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Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9][V3] Overlayfs SELinux Support

Started byPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
First post2016-08-09 03:20 +0200
Last post2016-08-10 21:30 +0200
Articles 3 — 2 participants

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  Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9][V3] Overlayfs SELinux Support Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> - 2016-08-09 03:20 +0200
    Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9][V3] Overlayfs SELinux Support Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> - 2016-08-10 21:00 +0200
    Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9][V3] Overlayfs SELinux Support Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> - 2016-08-10 21:30 +0200

#1458354 — Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9][V3] Overlayfs SELinux Support

FromPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date2016-08-09 03:20 +0200
SubjectRe: [RFC PATCH 0/9][V3] Overlayfs SELinux Support
Message-ID<s43S1-Lc-1@gated-at.bofh.it>
On Thu, Jul 21, 2016 at 5:16 PM, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 10:44 AM, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> wrote:
>> Hi All,
>>
>> Please find attached the V3 of patches. Changes since V2 are as follows.
>>
>> - Fixed the build issue with CONFIG_SECURITY=n.
>>
>> - Dan Walsh was writing more tests for selinux-testsuite and noted couple
>>   of issues. I have fixed those issues and added two more patches in series.
>>
>>   1. We are resetting MAY_WRITE check for lower inode assuming file will
>>      be coiped up. But this is not true for special_file() as these files
>>      are not copied up. So checks should not be reset in case of special
>>      file.
>>
>>   2. We are resetting MAY_WRITE check for lower inode assuming file will
>>      be copied up. But this also should mean that mounter has permission
>>      to MAY_READ lower file for copy up to succeed. So add MAY_READ
>>      check while resetting MAY_WRITE.
>>
>> Original description of patches follows.
>>
>> Following are RFC patches to support SELinux with overlayfs. I started
>> with David Howells's latest posting on this topic and started modifying
>> patches. These patches apply on top of overlayfs-next branch of miklos
>> vfs git tree.
>>
>> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs.git overlayfs-next
>>
>> These patches can be pulled from my branch too.
>>
>> https://github.com/rhvgoyal/linux/commits/overlayfs-selinux-mounter-next
>>
>> Thanks to Dan Walsh, Stephen Smalley and Miklos Szeredi for numerous
>> conversation and ideas in helping figuring out what one reasonable
>> implementation might look like.
>>
>> Dan Walsh has been writing tests for selinux overlayfs in selinux-testsuite.
>> These patches pass those tests now
>>
>> https://github.com/rhatdan/selinux-testsuite/commits/master
>>
>> Posting these patches for review and comments.
>>
>> These patches introduce 3 new security hooks.
>>
>> - security_inode_copy_up(), is called when a file is copied up. This hook
>>   prepares a new set of cred which is used for copy up operation. And
>>   new set of creds are prepared so that ->create_sid can be set appropriately
>>   and newly created file is labeled properly.
>>
>>   When a file is copied up, label of lower file is retained except for the
>>   case of context= mount where new file gets the label from context= option.
>>
>> - security_inode_copy_up_xattr(), is called when xattrs of a file are
>>   being copied up. Before this we already called security_inode_copy_up()
>>   and created new file and copied up data. That means file already got
>>   labeled properly and there is no need to take SELINUX xattr of lower
>>   file and overwrite the upper file xattr. So this hook is used to avoid
>>   copying up of SELINUX xattr.
>>
>> - dentry_create_files_as(), is called when a new file is about to be created.
>>   This hook determines what the label of the file should be if task had
>>   created that file in upper/ and sets create_sid accordingly in the passed
>>   in creds.
>>
>>   Normal transition rules don't work for the case of context mounts as
>>   underlying file system is not aware of context option which only overlay
>>   layer is aware of. For non-context mounts, creation can happen in work/
>>   dir first and then file might be renamed into upper/, and it might get
>>   label based on work/ dir. So this hooks helps avoiding all these issues.
>>
>>   When a new file is created in upper/, it gets its label based on transition
>>   rules. For the case of context mount, it gets the label from context=
>>   option.
>>
>> Any feedback is welcome.
>
> Hi Vivek,
>
> These patches look fine to me, thanks for all your hard work and to
> everyone who helped review and provide feedback.  I have tagged these
> patches for merging into the SELinux next branch after this merge
> window.

Okay, I just merged these patches into selinux#next.  With the
exception of some changes to restore the mode argument to
ovl_create_or_link() and to fix some whitespace damage the patches
were merged cleanly.

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

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#1459544

FromDaniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Date2016-08-10 21:00 +0200
Message-ID<s4GTo-n4-45@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1458354

On 08/10/2016 08:32 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 10, 2016 at 5:11 AM, Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> wrote:
>> On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 3:19 AM, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
>>> Okay, I just merged these patches into selinux#next.  With the
>>> exception of some changes to restore the mode argument to
>>> ovl_create_or_link() and to fix some whitespace damage the patches
>>> were merged cleanly.
>> Don't need to add the back the mode argument, just use stat->mode.
> Thanks for the pointer (I'm on vacation at the moment and trying to do
> this quickly).  Since it was a merge issue, and the branch hasn't been
> pulled by Linus, I didn't bother with a new patch, I simply updated
> the existing patch from Vivek and re-pushed to selinux#next.  If you
> see anything else, please let me know.
>
> For Fedora folks, I'm currently rebuilding the COPR
> pcmoore/kernel-secnext kernel packages with this update; assuming
> there are no problems with the COPR infrastructure the kernel should
> be ready in a couple of hours.
>
> * https://copr.fedorainfracloud.org/coprs/pcmoore/kernel-secnext
>
Cool once there is a kernel with ovlerlay fs/selinux support I will run
it on my laptop and attempt
the selinux test suite, if everything goes well I will start running
docker on overlay with selinux enforcing mode.

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#1459651

FromPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date2016-08-10 21:30 +0200
Message-ID<s4GTo-n4-49@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1458354
On Wed, Aug 10, 2016 at 5:11 AM, Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 3:19 AM, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
>> Okay, I just merged these patches into selinux#next.  With the
>> exception of some changes to restore the mode argument to
>> ovl_create_or_link() and to fix some whitespace damage the patches
>> were merged cleanly.
>
> Don't need to add the back the mode argument, just use stat->mode.

Thanks for the pointer (I'm on vacation at the moment and trying to do
this quickly).  Since it was a merge issue, and the branch hasn't been
pulled by Linus, I didn't bother with a new patch, I simply updated
the existing patch from Vivek and re-pushed to selinux#next.  If you
see anything else, please let me know.

For Fedora folks, I'm currently rebuilding the COPR
pcmoore/kernel-secnext kernel packages with this update; assuming
there are no problems with the COPR infrastructure the kernel should
be ready in a couple of hours.

* https://copr.fedorainfracloud.org/coprs/pcmoore/kernel-secnext

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

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