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[PATCH 4.4 00/49] 4.4.18-stable review

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  [PATCH 4.4 00/49] 4.4.18-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 33/49] mm: memcontrol: fix swap counter leak on swapout from offline cgroup Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 05/49] net: bgmac: Fix infinite loop in bgmac_dma_tx_add() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 26/49] x86/mtrr: Fix Xorg crashes in Qemu sessions Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 28/49] x86/xen, pat: Remove PAT table init code from Xen Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 01/49] tcp: make challenge acks less predictable Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 03/49] ipv4: reject RTNH_F_DEAD and RTNH_F_LINKDOWN from user space Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 12/49] PNP: Add Broadwell to Intel MCH size workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 23/49] x86/mm/pat: Add support of non-default PAT MSR setting Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 24/49] x86/mm/pat: Add pat_disable() interface Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 10/49] scsi: ignore errors from scsi_dh_add_device() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 20/49] apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 41/49] fs/dcache.c: avoid soft-lockup in dput() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 49/49] ext4: fix reference counting bug on block allocation error Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 07/49] qed: Fix setting/clearing bit in completion bitmap Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 38/49] fuse: fsync() did not return IO errors Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 46/49] ext4: dont call ext4_should_journal_data() on the journal inode Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 43/49] crypto: scatterwalk - Fix test in scatterwalk_done Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 19/49] Revert "s390/kdump: Clear subchannel ID to signal non-CCW/SCSI IPL" Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 45/49] ext4: fix deadlock during page writeback Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 22/49] devpts: clean up interface to pty drivers Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 48/49] ext4: short-cut orphan cleanup on error Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 32/49] mm: memcontrol: fix cgroup creation failure after many small jobs Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 06/49] net/irda: fix NULL pointer dereference on memory allocation failure Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 27/49] x86/mtrr: Fix PAT init handling when MTRR is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 44/49] ext4: check for extents that wrap around Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 29/49] x86/pat: Document the PAT initialization sequence Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 36/49] block: fix use-after-free in seq file Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:30 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 37/49] sysv, ipc: fix security-layer leaking Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:40 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 09/49] ipath: Restrict use of the write() interface Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:40 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 35/49] x86/syscalls/64: Add compat_sys_keyctl for 32-bit userspace Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:40 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 21/49] random: strengthen input validation for RNDADDTOENTCNT Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:40 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 04/49] bonding: set carrier off for devices created through netlink Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:40 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 11/49] PNP: Add Haswell-ULT to Intel MCH size workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-14 22:40 +0200
    Re: [PATCH 4.4 00/49] 4.4.18-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-08-15 10:00 +0200
    Re: [PATCH 4.4 00/49] 4.4.18-stable review Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> - 2016-08-15 15:10 +0200
    Re: [PATCH 4.4 00/49] 4.4.18-stable review Shuah Khan <shuah.kh@samsung.com> - 2016-08-16 06:10 +0200

Page 2 of 2 — ← Prev page 1 [2]

#1462375 — [PATCH 4.4 22/49] devpts: clean up interface to pty drivers

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

commit 67245ff332064c01b760afa7a384ccda024bfd24 upstream.

This gets rid of the horrible notion of having that

    struct inode *ptmx_inode

be the linchpin of the interface between the pty code and devpts.

By de-emphasizing the ptmx inode, a lot of things actually get cleaner,
and we will have a much saner way forward.  In particular, this will
allow us to associate with any particular devpts instance at open-time,
and not be artificially tied to one particular ptmx inode.

The patch itself is actually fairly straightforward, and apart from some
locking and return path cleanups it's pretty mechanical:

 - the interfaces that devpts exposes all take "struct pts_fs_info *"
   instead of "struct inode *ptmx_inode" now.

   NOTE! The "struct pts_fs_info" thing is a completely opaque structure
   as far as the pty driver is concerned: it's still declared entirely
   internally to devpts. So the pty code can't actually access it in any
   way, just pass it as a "cookie" to the devpts code.

 - the "look up the pts fs info" is now a single clear operation, that
   also does the reference count increment on the pts superblock.

   So "devpts_add/del_ref()" is gone, and replaced by a "lookup and get
   ref" operation (devpts_get_ref(inode)), along with a "put ref" op
   (devpts_put_ref()).

 - the pty master "tty->driver_data" field now contains the pts_fs_info,
   not the ptmx inode.

 - because we don't care about the ptmx inode any more as some kind of
   base index, the ref counting can now drop the inode games - it just
   gets the ref on the superblock.

 - the pts_fs_info now has a back-pointer to the super_block. That's so
   that we can easily look up the information we actually need. Although
   quite often, the pts fs info was actually all we wanted, and not having
   to look it up based on some magical inode makes things more
   straightforward.

In particular, now that "devpts_get_ref(inode)" operation should really
be the *only* place we need to look up what devpts instance we're
associated with, and we do it exactly once, at ptmx_open() time.

The other side of this is that one ptmx node could now be associated
with multiple different devpts instances - you could have a single
/dev/ptmx node, and then have multiple mount namespaces with their own
instances of devpts mounted on /dev/pts/.  And that's all perfectly sane
in a model where we just look up the pts instance at open time.

This will eventually allow us to get rid of our odd single-vs-multiple
pts instance model, but this patch in itself changes no semantics, only
an internal binding model.

Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>
Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@arista.com>
Cc: "Herton R. Krzesinski" <herton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/tty/pty.c         |   63 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
 fs/devpts/inode.c         |   49 +++++++++++++++++------------------
 include/linux/devpts_fs.h |   34 +++++++-----------------
 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/tty/pty.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/pty.c
@@ -679,14 +679,14 @@ static void pty_unix98_remove(struct tty
 /* this is called once with whichever end is closed last */
 static void pty_unix98_shutdown(struct tty_struct *tty)
 {
-	struct inode *ptmx_inode;
+	struct pts_fs_info *fsi;
 
 	if (tty->driver->subtype == PTY_TYPE_MASTER)
-		ptmx_inode = tty->driver_data;
+		fsi = tty->driver_data;
 	else
-		ptmx_inode = tty->link->driver_data;
-	devpts_kill_index(ptmx_inode, tty->index);
-	devpts_del_ref(ptmx_inode);
+		fsi = tty->link->driver_data;
+	devpts_kill_index(fsi, tty->index);
+	devpts_put_ref(fsi);
 }
 
 static const struct tty_operations ptm_unix98_ops = {
@@ -738,6 +738,7 @@ static const struct tty_operations pty_u
 
 static int ptmx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
+	struct pts_fs_info *fsi;
 	struct tty_struct *tty;
 	struct inode *slave_inode;
 	int retval;
@@ -752,47 +753,41 @@ static int ptmx_open(struct inode *inode
 	if (retval)
 		return retval;
 
+	fsi = devpts_get_ref(inode, filp);
+	retval = -ENODEV;
+	if (!fsi)
+		goto out_free_file;
+
 	/* find a device that is not in use. */
 	mutex_lock(&devpts_mutex);
-	index = devpts_new_index(inode);
-	if (index < 0) {
-		retval = index;
-		mutex_unlock(&devpts_mutex);
-		goto err_file;
-	}
-
+	index = devpts_new_index(fsi);
 	mutex_unlock(&devpts_mutex);
 
