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[PATCH v3 00/21] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces

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  [PATCH v3 00/21] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 17:40 +0200
    [PATCH v3 17/21] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 17:40 +0200
    [PATCH v3 01/21] fs: fix a posible leak of allocated superblock Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 17:40 +0200
    [PATCH v3 15/21] fs: Don't remove suid for CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 17:40 +0200
    [PATCH v3 16/21] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 17:50 +0200
    [PATCH v3 05/21] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 17:50 +0200
    [PATCH v3 04/21] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 17:50 +0200
    [PATCH v3 12/21] fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 17:50 +0200
    [PATCH v3 14/21] fs: Allow superblock owner to change ownership of inodes with unmappable ids Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 17:50 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v3 14/21] fs: Allow superblock owner to change ownership  of inodes with unmappable ids "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> - 2016-04-25 22:40 +0200
        Re: [PATCH v3 14/21] fs: Allow superblock owner to change ownership  of inodes with unmappable ids Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-26 21:50 +0200
    [PATCH v3 11/21] cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as() Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 17:50 +0200
    [PATCH v3 19/21] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 17:50 +0200
    [PATCH v3 21/21] fuse: Allow user namespace mounts Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 17:50 +0200
    [PATCH v3 20/21] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 17:50 +0200
    [PATCH v3 10/21] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 17:50 +0200
    [PATCH v3 09/21] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 17:50 +0200
    [PATCH v3 18/21] fuse: Add support for pid namespaces Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 17:50 +0200
    [PATCH v3 08/21] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 17:50 +0200
    [PATCH v3 06/21] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 18:00 +0200
    [PATCH v3 07/21] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 18:00 +0200
    [PATCH v3 03/21] fs: Allow sysfs and cgroupfs to share super blocks between user namespaces Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 18:00 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v3 03/21] fs: Allow sysfs and cgroupfs to share super  blocks between user namespaces "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> - 2016-04-25 21:10 +0200
    [PATCH v3 02/21] fs: Remove check of s_user_ns for existing mounts in fs_fully_visible() Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2016-04-22 18:00 +0200

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#1385283 — [PATCH v3 00/21] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces

Hi Eric,

Sorry that it's taken a while to get this update sent out. In part
that's because of a few problems I found, which resulted in some new
patches.

I wanted to point out one problem in particular because I'm not fully
settled on the solution. It turns out that for the sysfs and cgroup
filesystems we already have use cases where a super block is mounted
from multiple user namespaces. With sysfs this is done when criu is used
to snapshot a container; it will mount sysfs in the container's network
namespace but the host's user namespace. cgroup fs uses the same super
block for all mounts of a given hierarchy, and the addition of cgroup
namespaces makes this possible from within non-init user namepsaces. So
the check in sget_userns() which forbids mounting an existing super
block in a different user namespace causes regressions, and really it's
not necessary for these filesystems since ids in the inodes aren't
subect to translation relative to s_user_ns.

I've tried several ways to fix this. The one I'm sending here is to
exempt these filesystems from this requirement, which is the simplest
solution. The down side is that I couldn't find any existing property of
these file systems to use for excluding them, so I'm using a new file
system flag. My second-best option was to change kernfs_test_super() to
return false if the existing super block is in a different user
namespace. This is also pretty simple and works fine for sysfs, but
cgroups require some updating in order to get its internal reference
counting to work out.

These patches are based on the for-testing branch of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git
with everything rebased onto 4.6-rc4. I've also pushed everything to:

 git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sforshee/linux.git fuse-userns

Changes since v2:

 - Add patch from Pavel Tikhomirov to fix a potential memory leak in
   sget_userns().
 - Add a patch to fix a bug in the fs_fully_visible() MNT_LOCK_NODEV
   handling which was introduced by "userns: Simpilify MNT_NODEV
   handling."
 - Drop patch to make root in s_user_ns capable towards that superblock
   and replace it with a patch to allow root in s_user_ns to change
   ownership of inodes with invalid ids.
 - Use make_k[ug]id() in fuse_fillattr() instead of copying ids from
   inode.
 - Remove unnecessary initialization of user_id and group_id in fuse
   mount options.
 - Add a comment to get_file_caps() to indicate that the duplicate
   in_userns() check is intentional.
 - Fix incorrect statements in commit message of "fuse: Add support for
   pid namespaces"
 - Added acks.

Thanks,
Seth

---

Andy Lutomirski (1):
  fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid

Pavel Tikhomirov (1):
  fs: fix a posible leak of allocated superblock

Seth Forshee (19):
  fs: Remove check of s_user_ns for existing mounts in
    fs_fully_visible()
  fs: Allow sysfs and cgroupfs to share super blocks between user
    namespaces
  block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev()
  block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting
  selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
  userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns
  Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts
  fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link()
  cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as()
  fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns
  fs: Update posix_acl support to handle user namespace mounts
  fs: Allow superblock owner to change ownership of inodes with
    unmappable ids
  fs: Don't remove suid for CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns
  fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb()
  capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.*
    xattrs
  fuse: Add support for pid namespaces
  fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns
  fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a
    descendant
  fuse: Allow user namespace mounts

 drivers/md/bcache/super.c       |  2 +-
 drivers/md/dm-table.c           |  2 +-
 drivers/mtd/mtdsuper.c          |  2 +-
 fs/attr.c                       | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 fs/block_dev.c                  | 18 +++++++++--
 fs/exec.c                       |  2 +-
 fs/fuse/cuse.c                  |  3 +-
 fs/fuse/dev.c                   | 26 ++++++++++++----
 fs/fuse/dir.c                   | 16 +++++-----
 fs/fuse/file.c                  | 22 +++++++++++---
 fs/fuse/fuse_i.h                | 10 +++++-
 fs/fuse/inode.c                 | 40 +++++++++++++++---------
 fs/inode.c                      |  3 +-
 fs/kernfs/inode.c               |  2 ++
 fs/namei.c                      |  2 +-
 fs/namespace.c                  | 20 +++++++++---
 fs/posix_acl.c                  | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 fs/proc/base.c                  |  2 ++
 fs/proc/generic.c               |  3 ++
 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c           |  2 ++
 fs/quota/quota.c                |  2 +-
 fs/super.c                      |  7 ++++-
 fs/sysfs/mount.c                |  3 +-
 fs/xattr.c                      | 19 +++++++++---
 include/linux/fs.h              |  3 +-
 include/linux/mount.h           |  1 +
 include/linux/posix_acl_xattr.h | 17 ++++++++---
 include/linux/uidgid.h          | 10 ++++++
 include/linux/user_namespace.h  |  6 ++--
 kernel/cgroup.c                 |  4 +--
 kernel/cred.c                   |  2 ++
 kernel/user_namespace.c         |  6 ++--
 security/commoncap.c            | 22 ++++++++++----
 security/selinux/hooks.c        | 25 ++++++++++++++-
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c      | 29 ++++++++++++------
 35 files changed, 339 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-)

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#1385285 — [PATCH v3 17/21] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs

A privileged user in s_user_ns will generally have the ability to
manipulate the backing store and insert security.* xattrs into
the filesystem directly. Therefore the kernel must be prepared to
handle these xattrs from unprivileged mounts, and it makes little
sense for commoncap to prevent writing these xattrs to the
filesystem. The capability and LSM code have already been updated
to appropriately handle xattrs from unprivileged mounts, so it
is safe to loosen this restriction on setting xattrs.

