]. Can you
>> >> try that and if that fixes it can you adjust the commit log accordingly? Please
>> >> note the preferred solution would be:
>> >>
>> >> diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
>> >> index b9ac348e8d33..c530f8b4af01 100644
>> >> --- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
>> >> +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
>> >> @@ -542,6 +542,8 @@ static struct firmware_priv *to_firmware_priv(struct device *dev)
>> >>
>> >>  static void __fw_load_abort(struct firmware_buf *buf)
>> >>  {
>> >> +       if (!buf)
>> >> +               return;
>>
>> Allow me to try to persuade you one last time :)  My patch makes the
>> code more logical and easier to follow.  The code says:
>> in case no wake up happened - finish the wait (otherwise the waking
>> thread finishes it).
>
> Your patch is still wrong, as Patrick great commit log notes a null defer
> can also happen on a race with a case of -1 being sent and a -ENOENT error,
> so we'd have to adjust for when __fw_state_wait_common() returns also
> -ENOENT.

Sorry, I don't follow.  _Not_ calling abort on -ENOENT error is
exactly what my patch does.

>> Adding a NULL-check would just paper over the
>> issue and can cause trouble down the line.
>
> We typically bail on errors and use similar code to bail out, and we
> typically do these things. Here its no different. The *real* issue
> is the fact that we have a waiting timeout which can fail race against
> a user imposed error out on the sysfs interface. There is one catch:
>
> We already lock with the big fw_lock and use this to be able to check
> for the status of the fw, so once aborted we technically should not have
> to abort again. A proper way to address then this would have been to check
> for the status of the fw prior to aborting again given we also lock on the
> big fw_lock. A problem with this though is the status is part of the buf
> which is set to NULL after we are done aborting.

Yes, I've seen that too :\  This race seems to have been there prior
to 4.9, though.  I guess we could fix both issues with the NULL-check
although I would prefer if we had both patches.

FWIW I think the NULL-check could be put in the existing conditional:

         * There is a small window in which user can write to 'loading'
         * between loading done and disappearance of 'loading'
         */
-       if (fw_state_is_done(&buf->fw_st))
+       if (!buf || fw_state_is_done(&buf->fw_st))
                return;

        list_del_init(&buf->pending_list);

Note that the comment above seems to be mentioning the race we're
trying to solve.

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#1561026 — Re: [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout() return value

On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 12:53 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 10:04:20AM -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
>> On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 9:30 AM, Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> wrote:
>> > On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 08:30:37AM -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
>> >> Adding a NULL-check would just paper over the
>> >> issue and can cause trouble down the line.
>> >
>> > We typically bail on errors and use similar code to bail out, and we
>> > typically do these things. Here its no different. The *real* issue
>> > is the fact that we have a waiting timeout which can fail race against
>> > a user imposed error out on the sysfs interface. There is one catch:
>> >
>> > We already lock with the big fw_lock and use this to be able to check
>> > for the status of the fw, so once aborted we technically should not have
>> > to abort again. A proper way to address then this would have been to check
>> > for the status of the fw prior to aborting again given we also lock on the
>> > big fw_lock. A problem with this though is the status is part of the buf
>> > which is set to NULL after we are done aborting.
>>
>> Yes, I've seen that too :\  This race seems to have been there prior
>> to 4.9, though.  I guess we could fix both issues with the NULL-check
>> although I would prefer if we had both patches.
>>
>> FWIW I think the NULL-check could be put in the existing conditional:
>>
>>          * There is a small window in which user can write to 'loading'
>>          * between loading done and disappearance of 'loading'
>>          */
>> -       if (fw_state_is_done(&buf->fw_st))
>> +       if (!buf || fw_state_is_done(&buf->fw_st))
>>                 return;
>>
>>         list_del_init(&buf->pending_list);
>>
>> Note that the comment above seems to be mentioning the race we're
>> trying to solve.
>
> Right, I think another approach is to *enable* the state of the buf
> to be used to avoid further use on the sysfs iterface instead. Fortunately
> other sysfs interfaces already use fw_state_is_done() to bail out,
> so all that would be needed I think would be:
>
> diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
> index b9ac348e8d33..30ccf7aea3ca 100644
> --- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
> +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
> @@ -558,9 +558,6 @@ static void fw_load_abort(struct firmware_priv *fw_priv)
>         struct firmware_buf *buf = fw_priv->buf;
>
>         __fw_load_abort(buf);
> -
> -       /* avoid user action after loading abort */
> -       fw_priv->buf = NULL;
>  }
>
>  static LIST_HEAD(pending_fw_head);
> @@ -713,7 +710,7 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev,
>
>         mutex_lock(&fw_lock);
>         fw_buf = fw_priv->buf;
> -       if (!fw_buf)
> +       if (!fw_buf || fw_state_is_aborted(&fw_buf->fw_st))
>                 goto out;
>
>         switch (loading) {

IMHO this one is nice!  I think you can even drop the !fw_buf check in
this case because AFAICS the only case where fw_buf is set to NULL is
in the abort function.

I was initially thinking that this could be a slight change of
behavior - note that if mapping pages failed the abort state is
entered with fw_state_aborted() which does not unlink the buffer so in
theory one could still restart the FW load by writing 0 to sysfs and
retrying?  But it would have to be done before the waiting thread gets
woken so it's really a race condition rather then something user space
can depend on.  Or at least that's the case if I'm reading the code
correctly.

Yet another way to change the condition in firmware_loading_store()
would be to check if fw_priv->buf->pending_list is still hooked onto
the pending_fw_head list.

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#1561318 — RE: [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout() return value

>From: Jakub Kicinski [mailto:jakub.kicinski@netronome.com]
>Sent: Dienstag, 17. Januar 2017 22:18
>
>On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 12:53 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
>wrote:
>> On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 10:04:20AM -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
>>> On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 9:30 AM, Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
>wrote:
>>> > On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 08:30:37AM -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
>>> >> Adding a NULL-check would just paper over the
>>> >> issue and can cause trouble down the line.
>>> >
>>> > We typically bail on errors and use similar code to bail out, and we
>>> > typically do these things. Here its no different. The *real* issue
>>> > is the fact that we have a waiting timeout which can fail race against
>>> > a user imposed error out on the sysfs interface. There is one catch:
>>> >
>>> > We already lock with the big fw_lock and use this to be able to check
>>> > for the status of the fw, so once aborted we technically should not have
>>> > to abort again. A proper way to address then this would have been to
>check
>>> > for the status of the fw prior to aborting again given we also lock on the
>>> > big fw_lock. A problem with this though is the status is part of the buf
>>> > which is set to NULL after we are done aborting.
>>>
>>> Yes, I've seen that too :\  This race seems to have been there prior
>>> to 4.9, though.  I guess we could fix both issues with the NULL-check
>>> although I would prefer if we had both patches.
>>>
>>> FWIW I think the NULL-check could be put in the existing conditional:
>>>
>>>          * There is a small window in which user can write to 'loading'
>>>          * between loading done and disappearance of 'loading'
>>>          */
>>> -       if (fw_state_is_done(&buf->fw_st))
>>> +       if (!buf || fw_state_is_done(&buf->fw_st))
>>>                 return;
>>>
>>>         list_del_init(&buf->pending_list);
>>>
>>> Note that the comment above seems to be mentioning the race we're
>>> trying to solve.
>>
>> Right, I think another approach is to *enable* the state of the buf
>> to be used to avoid further use on the sysfs iterface instead. Fortunately
>> other sysfs interfaces already use fw_state_is_done() to bail out,
>> so all that would be needed I think would be:
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
>> index b9ac348e8d33..30ccf7aea3ca 100644
>> --- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
>> +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
>> @@ -558,9 +558,6 @@ static void fw_load_abort(struct firmware_priv
>*fw_priv)
>>         struct firmware_buf *buf = fw_priv->buf;
>>
>>         __fw_load_abort(buf);
>> -
>> -       /* avoid user action after loading abort */
>> -       fw_priv->buf = NULL;
>>  }
>>
>>  static LIST_HEAD(pending_fw_head);
>> @@ -713,7 +710,7 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device
>*dev,
>>
>>         mutex_lock(&fw_lock);
>>         fw_buf = fw_priv->buf;
>> -       if (!fw_buf)
>> +       if (!fw_buf || fw_state_is_aborted(&fw_buf->fw_st))
>>                 goto out;
>>
>>         switch (loading) {
>
>IMHO this one is nice!  I think you can even drop the !fw_buf check in
>this case because AFAICS the only case where fw_buf is set to NULL is
>in the abort function.
>
I can confirm, that patch looks nice and is working for my setup, even without the !fw_buf. 
Feel free to grab everything you need from my commit log, if it helps.
Unfortunately there is a crazy spam filter between us, so you can't rely on me.
 

