Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]
Groups > linux.kernel > #1388296 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2016-04-27 01:30 +0200 |
| Last post | 2016-04-27 01:30 +0200 |
| Articles | 1 — 1 participant |
Back to article view | Back to linux.kernel
This discussion starts older than the indexed window; earlier articles aren't shown. The article labeled Started by
below is the oldest one visible, not the original post.
[PATCH 3.2 082/115] USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> - 2016-04-27 01:30 +0200
| From | Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2016-04-27 01:30 +0200 |
| Subject | [PATCH 3.2 082/115] USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write |
| Message-ID | <rskAC-7Vw-113@gated-at.bofh.it> |
3.2.80-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
commit b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb upstream.
Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c
@@ -820,6 +820,17 @@ int usbip_recv_xbuff(struct usbip_device
if (!(size > 0))
return 0;
+ if (size > urb->transfer_buffer_length) {
+ /* should not happen, probably malicious packet */
+ if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {
+ usbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ usbip_event_add(ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
+ return -EPIPE;
+ }
+ }
+
ret = usbip_xmit(0, ud->tcp_socket, (char *)urb->transfer_buffer,
size, 0);
if (ret != size) {
Back to top | Article view | linux.kernel
csiph-web