The exception to this logic is that writing xattrs to a mounted
filesystem may also cause the LSM inode_post_setxattr or
inode_setsecurity callbacks to be invoked. SELinux will deny the
xattr update by virtue of applying mountpoint labeling to
unprivileged userns mounts, and Smack will deny the writes for
any user without global CAP_MAC_ADMIN, so loosening the
capability check in commoncap is safe in this respect as well.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 security/commoncap.c | 12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index e657227d221e..12477afaa8ed 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -664,15 +664,17 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		       const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
+
 	if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
+		if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETFCAP))
 			return -EPERM;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
 	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
-	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	    !ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -690,15 +692,17 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
  */
 int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
+
 	if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
+		if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETFCAP))
 			return -EPERM;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
 	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
-	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	    !ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 	return 0;
 }
-- 
1.9.1

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#1385288 — [PATCH v3 01/21] fs: fix a posible leak of allocated superblock

From: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>

We probably need to fix superblock leak in patch (v4 "fs: Add user
namesapace member to struct super_block"):

Imagine posible code path in sget_userns: we iterate through
type->fs_supers and do not find suitable sb, we drop sb_lock to
allocate s and go to retry. After we dropped sb_lock some other
task from different userns takes sb_lock, it is already in retry
stage and has s allocated, so it puts its s in type->fs_supers
list. So in retry we will find these sb in list and check it has
a different userns, and finally we will return without freeing s.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
---
 fs/super.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
index 829841e0ae7e..092a7828442e 100644
--- a/fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/super.c
@@ -474,6 +474,10 @@ retry:
 				continue;
 			if (user_ns != old->s_user_ns) {
 				spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
+				if (s) {
+					up_write(&s->s_umount);
+					destroy_super(s);
+				}
 				return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
 			}
 			if (!grab_super(old))
-- 
1.9.1

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#1385289 — [PATCH v3 15/21] fs: Don't remove suid for CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns

Expand the check in should_remove_suid() to keep privileges for
CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns rather than init_user_ns.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 fs/inode.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
index 69b8b526c194..cd52170f9117 100644
--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -1690,7 +1690,8 @@ int should_remove_suid(struct dentry *dentry)
 	if (unlikely((mode & S_ISGID) && (mode & S_IXGRP)))
 		kill |= ATTR_KILL_SGID;
 
-	if (unlikely(kill && !capable(CAP_FSETID) && S_ISREG(mode)))
+	if (unlikely(kill && !ns_capable(dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_FSETID) &&
+		     S_ISREG(mode)))
 		return kill;
 
 	return 0;
-- 
1.9.1

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#1385293 — [PATCH v3 16/21] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb()

Superblock level remounts are currently restricted to global
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, as is the path for changing the root mount to
read only on umount. Loosen both of these permission checks to
also allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in any namespace which is privileged
towards the userns which originally mounted the filesystem.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 fs/namespace.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 0ad8e4a4f50b..575e3f8b34fd 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -1510,7 +1510,7 @@ static int do_umount(struct mount *mnt, int flags)
 		 * Special case for "unmounting" root ...
 		 * we just try to remount it readonly.
 		 */
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		if (!ns_capable(sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
 		down_write(&sb->s_umount);
 		if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
@@ -2207,7 +2207,7 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int flags, int mnt_flags,
 	down_write(&sb->s_umount);
 	if (flags & MS_BIND)
 		err = change_mount_flags(path->mnt, flags);
-	else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	else if (!ns_capable(sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		err = -EPERM;
 	else
 		err = do_remount_sb(sb, flags, data, 0);
-- 
1.9.1

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#1385295 — [PATCH v3 05/21] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting

Unprivileged users should not be able to mount block devices when
they lack sufficient privileges towards the block device inode.
Update blkdev_get_by_path() to validate that the user has the
required access to the inode at the specified path. The check
will be skipped for CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so privileged mounts will
continue working as before.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 fs/block_dev.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/block_dev.c b/fs/block_dev.c
index e9b937845bdb..2007040afb7b 100644
--- a/fs/block_dev.c
+++ b/fs/block_dev.c
@@ -1429,9 +1429,14 @@ struct block_device *blkdev_get_by_path(const char *path, fmode_t mode,
 					void *holder)
 {
 	struct block_device *bdev;
+	int perm = 0;
 	int err;
 
-	bdev = lookup_bdev(path, 0);
+	if (mode & FMODE_READ)
+		perm |= MAY_READ;
+	if (mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+		perm |= MAY_WRITE;
+	bdev = lookup_bdev(path, perm);
 	if (IS_ERR(bdev))
 		return bdev;
 
-- 
1.9.1

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#1385297 — [PATCH v3 04/21] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev()

When looking up a block device by path no permission check is
done to verify that the user has access to the block device inode
at the specified path. In some cases it may be necessary to
check permissions towards the inode, such as allowing
unprivileged users to mount block devices in user namespaces.

Add an argument to lookup_bdev() to optionally perform this
permission check. A value of 0 skips the permission check and
behaves the same as before. A non-zero value specifies the mask
of access rights required towards the inode at the specified
path. The check is always skipped if the user has CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

All callers of lookup_bdev() currently pass a mask of 0, so this
patch results in no functional change. Subsequent patches will
add permission checks where appropriate.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 drivers/md/bcache/super.c |  2 +-
 drivers/md/dm-table.c     |  2 +-
 drivers/mtd/mtdsuper.c    |  2 +-
 fs/block_dev.c            | 13 ++++++++++---
 fs/quota/quota.c          |  2 +-
 include/linux/fs.h        |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/super.c b/drivers/md/bcache/super.c
index a296425a7270..e169739a0253 100644
--- a/drivers/md/bcache/super.c
+++ b/drivers/md/bcache/super.c
@@ -1950,7 +1950,7 @@ static ssize_t register_bcache(struct kobject *k, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
 				  sb);
 	if (IS_ERR(bdev)) {
 		if (bdev == ERR_PTR(-EBUSY)) {
-			bdev = lookup_bdev(strim(path));
+			bdev = lookup_bdev(strim(path), 0);
 			mutex_lock(&bch_register_lock);
 			if (!IS_ERR(bdev) && bch_is_open(bdev))
 				err = "device already registered";
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-table.c b/drivers/md/dm-table.c
index f9e8f0bef332..13f568d527b5 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-table.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-table.c
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ dev_t dm_get_dev_t(const char *path)
 	dev_t uninitialized_var(dev);
 	struct block_device *bdev;
 
-	bdev = lookup_bdev(path);
+	bdev = lookup_bdev(path, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(bdev))
 		dev = name_to_dev_t(path);
 	else {
diff --git a/drivers/mtd/mtdsuper.c b/drivers/mtd/mtdsuper.c
index 20c02a3b7417..b5b60e1af31c 100644
--- a/drivers/mtd/mtdsuper.c
+++ b/drivers/mtd/mtdsuper.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ struct dentry *mount_mtd(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
 	/* try the old way - the hack where we allowed users to mount
 	 * /dev/mtdblock$(n) but didn't actually _use_ the blockdev
 	 */
-	bdev = lookup_bdev(dev_name);
+	bdev = lookup_bdev(dev_name, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(bdev)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(bdev);
 		pr_debug("MTDSB: lookup_bdev() returned %d\n", ret);
diff --git a/fs/block_dev.c b/fs/block_dev.c
index 3e84d62d0a25..e9b937845bdb 100644
--- a/fs/block_dev.c
+++ b/fs/block_dev.c
@@ -1431,7 +1431,7 @@ struct block_device *blkdev_get_by_path(const char *path, fmode_t mode,
 	struct block_device *bdev;
 	int err;
 