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#1562126 — Re: [PATCHv2] firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait_timeout() return value

On Wed, Jan 18, 2017 at 06:33:56AM +0000, linux-kernel-dev wrote:
> >From: Jakub Kicinski [mailto:jakub.kicinski@netronome.com]
> >Sent: Dienstag, 17. Januar 2017 22:18
> >
> >On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 12:53 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
> >wrote:
> >> On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 10:04:20AM -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> >>> On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 9:30 AM, Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
> >wrote:
> >>> > On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 08:30:37AM -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> >>> >> Adding a NULL-check would just paper over the
> >>> >> issue and can cause trouble down the line.
> >>> >
> >>> > We typically bail on errors and use similar code to bail out, and we
> >>> > typically do these things. Here its no different. The *real* issue
> >>> > is the fact that we have a waiting timeout which can fail race against
> >>> > a user imposed error out on the sysfs interface. There is one catch:
> >>> >
> >>> > We already lock with the big fw_lock and use this to be able to check
> >>> > for the status of the fw, so once aborted we technically should not have
> >>> > to abort again. A proper way to address then this would have been to
> >check
> >>> > for the status of the fw prior to aborting again given we also lock on the
> >>> > big fw_lock. A problem with this though is the status is part of the buf
> >>> > which is set to NULL after we are done aborting.
> >>>
> >>> Yes, I've seen that too :\  This race seems to have been there prior
> >>> to 4.9, though.  I guess we could fix both issues with the NULL-check
> >>> although I would prefer if we had both patches.
> >>>
> >>> FWIW I think the NULL-check could be put in the existing conditional:
> >>>
> >>>          * There is a small window in which user can write to 'loading'
> >>>          * between loading done and disappearance of 'loading'
> >>>          */
> >>> -       if (fw_state_is_done(&buf->fw_st))
> >>> +       if (!buf || fw_state_is_done(&buf->fw_st))
> >>>                 return;
> >>>
> >>>         list_del_init(&buf->pending_list);
> >>>
> >>> Note that the comment above seems to be mentioning the race we're
> >>> trying to solve.
> >>
> >> Right, I think another approach is to *enable* the state of the buf
> >> to be used to avoid further use on the sysfs iterface instead. Fortunately
> >> other sysfs interfaces already use fw_state_is_done() to bail out,
> >> so all that would be needed I think would be:
> >>
> >> diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
> >> index b9ac348e8d33..30ccf7aea3ca 100644
> >> --- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
> >> +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
> >> @@ -558,9 +558,6 @@ static void fw_load_abort(struct firmware_priv
> >*fw_priv)
> >>         struct firmware_buf *buf = fw_priv->buf;
> >>
> >>         __fw_load_abort(buf);
> >> -
> >> -       /* avoid user action after loading abort */
> >> -       fw_priv->buf = NULL;
> >>  }
> >>
> >>  static LIST_HEAD(pending_fw_head);
> >> @@ -713,7 +710,7 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device
> >*dev,
> >>
> >>         mutex_lock(&fw_lock);
> >>         fw_buf = fw_priv->buf;
> >> -       if (!fw_buf)
> >> +       if (!fw_buf || fw_state_is_aborted(&fw_buf->fw_st))
> >>                 goto out;
> >>
> >>         switch (loading) {
> >
> >IMHO this one is nice!  I think you can even drop the !fw_buf check in
> >this case because AFAICS the only case where fw_buf is set to NULL is
> >in the abort function.
> >
> I can confirm, that patch looks nice and is working for my setup, even without the !fw_buf. 
> Feel free to grab everything you need from my commit log, if it helps.
> Unfortunately there is a crazy spam filter between us, so you can't rely on me.

OK I'll submit this version with both your Reported-and-Tested-by.

  Luis

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#1565095 — [PATCH 1/7] test_firmware: move misc_device down

This will make further changes easier to review.

Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
---
 lib/test_firmware.c | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/test_firmware.c b/lib/test_firmware.c
index a3e8ec3fb1c5..1cb9bf9eb41f 100644
--- a/lib/test_firmware.c
+++ b/lib/test_firmware.c
@@ -42,12 +42,6 @@ static const struct file_operations test_fw_fops = {
 	.read           = test_fw_misc_read,
 };
 
-static struct miscdevice test_fw_misc_device = {
-	.minor          = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
-	.name           = "test_firmware",
-	.fops           = &test_fw_fops,
-};
-
 static ssize_t trigger_request_store(struct device *dev,
 				     struct device_attribute *attr,
 				     const char *buf, size_t count)
@@ -132,6 +126,12 @@ static ssize_t trigger_async_request_store(struct device *dev,
 }
 static DEVICE_ATTR_WO(trigger_async_request);
 
+static struct miscdevice test_fw_misc_device = {
+	.minor          = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
+	.name           = "test_firmware",
+	.fops           = &test_fw_fops,
+};
+
 static int __init test_firmware_init(void)
 {
 	int rc;
-- 
2.11.0

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#1565096 — [PATCH 4/7] tools: firmware: rename fallback mechanism script

Calling it user mode helper only creates confusion.

Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/firmware/Makefile                            | 2 +-
 .../testing/selftests/firmware/{fw_userhelper.sh => fw_fallback.sh}  | 5 +++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 rename tools/testing/selftests/firmware/{fw_userhelper.sh => fw_fallback.sh} (96%)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/firmware/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/firmware/Makefile
index 9bf82234855b..1894d625af2d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/firmware/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/firmware/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 # No binaries, but make sure arg-less "make" doesn't trigger "run_tests"
 all:
 
-TEST_PROGS := fw_filesystem.sh fw_userhelper.sh
+TEST_PROGS := fw_filesystem.sh fw_fallback.sh
 
 include ../lib.mk
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/firmware/fw_userhelper.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/firmware/fw_fallback.sh
similarity index 96%
rename from tools/testing/selftests/firmware/fw_userhelper.sh
rename to tools/testing/selftests/firmware/fw_fallback.sh
index 01c626a1f226..f694afb7d12d 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/firmware/fw_userhelper.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/firmware/fw_fallback.sh
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-# This validates that the kernel will fall back to using the user helper
+# This validates that the kernel will fall back to using the fallback mechanism
 # to load firmware it can't find on disk itself. We must request a firmware
 # that the kernel won't find, and any installed helper (e.g. udev) also
 # won't find so that we can do the load ourself manually.
@@ -117,7 +117,8 @@ if ! diff -q "$FW" /dev/test_firmware >/dev/null ; then
 	echo "$0: firmware was not loaded" >&2
 	exit 1
 else
-	echo "$0: user helper firmware loading works"
+	echo "$0: fallback mechanism works"
+
 fi
 
 exit 0
-- 
2.11.0

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#1565097 — [PATCH 7/7] firmware: firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in __fw_load_abort()

