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Groups > linux.kernel > #1545046 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2016-12-20 12:10 +0100 |
| Last post | 2016-12-21 06:10 +0100 |
| Articles | 3 — 2 participants |
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[PATCH] fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de> - 2016-12-20 12:10 +0100
Re: [PATCH] fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> - 2016-12-20 18:40 +0100
Re: [PATCH] fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de> - 2016-12-21 06:10 +0100
| From | Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2016-12-20 12:10 +0100 |
| Subject | [PATCH] fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags |
| Message-ID | <sQqsW-4MR-13@gated-at.bofh.it> |
If you have a process that has set itself to be non-dumpable, and it
then undergoes exec(2), any CLOEXEC file descriptors it has open are
"exposed" during a race window between the dumpable flags of the process
being reset for exec(2) and CLOEXEC being applied to the file
descriptors. This can be exploited by a process by attempting to access
/proc/<pid>/fd/... during this window, without requiring CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
The race in question is after set_dumpable has been (for get_link,
though the trace is basically the same for readlink):
[vfs]
-> proc_pid_link_inode_operations.get_link
-> proc_pid_get_link
-> proc_fd_access_allowed
-> ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
Which will return 0, during the race window and CLOEXEC file descriptors
will still be open during this window because do_close_on_exec has not
been called yet. As a result, the ordering of these calls should be
reversed to avoid this race window.
This is of particular concern to container runtimes, where joining a
PID namespace with file descriptors referring to the host filesystem
can result in security issues (since PRCTL_SET_DUMPABLE doesn't protect
against access of CLOEXEC file descriptors -- file descriptors which may
reference filesystem objects the container shouldn't have access to).
Cc: dev@opencontainers.org
Reported-by: Michael Crosby <crosbymichael@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
---
fs/exec.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 4e497b9ee71e..3ad50c379413 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
* current->executable is only used by the procfs. This allows a dispatch
* table to check for several different types of binary formats. We keep
* trying until we recognize the file or we run out of supported binary
- * formats.
+ * formats.
*/
#include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -1287,6 +1287,13 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
/* This is the point of no return */
current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
+ /*
+ * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is
+ * dumpable to avoid a race with a process in userspace trying to access
+ * the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process undergoing exec(2).
+ */
+ do_close_on_exec(current->files);
+
if (uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))
set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
else
@@ -1315,7 +1322,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
group */
current->self_exec_id++;
flush_signal_handlers(current, 0);
- do_close_on_exec(current->files);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec);
--
2.11.0
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| From | Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2016-12-20 18:40 +0100 |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH] fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags |
| Message-ID | <sQwym-89-29@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1545046 |
On 12/20, Aleksa Sarai wrote: > > @@ -1287,6 +1287,13 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) > /* This is the point of no return */ > current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0; > > + /* > + * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is > + * dumpable to avoid a race with a process in userspace trying to access > + * the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process undergoing exec(2). > + */ > + do_close_on_exec(current->files); Cosmetic, but perhaps this should go into flush_old_exec() then? But I am fine either way, up to you. Oleg.
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| From | Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2016-12-21 06:10 +0100 |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH] fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags |
| Message-ID | <sQHk5-7um-5@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1545319 |
>> @@ -1287,6 +1287,13 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) >> /* This is the point of no return */ >> current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0; >> >> + /* >> + * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is >> + * dumpable to avoid a race with a process in userspace trying to access >> + * the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process undergoing exec(2). >> + */ >> + do_close_on_exec(current->files); > > Cosmetic, but perhaps this should go into flush_old_exec() then? Yeah, I was thinking the same thing. Also, I'll cc stable (v3.2+) to the patch. -- Aleksa Sarai Software Engineer (Containers) SUSE Linux GmbH https://www.cyphar.com/
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