Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]

Groups > linux.kernel > #1533570 > unrolled thread

[patch 1/4] rtmutex: Prevent dequeue vs. unlock race

Started byThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
First post2016-11-30 22:10 +0100
Last post2016-12-02 11:50 +0100
Articles 5 — 4 participants

Back to article view | Back to linux.kernel

This discussion starts older than the indexed window; earlier articles aren't shown. The article labeled Started by below is the oldest one visible, not the original post.

Contents

  [patch 1/4] rtmutex: Prevent dequeue vs. unlock race Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> - 2016-11-30 22:10 +0100
    Re: [patch 1/4] rtmutex: Prevent dequeue vs. unlock race Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2016-12-01 19:30 +0100
      Re: [patch 1/4] rtmutex: Prevent dequeue vs. unlock race Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> - 2016-12-02 09:30 +0100
    Re: [patch 1/4] rtmutex: Prevent dequeue vs. unlock race Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> - 2016-12-02 02:00 +0100
    [tip:locking/core] locking/rtmutex: Prevent dequeue vs. unlock race tip-bot for Thomas Gleixner <tipbot@zytor.com> - 2016-12-02 11:50 +0100

#1533570 — [patch 1/4] rtmutex: Prevent dequeue vs. unlock race

FromThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Date2016-11-30 22:10 +0100
Subject[patch 1/4] rtmutex: Prevent dequeue vs. unlock race
Message-ID<sJkiB-2NQ-11@gated-at.bofh.it>
David reported a futex/rtmutex state corruption. It's caused by the
following problem:

CPU0		CPU1		CPU2

l->owner=T1
		rt_mutex_lock(l)
		lock(l->wait_lock)
		l->owner = T1 | HAS_WAITERS;
		enqueue(T2)
		boost()
		  unlock(l->wait_lock)
		schedule()

				rt_mutex_lock(l)
				lock(l->wait_lock)
				l->owner = T1 | HAS_WAITERS;
				enqueue(T3)
				boost()
				  unlock(l->wait_lock)
				schedule()
		signal(->T2)	signal(->T3)
		lock(l->wait_lock)
		dequeue(T2)
		deboost()
		  unlock(l->wait_lock)
				lock(l->wait_lock)
				dequeue(T3)
				  ===> wait list is now empty
				deboost()
				 unlock(l->wait_lock)
		lock(l->wait_lock)
		fixup_rt_mutex_waiters()
		  if (wait_list_empty(l)) {
		    owner = l->owner & ~HAS_WAITERS;
 		    l->owner = owner
		     ==> l->owner = T1
		  }

				lock(l->wait_lock)
rt_mutex_unlock(l)		fixup_rt_mutex_waiters()
				  if (wait_list_empty(l)) {
				    owner = l->owner & ~HAS_WAITERS;
cmpxchg(l->owner, T1, NULL)
 ===> Success (l->owner = NULL)
				    l->owner = owner
				     ==> l->owner = T1
				  }

That means the problem is caused by fixup_rt_mutex_waiters() which does the
RMW to clear the waiters bit unconditionally when there are no waiters in
the rtmutexes rbtree.

This can be fatal: A concurrent unlock can release the rtmutex in the
fastpath because the waiters bit is not set. If the cmpxchg() gets in the
middle of the RMW operation then the previous owner, which just unlocked
the rtmutex is set as the owner again when the write takes place after the
successfull cmpxchg().

The solution is rather trivial: Verify that the owner member of the rtmutex
has the waiters bit set before clearing it. This does not require a
cmpxchg() or other atomic operations because the waiters bit can only be
set and cleared with the rtmutex wait_lock held. It's also safe against the
fast path unlock attempt. The unlock attempt via cmpxchg() will either see
the bit set and take the slowpath or see the bit cleared and release it
atomically in the fastpath.

It's remarkable that the test program provided by David triggers on ARM64
and MIPS64 really quick, but it refuses to reproduce on x8664, while the
problem exists there as well. That refusal might explain that this got not
discovered earlier despite the bug existing from day one of the rtmutex
implementation more than 10 years ago.

Thanks to David for meticulously instrumenting the code and providing the
information which allowed to decode this subtle problem.