-	bdev = lookup_bdev(path);
+	bdev = lookup_bdev(path, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(bdev))
 		return bdev;
 
@@ -1821,12 +1821,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ioctl_by_bdev);
 /**
  * lookup_bdev  - lookup a struct block_device by name
  * @pathname:	special file representing the block device
+ * @mask:	rights to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC)
  *
  * Get a reference to the blockdevice at @pathname in the current
  * namespace if possible and return it.  Return ERR_PTR(error)
- * otherwise.
+ * otherwise.  If @mask is non-zero, check for access rights to the
+ * inode at @pathname.
  */
-struct block_device *lookup_bdev(const char *pathname)
+struct block_device *lookup_bdev(const char *pathname, int mask)
 {
 	struct block_device *bdev;
 	struct inode *inode;
@@ -1841,6 +1843,11 @@ struct block_device *lookup_bdev(const char *pathname)
 		return ERR_PTR(error);
 
 	inode = d_backing_inode(path.dentry);
+	if (mask != 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+		error = __inode_permission(inode, mask);
+		if (error)
+			goto fail;
+	}
 	error = -ENOTBLK;
 	if (!S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode))
 		goto fail;
diff --git a/fs/quota/quota.c b/fs/quota/quota.c
index 0f10ee9892ce..59223384b22e 100644
--- a/fs/quota/quota.c
+++ b/fs/quota/quota.c
@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ static struct super_block *quotactl_block(const char __user *special, int cmd)
 
 	if (IS_ERR(tmp))
 		return ERR_CAST(tmp);
-	bdev = lookup_bdev(tmp->name);
+	bdev = lookup_bdev(tmp->name, 0);
 	putname(tmp);
 	if (IS_ERR(bdev))
 		return ERR_CAST(bdev);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 66a639ec1bc4..173b8adc6131 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2438,7 +2438,7 @@ static inline void unregister_chrdev(unsigned int major, const char *name)
 #define BLKDEV_MAJOR_HASH_SIZE	255
 extern const char *__bdevname(dev_t, char *buffer);
 extern const char *bdevname(struct block_device *bdev, char *buffer);
-extern struct block_device *lookup_bdev(const char *);
+extern struct block_device *lookup_bdev(const char *, int mask);
 extern void blkdev_show(struct seq_file *,off_t);
 
 #else
-- 
1.9.1

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#1385298 — [PATCH v3 12/21] fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns

Add checks to inode_change_ok to verify that uid and gid changes
will map into the superblock's user namespace. If they do not
fail with -EOVERFLOW. This cannot be overriden with ATTR_FORCE.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 fs/attr.c | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 25b24d0f6c88..3cfaaac4a18e 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -42,6 +42,17 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
 			return error;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Verify that uid/gid changes are valid in the target namespace
+	 * of the superblock. This cannot be overriden using ATTR_FORCE.
+	 */
+	if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID &&
+	    from_kuid(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, attr->ia_uid) == (uid_t)-1)
+		return -EOVERFLOW;
+	if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID &&
+	    from_kgid(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, attr->ia_gid) == (gid_t)-1)
+		return -EOVERFLOW;
+
 	/* If force is set do it anyway. */
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
 		return 0;
-- 
1.9.1

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#1385302 — [PATCH v3 14/21] fs: Allow superblock owner to change ownership of inodes with unmappable ids

In a userns mount some on-disk inodes may have ids which do not
map into s_user_ns, in which case the in-kernel inodes are owned
by invalid users. The superblock owner should be able to change
attributes of these inodes but cannot. However it is unsafe to
grant the superblock owner privileged access to all inodes in the
superblock since proc, sysfs, etc. use DAC to protect files which
may not belong to s_user_ns. The problem is restricted to only
inodes where the owner or group is an invalid user.

We can work around this by allowing users with CAP_CHOWN in
s_user_ns to change an invalid owner or group id, so long as the
other id is either invalid or mappable in s_user_ns. After
changing ownership the user will be privileged towards the inode
and thus able to change other attributes.

As an precaution, checks for invalid ids are added to the proc
and kernfs setattr interfaces. These filesystems are not expected
to have inodes with invalid ids, but if it does happen any
setattr operations will return -EPERM.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
---
 fs/attr.c             | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 fs/kernfs/inode.c     |  2 ++
 fs/proc/base.c        |  2 ++
 fs/proc/generic.c     |  3 +++
 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c |  2 ++
 5 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 3cfaaac4a18e..a8b0931654a5 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -16,6 +16,43 @@
 #include <linux/evm.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 
+static bool chown_ok(const struct inode *inode, kuid_t uid)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
+
+	if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) && uid_eq(uid, inode->i_uid))
+		return true;
+	if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+		return true;
+
+	user_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
+	if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) &&
+	    (!gid_valid(inode->i_gid) || kgid_has_mapping(user_ns, inode->i_gid)) &&
+	    ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool chgrp_ok(const struct inode *inode, kgid_t gid)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
+
+	if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) &&
+	    (in_group_p(gid) || gid_eq(gid, inode->i_gid)))
+		return true;
+	if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+		return true;
+
+	user_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
+	if (!gid_valid(inode->i_gid) &&
+	    (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, inode->i_uid)) &&
+	    ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 /**
  * inode_change_ok - check if attribute changes to an inode are allowed
  * @inode:	inode to check
@@ -58,17 +95,11 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Make sure a caller can chown. */
-	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
-	    (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
-	     !uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) &&
-	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) && !chown_ok(inode, attr->ia_uid))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
-	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
-	    (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
-	    (!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) &&
-	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) && !chgrp_ok(inode, attr->ia_gid))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index 16405ae88d2d..2e97a337ee5f 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ int kernfs_iop_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 
 	if (!kn)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
+		return -EPERM;
 
 	mutex_lock(&kernfs_mutex);
 	error = inode_change_ok(inode, iattr);
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index b1755b23893e..648d623e2158 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -711,6 +711,8 @@ int proc_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 
 	if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)
 		return -EPERM;
+	if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
+		return -EPERM;
 
 	error = inode_change_ok(inode, attr);
 	if (error)
diff --git a/fs/proc/generic.c b/fs/proc/generic.c
index ff3ffc76a937..1461570c552c 100644
--- a/fs/proc/generic.c
+++ b/fs/proc/generic.c
@@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ static int proc_notify_change(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 	struct proc_dir_entry *de = PDE(inode);
 	int error;
 
+	if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	error = inode_change_ok(inode, iattr);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
index fe5b6e6c4671..f5d575157194 100644
--- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
@@ -752,6 +752,8 @@ static int proc_sys_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 
 	if (attr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
 		return -EPERM;
+	if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
+		return -EPERM;
 
 	error = inode_change_ok(inode, attr);
 	if (error)
-- 
1.9.1

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#1386871 — Re: [PATCH v3 14/21] fs: Allow superblock owner to change ownership of inodes with unmappable ids

