Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]

Groups > linux.kernel > #1524220 > unrolled thread

[PATCH v2] slab: Add POISON_POINTER_DELTA to ZERO_SIZE_PTR

Started byMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
First post2016-11-17 11:00 +0100
Last post2016-11-18 19:40 +0100
Articles 5 — 3 participants

Back to article view | Back to linux.kernel

Contents

  [PATCH v2] slab: Add POISON_POINTER_DELTA to ZERO_SIZE_PTR Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> - 2016-11-17 11:00 +0100
    Re: [PATCH v2] slab: Add POISON_POINTER_DELTA to ZERO_SIZE_PTR Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-11-17 21:10 +0100
    Re: [PATCH v2] slab: Add POISON_POINTER_DELTA to ZERO_SIZE_PTR Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> - 2016-11-18 18:50 +0100
      Re: [PATCH v2] slab: Add POISON_POINTER_DELTA to ZERO_SIZE_PTR Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-11-18 19:00 +0100
        Re: [PATCH v2] slab: Add POISON_POINTER_DELTA to ZERO_SIZE_PTR Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> - 2016-11-18 19:40 +0100

#1524220 — [PATCH v2] slab: Add POISON_POINTER_DELTA to ZERO_SIZE_PTR

FromMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Date2016-11-17 11:00 +0100
Subject[PATCH v2] slab: Add POISON_POINTER_DELTA to ZERO_SIZE_PTR
Message-ID<sErE6-7my-21@gated-at.bofh.it>
POISON_POINTER_DELTA is defined in poison.h, and is intended to be used
to shift poison values so that they don't alias userspace.

We should add it to ZERO_SIZE_PTR so that attackers can't use
ZERO_SIZE_PTR as a way to get a non-NULL pointer to userspace.

Currently ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR() uses a trick of doing a single check that
x <= ZERO_SIZE_PTR, and ignoring the fact that it also matches 1-15.
That no longer really works once we add the poison delta, so split it
into two checks. Assign x to a temporary to avoid evaluating it
twice (suggested by Kees Cook).

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
---
 include/linux/slab.h | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

v2: Rework ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR() to do the two checks separately.

diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
index 084b12bad198..404419d9860f 100644
--- a/include/linux/slab.h
+++ b/include/linux/slab.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #define	_LINUX_SLAB_H
 
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/poison.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 
@@ -109,10 +110,13 @@
  * ZERO_SIZE_PTR can be passed to kfree though in the same way that NULL can.
  * Both make kfree a no-op.
  */
-#define ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16)
+#define ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)(16 + POISON_POINTER_DELTA))
 
-#define ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(x) ((unsigned long)(x) <= \
-				(unsigned long)ZERO_SIZE_PTR)
+#define ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(x)				\
+	({						\
+		void *p = (void *)(x);			\
+		(p == NULL || p == ZERO_SIZE_PTR);	\
+	})
 
 #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
-- 
2.7.4

[toc] | [next] | [standalone]

#1524793

FromKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date2016-11-17 21:10 +0100
Message-ID<sEBaq-5nI-19@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1524220
On Thu, Nov 17, 2016 at 1:51 AM, Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> wrote:
> POISON_POINTER_DELTA is defined in poison.h, and is intended to be used
> to shift poison values so that they don't alias userspace.
>
> We should add it to ZERO_SIZE_PTR so that attackers can't use
> ZERO_SIZE_PTR as a way to get a non-NULL pointer to userspace.
>
> Currently ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR() uses a trick of doing a single check that
> x <= ZERO_SIZE_PTR, and ignoring the fact that it also matches 1-15.
> That no longer really works once we add the poison delta, so split it
> into two checks. Assign x to a temporary to avoid evaluating it
> twice (suggested by Kees Cook).
>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

I continue to like this idea. If we want to avoid the loss of the 1-15
check, we could just explicitly retain it, see craziness below...

> ---
>  include/linux/slab.h | 10 +++++++---
>  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> v2: Rework ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR() to do the two checks separately.
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
> index 084b12bad198..404419d9860f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/slab.h
> +++ b/include/linux/slab.h
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
>  #define        _LINUX_SLAB_H
>
>  #include <linux/gfp.h>
> +#include <linux/poison.h>
>  #include <linux/types.h>
>  #include <linux/workqueue.h>
>
> @@ -109,10 +110,13 @@
>   * ZERO_SIZE_PTR can be passed to kfree though in the same way that NULL can.
>   * Both make kfree a no-op.
>   */
> -#define ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16)

#define __ZERO_SIZE_PTR((void *)16)
#define ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)(__ZERO_SIZE_PTR + POISON_POINTER_DELTA))

>
> -#define ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(x) ((unsigned long)(x) <= \
> -                               (unsigned long)ZERO_SIZE_PTR)
> +#define ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(x)                            \
> +       ({                                              \
> +               void *p = (void *)(x);                  \
              (p < __ZERO_SIZE_PTR || p == ZERO_SIZE_PTR);      \
> +       })

#undef __ZERO_SIZE_PTR

?

Anyone else have thoughts on this?

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Nexus Security

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]

#1525588

FromChristoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Date2016-11-18 18:50 +0100
Message-ID<sEVst-1L1-5@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1524220
On Thu, 17 Nov 2016, Michael Ellerman wrote:

> Currently ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR() uses a trick of doing a single check that
> x <= ZERO_SIZE_PTR, and ignoring the fact that it also matches 1-15.

Well yes that was done so we do not add too many branches all over the
kernel.....


> That no longer really works once we add the poison delta, so split it
> into two checks. Assign x to a temporary to avoid evaluating it
> twice (suggested by Kees Cook).

And now you are doing just that.

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]

#1525596

FromKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date2016-11-18 19:00 +0100
Message-ID<sEVCa-1Ow-5@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1525588
On Fri, Nov 18, 2016 at 9:47 AM, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> wrote:
> On Thu, 17 Nov 2016, Michael Ellerman wrote:
>
>> Currently ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR() uses a trick of doing a single check that
>> x <= ZERO_SIZE_PTR, and ignoring the fact that it also matches 1-15.
>
> Well yes that was done so we do not add too many branches all over the
> kernel.....

There are actually very few callers of this macro. (Though it's
possible they're executed frequently.)

>> That no longer really works once we add the poison delta, so split it
>> into two checks. Assign x to a temporary to avoid evaluating it
>> twice (suggested by Kees Cook).
>
> And now you are doing just that.

In this case, what about the original < ZERO_SIZE_PTR check Michael
suggested? At least the one use in usercopy.c needs to be fixed, but
otherwise, it should be fine?

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Nexus Security

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]

#1525621

FromChristoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Date2016-11-18 19:40 +0100
Message-ID<sEWeS-2n0-5@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1525596
On Fri, 18 Nov 2016, Kees Cook wrote:
> In this case, what about the original < ZERO_SIZE_PTR check Michael
> suggested? At least the one use in usercopy.c needs to be fixed, but
> otherwise, it should be fine?

Looks like it.

[toc] | [prev] | [standalone]

Back to top | Article view | linux.kernel

csiph-web