-	mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
-	tty = tty_init_dev(ptm_driver, index);
+	retval = index;
+	if (index < 0)
+		goto out_put_ref;
 
-	if (IS_ERR(tty)) {
-		retval = PTR_ERR(tty);
-		goto out;
-	}
 
+	mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
+	tty = tty_init_dev(ptm_driver, index);
 	/* The tty returned here is locked so we can safely
 	   drop the mutex */
 	mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
 
-	set_bit(TTY_PTY_LOCK, &tty->flags); /* LOCK THE SLAVE */
-	tty->driver_data = inode;
+	retval = PTR_ERR(tty);
+	if (IS_ERR(tty))
+		goto out;
 
 	/*
-	 * In the case where all references to ptmx inode are dropped and we
-	 * still have /dev/tty opened pointing to the master/slave pair (ptmx
-	 * is closed/released before /dev/tty), we must make sure that the inode
-	 * is still valid when we call the final pty_unix98_shutdown, thus we
-	 * hold an additional reference to the ptmx inode. For the same /dev/tty
-	 * last close case, we also need to make sure the super_block isn't
-	 * destroyed (devpts instance unmounted), before /dev/tty is closed and
-	 * on its release devpts_kill_index is called.
+	 * From here on out, the tty is "live", and the index and
+	 * fsi will be killed/put by the tty_release()
 	 */
-	devpts_add_ref(inode);
+	set_bit(TTY_PTY_LOCK, &tty->flags); /* LOCK THE SLAVE */
+	tty->driver_data = fsi;
 
 	tty_add_file(tty, filp);
 
-	slave_inode = devpts_pty_new(inode,
+	slave_inode = devpts_pty_new(fsi,
 			MKDEV(UNIX98_PTY_SLAVE_MAJOR, index), index,
 			tty->link);
 	if (IS_ERR(slave_inode)) {
@@ -811,12 +806,14 @@ static int ptmx_open(struct inode *inode
 	return 0;
 err_release:
 	tty_unlock(tty);
+	// This will also put-ref the fsi
 	tty_release(inode, filp);
 	return retval;
 out:
-	mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
-	devpts_kill_index(inode, index);
-err_file:
+	devpts_kill_index(fsi, index);
+out_put_ref:
+	devpts_put_ref(fsi);
+out_free_file:
 	tty_free_file(filp);
 	return retval;
 }
--- a/fs/devpts/inode.c
+++ b/fs/devpts/inode.c
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = {
 struct pts_fs_info {
 	struct ida allocated_ptys;
 	struct pts_mount_opts mount_opts;
+	struct super_block *sb;
 	struct dentry *ptmx_dentry;
 };
 
@@ -358,7 +359,7 @@ static const struct super_operations dev
 	.show_options	= devpts_show_options,
 };
 
-static void *new_pts_fs_info(void)
+static void *new_pts_fs_info(struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	struct pts_fs_info *fsi;
 
@@ -369,6 +370,7 @@ static void *new_pts_fs_info(void)
 	ida_init(&fsi->allocated_ptys);
 	fsi->mount_opts.mode = DEVPTS_DEFAULT_MODE;
 	fsi->mount_opts.ptmxmode = DEVPTS_DEFAULT_PTMX_MODE;
+	fsi->sb = sb;
 
 	return fsi;
 }
@@ -384,7 +386,7 @@ devpts_fill_super(struct super_block *s,
 	s->s_op = &devpts_sops;
 	s->s_time_gran = 1;
 
-	s->s_fs_info = new_pts_fs_info();
+	s->s_fs_info = new_pts_fs_info(s);
 	if (!s->s_fs_info)
 		goto fail;
 
@@ -524,17 +526,14 @@ static struct file_system_type devpts_fs
  * to the System V naming convention
  */
 
-int devpts_new_index(struct inode *ptmx_inode)
+int devpts_new_index(struct pts_fs_info *fsi)
 {
-	struct super_block *sb = pts_sb_from_inode(ptmx_inode);
-	struct pts_fs_info *fsi;
 	int index;
 	int ida_ret;
 
-	if (!sb)
+	if (!fsi)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	fsi = DEVPTS_SB(sb);
 retry:
 	if (!ida_pre_get(&fsi->allocated_ptys, GFP_KERNEL))
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -564,11 +563,8 @@ retry:
 	return index;
 }
 
-void devpts_kill_index(struct inode *ptmx_inode, int idx)
+void devpts_kill_index(struct pts_fs_info *fsi, int idx)
 {
-	struct super_block *sb = pts_sb_from_inode(ptmx_inode);
-	struct pts_fs_info *fsi = DEVPTS_SB(sb);
-
 	mutex_lock(&allocated_ptys_lock);
 	ida_remove(&fsi->allocated_ptys, idx);
 	pty_count--;
@@ -578,21 +574,25 @@ void devpts_kill_index(struct inode *ptm
 /*
  * pty code needs to hold extra references in case of last /dev/tty close
  */
-
-void devpts_add_ref(struct inode *ptmx_inode)
+struct pts_fs_info *devpts_get_ref(struct inode *ptmx_inode, struct file *file)
 {
-	struct super_block *sb = pts_sb_from_inode(ptmx_inode);
+	struct super_block *sb;
+	struct pts_fs_info *fsi;
+
+	sb = pts_sb_from_inode(ptmx_inode);
+	if (!sb)
+		return NULL;
+	fsi = DEVPTS_SB(sb);
+	if (!fsi)
+		return NULL;
 
 	atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
-	ihold(ptmx_inode);
+	return fsi;
 }
 
-void devpts_del_ref(struct inode *ptmx_inode)
+void devpts_put_ref(struct pts_fs_info *fsi)
 {
-	struct super_block *sb = pts_sb_from_inode(ptmx_inode);
-
-	iput(ptmx_inode);
-	deactivate_super(sb);
+	deactivate_super(fsi->sb);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -604,22 +604,21 @@ void devpts_del_ref(struct inode *ptmx_i
  *
  * The created inode is returned. Remove it from /dev/pts/ by devpts_pty_kill.
  */
-struct inode *devpts_pty_new(struct inode *ptmx_inode, dev_t device, int index,
+struct inode *devpts_pty_new(struct pts_fs_info *fsi, dev_t device, int index,
 		void *priv)
 {
 	struct dentry *dentry;
-	struct super_block *sb = pts_sb_from_inode(ptmx_inode);
+	struct super_block *sb;
 	struct inode *inode;
 	struct dentry *root;
-	struct pts_fs_info *fsi;
 	struct pts_mount_opts *opts;
 	char s[12];
 
-	if (!sb)
+	if (!fsi)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
 
+	sb = fsi->sb;
 	root = sb->s_root;
-	fsi = DEVPTS_SB(sb);
 	opts = &fsi->mount_opts;
 
 	inode = new_inode(sb);
--- a/include/linux/devpts_fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/devpts_fs.h
@@ -15,38 +15,24 @@
 
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 
+struct pts_fs_info;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_UNIX98_PTYS
 