Since commit 5d47ec02c37ea632398cb251c884e3a488dff794
("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return value")
fw_load_abort(fw_priv) could be called twice and lead us to a
kernel crash. This happens only when the firmware fallback mechanism
(regular or custom) is used. The fallback mechanism exposes a sysfs
interface for userspace to upload a file and notify the kernel when
the file is loaded and ready, or to cancel an upload by echo'ing -1
into on the loading file:

echo -n "-1" > /sys/$DEVPATH/loading

This will call fw_load_abort(). Some distributions actually have
a udev rule in place to *always* immediately cancel all firmware
fallback mechanism requests (Debian, OpenSUSE), they have:

  $ cat /lib/udev/rules.d/50-firmware.rules
  # stub for immediately telling the kernel that userspace firmware loading
  # failed; necessary to avoid long timeouts with CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER=y
  SUBSYSTEM=="firmware", ACTION=="add", ATTR{loading}="-1

This was done since udev removed the firmware fallback mechanism a while ago
and a long standing misunderstood issues with the timeout (but now corrected).
Distributions with this udev rule would run into this crash only if the
fallback mechanism is used. Since most distributions disable by default
using the fallback mechanism (CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER_FALLBACK), this
would typicaly mean only 2 drivers which *require* the fallback mechanism
could typically incur a crash: drivers/firmware/dell_rbu.c and the
drivers/leds/leds-lp55xx-common.c driver.

Distributions enabling CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER_FALLBACK are clearly
more exposed as every file not found through a firmware request will
use the fallback mechanism.

The crash happens because after commit 5b029624948d ("firmware: do not
use fw_lock for fw_state protection") and subsequent fix commit
5d47ec02c37ea6 ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return
value") a race can happen between this cancelation and the firmware
fw_state_wait_timeout() being woken up after a state change with which
fw_load_abort() as that calls swake_up(). Upon error fw_state_wait_timeout()
will also again call fw_load_abort() and trigger a null reference.

At first glance we could just fix this with a !buf check on
fw_load_abort() before accessing buf->fw_st, however there is
a logical issue in having a state machine used for the fallback
mechanism and preventing access from it once we abort as its inside
the buf (buf->fw_st).

The firmware_class.c code is setting the buf to NULL to annotate an
abort has occurred. Replace this mechanism by simply using the state check
instead. All the other code in place already uses similar checks
for aborting as well so no further changes are needed.

An oops can be reproduced with the new fw_fallback.sh fallback
mechanism cancellation test. Either cancelling the fallback mechanism
or the custom fallback mechanism triggers a crash.

mcgrof@piggy ~/linux-next/tools/testing/selftests/firmware
(git::20170111-fw-fixes)$ sudo ./fw_fallback.sh

./fw_fallback.sh: timeout works
./fw_fallback.sh: firmware comparison works
./fw_fallback.sh: fallback mechanism works

[ this then sits here when it is trying the cancellation test ]

Kernel log:

[   36.750521] test_firmware: loading 'nope-test-firmware.bin'
[   36.751144] misc test_firmware: Direct firmware load for nope-test-firmware.bin failed with error -2
[   36.752034] misc test_firmware: Falling back to user helper
[   36.853324] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000038
[   36.854221] IP: _request_firmware+0xa27/0xad0
[   36.854671] PGD 0
[   36.854672]
[   36.855081] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[   36.855433] Modules linked in: test_firmware(E) ... etc ...
[   36.857802] CPU: 1 PID: 1396 Comm: fw_fallback.sh Tainted: G        W E   4.10.0-rc3-next-20170111+ #30
[   36.857802] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.1-0-g8891697-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
[   36.857802] task: ffff9740b27f4340 task.stack: ffffbb15c0bc8000
[   36.857802] RIP: 0010:_request_firmware+0xa27/0xad0
[   36.857802] RSP: 0018:ffffbb15c0bcbd10 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   36.857802] RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9740afe5aa80 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   36.857802] RDX: ffff9740b27f4340 RSI: 0000000000000283 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   36.857802] RBP: ffffbb15c0bcbd90 R08: ffffbb15c0bcbcd8 R09: 0000000000000000
[   36.857802] R10: 0000000894a0d4b1 R11: 000000000000008c R12: ffffffffc0312480
[   36.857802] R13: 0000000000000005 R14: ffff9740b1c32400 R15: 00000000000003e8
[   36.857802] FS:  00007f8604422700(0000) GS:ffff9740bfc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   36.857802] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   36.857802] CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 000000012164c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[   36.857802] Call Trace:
[   36.857802]  request_firmware+0x37/0x50
[   36.857802]  trigger_request_store+0x79/0xd0 [test_firmware]
[   36.857802]  dev_attr_store+0x18/0x30
[   36.857802]  sysfs_kf_write+0x37/0x40
[   36.857802]  kernfs_fop_write+0x110/0x1a0
[   36.857802]  __vfs_write+0x37/0x160
[   36.857802]  ? _cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
[   36.857802]  vfs_write+0xb5/0x1a0
[   36.857802]  SyS_write+0x55/0xc0
[   36.857802]  ? trace_do_page_fault+0x37/0xd0
[   36.857802]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad
[   36.857802] RIP: 0033:0x7f8603f49620
[   36.857802] RSP: 002b:00007fff6287b788 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[   36.857802] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c307b110a0 RCX: 00007f8603f49620
[   36.857802] RDX: 0000000000000016 RSI: 000055c3084d8a90 RDI: 0000000000000001
[   36.857802] RBP: 0000000000000016 R08: 000000000000c0ff R09: 000055c3084d6336
[   36.857802] R10: 000055c307b108b0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055c307b13c80
[   36.857802] R13: 000055c3084d6320 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff6287b950
[   36.857802] Code: 9f 64 84 e8 9c 61 fe ff b8 f4 ff ff ff e9 6b f9 ff
ff 48 c7 c7 40 6b 8d 84 89 45 a8 e8 43 84 18 00 49 8b be 00 03 00 00 8b
45 a8 <83> 7f 38 02 74 08 e8 6e ec ff ff 8b 45 a8 49 c7 86 00 03 00 00
[   36.857802] RIP: _request_firmware+0xa27/0xad0 RSP: ffffbb15c0bcbd10
[   36.857802] CR2: 0000000000000038
[   36.872685] ---[ end trace 6d94ac339c133e6f ]---

In above case the call hierarchy that causes the crash looks as follows:

lib/test_firmware.c request_firmware()
-> fw_load_from_user_helper()
-> _request_firmware_load()
-> call fw_state_wait_timeout()

Some time later firmware_loading_store() scans a control value of "-1"
-> switch(loading) case -1: will call
-> fw_load_abort(fw_priv) which calls
-> __fw_load_abort(fw_priv->buf)
-> and set fw_priv->buf = NULL;

Upon being woken up via swake_up(), back in _request_firmware_load()
fw_state_wait_timeout() returns -ENOENT
-> since mentioned commit
-> fw_load_abort(fw_priv) is called a second time
-> and this time it would call:
-> __fw_load_abort(NULL /* fw_priv->buf */)
-> and we get: NULL->fw_st.status

Fixes: 5d47ec02c37e ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return value")
Reported-and-Tested-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reported-and-Tested-by: Patrick Bruenn <p.bruenn@beckhoff.com>
Reported-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>    [3.10+]
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/base/firmware_class.c | 5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
index 4497d263209f..ac350c518e0c 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
@@ -558,9 +558,6 @@ static void fw_load_abort(struct firmware_priv *fw_priv)
 	struct firmware_buf *buf = fw_priv->buf;
 
 	__fw_load_abort(buf);
-
-	/* avoid user action after loading abort */
-	fw_priv->buf = NULL;
 }
 
 static LIST_HEAD(pending_fw_head);
@@ -713,7 +710,7 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev,
 
 	mutex_lock(&fw_lock);
 	fw_buf = fw_priv->buf;
-	if (!fw_buf)
+	if (fw_state_is_aborted(&fw_buf->fw_st))
 		goto out;
 
 	switch (loading) {
-- 
2.11.0

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#1566485 — Re: [PATCH 7/7] firmware: firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in __fw_load_abort()