Fixes: 23f78d4a03c5 ("[PATCH] pi-futex: rt mutex core")
Reported-by: David Daney <ddaney@caviumnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c |   68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
@@ -65,8 +65,72 @@ static inline void clear_rt_mutex_waiter
 
 static void fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(struct rt_mutex *lock)
 {
-	if (!rt_mutex_has_waiters(lock))
-		clear_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);
+	unsigned long owner, *p = (unsigned long *) &lock->owner;
+
+	if (rt_mutex_has_waiters(lock))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * The rbtree has no waiters enqueued, now make sure that the
+	 * lock->owner still has the waiters bit set, otherwise the
+	 * following can happen:
+	 *
+	 * CPU 0	CPU 1		CPU2
+	 * l->owner=T1
+	 *		rt_mutex_lock(l)
+	 *		lock(l->lock)
+	 *		l->owner = T1 | HAS_WAITERS;
+	 *		enqueue(T2)
+	 *		boost()
+	 *		  unlock(l->lock)
+	 *		block()
+	 *
+	 *				rt_mutex_lock(l)
+	 *				lock(l->lock)
+	 *				l->owner = T1 | HAS_WAITERS;
+	 *				enqueue(T3)
+	 *				boost()
+	 *				  unlock(l->lock)
+	 *				block()
+	 *		signal(->T2)	signal(->T3)
+	 *		lock(l->lock)
+	 *		dequeue(T2)
+	 *		deboost()
+	 *		  unlock(l->lock)
+	 *				lock(l->lock)
+	 *				dequeue(T3)
+	 *				 ==> wait list is empty
+	 *				deboost()
+	 *				 unlock(l->lock)
+	 *		lock(l->lock)
+	 *		fixup_rt_mutex_waiters()
+	 *		  if (wait_list_empty(l) {
+	 *		    l->owner = owner
+	 *		    owner = l->owner & ~HAS_WAITERS;
+	 *		      ==> l->owner = T1
+	 *		  }
+	 *				lock(l->lock)
+	 * rt_mutex_unlock(l)		fixup_rt_mutex_waiters()
+	 *				  if (wait_list_empty(l) {
+	 *				    owner = l->owner & ~HAS_WAITERS;
+	 * cmpxchg(l->owner, T1, NULL)
+	 *  ===> Success (l->owner = NULL)
+	 *
+	 *				    l->owner = owner
+	 *				      ==> l->owner = T1
+	 *				  }
+	 *
+	 * With the check for the waiter bit in place T3 on CPU2 will not
+	 * overwrite. All tasks fiddling with the waiters bit are
+	 * serialized by l->lock, so nothing else can modify the waiters
+	 * bit. If the bit is set then nothing can change l->owner either
+	 * so the simple RMW is safe. The cmpxchg() will simply fail if it
+	 * happens in the middle of the RMW because the waiters bit is
+	 * still set.
+	 */
+	owner = READ_ONCE(*p);
+	if (owner & RT_MUTEX_HAS_WAITERS)
+		WRITE_ONCE(*p, owner & ~RT_MUTEX_HAS_WAITERS);
 }
 
 /*

[toc] | [next] | [standalone]

#1534372

FromPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Date2016-12-01 19:30 +0100
Message-ID<sJEhk-8aj-19@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1533570
On Wed, Nov 30, 2016 at 09:04:41PM -0000, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> It's remarkable that the test program provided by David triggers on ARM64
> and MIPS64 really quick, but it refuses to reproduce on x8664, while the
> problem exists there as well. That refusal might explain that this got not
> discovered earlier despite the bug existing from day one of the rtmutex
> implementation more than 10 years ago.

> -		clear_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);

So that compiles into:

	andq   $0xfffffffffffffffe,0x48(%rbx)

With is a RmW memop. Now per the architecture documents we can decompose
that into a normal load-store and the race exists. But I would not be
surprised if that starts with the cacheline in exclusive mode (because
it knows it will do the store). Which makes it a very tiny race indeed.

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]

#1534732

FromThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Date2016-12-02 09:30 +0100
Message-ID<sJRod-1bm-1@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1534372
On Thu, 1 Dec 2016, Peter Zijlstra wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 30, 2016 at 09:04:41PM -0000, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > It's remarkable that the test program provided by David triggers on ARM64
> > and MIPS64 really quick, but it refuses to reproduce on x8664, while the
> > problem exists there as well. That refusal might explain that this got not
> > discovered earlier despite the bug existing from day one of the rtmutex
> > implementation more than 10 years ago.
> 
> > -		clear_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);
> 
> So that compiles into:
> 
> 	andq   $0xfffffffffffffffe,0x48(%rbx)
> 
> With is a RmW memop. Now per the architecture documents we can decompose
> that into a normal load-store and the race exists. But I would not be
> surprised if that starts with the cacheline in exclusive mode (because
> it knows it will do the store). Which makes it a very tiny race indeed.

If it really takes the cacheline exclusive right away, then there is no
race because the cmpxchg has to wait for release and will see the store.
If the cmpxchg comes first the RmW will see the new value.