-int devpts_new_index(struct inode *ptmx_inode);
-void devpts_kill_index(struct inode *ptmx_inode, int idx);
-void devpts_add_ref(struct inode *ptmx_inode);
-void devpts_del_ref(struct inode *ptmx_inode);
+/* Look up a pts fs info and get a ref to it */
+struct pts_fs_info *devpts_get_ref(struct inode *, struct file *);
+void devpts_put_ref(struct pts_fs_info *);
+
+int devpts_new_index(struct pts_fs_info *);
+void devpts_kill_index(struct pts_fs_info *, int);
+
 /* mknod in devpts */
-struct inode *devpts_pty_new(struct inode *ptmx_inode, dev_t device, int index,
-		void *priv);
+struct inode *devpts_pty_new(struct pts_fs_info *, dev_t, int, void *);
 /* get private structure */
 void *devpts_get_priv(struct inode *pts_inode);
 /* unlink */
 void devpts_pty_kill(struct inode *inode);
 
-#else
-
-/* Dummy stubs in the no-pty case */
-static inline int devpts_new_index(struct inode *ptmx_inode) { return -EINVAL; }
-static inline void devpts_kill_index(struct inode *ptmx_inode, int idx) { }
-static inline void devpts_add_ref(struct inode *ptmx_inode) { }
-static inline void devpts_del_ref(struct inode *ptmx_inode) { }
-static inline struct inode *devpts_pty_new(struct inode *ptmx_inode,
-		dev_t device, int index, void *priv)
-{
-	return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-}
-static inline void *devpts_get_priv(struct inode *pts_inode)
-{
-	return NULL;
-}
-static inline void devpts_pty_kill(struct inode *inode) { }
-
 #endif
 
 

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#1462376 — [PATCH 4.4 48/49] ext4: short-cut orphan cleanup on error

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>

commit c65d5c6c81a1f27dec5f627f67840726fcd146de upstream.

If we encounter a filesystem error during orphan cleanup, we should stop.
Otherwise, we may end up in an infinite loop where the same inode is
processed again and again.

    EXT4-fs (loop0): warning: checktime reached, running e2fsck is recommended
    EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:758: group 2, block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: 6117 vs 0 free clusters
    Aborting journal on device loop0-8.
    EXT4-fs (loop0): Remounting filesystem read-only
    EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_free_blocks:4895: Journal has aborted
    EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_do_update_inode:4893: Journal has aborted
    EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_do_update_inode:4893: Journal has aborted
    EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_ext_remove_space:3068: IO failure
    EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_ext_truncate:4667: Journal has aborted
    EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_orphan_del:2927: Journal has aborted
    EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_do_update_inode:4893: Journal has aborted
    EXT4-fs (loop0): Inode 16 (00000000618192a0): orphan list check failed!
    [...]
    EXT4-fs (loop0): Inode 16 (0000000061819748): orphan list check failed!
    [...]
    EXT4-fs (loop0): Inode 16 (0000000061819bf0): orphan list check failed!
    [...]

See-also: c9eb13a9105 ("ext4: fix hang when processing corrupted orphaned inode list")
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/super.c |   10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -2240,6 +2240,16 @@ static void ext4_orphan_cleanup(struct s
 	while (es->s_last_orphan) {
 		struct inode *inode;
 
+		/*
+		 * We may have encountered an error during cleanup; if
+		 * so, skip the rest.
+		 */
+		if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state & EXT4_ERROR_FS) {
+			jbd_debug(1, "Skipping orphan recovery on fs with errors.\n");
+			es->s_last_orphan = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+
 		inode = ext4_orphan_get(sb, le32_to_cpu(es->s_last_orphan));
 		if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
 			es->s_last_orphan = 0;

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#1462377 — [PATCH 4.4 32/49] mm: memcontrol: fix cgroup creation failure after many small jobs

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>

commit 73f576c04b9410ed19660f74f97521bee6e1c546 upstream.

The memory controller has quite a bit of state that usually outlives the
cgroup and pins its CSS until said state disappears.  At the same time
it imposes a 16-bit limit on the CSS ID space to economically store IDs
in the wild.  Consequently, when we use cgroups to contain frequent but
small and short-lived jobs that leave behind some page cache, we quickly
run into the 64k limitations of outstanding CSSs.  Creating a new cgroup
fails with -ENOSPC while there are only a few, or even no user-visible
cgroups in existence.

Although pinning CSSs past cgroup removal is common, there are only two
instances that actually need an ID after a cgroup is deleted: cache
shadow entries and swapout records.

Cache shadow entries reference the ID weakly and can deal with the CSS
having disappeared when it's looked up later.  They pose no hurdle.

Swap-out records do need to pin the css to hierarchically attribute
swapins after the cgroup has been deleted; though the only pages that
remain swapped out after offlining are tmpfs/shmem pages.  And those
references are under the user's control, so they are manageable.

This patch introduces a private 16-bit memcg ID and switches swap and
cache shadow entries over to using that.  This ID can then be recycled
after offlining when the CSS remains pinned only by objects that don't
specifically need it.

This script demonstrates the problem by faulting one cache page in a new
cgroup and deleting it again:

  set -e
  mkdir -p pages
  for x in `seq 128000`; do
    [ $((x % 1000)) -eq 0 ] && echo $x
    mkdir /cgroup/foo
    echo $$ >/cgroup/foo/cgroup.procs
    echo trex >pages/$x
    echo $$ >/cgroup/cgroup.procs
    rmdir /cgroup/foo
  done

When run on an unpatched kernel, we eventually run out of possible IDs
even though there are no visible cgroups:

  [root@ham ~]# ./cssidstress.sh
  [...]
  65000
  mkdir: cannot create directory '/cgroup/foo': No space left on device

After this patch, the IDs get released upon cgroup destruction and the
cache and css objects get released once memory reclaim kicks in.

[hannes@cmpxchg.org: init the IDR]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160621154601.GA22431@cmpxchg.org
Fixes: b2052564e66d ("mm: memcontrol: continue cache reclaim from offlined groups")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160617162516.GD19084@cmpxchg.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reported-by: John Garcia <john.garcia@mesosphere.io>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Nikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 include/linux/memcontrol.h |    8 +++
 mm/memcontrol.c            |   95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 mm/slab_common.c           |    2 
 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/memcontrol.h
+++ b/include/linux/memcontrol.h
@@ -174,6 +174,11 @@ struct mem_cgroup_thresholds {
 	struct mem_cgroup_threshold_ary *spare;
 };
 
+struct mem_cgroup_id {
+	int id;
+	atomic_t ref;
+};
+
 /*
  * The memory controller data structure. The memory controller controls both
  * page cache and RSS per cgroup. We would eventually like to provide
@@ -183,6 +188,9 @@ struct mem_cgroup_thresholds {
 struct mem_cgroup {
 	struct cgroup_subsys_state css;
 