Quoting Seth Forshee (seth.forshee@canonical.com):
> In a userns mount some on-disk inodes may have ids which do not
> map into s_user_ns, in which case the in-kernel inodes are owned
> by invalid users. The superblock owner should be able to change
> attributes of these inodes but cannot. However it is unsafe to
> grant the superblock owner privileged access to all inodes in the
> superblock since proc, sysfs, etc. use DAC to protect files which
> may not belong to s_user_ns. The problem is restricted to only
> inodes where the owner or group is an invalid user.
> 
> We can work around this by allowing users with CAP_CHOWN in
> s_user_ns to change an invalid owner or group id, so long as the
> other id is either invalid or mappable in s_user_ns. After
> changing ownership the user will be privileged towards the inode
> and thus able to change other attributes.
> 
> As an precaution, checks for invalid ids are added to the proc
> and kernfs setattr interfaces. These filesystems are not expected
> to have inodes with invalid ids, but if it does happen any
> setattr operations will return -EPERM.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

bug a request below,

> ---
>  fs/attr.c             | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>  fs/kernfs/inode.c     |  2 ++
>  fs/proc/base.c        |  2 ++
>  fs/proc/generic.c     |  3 +++
>  fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c |  2 ++
>  5 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
> index 3cfaaac4a18e..a8b0931654a5 100644
> --- a/fs/attr.c
> +++ b/fs/attr.c
> @@ -16,6 +16,43 @@
>  #include <linux/evm.h>
>  #include <linux/ima.h>
>  
> +static bool chown_ok(const struct inode *inode, kuid_t uid)
> +{
> +	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
> +
> +	if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) && uid_eq(uid, inode->i_uid))
> +		return true;
> +	if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
> +		return true;
> +
> +	user_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
> +	if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) &&
> +	    (!gid_valid(inode->i_gid) || kgid_has_mapping(user_ns, inode->i_gid)) &&

This confused me to no end :)  Perhaps a "is_unmapped_valid_gid()" helper
would make it clearer what this is meant to do?  Or else maybe a comment
above chown_ok(), explaining that

1. for a blockdev, the uid is converted at inode read so that it is
either mapped or invalid
2. for sysfs / etc, uid can be valid but not mapped into the userns

> +	    ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
> +		return true;
> +
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
> +static bool chgrp_ok(const struct inode *inode, kgid_t gid)
> +{
> +	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
> +
> +	if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) &&
> +	    (in_group_p(gid) || gid_eq(gid, inode->i_gid)))
> +		return true;
> +	if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
> +		return true;
> +
> +	user_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
> +	if (!gid_valid(inode->i_gid) &&
> +	    (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, inode->i_uid)) &&
> +	    ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
> +		return true;
> +
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * inode_change_ok - check if attribute changes to an inode are allowed
>   * @inode:	inode to check
> @@ -58,17 +95,11 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
>  		return 0;
>  
>  	/* Make sure a caller can chown. */
> -	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
> -	    (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
> -	     !uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) &&
> -	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
> +	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) && !chown_ok(inode, attr->ia_uid))
>  		return -EPERM;
>  
>  	/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
> -	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
> -	    (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
> -	    (!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) &&
> -	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
> +	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) && !chgrp_ok(inode, attr->ia_gid))
>  		return -EPERM;
>  
>  	/* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
> diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
> index 16405ae88d2d..2e97a337ee5f 100644
> --- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
> @@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ int kernfs_iop_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
>  
>  	if (!kn)
>  		return -EINVAL;
> +	if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
> +		return -EPERM;
>  
>  	mutex_lock(&kernfs_mutex);
>  	error = inode_change_ok(inode, iattr);
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index b1755b23893e..648d623e2158 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -711,6 +711,8 @@ int proc_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
>  
>  	if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)
>  		return -EPERM;
> +	if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
> +		return -EPERM;
>  
>  	error = inode_change_ok(inode, attr);
>  	if (error)
> diff --git a/fs/proc/generic.c b/fs/proc/generic.c
> index ff3ffc76a937..1461570c552c 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/generic.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/generic.c
> @@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ static int proc_notify_change(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
>  	struct proc_dir_entry *de = PDE(inode);
>  	int error;
>  
> +	if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
> +		return -EPERM;
> +
>  	error = inode_change_ok(inode, iattr);
>  	if (error)
>  		return error;
> diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> index fe5b6e6c4671..f5d575157194 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> @@ -752,6 +752,8 @@ static int proc_sys_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
>  
>  	if (attr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
>  		return -EPERM;
> +	if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
> +		return -EPERM;
>  
>  	error = inode_change_ok(inode, attr);
>  	if (error)
> -- 
> 1.9.1

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#1387966 — Re: [PATCH v3 14/21] fs: Allow superblock owner to change ownership of inodes with unmappable ids

On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 03:30:47PM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Seth Forshee (seth.forshee@canonical.com):
> > In a userns mount some on-disk inodes may have ids which do not
> > map into s_user_ns, in which case the in-kernel inodes are owned
> > by invalid users. The superblock owner should be able to change
> > attributes of these inodes but cannot. However it is unsafe to
> > grant the superblock owner privileged access to all inodes in the
> > superblock since proc, sysfs, etc. use DAC to protect files which
> > may not belong to s_user_ns. The problem is restricted to only
> > inodes where the owner or group is an invalid user.
> > 
> > We can work around this by allowing users with CAP_CHOWN in
> > s_user_ns to change an invalid owner or group id, so long as the
> > other id is either invalid or mappable in s_user_ns. After
> > changing ownership the user will be privileged towards the inode
> > and thus able to change other attributes.
> > 
> > As an precaution, checks for invalid ids are added to the proc
> > and kernfs setattr interfaces. These filesystems are not expected
> > to have inodes with invalid ids, but if it does happen any
> > setattr operations will return -EPERM.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
> 
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
> 
> bug a request below,
> 
> > ---
> >  fs/attr.c             | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> >  fs/kernfs/inode.c     |  2 ++
> >  fs/proc/base.c        |  2 ++
> >  fs/proc/generic.c     |  3 +++
> >  fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c |  2 ++
> >  5 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
> > index 3cfaaac4a18e..a8b0931654a5 100644
> > --- a/fs/attr.c
> > +++ b/fs/attr.c
> > @@ -16,6 +16,43 @@
> >  #include <linux/evm.h>
> >  #include <linux/ima.h>
> >  
> > +static bool chown_ok(const struct inode *inode, kuid_t uid)
> > +{
> > +	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
> > +
> > +	if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) && uid_eq(uid, inode->i_uid))
> > +		return true;
> > +	if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
> > +		return true;
> > +
> > +	user_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
> > +	if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) &&
> > +	    (!gid_valid(inode->i_gid) || kgid_has_mapping(user_ns, inode->i_gid)) &&
> 
> This confused me to no end :)  Perhaps a "is_unmapped_valid_gid()" helper
> would make it clearer what this is meant to do?  Or else maybe a comment
> above chown_ok(), explaining that
> 
> 1. for a blockdev, the uid is converted at inode read so that it is
> either mapped or invalid
> 2. for sysfs / etc, uid can be valid but not mapped into the userns

Even with a helper a comment is probably helpful to explain why. I'll do
that first, then see if a helper would make things any clearer.
Honestly, I had to think about the helper name you proposed for a minute
before it made sense even though I already understood the code ;-)

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#1385303 — [PATCH v3 11/21] cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as()

Using INVALID_[UG]ID for the LSM file creation context doesn't
make sense, so return an error if the inode passed to
set_create_file_as() has an invalid id.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 kernel/cred.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 0c0cd8a62285..5f264fb5737d 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -689,6 +689,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
  */
 int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 {
+	if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
+		return -EINVAL;
 	new->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
 	new->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
 	return security_kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
-- 
1.9.1

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#1385305 — [PATCH v3 19/21] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns

In order to support mounts from namespaces other than
init_user_ns, fuse must translate uids and gids to/from the
userns of the process servicing requests on /dev/fuse. This
patch does that, with a couple of restrictions on the namespace:

 - The userns for the fuse connection is fixed to the namespace
   from which /dev/fuse is opened.