On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 08:11:11AM -0800, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> Since commit 5d47ec02c37ea632398cb251c884e3a488dff794
> ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return value")
> fw_load_abort(fw_priv) could be called twice and lead us to a
> kernel crash. This happens only when the firmware fallback mechanism
> (regular or custom) is used. The fallback mechanism exposes a sysfs
> interface for userspace to upload a file and notify the kernel when
> the file is loaded and ready, or to cancel an upload by echo'ing -1
> into on the loading file:
> 
> echo -n "-1" > /sys/$DEVPATH/loading
> 
> This will call fw_load_abort(). Some distributions actually have
> a udev rule in place to *always* immediately cancel all firmware
> fallback mechanism requests (Debian, OpenSUSE), they have:
> 
>   $ cat /lib/udev/rules.d/50-firmware.rules
>   # stub for immediately telling the kernel that userspace firmware loading
>   # failed; necessary to avoid long timeouts with CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER=y
>   SUBSYSTEM=="firmware", ACTION=="add", ATTR{loading}="-1
> 
> This was done since udev removed the firmware fallback mechanism a while ago
> and a long standing misunderstood issues with the timeout (but now corrected).
> Distributions with this udev rule would run into this crash only if the
> fallback mechanism is used. Since most distributions disable by default
> using the fallback mechanism (CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER_FALLBACK), this
> would typicaly mean only 2 drivers which *require* the fallback mechanism
> could typically incur a crash: drivers/firmware/dell_rbu.c and the
> drivers/leds/leds-lp55xx-common.c driver.
> 
> Distributions enabling CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER_FALLBACK are clearly
> more exposed as every file not found through a firmware request will
> use the fallback mechanism.
> 
> The crash happens because after commit 5b029624948d ("firmware: do not
> use fw_lock for fw_state protection") and subsequent fix commit
> 5d47ec02c37ea6 ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return
> value") a race can happen between this cancelation and the firmware
> fw_state_wait_timeout() being woken up after a state change with which
> fw_load_abort() as that calls swake_up(). Upon error fw_state_wait_timeout()
> will also again call fw_load_abort() and trigger a null reference.
> 
> At first glance we could just fix this with a !buf check on
> fw_load_abort() before accessing buf->fw_st, however there is
> a logical issue in having a state machine used for the fallback
> mechanism and preventing access from it once we abort as its inside
> the buf (buf->fw_st).
> 
> The firmware_class.c code is setting the buf to NULL to annotate an
> abort has occurred. Replace this mechanism by simply using the state check
> instead. All the other code in place already uses similar checks
> for aborting as well so no further changes are needed.
> 
> An oops can be reproduced with the new fw_fallback.sh fallback
> mechanism cancellation test. Either cancelling the fallback mechanism
> or the custom fallback mechanism triggers a crash.
> 
> mcgrof@piggy ~/linux-next/tools/testing/selftests/firmware
> (git::20170111-fw-fixes)$ sudo ./fw_fallback.sh
> 
> ./fw_fallback.sh: timeout works
> ./fw_fallback.sh: firmware comparison works
> ./fw_fallback.sh: fallback mechanism works
> 
> [ this then sits here when it is trying the cancellation test ]
> 
> Kernel log:
> 
> [   36.750521] test_firmware: loading 'nope-test-firmware.bin'
> [   36.751144] misc test_firmware: Direct firmware load for nope-test-firmware.bin failed with error -2
> [   36.752034] misc test_firmware: Falling back to user helper
> [   36.853324] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000038
> [   36.854221] IP: _request_firmware+0xa27/0xad0
> [   36.854671] PGD 0
> [   36.854672]
> [   36.855081] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
> [   36.855433] Modules linked in: test_firmware(E) ... etc ...
> [   36.857802] CPU: 1 PID: 1396 Comm: fw_fallback.sh Tainted: G        W E   4.10.0-rc3-next-20170111+ #30
> [   36.857802] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.1-0-g8891697-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
> [   36.857802] task: ffff9740b27f4340 task.stack: ffffbb15c0bc8000
> [   36.857802] RIP: 0010:_request_firmware+0xa27/0xad0
> [   36.857802] RSP: 0018:ffffbb15c0bcbd10 EFLAGS: 00010246
> [   36.857802] RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9740afe5aa80 RCX: 0000000000000000
> [   36.857802] RDX: ffff9740b27f4340 RSI: 0000000000000283 RDI: 0000000000000000
> [   36.857802] RBP: ffffbb15c0bcbd90 R08: ffffbb15c0bcbcd8 R09: 0000000000000000
> [   36.857802] R10: 0000000894a0d4b1 R11: 000000000000008c R12: ffffffffc0312480
> [   36.857802] R13: 0000000000000005 R14: ffff9740b1c32400 R15: 00000000000003e8
> [   36.857802] FS:  00007f8604422700(0000) GS:ffff9740bfc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> [   36.857802] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> [   36.857802] CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 000000012164c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
> [   36.857802] Call Trace:
> [   36.857802]  request_firmware+0x37/0x50
> [   36.857802]  trigger_request_store+0x79/0xd0 [test_firmware]
> [   36.857802]  dev_attr_store+0x18/0x30
> [   36.857802]  sysfs_kf_write+0x37/0x40
> [   36.857802]  kernfs_fop_write+0x110/0x1a0
> [   36.857802]  __vfs_write+0x37/0x160
> [   36.857802]  ? _cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
> [   36.857802]  vfs_write+0xb5/0x1a0
> [   36.857802]  SyS_write+0x55/0xc0
> [   36.857802]  ? trace_do_page_fault+0x37/0xd0
> [   36.857802]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad
> [   36.857802] RIP: 0033:0x7f8603f49620
> [   36.857802] RSP: 002b:00007fff6287b788 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
> [   36.857802] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c307b110a0 RCX: 00007f8603f49620
> [   36.857802] RDX: 0000000000000016 RSI: 000055c3084d8a90 RDI: 0000000000000001
> [   36.857802] RBP: 0000000000000016 R08: 000000000000c0ff R09: 000055c3084d6336
> [   36.857802] R10: 000055c307b108b0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055c307b13c80
> [   36.857802] R13: 000055c3084d6320 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff6287b950
> [   36.857802] Code: 9f 64 84 e8 9c 61 fe ff b8 f4 ff ff ff e9 6b f9 ff
> ff 48 c7 c7 40 6b 8d 84 89 45 a8 e8 43 84 18 00 49 8b be 00 03 00 00 8b
> 45 a8 <83> 7f 38 02 74 08 e8 6e ec ff ff 8b 45 a8 49 c7 86 00 03 00 00
> [   36.857802] RIP: _request_firmware+0xa27/0xad0 RSP: ffffbb15c0bcbd10
> [   36.857802] CR2: 0000000000000038
> [   36.872685] ---[ end trace 6d94ac339c133e6f ]---
> 
> In above case the call hierarchy that causes the crash looks as follows:
> 
> lib/test_firmware.c request_firmware()
> -> fw_load_from_user_helper()
> -> _request_firmware_load()
> -> call fw_state_wait_timeout()
> 
> Some time later firmware_loading_store() scans a control value of "-1"
> -> switch(loading) case -1: will call
> -> fw_load_abort(fw_priv) which calls
> -> __fw_load_abort(fw_priv->buf)
> -> and set fw_priv->buf = NULL;
> 
> Upon being woken up via swake_up(), back in _request_firmware_load()
> fw_state_wait_timeout() returns -ENOENT
> -> since mentioned commit
> -> fw_load_abort(fw_priv) is called a second time
> -> and this time it would call:
> -> __fw_load_abort(NULL /* fw_priv->buf */)
> -> and we get: NULL->fw_st.status
> 
> Fixes: 5d47ec02c37e ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return value")
> Reported-and-Tested-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
> Reported-and-Tested-by: Patrick Bruenn <p.bruenn@beckhoff.com>
> Reported-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
> CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>    [3.10+]
> Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
> ---
>  drivers/base/firmware_class.c | 5 +----
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)