+	/* Private memcg ID. Used to ID objects that outlive the cgroup */
+	struct mem_cgroup_id id;
+
 	/* Accounted resources */
 	struct page_counter memory;
 	struct page_counter memsw;
--- a/mm/memcontrol.c
+++ b/mm/memcontrol.c
@@ -272,21 +272,7 @@ static inline bool mem_cgroup_is_root(st
 
 static inline unsigned short mem_cgroup_id(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
 {
-	return memcg->css.id;
-}
-
-/*
- * A helper function to get mem_cgroup from ID. must be called under
- * rcu_read_lock().  The caller is responsible for calling
- * css_tryget_online() if the mem_cgroup is used for charging. (dropping
- * refcnt from swap can be called against removed memcg.)
- */
-static inline struct mem_cgroup *mem_cgroup_from_id(unsigned short id)
-{
-	struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
-
-	css = css_from_id(id, &memory_cgrp_subsys);
-	return mem_cgroup_from_css(css);
+	return memcg->id.id;
 }
 
 /* Writing them here to avoid exposing memcg's inner layout */
@@ -4124,6 +4110,60 @@ static struct cftype mem_cgroup_legacy_f
 	{ },	/* terminate */
 };
 
+/*
+ * Private memory cgroup IDR
+ *
+ * Swap-out records and page cache shadow entries need to store memcg
+ * references in constrained space, so we maintain an ID space that is
+ * limited to 16 bit (MEM_CGROUP_ID_MAX), limiting the total number of
+ * memory-controlled cgroups to 64k.
+ *
+ * However, there usually are many references to the oflline CSS after
+ * the cgroup has been destroyed, such as page cache or reclaimable
+ * slab objects, that don't need to hang on to the ID. We want to keep
+ * those dead CSS from occupying IDs, or we might quickly exhaust the
+ * relatively small ID space and prevent the creation of new cgroups
+ * even when there are much fewer than 64k cgroups - possibly none.
+ *
+ * Maintain a private 16-bit ID space for memcg, and allow the ID to
+ * be freed and recycled when it's no longer needed, which is usually
+ * when the CSS is offlined.
+ *
+ * The only exception to that are records of swapped out tmpfs/shmem
+ * pages that need to be attributed to live ancestors on swapin. But
+ * those references are manageable from userspace.
+ */
+
+static DEFINE_IDR(mem_cgroup_idr);
+
+static void mem_cgroup_id_get(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
+{
+	atomic_inc(&memcg->id.ref);
+}
+
+static void mem_cgroup_id_put(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
+{
+	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&memcg->id.ref)) {
+		idr_remove(&mem_cgroup_idr, memcg->id.id);
+		memcg->id.id = 0;
+
+		/* Memcg ID pins CSS */
+		css_put(&memcg->css);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * mem_cgroup_from_id - look up a memcg from a memcg id
+ * @id: the memcg id to look up
+ *
+ * Caller must hold rcu_read_lock().
+ */
+struct mem_cgroup *mem_cgroup_from_id(unsigned short id)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held());
+	return idr_find(&mem_cgroup_idr, id);
+}
+
 static int alloc_mem_cgroup_per_zone_info(struct mem_cgroup *memcg, int node)
 {
 	struct mem_cgroup_per_node *pn;
@@ -4171,17 +4211,27 @@ static struct mem_cgroup *mem_cgroup_all
 	if (!memcg)
 		return NULL;
 
+	memcg->id.id = idr_alloc(&mem_cgroup_idr, NULL,
+				 1, MEM_CGROUP_ID_MAX,
+				 GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (memcg->id.id < 0)
+		goto out_free;
+
 	memcg->stat = alloc_percpu(struct mem_cgroup_stat_cpu);
 	if (!memcg->stat)
-		goto out_free;
+		goto out_idr;
 
 	if (memcg_wb_domain_init(memcg, GFP_KERNEL))
 		goto out_free_stat;
 
+	idr_replace(&mem_cgroup_idr, memcg, memcg->id.id);
 	return memcg;
 
 out_free_stat:
 	free_percpu(memcg->stat);
+out_idr:
+	if (memcg->id.id > 0)
+		idr_remove(&mem_cgroup_idr, memcg->id.id);
 out_free:
 	kfree(memcg);
 	return NULL;
@@ -4277,8 +4327,9 @@ mem_cgroup_css_online(struct cgroup_subs
 	struct mem_cgroup *parent = mem_cgroup_from_css(css->parent);
 	int ret;
 
-	if (css->id > MEM_CGROUP_ID_MAX)
-		return -ENOSPC;
+	/* Online state pins memcg ID, memcg ID pins CSS */
+	mem_cgroup_id_get(mem_cgroup_from_css(css));
+	css_get(css);
 
 	if (!parent)
 		return 0;
@@ -4352,6 +4403,8 @@ static void mem_cgroup_css_offline(struc
 	memcg_deactivate_kmem(memcg);
 
 	wb_memcg_offline(memcg);
+
+	mem_cgroup_id_put(memcg);
 }
 
 static void mem_cgroup_css_released(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css)
@@ -5685,6 +5738,7 @@ void mem_cgroup_swapout(struct page *pag
 	if (!memcg)
 		return;
 
+	mem_cgroup_id_get(memcg);
 	oldid = swap_cgroup_record(entry, mem_cgroup_id(memcg));
 	VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(oldid, page);
 	mem_cgroup_swap_statistics(memcg, true);
@@ -5703,6 +5757,9 @@ void mem_cgroup_swapout(struct page *pag
 	VM_BUG_ON(!irqs_disabled());
 	mem_cgroup_charge_statistics(memcg, page, -1);
 	memcg_check_events(memcg, page);
+
+	if (!mem_cgroup_is_root(memcg))
+		css_put(&memcg->css);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5726,7 +5783,7 @@ void mem_cgroup_uncharge_swap(swp_entry_
 		if (!mem_cgroup_is_root(memcg))
 			page_counter_uncharge(&memcg->memsw, 1);
 		mem_cgroup_swap_statistics(memcg, false);
-		css_put(&memcg->css);
+		mem_cgroup_id_put(memcg);
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ void memcg_create_kmem_cache(struct mem_
 
 	cgroup_name(css->cgroup, memcg_name_buf, sizeof(memcg_name_buf));
 	cache_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s(%d:%s)", root_cache->name,
-			       css->id, memcg_name_buf);
+			       css->serial_nr, memcg_name_buf);
 	if (!cache_name)
 		goto out_unlock;
 

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#1462378 — [PATCH 4.4 06/49] net/irda: fix NULL pointer dereference on memory allocation failure

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit d3e6952cfb7ba5f4bfa29d4803ba91f96ce1204d ]