 - The namespace must be the same as s_user_ns.

These restrictions simplify the implementation by avoiding the
need to pass around userns references and by allowing fuse to
rely on the checks in inode_change_ok for ownership changes.
Either restriction could be relaxed in the future if needed.

For cuse the namespace used for the connection is also simply
current_user_ns() at the time /dev/cuse is opened.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
---
 fs/fuse/cuse.c   |  3 ++-
 fs/fuse/dev.c    | 13 ++++++++-----
 fs/fuse/dir.c    | 14 +++++++-------
 fs/fuse/fuse_i.h |  6 +++++-
 fs/fuse/inode.c  | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++------------
 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/fuse/cuse.c b/fs/fuse/cuse.c
index c5b6b7165489..98ebd0f4fd4c 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/cuse.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/cuse.c
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
 #include <linux/stat.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/uio.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 
 #include "fuse_i.h"
 
@@ -498,7 +499,7 @@ static int cuse_channel_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	if (!cc)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	fuse_conn_init(&cc->fc);
+	fuse_conn_init(&cc->fc, current_user_ns());
 
 	fud = fuse_dev_alloc(&cc->fc);
 	if (!fud) {
diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev.c b/fs/fuse/dev.c
index 4e91b2ac25a7..8fa1ce934df3 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/dev.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dev.c
@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ static void __fuse_put_request(struct fuse_req *req)
 
 static void fuse_req_init_context(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_req *req)
 {
-	req->in.h.uid = from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, current_fsuid());
-	req->in.h.gid = from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, current_fsgid());
+	req->in.h.uid = from_kuid(fc->user_ns, current_fsuid());
+	req->in.h.gid = from_kgid(fc->user_ns, current_fsgid());
 	req->in.h.pid = pid_nr_ns(task_pid(current), fc->pid_ns);
 }
 
@@ -186,7 +186,8 @@ static struct fuse_req *__fuse_get_req(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned npages,
 	__set_bit(FR_WAITING, &req->flags);
 	if (for_background)
 		__set_bit(FR_BACKGROUND, &req->flags);
-	if (req->in.h.pid == 0) {
+	if (req->in.h.pid == 0 || req->in.h.uid == (uid_t)-1 ||
+	    req->in.h.gid == (gid_t)-1) {
 		fuse_put_request(fc, req);
 		return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW);
 	}
@@ -1248,7 +1249,8 @@ static ssize_t fuse_dev_do_read(struct fuse_dev *fud, struct file *file,
 	struct fuse_in *in;
 	unsigned reqsize;
 
-	if (task_active_pid_ns(current) != fc->pid_ns)
+	if (task_active_pid_ns(current) != fc->pid_ns ||
+	    current_user_ns() != fc->user_ns)
 		return -EIO;
 
  restart:
@@ -1880,7 +1882,8 @@ static ssize_t fuse_dev_do_write(struct fuse_dev *fud,
 	struct fuse_req *req;
 	struct fuse_out_header oh;
 
-	if (task_active_pid_ns(current) != fc->pid_ns)
+	if (task_active_pid_ns(current) != fc->pid_ns ||
+	    current_user_ns() != fc->user_ns)
 		return -EIO;
 
 	if (nbytes < sizeof(struct fuse_out_header))
diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c
index 4b855b65d457..ecba75bf6640 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
@@ -841,8 +841,8 @@ static void fuse_fillattr(struct inode *inode, struct fuse_attr *attr,
 	stat->ino = attr->ino;
 	stat->mode = (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT) | (attr->mode & 07777);
 	stat->nlink = attr->nlink;
-	stat->uid = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, attr->uid);
-	stat->gid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, attr->gid);
+	stat->uid = make_kuid(fc->user_ns, attr->uid);
+	stat->gid = make_kgid(fc->user_ns, attr->gid);
 	stat->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
 	stat->atime.tv_sec = attr->atime;
 	stat->atime.tv_nsec = attr->atimensec;
@@ -1459,17 +1459,17 @@ static bool update_mtime(unsigned ivalid, bool trust_local_mtime)
 	return true;
 }
 
-static void iattr_to_fattr(struct iattr *iattr, struct fuse_setattr_in *arg,
-			   bool trust_local_cmtime)
+static void iattr_to_fattr(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct iattr *iattr,
+			   struct fuse_setattr_in *arg, bool trust_local_cmtime)
 {
 	unsigned ivalid = iattr->ia_valid;
 
 	if (ivalid & ATTR_MODE)
 		arg->valid |= FATTR_MODE,   arg->mode = iattr->ia_mode;
 	if (ivalid & ATTR_UID)
-		arg->valid |= FATTR_UID,    arg->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, iattr->ia_uid);
+		arg->valid |= FATTR_UID,    arg->uid = from_kuid(fc->user_ns, iattr->ia_uid);
 	if (ivalid & ATTR_GID)
-		arg->valid |= FATTR_GID,    arg->gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, iattr->ia_gid);
+		arg->valid |= FATTR_GID,    arg->gid = from_kgid(fc->user_ns, iattr->ia_gid);
 	if (ivalid & ATTR_SIZE)
 		arg->valid |= FATTR_SIZE,   arg->size = iattr->ia_size;
 	if (ivalid & ATTR_ATIME) {
@@ -1629,7 +1629,7 @@ int fuse_do_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr,
 
 	memset(&inarg, 0, sizeof(inarg));
 	memset(&outarg, 0, sizeof(outarg));
-	iattr_to_fattr(attr, &inarg, trust_local_cmtime);
+	iattr_to_fattr(fc, attr, &inarg, trust_local_cmtime);
 	if (file) {
 		struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data;
 		inarg.valid |= FATTR_FH;
diff --git a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
index 9145445a759a..9f4c3c82edd6 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
+++ b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/kref.h>
 #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 
 /** Max number of pages that can be used in a single read request */
 #define FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ 32
@@ -469,6 +470,9 @@ struct fuse_conn {
 	/** The pid namespace for this mount */
 	struct pid_namespace *pid_ns;
 
+	/** The user namespace for this mount */
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
+
 	/** The fuse mount flags for this mount */
 	unsigned flags;
 
@@ -867,7 +871,7 @@ struct fuse_conn *fuse_conn_get(struct fuse_conn *fc);
 /**
  * Initialize fuse_conn
  */
-void fuse_conn_init(struct fuse_conn *fc);
+void fuse_conn_init(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct user_namespace *user_ns);
 