Why is this patch 7/7?  Shouldn't it go into 4.10-final now?  Why wait
for 4.11-rc1?

thanks,

greg k-h

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#1566595 — Re: [PATCH 7/7] firmware: firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in __fw_load_abort()

On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 11:52:04AM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 08:11:11AM -0800, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> > Since commit 5d47ec02c37ea632398cb251c884e3a488dff794
> > ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return value")
> > fw_load_abort(fw_priv) could be called twice and lead us to a
> > kernel crash. This happens only when the firmware fallback mechanism
> > (regular or custom) is used. The fallback mechanism exposes a sysfs
> > interface for userspace to upload a file and notify the kernel when
> > the file is loaded and ready, or to cancel an upload by echo'ing -1
> > into on the loading file:
> > 
> > echo -n "-1" > /sys/$DEVPATH/loading
> > 
> > This will call fw_load_abort(). Some distributions actually have
> > a udev rule in place to *always* immediately cancel all firmware
> > fallback mechanism requests (Debian, OpenSUSE), they have:
> > 
> >   $ cat /lib/udev/rules.d/50-firmware.rules
> >   # stub for immediately telling the kernel that userspace firmware loading
> >   # failed; necessary to avoid long timeouts with CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER=y
> >   SUBSYSTEM=="firmware", ACTION=="add", ATTR{loading}="-1
> > 
> > This was done since udev removed the firmware fallback mechanism a while ago
> > and a long standing misunderstood issues with the timeout (but now corrected).
> > Distributions with this udev rule would run into this crash only if the
> > fallback mechanism is used. Since most distributions disable by default
> > using the fallback mechanism (CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER_FALLBACK), this
> > would typicaly mean only 2 drivers which *require* the fallback mechanism
> > could typically incur a crash: drivers/firmware/dell_rbu.c and the
> > drivers/leds/leds-lp55xx-common.c driver.
> > 
> > Distributions enabling CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER_FALLBACK are clearly
> > more exposed as every file not found through a firmware request will
> > use the fallback mechanism.
> > 
> > The crash happens because after commit 5b029624948d ("firmware: do not
> > use fw_lock for fw_state protection") and subsequent fix commit
> > 5d47ec02c37ea6 ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return
> > value") a race can happen between this cancelation and the firmware
> > fw_state_wait_timeout() being woken up after a state change with which
> > fw_load_abort() as that calls swake_up(). Upon error fw_state_wait_timeout()
> > will also again call fw_load_abort() and trigger a null reference.
> > 
> > At first glance we could just fix this with a !buf check on
> > fw_load_abort() before accessing buf->fw_st, however there is
> > a logical issue in having a state machine used for the fallback
> > mechanism and preventing access from it once we abort as its inside
> > the buf (buf->fw_st).
> > 
> > The firmware_class.c code is setting the buf to NULL to annotate an
> > abort has occurred. Replace this mechanism by simply using the state check
> > instead. All the other code in place already uses similar checks
> > for aborting as well so no further changes are needed.
> > 
> > An oops can be reproduced with the new fw_fallback.sh fallback
> > mechanism cancellation test. Either cancelling the fallback mechanism
> > or the custom fallback mechanism triggers a crash.
> > 
> > mcgrof@piggy ~/linux-next/tools/testing/selftests/firmware
> > (git::20170111-fw-fixes)$ sudo ./fw_fallback.sh
> > 
> > ./fw_fallback.sh: timeout works
> > ./fw_fallback.sh: firmware comparison works
> > ./fw_fallback.sh: fallback mechanism works
> > 
> > [ this then sits here when it is trying the cancellation test ]
> > 
> > Kernel log:
> > 
> > [   36.750521] test_firmware: loading 'nope-test-firmware.bin'
> > [   36.751144] misc test_firmware: Direct firmware load for nope-test-firmware.bin failed with error -2
> > [   36.752034] misc test_firmware: Falling back to user helper
> > [   36.853324] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000038
> > [   36.854221] IP: _request_firmware+0xa27/0xad0
> > [   36.854671] PGD 0
> > [   36.854672]
> > [   36.855081] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
> > [   36.855433] Modules linked in: test_firmware(E) ... etc ...
> > [   36.857802] CPU: 1 PID: 1396 Comm: fw_fallback.sh Tainted: G        W E   4.10.0-rc3-next-20170111+ #30
> > [   36.857802] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.1-0-g8891697-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
> > [   36.857802] task: ffff9740b27f4340 task.stack: ffffbb15c0bc8000
> > [   36.857802] RIP: 0010:_request_firmware+0xa27/0xad0
> > [   36.857802] RSP: 0018:ffffbb15c0bcbd10 EFLAGS: 00010246
> > [   36.857802] RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9740afe5aa80 RCX: 0000000000000000
> > [   36.857802] RDX: ffff9740b27f4340 RSI: 0000000000000283 RDI: 0000000000000000
> > [   36.857802] RBP: ffffbb15c0bcbd90 R08: ffffbb15c0bcbcd8 R09: 0000000000000000
> > [   36.857802] R10: 0000000894a0d4b1 R11: 000000000000008c R12: ffffffffc0312480
> > [   36.857802] R13: 0000000000000005 R14: ffff9740b1c32400 R15: 00000000000003e8
> > [   36.857802] FS:  00007f8604422700(0000) GS:ffff9740bfc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> > [   36.857802] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> > [   36.857802] CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 000000012164c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
> > [   36.857802] Call Trace:
> > [   36.857802]  request_firmware+0x37/0x50
> > [   36.857802]  trigger_request_store+0x79/0xd0 [test_firmware]
> > [   36.857802]  dev_attr_store+0x18/0x30
> > [   36.857802]  sysfs_kf_write+0x37/0x40
> > [   36.857802]  kernfs_fop_write+0x110/0x1a0
> > [   36.857802]  __vfs_write+0x37/0x160
> > [   36.857802]  ? _cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
> > [   36.857802]  vfs_write+0xb5/0x1a0
> > [   36.857802]  SyS_write+0x55/0xc0
> > [   36.857802]  ? trace_do_page_fault+0x37/0xd0
> > [   36.857802]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad
> > [   36.857802] RIP: 0033:0x7f8603f49620
> > [   36.857802] RSP: 002b:00007fff6287b788 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
> > [   36.857802] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c307b110a0 RCX: 00007f8603f49620
> > [   36.857802] RDX: 0000000000000016 RSI: 000055c3084d8a90 RDI: 0000000000000001
> > [   36.857802] RBP: 0000000000000016 R08: 000000000000c0ff R09: 000055c3084d6336
> > [   36.857802] R10: 000055c307b108b0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055c307b13c80
> > [   36.857802] R13: 000055c3084d6320 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff6287b950
> > [   36.857802] Code: 9f 64 84 e8 9c 61 fe ff b8 f4 ff ff ff e9 6b f9 ff
> > ff 48 c7 c7 40 6b 8d 84 89 45 a8 e8 43 84 18 00 49 8b be 00 03 00 00 8b
> > 45 a8 <83> 7f 38 02 74 08 e8 6e ec ff ff 8b 45 a8 49 c7 86 00 03 00 00
> > [   36.857802] RIP: _request_firmware+0xa27/0xad0 RSP: ffffbb15c0bcbd10
> > [   36.857802] CR2: 0000000000000038
> > [   36.872685] ---[ end trace 6d94ac339c133e6f ]---
> > 
> > In above case the call hierarchy that causes the crash looks as follows:
> > 
> > lib/test_firmware.c request_firmware()
> > -> fw_load_from_user_helper()
> > -> _request_firmware_load()
> > -> call fw_state_wait_timeout()
> > 
> > Some time later firmware_loading_store() scans a control value of "-1"
> > -> switch(loading) case -1: will call
> > -> fw_load_abort(fw_priv) which calls
> > -> __fw_load_abort(fw_priv->buf)
> > -> and set fw_priv->buf = NULL;
> > 
> > Upon being woken up via swake_up(), back in _request_firmware_load()
> > fw_state_wait_timeout() returns -ENOENT
> > -> since mentioned commit
> > -> fw_load_abort(fw_priv) is called a second time
> > -> and this time it would call:
> > -> __fw_load_abort(NULL /* fw_priv->buf */)
> > -> and we get: NULL->fw_st.status
> > 
> > Fixes: 5d47ec02c37e ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return value")
> > Reported-and-Tested-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
> > Reported-and-Tested-by: Patrick Bruenn <p.bruenn@beckhoff.com>
> > Reported-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
> > CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>    [3.10+]

Note: 3.10+

> > Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
> > ---
> >  drivers/base/firmware_class.c | 5 +----
> >  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> Why is this patch 7/7? 

