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[PATCH 1/2] fs/proc/kcore.c: Make bounce buffer global for read

Started byJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
First post2016-09-08 10:00 +0200
Last post2016-09-08 10:00 +0200
Articles 2 — 1 participant

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  [PATCH 1/2] fs/proc/kcore.c: Make bounce buffer global for read Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> - 2016-09-08 10:00 +0200
    [PATCH 2/2] fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> - 2016-09-08 10:00 +0200

#1478881 — [PATCH 1/2] fs/proc/kcore.c: Make bounce buffer global for read

FromJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Date2016-09-08 10:00 +0200
Subject[PATCH 1/2] fs/proc/kcore.c: Make bounce buffer global for read
Message-ID<sf2pA-2Va-17@gated-at.bofh.it>
Next patch adds bounce buffer for ktext area, so it's
convenient to have single bounce buffer for both
vmalloc/module and ktext cases.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
---
 fs/proc/kcore.c | 24 ++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/kcore.c b/fs/proc/kcore.c
index a939f5ed7f89..bd3ac9dca252 100644
--- a/fs/proc/kcore.c
+++ b/fs/proc/kcore.c
@@ -430,6 +430,7 @@ static void elf_kcore_store_hdr(char *bufp, int nphdr, int dataoff)
 static ssize_t
 read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
 {
+	char *buf = file->private_data;
 	ssize_t acc = 0;
 	size_t size, tsz;
 	size_t elf_buflen;
@@ -500,18 +501,10 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
 			if (clear_user(buffer, tsz))
 				return -EFAULT;
 		} else if (is_vmalloc_or_module_addr((void *)start)) {
-			char * elf_buf;
-
-			elf_buf = kzalloc(tsz, GFP_KERNEL);
-			if (!elf_buf)
-				return -ENOMEM;
-			vread(elf_buf, (char *)start, tsz);
+			vread(buf, (char *)start, tsz);
 			/* we have to zero-fill user buffer even if no read */
-			if (copy_to_user(buffer, elf_buf, tsz)) {
-				kfree(elf_buf);
+			if (copy_to_user(buffer, buf, tsz))
 				return -EFAULT;
-			}
-			kfree(elf_buf);
 		} else {
 			if (kern_addr_valid(start)) {
 				unsigned long n;
@@ -549,6 +542,11 @@ static int open_kcore(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
 		return -EPERM;
+
+	filp->private_data = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!filp->private_data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	if (kcore_need_update)
 		kcore_update_ram();
 	if (i_size_read(inode) != proc_root_kcore->size) {
@@ -559,10 +557,16 @@ static int open_kcore(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int release_kcore(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	kfree(file->private_data);
+	return 0;
+}
 
 static const struct file_operations proc_kcore_operations = {
 	.read		= read_kcore,
 	.open		= open_kcore,
+	.release	= release_kcore,
 	.llseek		= default_llseek,
 };
 
-- 
2.7.4

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#1478886 — [PATCH 2/2] fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data

FromJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Date2016-09-08 10:00 +0200
Subject[PATCH 2/2] fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data
Message-ID<sf2pA-2Va-21@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1478881
We hit hardened usercopy feature check for kernel text
access by reading kcore file:

  usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffffffff8179a01f (<kernel text>) (4065 bytes)
  kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:75!

Bypassing this check for kcore by adding bounce buffer
for ktext data.

Reported-by: Steve Best <sbest@redhat.com>
Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
---
 fs/proc/kcore.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/kcore.c b/fs/proc/kcore.c
index bd3ac9dca252..5c89a07e3d7f 100644
--- a/fs/proc/kcore.c
+++ b/fs/proc/kcore.c
@@ -509,7 +509,12 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
 			if (kern_addr_valid(start)) {
 				unsigned long n;
 
-				n = copy_to_user(buffer, (char *)start, tsz);
+				/*
+				 * Using bounce buffer to bypass the
+				 * hardened user copy kernel text checks.
+				 */
+				memcpy(buf, (char *) start, tsz);
+				n = copy_to_user(buffer, buf, tsz);
 				/*
 				 * We cannot distinguish between fault on source
 				 * and fault on destination. When this happens
-- 
2.7.4

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