 /**
  * Release reference to fuse_conn
diff --git a/fs/fuse/inode.c b/fs/fuse/inode.c
index eade0bfa4488..0a771145d853 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/inode.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/inode.c
@@ -167,8 +167,8 @@ void fuse_change_attributes_common(struct inode *inode, struct fuse_attr *attr,
 	inode->i_ino     = fuse_squash_ino(attr->ino);
 	inode->i_mode    = (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT) | (attr->mode & 07777);
 	set_nlink(inode, attr->nlink);
-	inode->i_uid     = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, attr->uid);
-	inode->i_gid     = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, attr->gid);
+	inode->i_uid     = make_kuid(fc->user_ns, attr->uid);
+	inode->i_gid     = make_kgid(fc->user_ns, attr->gid);
 	inode->i_blocks  = attr->blocks;
 	inode->i_atime.tv_sec   = attr->atime;
 	inode->i_atime.tv_nsec  = attr->atimensec;
@@ -467,7 +467,8 @@ static int fuse_match_uint(substring_t *s, unsigned int *res)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int parse_fuse_opt(char *opt, struct fuse_mount_data *d, int is_bdev)
+static int parse_fuse_opt(char *opt, struct fuse_mount_data *d, int is_bdev,
+			  struct user_namespace *user_ns)
 {
 	char *p;
 	memset(d, 0, sizeof(struct fuse_mount_data));
@@ -503,7 +504,7 @@ static int parse_fuse_opt(char *opt, struct fuse_mount_data *d, int is_bdev)
 		case OPT_USER_ID:
 			if (fuse_match_uint(&args[0], &uv))
 				return 0;
-			d->user_id = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), uv);
+			d->user_id = make_kuid(user_ns, uv);
 			if (!uid_valid(d->user_id))
 				return 0;
 			d->user_id_present = 1;
@@ -512,7 +513,7 @@ static int parse_fuse_opt(char *opt, struct fuse_mount_data *d, int is_bdev)
 		case OPT_GROUP_ID:
 			if (fuse_match_uint(&args[0], &uv))
 				return 0;
-			d->group_id = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), uv);
+			d->group_id = make_kgid(user_ns, uv);
 			if (!gid_valid(d->group_id))
 				return 0;
 			d->group_id_present = 1;
@@ -555,8 +556,10 @@ static int fuse_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root)
 	struct super_block *sb = root->d_sb;
 	struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn_super(sb);
 
-	seq_printf(m, ",user_id=%u", from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, fc->user_id));
-	seq_printf(m, ",group_id=%u", from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, fc->group_id));
+	seq_printf(m, ",user_id=%u",
+		   from_kuid_munged(fc->user_ns, fc->user_id));
+	seq_printf(m, ",group_id=%u",
+		   from_kgid_munged(fc->user_ns, fc->group_id));
 	if (fc->flags & FUSE_DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS)
 		seq_puts(m, ",default_permissions");
 	if (fc->flags & FUSE_ALLOW_OTHER)
@@ -587,7 +590,7 @@ static void fuse_pqueue_init(struct fuse_pqueue *fpq)
 	fpq->connected = 1;
 }
 
-void fuse_conn_init(struct fuse_conn *fc)
+void fuse_conn_init(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct user_namespace *user_ns)
 {
 	memset(fc, 0, sizeof(*fc));
 	spin_lock_init(&fc->lock);
@@ -611,6 +614,7 @@ void fuse_conn_init(struct fuse_conn *fc)
 	fc->attr_version = 1;
 	get_random_bytes(&fc->scramble_key, sizeof(fc->scramble_key));
 	fc->pid_ns = get_pid_ns(task_active_pid_ns(current));
+	fc->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_conn_init);
 
@@ -620,6 +624,7 @@ void fuse_conn_put(struct fuse_conn *fc)
 		if (fc->destroy_req)
 			fuse_request_free(fc->destroy_req);
 		put_pid_ns(fc->pid_ns);
+		put_user_ns(fc->user_ns);
 		fc->release(fc);
 	}
 }
@@ -1046,7 +1051,7 @@ static int fuse_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 
 	sb->s_flags &= ~(MS_NOSEC | MS_I_VERSION);
 
-	if (!parse_fuse_opt(data, &d, is_bdev))
+	if (!parse_fuse_opt(data, &d, is_bdev, sb->s_user_ns))
 		goto err;
 
 	if (is_bdev) {
@@ -1070,8 +1075,12 @@ static int fuse_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	if (!file)
 		goto err;
 
-	if ((file->f_op != &fuse_dev_operations) ||
-	    (file->f_cred->user_ns != &init_user_ns))
+	/*
+	 * Require mount to happen from the same user namespace which
+	 * opened /dev/fuse to prevent potential attacks.
+	 */
+	if (file->f_op != &fuse_dev_operations ||
+	    file->f_cred->user_ns != sb->s_user_ns)
 		goto err_fput;
 
 	fc = kmalloc(sizeof(*fc), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1079,7 +1088,7 @@ static int fuse_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	if (!fc)
 		goto err_fput;
 
-	fuse_conn_init(fc);
+	fuse_conn_init(fc, sb->s_user_ns);
 	fc->release = fuse_free_conn;
 
 	fud = fuse_dev_alloc(fc);
-- 
1.9.1

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#1385308 — [PATCH v3 21/21] fuse: Allow user namespace mounts

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
---
 fs/fuse/inode.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/fuse/inode.c b/fs/fuse/inode.c
index 0a771145d853..254f1944ee98 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/inode.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/inode.c
@@ -1199,7 +1199,7 @@ static void fuse_kill_sb_anon(struct super_block *sb)
 static struct file_system_type fuse_fs_type = {
 	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
 	.name		= "fuse",
-	.fs_flags	= FS_HAS_SUBTYPE,
+	.fs_flags	= FS_HAS_SUBTYPE | FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
 	.mount		= fuse_mount,
 	.kill_sb	= fuse_kill_sb_anon,
 };
@@ -1231,7 +1231,7 @@ static struct file_system_type fuseblk_fs_type = {
 	.name		= "fuseblk",
 	.mount		= fuse_mount_blk,
 	.kill_sb	= fuse_kill_sb_blk,
-	.fs_flags	= FS_REQUIRES_DEV | FS_HAS_SUBTYPE,
+	.fs_flags	= FS_REQUIRES_DEV | FS_HAS_SUBTYPE | FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
 };
 MODULE_ALIAS_FS("fuseblk");
 
-- 
1.9.1

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#1385311 — [PATCH v3 20/21] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant

Unprivileged users are normally restricted from mounting with the
allow_other option by system policy, but this could be bypassed
for a mount done with user namespace root permissions. In such
cases allow_other should not allow users outside the userns
to access the mount as doing so would give the unprivileged user
the ability to manipulate processes it would otherwise be unable
to manipulate. Restrict allow_other to apply to users in the same
userns used at mount or a descendant of that namespace.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
---
 fs/fuse/dir.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c
index ecba75bf6640..1a6c5af49608 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
@@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ int fuse_allow_current_process(struct fuse_conn *fc)
 	const struct cred *cred;
 
 	if (fc->flags & FUSE_ALLOW_OTHER)
-		return 1;
+		return current_in_userns(fc->user_ns);
 
 	cred = current_cred();
 	if (uid_eq(cred->euid, fc->user_id) &&
-- 
1.9.1

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#1385312 — [PATCH v3 10/21] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link()

Filesystem uids which don't map into a user namespace may result
in inode->i_uid being INVALID_UID. A symlink and its parent
could have different owners in the filesystem can both get
mapped to INVALID_UID, which may result in following a symlink
when this would not have otherwise been permitted when protected
symlinks are enabled.