I ran into this:

    kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
    kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
    general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
    CPU: 2 PID: 2012 Comm: trinity-c3 Not tainted 4.7.0-rc7+ #19
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
    task: ffff8800b745f2c0 ti: ffff880111740000 task.ti: ffff880111740000
    RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82bbf066>]  [<ffffffff82bbf066>] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710
    RSP: 0018:ffff880111747bb8  EFLAGS: 00010286
    RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000069dd8358
    RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: 0000000000000048
    RBP: ffff880111747c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000069dd8358 R11: 1ffffffff0759723 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: ffff88011a7e4780 R14: 0000000000000027 R15: 0000000000000000
    FS:  00007fc738404700(0000) GS:ffff88011af00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 00007fc737fdfb10 CR3: 0000000118087000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    Stack:
     0000000000000200 ffff880111747bd8 ffffffff810ee611 ffff880119f1f220
     ffff880119f1f4f8 ffff880119f1f4f0 ffff88011a7e4780 ffff880119f1f232
     ffff880119f1f220 ffff880111747d58 ffffffff82bca542 0000000000000000
    Call Trace:
     [<ffffffff82bca542>] irda_connect+0x562/0x1190
     [<ffffffff825ae582>] SYSC_connect+0x202/0x2a0
     [<ffffffff825b4489>] SyS_connect+0x9/0x10
     [<ffffffff8100334c>] do_syscall_64+0x19c/0x410
     [<ffffffff83295ca5>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
    Code: 41 89 ca 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 d7 53 48 89 fb 48 83 c7 48 48 89 fa 41 89 f6 48 c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 20 4c 8b 65 10 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 84 c0 0f 8e 4c 04 00 00 80 7b 48 00 74
    RIP  [<ffffffff82bbf066>] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710
     RSP <ffff880111747bb8>
    ---[ end trace 4cda2588bc055b30 ]---

The problem is that irda_open_tsap() can fail and leave self->tsap = NULL,
and then irttp_connect_request() almost immediately dereferences it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/irda/af_irda.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/irda/af_irda.c
+++ b/net/irda/af_irda.c
@@ -1024,8 +1024,11 @@ static int irda_connect(struct socket *s
 	}
 
 	/* Check if we have opened a local TSAP */
-	if (!self->tsap)
-		irda_open_tsap(self, LSAP_ANY, addr->sir_name);
+	if (!self->tsap) {
+		err = irda_open_tsap(self, LSAP_ANY, addr->sir_name);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* Move to connecting socket, start sending Connect Requests */
 	sock->state = SS_CONNECTING;

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#1462379 — [PATCH 4.4 27/49] x86/mtrr: Fix PAT init handling when MTRR is disabled

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>

commit ad025a73f0e9344ac73ffe1b74c184033e08e7d5 upstream.

get_mtrr_state() calls pat_init() on BSP even if MTRR is disabled.
This results in calling pat_init() on BSP only since APs do not call
pat_init() when MTRR is disabled.  This inconsistency between BSP
and APs leads to undefined behavior.

Make BSP's calling condition to pat_init() consistent with AP's,
mtrr_ap_init() and mtrr_aps_init().

Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: elliott@hpe.com
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1458769323-24491-6-git-send-email-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c |   24 ++++++++++++++----------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/main.c    |    3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.h    |    1 +
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
@@ -444,11 +444,24 @@ static void __init print_mtrr_state(void
 		pr_debug("TOM2: %016llx aka %lldM\n", mtrr_tom2, mtrr_tom2>>20);
 }
 
+/* PAT setup for BP. We need to go through sync steps here */
+void __init mtrr_bp_pat_init(void)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+	prepare_set();
+
+	pat_init();
+
+	post_set();
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+
 /* Grab all of the MTRR state for this CPU into *state */
 bool __init get_mtrr_state(void)
 {
 	struct mtrr_var_range *vrs;
-	unsigned long flags;
 	unsigned lo, dummy;
 	unsigned int i;
 
@@ -481,15 +494,6 @@ bool __init get_mtrr_state(void)
 
 	mtrr_state_set = 1;
 
-	/* PAT setup for BP. We need to go through sync steps here */
-	local_irq_save(flags);
-	prepare_set();
-
-	pat_init();
-
-	post_set();
-	local_irq_restore(flags);
-
 	return !!(mtrr_state.enabled & MTRR_STATE_MTRR_ENABLED);
 }
 
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/main.c
@@ -752,6 +752,9 @@ void __init mtrr_bp_init(void)
 			/* BIOS may override */
 			__mtrr_enabled = get_mtrr_state();
 
+			if (mtrr_enabled())
+				mtrr_bp_pat_init();
+
 			if (mtrr_cleanup(phys_addr)) {
 				changed_by_mtrr_cleanup = 1;
 				mtrr_if->set_all();
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.h
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ void set_mtrr_prepare_save(struct set_mt
 void fill_mtrr_var_range(unsigned int index,
 		u32 base_lo, u32 base_hi, u32 mask_lo, u32 mask_hi);
 bool get_mtrr_state(void);
+void mtrr_bp_pat_init(void);
 
 extern void set_mtrr_ops(const struct mtrr_ops *ops);
 

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#1462380 — [PATCH 4.4 44/49] ext4: check for extents that wrap around

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>

commit f70749ca42943faa4d4dcce46dfdcaadb1d0c4b6 upstream.

An extent with lblock = 4294967295 and len = 1 will pass the
ext4_valid_extent() test:

	ext4_lblk_t last = lblock + len - 1;

	if (len == 0 || lblock > last)
		return 0;

since last = 4294967295 + 1 - 1 = 4294967295. This would later trigger
the BUG_ON(es->es_lblk + es->es_len < es->es_lblk) in ext4_es_end().

We can simplify it by removing the - 1 altogether and changing the test
to use lblock + len <= lblock, since now if len = 0, then lblock + 0 ==
lblock and it fails, and if len > 0 then lblock + len > lblock in order
to pass (i.e. it doesn't overflow).

Fixes: 5946d0893 ("ext4: check for overlapping extents in ext4_valid_extent_entries()")
Fixes: 2f974865f ("ext4: check for zero length extent explicitly")
Cc: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/extents.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/extents.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c
@@ -376,9 +376,13 @@ static int ext4_valid_extent(struct inod
 	ext4_fsblk_t block = ext4_ext_pblock(ext);
 	int len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ext);
 	ext4_lblk_t lblock = le32_to_cpu(ext->ee_block);
-	ext4_lblk_t last = lblock + len - 1;
 
-	if (len == 0 || lblock > last)
+	/*
+	 * We allow neither:
+	 *  - zero length
+	 *  - overflow/wrap-around
+	 */
+	if (lblock + len <= lblock)
 		return 0;
 	return ext4_data_block_valid(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb), block, len);
 }

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#1462381 — [PATCH 4.4 29/49] x86/pat: Document the PAT initialization sequence

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>

commit b6350c21cfe8aa9d65e189509a23c0ea4b8362c2 upstream.

Update PAT documentation to describe how PAT is initialized under
various configurations.

Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: elliott@hpe.com
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1458769323-24491-8-git-send-email-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 Documentation/x86/pat.txt |   32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+)

--- a/Documentation/x86/pat.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/pat.txt
@@ -196,3 +196,35 @@ Another, more verbose way of getting PAT
 "debugpat" boot parameter. With this parameter, various debug messages are
 printed to dmesg log.
 