Without the tests available on a development tree one cannot easily
reproduce.

> Shouldn't it go into 4.10-final now?  Why wait
> for 4.11-rc1?

Certainly, it should go into 4.10 now, sorry if it seemed otherwise.

  Luis

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#1566598 — Re: [PATCH 7/7] firmware: firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in __fw_load_abort()

On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 02:36:31PM +0100, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 11:52:04AM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 08:11:11AM -0800, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> > > Since commit 5d47ec02c37ea632398cb251c884e3a488dff794
> > > ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return value")
> > > fw_load_abort(fw_priv) could be called twice and lead us to a
> > > kernel crash. This happens only when the firmware fallback mechanism
> > > (regular or custom) is used. The fallback mechanism exposes a sysfs
> > > interface for userspace to upload a file and notify the kernel when
> > > the file is loaded and ready, or to cancel an upload by echo'ing -1
> > > into on the loading file:
> > > 
> > > echo -n "-1" > /sys/$DEVPATH/loading
> > > 
> > > This will call fw_load_abort(). Some distributions actually have
> > > a udev rule in place to *always* immediately cancel all firmware
> > > fallback mechanism requests (Debian, OpenSUSE), they have:

I made a typo here, OpenSUSE in fact does not carry this. Its so far
only Debian I am aware of.

> > >   $ cat /lib/udev/rules.d/50-firmware.rules
> > >   # stub for immediately telling the kernel that userspace firmware loading
> > >   # failed; necessary to avoid long timeouts with CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER=y
> > >   SUBSYSTEM=="firmware", ACTION=="add", ATTR{loading}="-1

  Luis

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#1566655 — Re: [PATCH 7/7] firmware: firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in __fw_load_abort()

On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 02:42:50PM +0100, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 02:36:31PM +0100, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 11:52:04AM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> > > On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 08:11:11AM -0800, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> > > > Since commit 5d47ec02c37ea632398cb251c884e3a488dff794
> > > > ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return value")
> > > > fw_load_abort(fw_priv) could be called twice and lead us to a
> > > > kernel crash. This happens only when the firmware fallback mechanism
> > > > (regular or custom) is used. The fallback mechanism exposes a sysfs
> > > > interface for userspace to upload a file and notify the kernel when
> > > > the file is loaded and ready, or to cancel an upload by echo'ing -1
> > > > into on the loading file:
> > > > 
> > > > echo -n "-1" > /sys/$DEVPATH/loading
> > > > 
> > > > This will call fw_load_abort(). Some distributions actually have
> > > > a udev rule in place to *always* immediately cancel all firmware
> > > > fallback mechanism requests (Debian, OpenSUSE), they have:
> 
> I made a typo here, OpenSUSE in fact does not carry this. Its so far
> only Debian I am aware of.
> 
> > > >   $ cat /lib/udev/rules.d/50-firmware.rules
> > > >   # stub for immediately telling the kernel that userspace firmware loading
> > > >   # failed; necessary to avoid long timeouts with CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER=y
> > > >   SUBSYSTEM=="firmware", ACTION=="add", ATTR{loading}="-1

Please resend this as a single patch, to be applied to 4.10-final, with
the above fix, and I will be glad to take it.  Never mix patches in a
series that are for -final and for -next.

thanks,

greg k-h

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#1566678 — [PATCH v2] firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in __fw_load_abort()

Since commit 5d47ec02c37ea632398cb251c884e3a488dff794
("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return value")
fw_load_abort(fw_priv) could be called twice and lead us to a
kernel crash. This happens only when the firmware fallback mechanism
(regular or custom) is used. The fallback mechanism exposes a sysfs
interface for userspace to upload a file and notify the kernel when
the file is loaded and ready, or to cancel an upload by echo'ing -1
into on the loading file:

echo -n "-1" > /sys/$DEVPATH/loading

This will call fw_load_abort(). Some distributions actually have
a udev rule in place to *always* immediately cancel all firmware
fallback mechanism requests (Debian), they have:

  $ cat /lib/udev/rules.d/50-firmware.rules
  # stub for immediately telling the kernel that userspace firmware loading
  # failed; necessary to avoid long timeouts with CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER=y
  SUBSYSTEM=="firmware", ACTION=="add", ATTR{loading}="-1

This was done since udev removed the firmware fallback mechanism a while ago
and a long standing misunderstood issues with the timeout (but now corrected).
Distributions with this udev rule would run into this crash only if the
fallback mechanism is used. Since most distributions disable by default
using the fallback mechanism (CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER_FALLBACK), this
would typicaly mean only 2 drivers which *require* the fallback mechanism
could typically incur a crash: drivers/firmware/dell_rbu.c and the
drivers/leds/leds-lp55xx-common.c driver.

The crash happens because after commit 5b029624948d ("firmware: do not
use fw_lock for fw_state protection") and subsequent fix commit
5d47ec02c37ea6 ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return
value") a race can happen between this cancelation and the firmware
fw_state_wait_timeout() being woken up after a state change with which
fw_load_abort() as that calls swake_up(). Upon error fw_state_wait_timeout()
will also again call fw_load_abort() and trigger a null reference.

At first glance we could just fix this with a !buf check on
fw_load_abort() before accessing buf->fw_st, however there is
a logical issue in having a state machine used for the fallback
mechanism and preventing access from it once we abort as its inside
the buf (buf->fw_st).

The firmware_class.c code is setting the buf to NULL to annotate an
abort has occurred. Replace this mechanism by simply using the state check
instead. All the other code in place already uses similar checks
for aborting as well so no further changes are needed.

An oops can be reproduced with the new fw_fallback.sh fallback
mechanism cancellation test. Either cancelling the fallback mechanism
or the custom fallback mechanism triggers a crash.

mcgrof@piggy ~/linux-next/tools/testing/selftests/firmware
(git::20170111-fw-fixes)$ sudo ./fw_fallback.sh

./fw_fallback.sh: timeout works
./fw_fallback.sh: firmware comparison works
./fw_fallback.sh: fallback mechanism works

[ this then sits here when it is trying the cancellation test ]

Kernel log:

test_firmware: loading 'nope-test-firmware.bin'
misc test_firmware: Direct firmware load for nope-test-firmware.bin failed with error -2
misc test_firmware: Falling back to user helper
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000038
IP: _request_firmware+0xa27/0xad0
PGD 0

Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: test_firmware(E) ... etc ...
CPU: 1 PID: 1396 Comm: fw_fallback.sh Tainted: G        W E   4.10.0-rc3-next-20170111+ #30
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.1-0-g8891697-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
task: ffff9740b27f4340 task.stack: ffffbb15c0bc8000
RIP: 0010:_request_firmware+0xa27/0xad0
RSP: 0018:ffffbb15c0bcbd10 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9740afe5aa80 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff9740b27f4340 RSI: 0000000000000283 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffbb15c0bcbd90 R08: ffffbb15c0bcbcd8 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000894a0d4b1 R11: 000000000000008c R12: ffffffffc0312480
R13: 0000000000000005 R14: ffff9740b1c32400 R15: 00000000000003e8
FS:  00007f8604422700(0000) GS:ffff9740bfc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 000000012164c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
 request_firmware+0x37/0x50
 trigger_request_store+0x79/0xd0 [test_firmware]
 dev_attr_store+0x18/0x30
 sysfs_kf_write+0x37/0x40
 kernfs_fop_write+0x110/0x1a0
 __vfs_write+0x37/0x160
 ? _cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
 vfs_write+0xb5/0x1a0
 SyS_write+0x55/0xc0
 ? trace_do_page_fault+0x37/0xd0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad
RIP: 0033:0x7f8603f49620
RSP: 002b:00007fff6287b788 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c307b110a0 RCX: 00007f8603f49620
RDX: 0000000000000016 RSI: 000055c3084d8a90 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000016 R08: 000000000000c0ff R09: 000055c3084d6336
R10: 000055c307b108b0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055c307b13c80
R13: 000055c3084d6320 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff6287b950
Code: 9f 64 84 e8 9c 61 fe ff b8 f4 ff ff ff e9 6b f9 ff
ff 48 c7 c7 40 6b 8d 84 89 45 a8 e8 43 84 18 00 49 8b be 00 03 00 00 8b
45 a8 <83> 7f 38 02 74 08 e8 6e ec ff ff 8b 45 a8 49 c7 86 00 03 00 00
RIP: _request_firmware+0xa27/0xad0 RSP: ffffbb15c0bcbd10
CR2: 0000000000000038
---[ end trace 6d94ac339c133e6f ]---

In above case the call hierarchy that causes the crash looks as follows:

lib/test_firmware.c request_firmware()
-> fw_load_from_user_helper()
-> _request_firmware_load()
-> call fw_state_wait_timeout()

Some time later firmware_loading_store() scans a control value of "-1"
-> switch(loading) case -1: will call
-> fw_load_abort(fw_priv) which calls
-> __fw_load_abort(fw_priv->buf)
-> and set fw_priv->buf = NULL;

Upon being woken up via swake_up(), back in _request_firmware_load()
fw_state_wait_timeout() returns -ENOENT
-> since mentioned commit
-> fw_load_abort(fw_priv) is called a second time
-> and this time it would call:
-> __fw_load_abort(NULL /* fw_priv->buf */)
-> and we get: NULL->fw_st.status

Fixes: 5d47ec02c37e ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return value")
Reported-and-Tested-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reported-and-Tested-by: Patrick Bruenn <p.bruenn@beckhoff.com>
Reported-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>    [3.10+]
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
---

v2: adjust commit log to remove the OpenSUSE reference as it doesn't
    carry the same udev rule which cancels all fallback requests.

 drivers/base/firmware_class.c | 5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
index 4497d263209f..ac350c518e0c 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
@@ -558,9 +558,6 @@ static void fw_load_abort(struct firmware_priv *fw_priv)
 	struct firmware_buf *buf = fw_priv->buf;
 
 	__fw_load_abort(buf);
-
-	/* avoid user action after loading abort */
-	fw_priv->buf = NULL;
 }
 
 static LIST_HEAD(pending_fw_head);
@@ -713,7 +710,7 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev,
 
 	mutex_lock(&fw_lock);
 	fw_buf = fw_priv->buf;
-	if (!fw_buf)
+	if (fw_state_is_aborted(&fw_buf->fw_st))
 		goto out;
 
 	switch (loading) {
-- 
2.11.0

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#1566700 — Re: [PATCH v2] firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in __fw_load_abort()

On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 07:21:18AM -0800, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> Since commit 5d47ec02c37ea632398cb251c884e3a488dff794
> ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return value")
> fw_load_abort(fw_priv) could be called twice and lead us to a
> kernel crash. This happens only when the firmware fallback mechanism
> (regular or custom) is used. The fallback mechanism exposes a sysfs
> interface for userspace to upload a file and notify the kernel when
> the file is loaded and ready, or to cancel an upload by echo'ing -1
> into on the loading file:
> 
> echo -n "-1" > /sys/$DEVPATH/loading
> 
> This will call fw_load_abort(). Some distributions actually have
> a udev rule in place to *always* immediately cancel all firmware
> fallback mechanism requests (Debian), they have:
> 
>   $ cat /lib/udev/rules.d/50-firmware.rules
>   # stub for immediately telling the kernel that userspace firmware loading
>   # failed; necessary to avoid long timeouts with CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER=y
>   SUBSYSTEM=="firmware", ACTION=="add", ATTR{loading}="-1
> 
> This was done since udev removed the firmware fallback mechanism a while ago
> and a long standing misunderstood issues with the timeout (but now corrected).
> Distributions with this udev rule would run into this crash only if the
> fallback mechanism is used. Since most distributions disable by default
> using the fallback mechanism (CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER_FALLBACK), this
> would typicaly mean only 2 drivers which *require* the fallback mechanism
> could typically incur a crash: drivers/firmware/dell_rbu.c and the
> drivers/leds/leds-lp55xx-common.c driver.
> 
> The crash happens because after commit 5b029624948d ("firmware: do not
> use fw_lock for fw_state protection") and subsequent fix commit
> 5d47ec02c37ea6 ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return
> value") a race can happen between this cancelation and the firmware
> fw_state_wait_timeout() being woken up after a state change with which
> fw_load_abort() as that calls swake_up(). Upon error fw_state_wait_timeout()
> will also again call fw_load_abort() and trigger a null reference.
> 
> At first glance we could just fix this with a !buf check on
> fw_load_abort() before accessing buf->fw_st, however there is
> a logical issue in having a state machine used for the fallback
> mechanism and preventing access from it once we abort as its inside
> the buf (buf->fw_st).
> 
> The firmware_class.c code is setting the buf to NULL to annotate an
> abort has occurred. Replace this mechanism by simply using the state check
> instead. All the other code in place already uses similar checks
> for aborting as well so no further changes are needed.
> 
> An oops can be reproduced with the new fw_fallback.sh fallback
> mechanism cancellation test. Either cancelling the fallback mechanism
> or the custom fallback mechanism triggers a crash.

You are still writing books here.

With crazy margins, pick one line width (72 columns), and stick with it
please.

Can you reformat this and resend please?

thanks,

greg k-h-

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#1566829 — Re: [PATCH v2] firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in __fw_load_abort()

On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 04:47:25PM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 07:21:18AM -0800, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> > Since commit 5d47ec02c37ea632398cb251c884e3a488dff794
> > ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return value")
> > fw_load_abort(fw_priv) could be called twice and lead us to a
> > kernel crash. This happens only when the firmware fallback mechanism
> > (regular or custom) is used. The fallback mechanism exposes a sysfs
> > interface for userspace to upload a file and notify the kernel when
> > the file is loaded and ready, or to cancel an upload by echo'ing -1
> > into on the loading file:
> > 
> > echo -n "-1" > /sys/$DEVPATH/loading
> > 
> > This will call fw_load_abort(). Some distributions actually have
> > a udev rule in place to *always* immediately cancel all firmware
> > fallback mechanism requests (Debian), they have:
> > 
> >   $ cat /lib/udev/rules.d/50-firmware.rules
> >   # stub for immediately telling the kernel that userspace firmware loading
> >   # failed; necessary to avoid long timeouts with CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER=y
> >   SUBSYSTEM=="firmware", ACTION=="add", ATTR{loading}="-1
> > 
> > This was done since udev removed the firmware fallback mechanism a while ago
> > and a long standing misunderstood issues with the timeout (but now corrected).
> > Distributions with this udev rule would run into this crash only if the
> > fallback mechanism is used. Since most distributions disable by default
> > using the fallback mechanism (CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER_FALLBACK), this
> > would typicaly mean only 2 drivers which *require* the fallback mechanism
> > could typically incur a crash: drivers/firmware/dell_rbu.c and the
> > drivers/leds/leds-lp55xx-common.c driver.
> > 
> > The crash happens because after commit 5b029624948d ("firmware: do not
> > use fw_lock for fw_state protection") and subsequent fix commit
> > 5d47ec02c37ea6 ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return
> > value") a race can happen between this cancelation and the firmware
> > fw_state_wait_timeout() being woken up after a state change with which
> > fw_load_abort() as that calls swake_up(). Upon error fw_state_wait_timeout()
> > will also again call fw_load_abort() and trigger a null reference.
> > 
> > At first glance we could just fix this with a !buf check on
> > fw_load_abort() before accessing buf->fw_st, however there is
> > a logical issue in having a state machine used for the fallback
> > mechanism and preventing access from it once we abort as its inside
> > the buf (buf->fw_st).
> > 
> > The firmware_class.c code is setting the buf to NULL to annotate an
> > abort has occurred. Replace this mechanism by simply using the state check
> > instead. All the other code in place already uses similar checks
> > for aborting as well so no further changes are needed.
> > 
> > An oops can be reproduced with the new fw_fallback.sh fallback
> > mechanism cancellation test. Either cancelling the fallback mechanism
> > or the custom fallback mechanism triggers a crash.
> 
> You are still writing books here.