Add a new helper function, uid_valid_eq(), and use this to
validate that the ids in may_follow_link() are both equal and
valid. Also add an equivalent helper for gids, which is
currently unused.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 fs/namei.c             |  2 +-
 include/linux/uidgid.h | 10 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index a29094c6f4a1..6fe8b0d8ca90 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -915,7 +915,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */
-	if (uid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
+	if (uid_valid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
diff --git a/include/linux/uidgid.h b/include/linux/uidgid.h
index 03835522dfcb..e09529fe2668 100644
--- a/include/linux/uidgid.h
+++ b/include/linux/uidgid.h
@@ -117,6 +117,16 @@ static inline bool gid_valid(kgid_t gid)
 	return __kgid_val(gid) != (gid_t) -1;
 }
 
+static inline bool uid_valid_eq(kuid_t left, kuid_t right)
+{
+	return uid_eq(left, right) && uid_valid(left);
+}
+
+static inline bool gid_valid_eq(kgid_t left, kgid_t right)
+{
+	return gid_eq(left, right) && gid_valid(left);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
 
 extern kuid_t make_kuid(struct user_namespace *from, uid_t uid);
-- 
1.9.1

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#1385314 — [PATCH v3 09/21] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts

The SMACK64, SMACK64EXEC, and SMACK64MMAP labels are all handled
differently in untrusted mounts. This is confusing and
potentically problematic. Change this to handle them all the same
way that SMACK64 is currently handled; that is, read the label
from disk and check it at use time. For SMACK64 and SMACK64MMAP
access is denied if the label does not match smk_root. To be
consistent with suid, a SMACK64EXEC label which does not match
smk_root will still allow execution of the file but will not run
with the label supplied in the xattr.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index aa17198cd5f2..ca564590cc1b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -919,6 +919,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
 	struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
 	int rc;
 
 	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
@@ -928,6 +929,11 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
 		return 0;
 
+	sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+	if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
+	    isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
+		return 0;
+
 	if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
 		struct task_struct *tracer;
 		rc = 0;
@@ -1725,6 +1731,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 	struct task_smack *tsp;
 	struct smack_known *okp;
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
 	int may;
 	int mmay;
 	int tmay;
@@ -1736,6 +1743,10 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 	isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
 	if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
 		return 0;
+	sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
+	if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
+	    isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
+		return -EACCES;
 	mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
 
 	tsp = current_security();
@@ -3546,16 +3557,14 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 			if (rc >= 0)
 				transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
 		}
-		if (!(sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED)) {
-			/*
-			 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
-			 */
-			skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
-			if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
-			    skp == &smack_known_web)
-				skp = NULL;
-			isp->smk_task = skp;
-		}
+		/*
+		 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
+		 */
+		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
+		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
+		    skp == &smack_known_web)
+			skp = NULL;
+		isp->smk_task = skp;
 
 		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
 		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
-- 
1.9.1

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#1385318 — [PATCH v3 18/21] fuse: Add support for pid namespaces

When the userspace process servicing fuse requests is running in
a pid namespace then pids passed via the fuse fd are not being
translated into that process' namespace. Translation is necessary
for the pid to be useful to that process.

Since no use case currently exists for changing namespaces all
translations can be done relative to the pid namespace in use
when fuse_conn_init() is called. For fuse this translates to
mount time, and for cuse this is when /dev/cuse is opened. IO for
this connection from another namespace will return errors.

Requests from processes whose pid cannot be translated into the
target namespace are not permitted, except for requests
allocated via fuse_get_req_nofail_nopages. For no-fail requests
in.h.pid will be 0 if the pid translation fails.

File locking changes based on previous work done by Eric
Biederman.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
---
 fs/fuse/dev.c    | 19 +++++++++++++++----
 fs/fuse/file.c   | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
 fs/fuse/fuse_i.h |  4 ++++
 fs/fuse/inode.c  |  3 +++
 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev.c b/fs/fuse/dev.c
index cbece1221417..4e91b2ac25a7 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/dev.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dev.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
 #include <linux/splice.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
 
 MODULE_ALIAS_MISCDEV(FUSE_MINOR);
 MODULE_ALIAS("devname:fuse");
@@ -124,11 +125,11 @@ static void __fuse_put_request(struct fuse_req *req)
 	atomic_dec(&req->count);
 }
 
-static void fuse_req_init_context(struct fuse_req *req)
+static void fuse_req_init_context(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_req *req)
 {
 	req->in.h.uid = from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, current_fsuid());
 	req->in.h.gid = from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, current_fsgid());
-	req->in.h.pid = current->pid;
+	req->in.h.pid = pid_nr_ns(task_pid(current), fc->pid_ns);
 }
 
 void fuse_set_initialized(struct fuse_conn *fc)
@@ -181,10 +182,14 @@ static struct fuse_req *__fuse_get_req(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned npages,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	fuse_req_init_context(req);
+	fuse_req_init_context(fc, req);
 	__set_bit(FR_WAITING, &req->flags);
 	if (for_background)
 		__set_bit(FR_BACKGROUND, &req->flags);
+	if (req->in.h.pid == 0) {
+		fuse_put_request(fc, req);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW);
+	}
 
 	return req;
 
@@ -274,7 +279,7 @@ struct fuse_req *fuse_get_req_nofail_nopages(struct fuse_conn *fc,
 	if (!req)
 		req = get_reserved_req(fc, file);
 
-	fuse_req_init_context(req);
+	fuse_req_init_context(fc, req);
 	__set_bit(FR_WAITING, &req->flags);
 	__clear_bit(FR_BACKGROUND, &req->flags);
 	return req;
@@ -1243,6 +1248,9 @@ static ssize_t fuse_dev_do_read(struct fuse_dev *fud, struct file *file,
 	struct fuse_in *in;
 	unsigned reqsize;
 
+	if (task_active_pid_ns(current) != fc->pid_ns)
+		return -EIO;
+
  restart:
 	spin_lock(&fiq->waitq.lock);
 	err = -EAGAIN;
@@ -1872,6 +1880,9 @@ static ssize_t fuse_dev_do_write(struct fuse_dev *fud,
 	struct fuse_req *req;
 	struct fuse_out_header oh;
 
+	if (task_active_pid_ns(current) != fc->pid_ns)
+		return -EIO;
+
 	if (nbytes < sizeof(struct fuse_out_header))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
diff --git a/fs/fuse/file.c b/fs/fuse/file.c
index 719924d6c706..b5c616c5ec98 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/file.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/file.c
@@ -2067,7 +2067,8 @@ static int fuse_direct_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	return generic_file_mmap(file, vma);
 }
 
-static int convert_fuse_file_lock(const struct fuse_file_lock *ffl,
+static int convert_fuse_file_lock(struct fuse_conn *fc,
+				  const struct fuse_file_lock *ffl,
 				  struct file_lock *fl)
 {
 	switch (ffl->type) {
@@ -2082,7 +2083,14 @@ static int convert_fuse_file_lock(const struct fuse_file_lock *ffl,
 
 		fl->fl_start = ffl->start;
 		fl->fl_end = ffl->end;
-		fl->fl_pid = ffl->pid;
+
+		/*
+		 * Convert pid into the caller's pid namespace. If the pid
+		 * does not map into the namespace fl_pid will get set to 0.
+		 */
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		fl->fl_pid = pid_vnr(find_pid_ns(ffl->pid, fc->pid_ns));
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 		break;
 
 	default:
@@ -2131,7 +2139,7 @@ static int fuse_getlk(struct file *file, struct file_lock *fl)
 	args.out.args[0].value = &outarg;
 	err = fuse_simple_request(fc, &args);
 	if (!err)
-		err = convert_fuse_file_lock(&outarg.lk, fl);
+		err = convert_fuse_file_lock(fc, &outarg.lk, fl);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -2143,7 +2151,8 @@ static int fuse_setlk(struct file *file, struct file_lock *fl, int flock)
 	FUSE_ARGS(args);
 	struct fuse_lk_in inarg;
 	int opcode = (fl->fl_flags & FL_SLEEP) ? FUSE_SETLKW : FUSE_SETLK;
-	pid_t pid = fl->fl_type != F_UNLCK ? current->tgid : 0;
+	struct pid *pid = fl->fl_type != F_UNLCK ? task_tgid(current) : NULL;
+	pid_t pid_nr = pid_nr_ns(pid, fc->pid_ns);
 	int err;
 
 	if (fl->fl_lmops && fl->fl_lmops->lm_grant) {
@@ -2155,7 +2164,10 @@ static int fuse_setlk(struct file *file, struct file_lock *fl, int flock)
 	if (fl->fl_flags & FL_CLOSE)
 		return 0;
 