Fun stuff, isn't it?

	tglx

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]

#1534606

FromSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Date2016-12-02 02:00 +0100
Message-ID<sJKmK-4Kj-7@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1533570
On Wed, 30 Nov 2016 21:04:41 -0000
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:

> David reported a futex/rtmutex state corruption. It's caused by the
> following problem:
> 
> CPU0		CPU1		CPU2
> 
> l->owner=T1
> 		rt_mutex_lock(l)
> 		lock(l->wait_lock)
> 		l->owner = T1 | HAS_WAITERS;
> 		enqueue(T2)
> 		boost()
> 		  unlock(l->wait_lock)
> 		schedule()
> 
> 				rt_mutex_lock(l)
> 				lock(l->wait_lock)
> 				l->owner = T1 | HAS_WAITERS;
> 				enqueue(T3)
> 				boost()
> 				  unlock(l->wait_lock)
> 				schedule()
> 		signal(->T2)	signal(->T3)
> 		lock(l->wait_lock)
> 		dequeue(T2)
> 		deboost()
> 		  unlock(l->wait_lock)
> 				lock(l->wait_lock)
> 				dequeue(T3)
> 				  ===> wait list is now empty  
> 				deboost()
> 				 unlock(l->wait_lock)
> 		lock(l->wait_lock)
> 		fixup_rt_mutex_waiters()
> 		  if (wait_list_empty(l)) {
> 		    owner = l->owner & ~HAS_WAITERS;
>  		    l->owner = owner
> 		     ==> l->owner = T1  
> 		  }
> 
> 				lock(l->wait_lock)
> rt_mutex_unlock(l)		fixup_rt_mutex_waiters()
> 				  if (wait_list_empty(l)) {
> 				    owner = l->owner & ~HAS_WAITERS;
> cmpxchg(l->owner, T1, NULL)
>  ===> Success (l->owner = NULL)  
> 				    l->owner = owner
> 				     ==> l->owner = T1  
> 				  }
> 
> That means the problem is caused by fixup_rt_mutex_waiters() which does the
> RMW to clear the waiters bit unconditionally when there are no waiters in
> the rtmutexes rbtree.
> 
> This can be fatal: A concurrent unlock can release the rtmutex in the
> fastpath because the waiters bit is not set. If the cmpxchg() gets in the
> middle of the RMW operation then the previous owner, which just unlocked
> the rtmutex is set as the owner again when the write takes place after the
> successfull cmpxchg().
> 
> The solution is rather trivial: Verify that the owner member of the rtmutex
> has the waiters bit set before clearing it. This does not require a
> cmpxchg() or other atomic operations because the waiters bit can only be
> set and cleared with the rtmutex wait_lock held. It's also safe against the
> fast path unlock attempt. The unlock attempt via cmpxchg() will either see
> the bit set and take the slowpath or see the bit cleared and release it
> atomically in the fastpath.
> 
> It's remarkable that the test program provided by David triggers on ARM64
> and MIPS64 really quick, but it refuses to reproduce on x8664, while the
> problem exists there as well. That refusal might explain that this got not
> discovered earlier despite the bug existing from day one of the rtmutex
> implementation more than 10 years ago.

Because x86 is awesome! ;-)

> 
> Thanks to David for meticulously instrumenting the code and providing the
> information which allowed to decode this subtle problem.
> 
> Fixes: 23f78d4a03c5 ("[PATCH] pi-futex: rt mutex core")
> Reported-by: David Daney <ddaney@caviumnetworks.com>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> ---
>  kernel/locking/rtmutex.c |   68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> --- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
> +++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
> @@ -65,8 +65,72 @@ static inline void clear_rt_mutex_waiter
>  
>  static void fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(struct rt_mutex *lock)
>  {
> -	if (!rt_mutex_has_waiters(lock))
> -		clear_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);

Hmm, now that clear_rt_mutex_waiters() has only one user, but luckily
it's done in the slow unlock case where the wait lock is held and its
the owner doing the update. Perhaps that function should go away, and
just open code it in the one use case. Because it's part of the danger
that happened here, and we don't want it used outside of an unlock.

Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>

-- Steve


> +	unsigned long owner, *p = (unsigned long *) &lock->owner;
> +
> +	if (rt_mutex_has_waiters(lock))
> +		return;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * The rbtree has no waiters enqueued, now make sure that the
> +	 * lock->owner still has the waiters bit set, otherwise the
> +	 * following can happen:
> +	 *
> +	 * CPU 0	CPU 1		CPU2
> +	 * l->owner=T1
> +	 *		rt_mutex_lock(l)
> +	 *		lock(l->lock)
> +	 *		l->owner = T1 | HAS_WAITERS;
> +	 *		enqueue(T2)
> +	 *		boost()
> +	 *		  unlock(l->lock)
> +	 *		block()
> +	 *
> +	 *				rt_mutex_lock(l)
> +	 *				lock(l->lock)
> +	 *				l->owner = T1 | HAS_WAITERS;
> +	 *				enqueue(T3)
> +	 *				boost()
> +	 *				  unlock(l->lock)
> +	 *				block()
> +	 *		signal(->T2)	signal(->T3)
> +	 *		lock(l->lock)
> +	 *		dequeue(T2)
> +	 *		deboost()
> +	 *		  unlock(l->lock)
> +	 *				lock(l->lock)
> +	 *				dequeue(T3)
> +	 *				 ==> wait list is empty
> +	 *				deboost()
> +	 *				 unlock(l->lock)
> +	 *		lock(l->lock)
> +	 *		fixup_rt_mutex_waiters()
> +	 *		  if (wait_list_empty(l) {
> +	 *		    l->owner = owner
> +	 *		    owner = l->owner & ~HAS_WAITERS;
> +	 *		      ==> l->owner = T1
> +	 *		  }
> +	 *				lock(l->lock)
> +	 * rt_mutex_unlock(l)		fixup_rt_mutex_waiters()
> +	 *				  if (wait_list_empty(l) {
> +	 *				    owner = l->owner & ~HAS_WAITERS;
> +	 * cmpxchg(l->owner, T1, NULL)
> +	 *  ===> Success (l->owner = NULL)
> +	 *
> +	 *				    l->owner = owner
> +	 *				      ==> l->owner = T1
> +	 *				  }
> +	 *
> +	 * With the check for the waiter bit in place T3 on CPU2 will not
> +	 * overwrite. All tasks fiddling with the waiters bit are
> +	 * serialized by l->lock, so nothing else can modify the waiters
> +	 * bit. If the bit is set then nothing can change l->owner either
> +	 * so the simple RMW is safe. The cmpxchg() will simply fail if it
> +	 * happens in the middle of the RMW because the waiters bit is
> +	 * still set.
> +	 */
> +	owner = READ_ONCE(*p);
> +	if (owner & RT_MUTEX_HAS_WAITERS)
> +		WRITE_ONCE(*p, owner & ~RT_MUTEX_HAS_WAITERS);
>  }
>  
>  /*
>

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]

#1534817 — [tip:locking/core] locking/rtmutex: Prevent dequeue vs. unlock race

Fromtip-bot for Thomas Gleixner <tipbot@zytor.com>
Date2016-12-02 11:50 +0100
Subject[tip:locking/core] locking/rtmutex: Prevent dequeue vs. unlock race
Message-ID<sJTzH-2Il-1@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1533570
Commit-ID:  dbb26055defd03d59f678cb5f2c992abe05b064a
Gitweb:     http://git.kernel.org/tip/dbb26055defd03d59f678cb5f2c992abe05b064a
Author:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
AuthorDate: Wed, 30 Nov 2016 21:04:41 +0000
Committer:  Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Fri, 2 Dec 2016 11:13:26 +0100

locking/rtmutex: Prevent dequeue vs. unlock race

David reported a futex/rtmutex state corruption. It's caused by the
following problem:

CPU0		CPU1		CPU2

l->owner=T1
		rt_mutex_lock(l)
		lock(l->wait_lock)
		l->owner = T1 | HAS_WAITERS;
		enqueue(T2)
		boost()
		  unlock(l->wait_lock)
		schedule()

				rt_mutex_lock(l)
				lock(l->wait_lock)
				l->owner = T1 | HAS_WAITERS;
				enqueue(T3)
				boost()
				  unlock(l->wait_lock)
				schedule()
		signal(->T2)	signal(->T3)
		lock(l->wait_lock)
		dequeue(T2)
		deboost()
		  unlock(l->wait_lock)
				lock(l->wait_lock)
				dequeue(T3)
				  ===> wait list is now empty
				deboost()
				 unlock(l->wait_lock)
		lock(l->wait_lock)
		fixup_rt_mutex_waiters()
		  if (wait_list_empty(l)) {
		    owner = l->owner & ~HAS_WAITERS;
		    l->owner = owner
		     ==> l->owner = T1
		  }

				lock(l->wait_lock)
rt_mutex_unlock(l)		fixup_rt_mutex_waiters()
				  if (wait_list_empty(l)) {
				    owner = l->owner & ~HAS_WAITERS;
cmpxchg(l->owner, T1, NULL)
 ===> Success (l->owner = NULL)
				    l->owner = owner
				     ==> l->owner = T1
				  }

That means the problem is caused by fixup_rt_mutex_waiters() which does the
RMW to clear the waiters bit unconditionally when there are no waiters in
the rtmutexes rbtree.