Alright trimmed.

> With crazy margins, pick one line width (72 columns), and stick with it
> please.
> 
> Can you reformat this and resend please?

Sure.

  Luis

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#1566839 — [PATCH v3] firmware: fix NULL pointer dereference in __fw_load_abort()

Since commit 5d47ec02c37ea6 ("firmware: Correct handling of
fw_state_wait() return value") fw_load_abort() could be called twice and
lead us to a kernel crash. This happens only when the firmware fallback
mechanism (regular or custom) is used. The fallback mechanism exposes a
sysfs interface for userspace to upload a file and notify the kernel
when the file is loaded and ready, or to cancel an upload by echo'ing -1
into on the loading file:

echo -n "-1" > /sys/$DEVPATH/loading

This will call fw_load_abort(). Some distributions actually have a udev
rule in place to *always* immediately cancel all firmware fallback
mechanism requests (Debian), they have:

  $ cat /lib/udev/rules.d/50-firmware.rules
  # stub for immediately telling the kernel that userspace firmware loading
  # failed; necessary to avoid long timeouts with CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER=y
  SUBSYSTEM=="firmware", ACTION=="add", ATTR{loading}="-1

Distributions with this udev rule would run into this crash only if the
fallback mechanism is used. Since most distributions disable by default
using the fallback mechanism (CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER_FALLBACK),
this would typicaly mean only 2 drivers which *require* the fallback
mechanism could typically incur a crash: drivers/firmware/dell_rbu.c and
the drivers/leds/leds-lp55xx-common.c driver. Distributions enabling
CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER_FALLBACK by default are obviously more
exposed to this crash.

The crash happens because after commit 5b029624948d ("firmware: do not
use fw_lock for fw_state protection") and subsequent fix commit
5d47ec02c37ea6 ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return
value") a race can happen between this cancelation and the firmware
fw_state_wait_timeout() being woken up after a state change with which
fw_load_abort() as that calls swake_up(). Upon error
fw_state_wait_timeout() will also again call fw_load_abort() and trigger
a null reference.

At first glance we could just fix this with a !buf check on
fw_load_abort() before accessing buf->fw_st, however there is a logical
issue in having a state machine used for the fallback mechanism and
preventing access from it once we abort as its inside the buf
(buf->fw_st).

The firmware_class.c code is setting the buf to NULL to annotate an
abort has occurred. Replace this mechanism by simply using the state
check instead. All the other code in place already uses similar checks
for aborting as well so no further changes are needed.

An oops can be reproduced with the new fw_fallback.sh fallback mechanism
cancellation test. Either cancelling the fallback mechanism or the
custom fallback mechanism triggers a crash.

mcgrof@piggy ~/linux-next/tools/testing/selftests/firmware
(git::20170111-fw-fixes)$ sudo ./fw_fallback.sh

./fw_fallback.sh: timeout works
./fw_fallback.sh: firmware comparison works
./fw_fallback.sh: fallback mechanism works

[ this then sits here when it is trying the cancellation test ]

Kernel log:

test_firmware: loading 'nope-test-firmware.bin'
misc test_firmware: Direct firmware load for nope-test-firmware.bin failed with error -2
misc test_firmware: Falling back to user helper
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000038
IP: _request_firmware+0xa27/0xad0
PGD 0

Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: test_firmware(E) ... etc ...
CPU: 1 PID: 1396 Comm: fw_fallback.sh Tainted: G        W E   4.10.0-rc3-next-20170111+ #30
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.1-0-g8891697-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
task: ffff9740b27f4340 task.stack: ffffbb15c0bc8000
RIP: 0010:_request_firmware+0xa27/0xad0
RSP: 0018:ffffbb15c0bcbd10 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9740afe5aa80 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff9740b27f4340 RSI: 0000000000000283 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffbb15c0bcbd90 R08: ffffbb15c0bcbcd8 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000894a0d4b1 R11: 000000000000008c R12: ffffffffc0312480
R13: 0000000000000005 R14: ffff9740b1c32400 R15: 00000000000003e8
FS:  00007f8604422700(0000) GS:ffff9740bfc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 000000012164c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
 request_firmware+0x37/0x50
 trigger_request_store+0x79/0xd0 [test_firmware]
 dev_attr_store+0x18/0x30
 sysfs_kf_write+0x37/0x40
 kernfs_fop_write+0x110/0x1a0
 __vfs_write+0x37/0x160
 ? _cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
 vfs_write+0xb5/0x1a0
 SyS_write+0x55/0xc0
 ? trace_do_page_fault+0x37/0xd0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad
RIP: 0033:0x7f8603f49620
RSP: 002b:00007fff6287b788 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c307b110a0 RCX: 00007f8603f49620
RDX: 0000000000000016 RSI: 000055c3084d8a90 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000016 R08: 000000000000c0ff R09: 000055c3084d6336
R10: 000055c307b108b0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055c307b13c80
R13: 000055c3084d6320 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff6287b950
Code: 9f 64 84 e8 9c 61 fe ff b8 f4 ff ff ff e9 6b f9 ff
ff 48 c7 c7 40 6b 8d 84 89 45 a8 e8 43 84 18 00 49 8b be 00 03 00 00 8b
45 a8 <83> 7f 38 02 74 08 e8 6e ec ff ff 8b 45 a8 49 c7 86 00 03 00 00
RIP: _request_firmware+0xa27/0xad0 RSP: ffffbb15c0bcbd10
CR2: 0000000000000038
---[ end trace 6d94ac339c133e6f ]---

Fixes: 5d47ec02c37e ("firmware: Correct handling of fw_state_wait() return value")
Reported-and-Tested-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reported-and-Tested-by: Patrick Bruenn <p.bruenn@beckhoff.com>
Reported-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>    [3.10+]
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
---

v3: shorten commit log and stick to 72 characters for margins on
    commit log

 drivers/base/firmware_class.c | 5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
index 4497d263209f..ac350c518e0c 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
@@ -558,9 +558,6 @@ static void fw_load_abort(struct firmware_priv *fw_priv)
 	struct firmware_buf *buf = fw_priv->buf;
 
 	__fw_load_abort(buf);
-
-	/* avoid user action after loading abort */
-	fw_priv->buf = NULL;
 }
 
 static LIST_HEAD(pending_fw_head);
@@ -713,7 +710,7 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev,
 
 	mutex_lock(&fw_lock);
 	fw_buf = fw_priv->buf;
-	if (!fw_buf)
+	if (fw_state_is_aborted(&fw_buf->fw_st))
 		goto out;
 
 	switch (loading) {
-- 
2.11.0

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