-	fuse_lk_fill(&args, file, fl, opcode, pid, flock, &inarg);
+	if (pid && pid_nr == 0)
+		return -EOVERFLOW;
+
+	fuse_lk_fill(&args, file, fl, opcode, pid_nr, flock, &inarg);
 	err = fuse_simple_request(fc, &args);
 
 	/* locking is restartable */
diff --git a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
index eddbe02c4028..9145445a759a 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
+++ b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/poll.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
 
 /** Max number of pages that can be used in a single read request */
 #define FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ 32
@@ -465,6 +466,9 @@ struct fuse_conn {
 	/** The group id for this mount */
 	kgid_t group_id;
 
+	/** The pid namespace for this mount */
+	struct pid_namespace *pid_ns;
+
 	/** The fuse mount flags for this mount */
 	unsigned flags;
 
diff --git a/fs/fuse/inode.c b/fs/fuse/inode.c
index 1ce67668a8e1..eade0bfa4488 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/inode.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/inode.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/exportfs.h>
+#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>");
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Filesystem in Userspace");
@@ -609,6 +610,7 @@ void fuse_conn_init(struct fuse_conn *fc)
 	fc->connected = 1;
 	fc->attr_version = 1;
 	get_random_bytes(&fc->scramble_key, sizeof(fc->scramble_key));
+	fc->pid_ns = get_pid_ns(task_active_pid_ns(current));
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_conn_init);
 
@@ -617,6 +619,7 @@ void fuse_conn_put(struct fuse_conn *fc)
 	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&fc->count)) {
 		if (fc->destroy_req)
 			fuse_request_free(fc->destroy_req);
+		put_pid_ns(fc->pid_ns);
 		fc->release(fc);
 	}
 }
-- 
1.9.1

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#1385319 — [PATCH v3 08/21] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns

All current callers of in_userns pass current_user_ns as the
first argument. Simplify by replacing in_userns with
current_in_userns which checks whether current_user_ns is in the
namespace supplied as an argument.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 fs/namespace.c                 | 2 +-
 include/linux/user_namespace.h | 6 ++----
 kernel/user_namespace.c        | 6 +++---
 security/commoncap.c           | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 6e9db4c166b4..0ad8e4a4f50b 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -3294,7 +3294,7 @@ bool mnt_may_suid(struct vfsmount *mnt)
 	 * in other namespaces.
 	 */
 	return !(mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) && check_mnt(real_mount(mnt)) &&
-	       in_userns(current_user_ns(), mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns);
+	       current_in_userns(mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns);
 }
 
 static struct ns_common *mntns_get(struct task_struct *task)
diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index a43faa727124..9217169c64cb 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -72,8 +72,7 @@ extern ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t,
 extern ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
 extern bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns);
-extern bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ns,
-		      const struct user_namespace *target_ns);
+extern bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns);
 #else
 
 static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
@@ -103,8 +102,7 @@ static inline bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
 	return true;
 }
 
-static inline bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ns,
-			     const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
+static inline bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
 {
 	return true;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index dee3be5445da..68f594212759 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -942,10 +942,10 @@ bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
  * Returns true if @ns is the same namespace as or a descendant of
  * @target_ns.
  */
-bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ns,
-	       const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
+bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
 {
-	for (; ns; ns = ns->parent) {
+	struct user_namespace *ns;
+	for (ns = current_user_ns(); ns; ns = ns->parent) {
 		if (ns == target_ns)
 			return true;
 	}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index a306c5d90709..e657227d221e 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
 	 * explicit that capability bits are limited to s_user_ns and its
 	 * descendants.
 	 */
-	if (!in_userns(current_user_ns(), bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
+	if (!current_in_userns(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
 		return 0;
 
 	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
-- 
1.9.1

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#1385321 — [PATCH v3 06/21] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>

If a process gets access to a mount from a different user
namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of
setuid files or selinux entrypoints from that filesystem.  Prevent
this by treating mounts from other mount namespaces and those not
owned by current_user_ns() or an ancestor as nosuid.

This will make it safer to allow more complex filesystems to be
mounted in non-root user namespaces.

This does not remove the need for MNT_LOCK_NOSUID.  The setuid,
setgid, and file capability bits can no longer be abused if code in
a user namespace were to clear nosuid on an untrusted filesystem,
but this patch, by itself, is insufficient to protect the system
from abuse of files that, when execed, would increase MAC privilege.

As a more concrete explanation, any task that can manipulate a
vfsmount associated with a given user namespace already has
capabilities in that namespace and all of its descendents.  If they
can cause a malicious setuid, setgid, or file-caps executable to
appear in that mount, then that executable will only allow them to
elevate privileges in exactly the set of namespaces in which they
are already privileges.

On the other hand, if they can cause a malicious executable to
appear with a dangerous MAC label, running it could change the
caller's security context in a way that should not have been
possible, even inside the namespace in which the task is confined.

As a hardening measure, this would have made CVE-2014-5207 much
more difficult to exploit.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 fs/exec.c                |  2 +-
 fs/namespace.c           | 13 +++++++++++++
 include/linux/mount.h    |  1 +
 security/commoncap.c     |  8 +++++++-
 security/selinux/hooks.c |  2 +-
 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index c4010b8207a1..706088dd0cb1 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1391,7 +1391,7 @@ static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	bprm->cred->euid = current_euid();
 	bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();
 
-	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
+	if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt))
 		return;
 
 	if (task_no_new_privs(current))
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index c133318bec35..6e9db4c166b4 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -3284,6 +3284,19 @@ found:
 	return visible;
 }
 
+bool mnt_may_suid(struct vfsmount *mnt)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Foreign mounts (accessed via fchdir or through /proc
+	 * symlinks) are always treated as if they are nosuid.  This
+	 * prevents namespaces from trusting potentially unsafe
+	 * suid/sgid bits, file caps, or security labels that originate
+	 * in other namespaces.
+	 */
+	return !(mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) && check_mnt(real_mount(mnt)) &&
+	       in_userns(current_user_ns(), mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns);
+}
+
 static struct ns_common *mntns_get(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	struct ns_common *ns = NULL;
diff --git a/include/linux/mount.h b/include/linux/mount.h
index f822c3c11377..54a594d49733 100644
--- a/include/linux/mount.h
+++ b/include/linux/mount.h
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ extern void mntput(struct vfsmount *mnt);
 extern struct vfsmount *mntget(struct vfsmount *mnt);
 extern struct vfsmount *mnt_clone_internal(struct path *path);
 extern int __mnt_is_readonly(struct vfsmount *mnt);
+extern bool mnt_may_suid(struct vfsmount *mnt);
 
 struct path;
 extern struct vfsmount *clone_private_mount(struct path *path);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 8912ef117faa..a306c5d90709 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -453,8 +453,14 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
 	if (!file_caps_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
+	if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt))
 		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * This check is redundant with mnt_may_suid() but is kept to make
+	 * explicit that capability bits are limited to s_user_ns and its
+	 * descendants.
+	 */
 	if (!in_userns(current_user_ns(), bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
 		return 0;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 912deee3f01e..1350167635cb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2234,7 +2234,7 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 			    const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
 {
 	int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
-	int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID);
+	int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
 	int rc;
 
 	if (!nnp && !nosuid)
-- 
1.9.1

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