+PAT Initialization
+------------------
+
+The following table describes how PAT is initialized under various
+configurations. The PAT MSR must be updated by Linux in order to support WC
+and WT attributes. Otherwise, the PAT MSR has the value programmed in it
+by the firmware. Note, Xen enables WC attribute in the PAT MSR for guests.
+
+ MTRR PAT   Call Sequence               PAT State  PAT MSR
+ =========================================================
+ E    E     MTRR -> PAT init            Enabled    OS
+ E    D     MTRR -> PAT init            Disabled    -
+ D    E     MTRR -> PAT disable         Disabled   BIOS
+ D    D     MTRR -> PAT disable         Disabled    -
+ -    np/E  PAT  -> PAT disable         Disabled   BIOS
+ -    np/D  PAT  -> PAT disable         Disabled    -
+ E    !P/E  MTRR -> PAT init            Disabled   BIOS
+ D    !P/E  MTRR -> PAT disable         Disabled   BIOS
+ !M   !P/E  MTRR stub -> PAT disable    Disabled   BIOS
+
+ Legend
+ ------------------------------------------------
+ E         Feature enabled in CPU
+ D	   Feature disabled/unsupported in CPU
+ np	   "nopat" boot option specified
+ !P	   CONFIG_X86_PAT option unset
+ !M	   CONFIG_MTRR option unset
+ Enabled   PAT state set to enabled
+ Disabled  PAT state set to disabled
+ OS        PAT initializes PAT MSR with OS setting
+ BIOS      PAT keeps PAT MSR with BIOS setting
+

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#1462382 — [PATCH 4.4 36/49] block: fix use-after-free in seq file

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>

commit 77da160530dd1dc94f6ae15a981f24e5f0021e84 upstream.

I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:

    ==================================================================
    BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
    Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
    =============================================================================
    BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
    INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
            ___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
            __slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
            kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
            disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
            traverse+0x176/0x860
            seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
            proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
            do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
            do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
            vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
            do_preadv+0x126/0x170
            SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
            do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
            return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
    INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
            __slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
            kfree+0x20a/0x220
            disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
            traverse+0x3b5/0x860
            seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
            proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
            do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
            do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
            vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
            do_preadv+0x126/0x170
            SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
            do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
            return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a

    CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G    B           4.7.0+ #62
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
     ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
     ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
     ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
    Call Trace:
     [<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
     [<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
     [<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
     [<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
     [<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
     [<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
     [<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
     [<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
     [<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
     [<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
     [<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
     [<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
     [<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
     [<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
     [<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10

This problem can occur in the following situation:

open()
 - pread()
    - .seq_start()
       - iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
       - seqf->private = iter
    - .seq_stop()
       - kfree(seqf->private)
 - pread()
    - .seq_start()
       - iter = kmalloc() // fails
    - .seq_stop()
       - class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer

As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.

An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.

Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 block/genhd.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/block/genhd.c
+++ b/block/genhd.c
@@ -831,6 +831,7 @@ static void disk_seqf_stop(struct seq_fi
 	if (iter) {
 		class_dev_iter_exit(iter);
 		kfree(iter);
+		seqf->private = NULL;
 	}
 }
 

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#1462384 — [PATCH 4.4 37/49] sysv, ipc: fix security-layer leaking

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>

commit 9b24fef9f0410fb5364245d6cc2bd044cc064007 upstream.

Commit 53dad6d3a8e5 ("ipc: fix race with LSMs") updated ipc_rcu_putref()
to receive rcu freeing function but used generic ipc_rcu_free() instead
of msg_rcu_free() which does security cleaning.

Running LTP msgsnd06 with kmemleak gives the following:

  cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak

  unreferenced object 0xffff88003c0a11f8 (size 8):
    comm "msgsnd06", pid 1645, jiffies 4294672526 (age 6.549s)
    hex dump (first 8 bytes):
      1b 00 00 00 01 00 00 00                          ........
    backtrace:
      kmemleak_alloc+0x23/0x40
      kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xe1/0x180
      selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security+0x3f/0xd0
      security_msg_queue_alloc+0x2e/0x40
      newque+0x4e/0x150
      ipcget+0x159/0x1b0
      SyS_msgget+0x39/0x40
      entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x8f

Manfred Spraul suggested to fix sem.c as well and Davidlohr Bueso to
only use ipc_rcu_free in case of security allocation failure in newary()

Fixes: 53dad6d3a8e ("ipc: fix race with LSMs")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470083552-22966-1-git-send-email-fabf@skynet.be
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 ipc/msg.c |    2 +-
 ipc/sem.c |   12 ++++++------
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/ipc/msg.c
+++ b/ipc/msg.c
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ long do_msgsnd(int msqid, long mtype, vo
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		ipc_lock_object(&msq->q_perm);
 
-		ipc_rcu_putref(msq, ipc_rcu_free);
+		ipc_rcu_putref(msq, msg_rcu_free);
 		/* raced with RMID? */
 		if (!ipc_valid_object(&msq->q_perm)) {
 			err = -EIDRM;
--- a/ipc/sem.c
+++ b/ipc/sem.c
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static inline struct sem_array *sem_obta
 static inline void sem_lock_and_putref(struct sem_array *sma)
 {
 	sem_lock(sma, NULL, -1);
-	ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+	ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 }
 
 static inline void sem_rmid(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct sem_array *s)
@@ -1385,7 +1385,7 @@ static int semctl_main(struct ipc_namesp
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 			sem_io = ipc_alloc(sizeof(ushort)*nsems);
 			if (sem_io == NULL) {
-				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 				return -ENOMEM;
 			}
 
@@ -1419,20 +1419,20 @@ static int semctl_main(struct ipc_namesp
 		if (nsems > SEMMSL_FAST) {
 			sem_io = ipc_alloc(sizeof(ushort)*nsems);
 			if (sem_io == NULL) {
-				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 				return -ENOMEM;
 			}
 		}
 
 		if (copy_from_user(sem_io, p, nsems*sizeof(ushort))) {
-			ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+			ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 			err = -EFAULT;
 			goto out_free;
 		}
 
 		for (i = 0; i < nsems; i++) {
 			if (sem_io[i] > SEMVMX) {
-				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 				err = -ERANGE;
 				goto out_free;
 			}
@@ -1722,7 +1722,7 @@ static struct sem_undo *find_alloc_undo(
 	/* step 2: allocate new undo structure */
 	new = kzalloc(sizeof(struct sem_undo) + sizeof(short)*nsems, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!new) {
-		ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+		ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	}
 

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#1462385 — [PATCH 4.4 09/49] ipath: Restrict use of the write() interface

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

Commit e6bd18f57aad ("IB/security: Restrict use of the write()
interface") fixed a security problem with various write()
implementations in the Infiniband subsystem.  In older kernel versions
the ipath_write() function has the same problem and needs the same
restriction.  (The ipath driver has been completely removed upstream.)

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/staging/rdma/ipath/ipath_file_ops.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/staging/rdma/ipath/ipath_file_ops.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rdma/ipath/ipath_file_ops.c
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
 #include <linux/uio.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 
+#include <rdma/ib.h>
+
 #include "ipath_kernel.h"
 #include "ipath_common.h"
 #include "ipath_user_sdma.h"
@@ -2243,6 +2245,9 @@ static ssize_t ipath_write(struct file *
 	ssize_t ret = 0;
 	void *dest;
 
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ib_safe_file_access(fp)))
+		return -EACCES;
+
 	if (count < sizeof(cmd.type)) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto bail;

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#1462389 — [PATCH 4.4 35/49] x86/syscalls/64: Add compat_sys_keyctl for 32-bit userspace

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

commit f7d665627e103e82d34306c7d3f6f46f387c0d8b upstream.

x86_64 needs to use compat_sys_keyctl for 32-bit userspace rather than
calling sys_keyctl(). The latter will work in a lot of cases, thereby
hiding the issue.

Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Tested-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/146961615805.14395.5581949237156769439.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@
 # 285 sys_setaltroot
 286	i386	add_key			sys_add_key
 287	i386	request_key		sys_request_key
-288	i386	keyctl			sys_keyctl
+288	i386	keyctl			sys_keyctl			compat_sys_keyctl
 289	i386	ioprio_set		sys_ioprio_set
 290	i386	ioprio_get		sys_ioprio_get
 291	i386	inotify_init		sys_inotify_init

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#1462392 — [PATCH 4.4 21/49] random: strengthen input validation for RNDADDTOENTCNT

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit 86a574de4590ffe6fd3f3ca34cdcf655a78e36ec upstream.

Don't allow RNDADDTOENTCNT or RNDADDENTROPY to accept a negative
entropy value.  It doesn't make any sense to subtract from the entropy
counter, and it can trigger a warning:

random: negative entropy/overflow: pool input count -40000
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 6828 at drivers/char/random.c:670[<      none
 >] credit_entropy_bits+0x21e/0xad0 drivers/char/random.c:670
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 6828 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.7.0-rc4+ #4
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 ffffffff880b58e0 ffff88005dd9fcb0 ffffffff82cc838f ffffffff87158b40
 fffffbfff1016b1c 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff87158b40
 ffffffff83283dae 0000000000000009 ffff88005dd9fcf8 ffffffff8136d27f
Call Trace:
 [<     inline     >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
 [<ffffffff82cc838f>] dump_stack+0x12e/0x18f lib/dump_stack.c:51
 [<ffffffff8136d27f>] __warn+0x19f/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:516
 [<ffffffff8136d48c>] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:551
 [<ffffffff83283dae>] credit_entropy_bits+0x21e/0xad0 drivers/char/random.c:670
 [<     inline     >] credit_entropy_bits_safe drivers/char/random.c:734
 [<ffffffff8328785d>] random_ioctl+0x21d/0x250 drivers/char/random.c:1546
 [<     inline     >] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
 [<ffffffff8185316c>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0xff0 fs/ioctl.c:674
 [<     inline     >] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:689
 [<ffffffff8185405f>] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:680
 [<ffffffff86a995c0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc1
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:207
---[ end trace 5d4902b2ba842f1f ]---

This was triggered using the test program:

// autogenerated by syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller)

int main() {
        int fd = open("/dev/random", O_RDWR);
        int val = -5000;
        ioctl(fd, RNDADDTOENTCNT, &val);
        return 0;
}

It's harmless in that (a) only root can trigger it, and (b) after
complaining the code never does let the entropy count go negative, but
it's better to simply not allow this userspace from passing in a
negative entropy value altogether.

Google-Bug-Id: #29575089
Reported-By: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/random.c |   13 +++++++------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -722,15 +722,18 @@ retry:
 	}
 }
 
-static void credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
+static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
 {
 	const int nbits_max = (int)(~0U >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 1));
 
+	if (nbits < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* Cap the value to avoid overflows */
 	nbits = min(nbits,  nbits_max);
-	nbits = max(nbits, -nbits_max);
 
 	credit_entropy_bits(r, nbits);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*********************************************************************
@@ -1542,8 +1545,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
 			return -EPERM;
 		if (get_user(ent_count, p))
 			return -EFAULT;
-		credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
-		return 0;
+		return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
 	case RNDADDENTROPY:
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
@@ -1557,8 +1559,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
 				    size);
 		if (retval < 0)
 			return retval;
-		credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
-		return 0;
+		return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
 	case RNDZAPENTCNT:
 	case RNDCLEARPOOL:
 		/*

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#1462393 — [PATCH 4.4 04/49] bonding: set carrier off for devices created through netlink

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 005db31d5f5f7c31cfdc43505d77eb3ca5cf8ec6 ]

Commit e826eafa65c6 ("bonding: Call netif_carrier_off after
register_netdevice") moved netif_carrier_off() from bond_init() to
bond_create(), but the latter is called only for initial default
devices and ones created through sysfs:

 $ modprobe bonding
 $ echo +bond1 > /sys/class/net/bonding_masters
 $ ip link add bond2 type bond
 $ grep "MII Status" /proc/net/bonding/*
 /proc/net/bonding/bond0:MII Status: down
 /proc/net/bonding/bond1:MII Status: down
 /proc/net/bonding/bond2:MII Status: up

Ensure that carrier is initially off also for devices created through
netlink.

Signed-off-by: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_netlink.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_netlink.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_netlink.c
@@ -446,7 +446,11 @@ static int bond_newlink(struct net *src_
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 
-	return register_netdevice(bond_dev);
+	err = register_netdevice(bond_dev);
+
+	netif_carrier_off(bond_dev);
+
+	return err;
 }
 
 static size_t bond_get_size(const struct net_device *bond_dev)

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#1462394 — [PATCH 4.4 11/49] PNP: Add Haswell-ULT to Intel MCH size workaround

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>

commit ed1f0eeebaeeb7f790e9e7642116a208581e5bfc upstream.

Add device ID 0x0a04 for Haswell-ULT to the list of devices with MCH
problems.

>From a Lenovo ThinkPad T440S:
[    0.188604] pnp: PnP ACPI init
[    0.189044] system 00:00: [mem 0x00000000-0x0009ffff] could not be reserved
[    0.189048] system 00:00: [mem 0x000c0000-0x000c3fff] could not be reserved
[    0.189050] system 00:00: [mem 0x000c4000-0x000c7fff] could not be reserved
[    0.189052] system 00:00: [mem 0x000c8000-0x000cbfff] could not be reserved
[    0.189054] system 00:00: [mem 0x000cc000-0x000cffff] could not be reserved
[    0.189056] system 00:00: [mem 0x000d0000-0x000d3fff] has been reserved
[    0.189058] system 00:00: [mem 0x000d4000-0x000d7fff] has been reserved
[    0.189060] system 00:00: [mem 0x000d8000-0x000dbfff] has been reserved
[    0.189061] system 00:00: [mem 0x000dc000-0x000dffff] has been reserved
[    0.189063] system 00:00: [mem 0x000e0000-0x000e3fff] could not be reserved
[    0.189065] system 00:00: [mem 0x000e4000-0x000e7fff] could not be reserved
[    0.189067] system 00:00: [mem 0x000e8000-0x000ebfff] could not be reserved
[    0.189069] system 00:00: [mem 0x000ec000-0x000effff] could not be reserved
[    0.189071] system 00:00: [mem 0x000f0000-0x000fffff] could not be reserved
[    0.189073] system 00:00: [mem 0x00100000-0xdf9fffff] could not be reserved
[    0.189075] system 00:00: [mem 0xfec00000-0xfed3ffff] could not be reserved
[    0.189078] system 00:00: [mem 0xfed4c000-0xffffffff] could not be reserved
[    0.189082] system 00:00: Plug and Play ACPI device, IDs PNP0c01 (active)
[    0.189216] system 00:01: [io  0x1800-0x189f] could not be reserved
[    0.189220] system 00:01: [io  0x0800-0x087f] has been reserved
[    0.189222] system 00:01: [io  0x0880-0x08ff] has been reserved
[    0.189224] system 00:01: [io  0x0900-0x097f] has been reserved
[    0.189226] system 00:01: [io  0x0980-0x09ff] has been reserved
[    0.189229] system 00:01: [io  0x0a00-0x0a7f] has been reserved
[    0.189231] system 00:01: [io  0x0a80-0x0aff] has been reserved
[    0.189233] system 00:01: [io  0x0b00-0x0b7f] has been reserved
[    0.189235] system 00:01: [io  0x0b80-0x0bff] has been reserved
[    0.189238] system 00:01: [io  0x15e0-0x15ef] has been reserved
[    0.189240] system 00:01: [io  0x1600-0x167f] has been reserved
[    0.189242] system 00:01: [io  0x1640-0x165f] has been reserved
[    0.189246] system 00:01: [mem 0xf8000000-0xfbffffff] could not be reserved
[    0.189249] system 00:01: [mem 0x00000000-0x00000fff] could not be reserved
[    0.189251] system 00:01: [mem 0xfed1c000-0xfed1ffff] has been reserved
[    0.189254] system 00:01: [mem 0xfed10000-0xfed13fff] has been reserved
[    0.189256] system 00:01: [mem 0xfed18000-0xfed18fff] has been reserved
[    0.189258] system 00:01: [mem 0xfed19000-0xfed19fff] has been reserved
[    0.189261] system 00:01: [mem 0xfed45000-0xfed4bfff] has been reserved
[    0.189264] system 00:01: Plug and Play ACPI device, IDs PNP0c02 (active)
[....]
[    0.583653] resource sanity check: requesting [mem 0xfed10000-0xfed15fff], which spans more than pnp 00:01 [mem 0xfed10000-0xfed13fff]
[    0.583654] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    0.583660] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:198 __ioremap_caller+0x2c5/0x380()
[    0.583661] Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine.
[    0.583662] Modules linked in:

[    0.583666] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.3.3-303.fc23.x86_64 #1
[    0.583668] Hardware name: LENOVO 20AR001GXS/20AR001GXS, BIOS GJET86WW (2.36 ) 12/04/2015
[    0.583670]  0000000000000000 0000000014cf7e59 ffff880214a1baf8 ffffffff813a625f
[    0.583673]  ffff880214a1bb40 ffff880214a1bb30 ffffffff810a07c2 00000000fed10000
[    0.583675]  ffffc90000cb8000 0000000000006000 0000000000000000 ffff8800d6381040
[    0.583678] Call Trace:
[    0.583683]  [<ffffffff813a625f>] dump_stack+0x44/0x55
[    0.583686]  [<ffffffff810a07c2>] warn_slowpath_common+0x82/0xc0
[    0.583688]  [<ffffffff810a085c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5c/0x80
[    0.583692]  [<ffffffff810a6fba>] ? iomem_map_sanity_check+0xba/0xd0
[    0.583695]  [<ffffffff81065835>] __ioremap_caller+0x2c5/0x380
[    0.583698]  [<ffffffff81065907>] ioremap_nocache+0x17/0x20
[    0.583701]  [<ffffffff8103a119>] snb_uncore_imc_init_box+0x79/0xb0
[    0.583705]  [<ffffffff81038900>] uncore_pci_probe+0xd0/0x1b0
[    0.583707]  [<ffffffff813efda5>] local_pci_probe+0x45/0xa0
[    0.583710]  [<ffffffff813f118d>] pci_device_probe+0xfd/0x140
[    0.583713]  [<ffffffff814d9b52>] driver_probe_device+0x222/0x480
[    0.583715]  [<ffffffff814d9e34>] __driver_attach+0x84/0x90
[    0.583717]  [<ffffffff814d9db0>] ? driver_probe_device+0x480/0x480
[    0.583720]  [<ffffffff814d762c>] bus_for_each_dev+0x6c/0xc0
[    0.583722]  [<ffffffff814d930e>] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20
[    0.583724]  [<ffffffff814d8e4b>] bus_add_driver+0x1eb/0x280
[    0.583727]  [<ffffffff81d6af1a>] ? uncore_cpu_setup+0x12/0x12
[    0.583729]  [<ffffffff814da680>] driver_register+0x60/0xe0
[    0.583733]  [<ffffffff813ef78c>] __pci_register_driver+0x4c/0x50
[    0.583736]  [<ffffffff81d6affc>] intel_uncore_init+0xe2/0x2e6
[    0.583738]  [<ffffffff81d6af1a>] ? uncore_cpu_setup+0x12/0x12
[    0.583741]  [<ffffffff81002123>] do_one_initcall+0xb3/0x200
[    0.583745]  [<ffffffff810be500>] ? parse_args+0x1a0/0x4a0
[    0.583749]  [<ffffffff81d5c1c8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x223
[    0.583752]  [<ffffffff81775c40>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
[    0.583754]  [<ffffffff81775c4e>] kernel_init+0xe/0xe0
[    0.583758]  [<ffffffff81781adf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[    0.583760]  [<ffffffff81775c40>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
[    0.583765] ---[ end trace 077c426a39e018aa ]---

00:00.0 Host bridge [0600]: Intel Corporation Haswell-ULT DRAM Controller [8086:0a04] (rev 0b)
	Subsystem: Lenovo Device [17aa:220c]
	Control: I/O- Mem+ BusMaster+ SpecCycle- MemWINV- VGASnoop- ParErr- Stepping- SERR- FastB2B- DisINTx-
	Status: Cap+ 66MHz- UDF- FastB2B+ ParErr- DEVSEL=fast >TAbort- <TAbort- <MAbort+ >SERR- <PERR- INTx-
	Latency: 0
	Capabilities: <access denied>
	Kernel driver in use: hsw_uncore

Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1300955
Tested-by: <robo@tcp.sk>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/pnp/quirks.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/pnp/quirks.c
+++ b/drivers/pnp/quirks.c
@@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ static void quirk_amd_mmconfig_area(stru
 /* Device IDs of parts that have 32KB MCH space */
 static const unsigned int mch_quirk_devices[] = {
 	0x0154,	/* Ivy Bridge */
+	0x0a04, /* Haswell-ULT */
 	0x0c00,	/* Haswell */
 };
 

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#1462618

On Sun, Aug 14, 2016 at 05:44:09PM -0700, kernelci.org bot wrote:
> stable-rc boot: 163 boots: 0 failed, 159 passed with 4 offline (v4.4.17-49-ga44a0226e486)

Yeah!

thanks for letting us know.

greg k-h

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#1462770

On 08/14/2016 01:23 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.18 release.
> There are 49 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Tue Aug 16 20:22:43 UTC 2016.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>

Build results:
	total: 148 pass: 148 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 102 pass: 102 fail: 0

Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders.

Guenter

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#1463390

On 08/14/2016 02:23 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.18 release.
> There are 49 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Tue Aug 16 20:22:43 UTC 2016.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.18-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
>   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

-- 
Shuah Khan
Sr. Linux Kernel Developer
Open Source Innovation Group
Samsung Research America(Silicon Valley)
shuah.kh@samsung.com

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