This can be fatal: A concurrent unlock can release the rtmutex in the
fastpath because the waiters bit is not set. If the cmpxchg() gets in the
middle of the RMW operation then the previous owner, which just unlocked
the rtmutex is set as the owner again when the write takes place after the
successfull cmpxchg().

The solution is rather trivial: verify that the owner member of the rtmutex
has the waiters bit set before clearing it. This does not require a
cmpxchg() or other atomic operations because the waiters bit can only be
set and cleared with the rtmutex wait_lock held. It's also safe against the
fast path unlock attempt. The unlock attempt via cmpxchg() will either see
the bit set and take the slowpath or see the bit cleared and release it
atomically in the fastpath.

It's remarkable that the test program provided by David triggers on ARM64
and MIPS64 really quick, but it refuses to reproduce on x86-64, while the
problem exists there as well. That refusal might explain that this got not
discovered earlier despite the bug existing from day one of the rtmutex
implementation more than 10 years ago.

Thanks to David for meticulously instrumenting the code and providing the
information which allowed to decode this subtle problem.

Reported-by: David Daney <ddaney@caviumnetworks.com>
Tested-by: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 23f78d4a03c5 ("[PATCH] pi-futex: rt mutex core")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161130210030.351136722@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
index 1ec0f48..2c49d76 100644
--- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
@@ -65,8 +65,72 @@ static inline void clear_rt_mutex_waiters(struct rt_mutex *lock)
 
 static void fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(struct rt_mutex *lock)
 {
-	if (!rt_mutex_has_waiters(lock))
-		clear_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);
+	unsigned long owner, *p = (unsigned long *) &lock->owner;
+
+	if (rt_mutex_has_waiters(lock))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * The rbtree has no waiters enqueued, now make sure that the
+	 * lock->owner still has the waiters bit set, otherwise the
+	 * following can happen:
+	 *
+	 * CPU 0	CPU 1		CPU2
+	 * l->owner=T1
+	 *		rt_mutex_lock(l)
+	 *		lock(l->lock)
+	 *		l->owner = T1 | HAS_WAITERS;
+	 *		enqueue(T2)
+	 *		boost()
+	 *		  unlock(l->lock)
+	 *		block()
+	 *
+	 *				rt_mutex_lock(l)
+	 *				lock(l->lock)
+	 *				l->owner = T1 | HAS_WAITERS;
+	 *				enqueue(T3)
+	 *				boost()
+	 *				  unlock(l->lock)
+	 *				block()
+	 *		signal(->T2)	signal(->T3)
+	 *		lock(l->lock)
+	 *		dequeue(T2)
+	 *		deboost()
+	 *		  unlock(l->lock)
+	 *				lock(l->lock)
+	 *				dequeue(T3)
+	 *				 ==> wait list is empty
+	 *				deboost()
+	 *				 unlock(l->lock)
+	 *		lock(l->lock)
+	 *		fixup_rt_mutex_waiters()
+	 *		  if (wait_list_empty(l) {
+	 *		    l->owner = owner
+	 *		    owner = l->owner & ~HAS_WAITERS;
+	 *		      ==> l->owner = T1
+	 *		  }
+	 *				lock(l->lock)
+	 * rt_mutex_unlock(l)		fixup_rt_mutex_waiters()
+	 *				  if (wait_list_empty(l) {
+	 *				    owner = l->owner & ~HAS_WAITERS;
+	 * cmpxchg(l->owner, T1, NULL)
+	 *  ===> Success (l->owner = NULL)
+	 *
+	 *				    l->owner = owner
+	 *				      ==> l->owner = T1
+	 *				  }
+	 *
+	 * With the check for the waiter bit in place T3 on CPU2 will not
+	 * overwrite. All tasks fiddling with the waiters bit are
+	 * serialized by l->lock, so nothing else can modify the waiters
+	 * bit. If the bit is set then nothing can change l->owner either
+	 * so the simple RMW is safe. The cmpxchg() will simply fail if it
+	 * happens in the middle of the RMW because the waiters bit is
+	 * still set.
+	 */
+	owner = READ_ONCE(*p);
+	if (owner & RT_MUTEX_HAS_WAITERS)
+		WRITE_ONCE(*p, owner & ~RT_MUTEX_HAS_WAITERS);
 }
 
 /*

[toc] | [prev] | [standalone]

Back to top | Article view | linux.kernel

csiph-web