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Groups > linux.kernel > #1389006 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2016-04-27 14:50 +0200 |
| Last post | 2016-04-27 17:50 +0200 |
| Articles | 6 — 2 participants |
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Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> - 2016-04-27 14:50 +0200
Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> - 2016-04-27 16:10 +0200
Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> - 2016-04-27 16:40 +0200
Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> - 2016-04-27 16:50 +0200
Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> - 2016-04-27 17:00 +0200
Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> - 2016-04-27 17:50 +0200
| From | Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2016-04-27 14:50 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) |
| Message-ID | <rsx4L-1jL-63@gated-at.bofh.it> |
Hi! > This RFC patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory > Encryption (SME) feature. > > SME can be used to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted through the > page tables. A page of memory that is marked encrypted will be automatically > decrypted when read from DRAM and will be automatically encrypted when > written to DRAM. Details on SME can found in the links below. Well, actually brief summary should go to changelog and probably to the documentation, too... Why would I want SME on my system? My system seems to work without it. Does it protect against cold boot attacks? Rowhammer (I guess not?) Does it cost some performance? Does it break debugging over JTAG? > The approach that this patch series takes is to encrypt everything possible > starting early in the boot where the kernel is encrypted. Using the page > table macros the encryption mask can be incorporated into all page table > entries and page allocations. By updating the protection map, userspace > allocations are also marked encrypted. Certain data must be accounted for > as having been placed in memory before SME was enabled (EFI, initrd, etc.) > and accessed accordingly. Do you also need to do something special for device DMA? Thanks, Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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| From | Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2016-04-27 16:10 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <rsyka-2uQ-5@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1389006 |
On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 02:00:58PM +0100, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Why would I want SME on my system? My system seems to work without it.
Your system doesn't have it and SME is default off.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.
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| From | Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2016-04-27 16:40 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <rsyNe-2L2-69@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1389092 |
On Wed 2016-04-27 16:05:20, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 02:00:58PM +0100, Pavel Machek wrote: > > Why would I want SME on my system? My system seems to work without it. > > Your system doesn't have it and SME is default off. That does not answer the question. "Why would I want SME on my system?". And that answer should go to Documentation/. Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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| From | Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2016-04-27 16:50 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <rsyWR-2P1-7@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1389153 |
On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 04:30:45PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> That does not answer the question. "Why would I want SME on my
> system?".
Because your question wasn't formulated properly. Here's some text from
the 0th mail which you could've found on your own:
"The following links provide additional detail:
AMD Memory Encryption whitepaper:
http://amd-dev.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf
"
> And that answer should go to Documentation/.
It will.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.
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| From | Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2016-04-27 17:00 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <rsz6y-2T0-13@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1389164 |
On Wed 2016-04-27 16:39:51, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 04:30:45PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote: > > That does not answer the question. "Why would I want SME on my > > system?". > > Because your question wasn't formulated properly. Here's some text from > the 0th mail which you could've found on your own: > "The following links provide additional detail: > > AMD Memory Encryption whitepaper: > http://amd-dev.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf > " > > > And that answer should go to Documentation/. > > It will. Yeah? So why not include it in reply instead of flaming me? Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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| From | Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2016-04-27 17:50 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <rszSW-3yc-35@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1389164 |
On Wed 2016-04-27 16:39:51, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 04:30:45PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > That does not answer the question. "Why would I want SME on my
> > system?".
>
> Because your question wasn't formulated properly. Here's some text from
> the 0th mail which you could've found on your own:
>
> "The following links provide additional detail:
>
> AMD Memory Encryption whitepaper:
> http://amd-dev.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf
> "
Unfortunately that document is marketing junk.
AFAICT:
SME can protect against cold boot attack and snooping at DRAM
level. That's pretty much it.
Does the AES encryption take the address as a parameter?
SEV may protect against passive attack on the VM. For active attack,
they claim it will "probably" crash the VM, but we already know that
is untrue, see the work on gaining root using rowhammer. In this case,
attacker can choose which address to damage and has precise control of
timing.
Best regards,
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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