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[PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit

Started byAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
First post2016-06-24 06:30 +0200
Last post2016-06-24 17:40 +0200
Articles 4 — 3 participants

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  [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> - 2016-06-24 06:30 +0200
    Re: [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack  before do_exit Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> - 2016-06-24 17:40 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack  before do_exit Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> - 2016-06-24 17:50 +0200
    Re: [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack  before do_exit Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> - 2016-06-24 17:40 +0200

#1430346 — [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit

FromAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Date2016-06-24 06:30 +0200
Subject[PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit
Message-ID<rNqUG-3pa-13@gated-at.bofh.it>
If we call do_exit with a clean stack, we greatly reduce the risk of
recursive oopses due to stack overflow in do_exit, and we allow
do_exit to work even if we OOPS from an IST stack.  The latter gives
us a much better chance of surviving long enough after we detect a
stack overflow to write out our logs.

I intentionally separated this from the preceding patch that
disables do_exit-on-OOPS on IST stacks.  This way, if we need to
revert this patch, we still end up in an acceptable state wrt stack
overflow handling.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S   | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S   | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 13 +++++++++----
 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
index 983e5d3a0d27..0b56666e6039 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -1153,3 +1153,14 @@ ENTRY(async_page_fault)
 	jmp	error_code
 END(async_page_fault)
 #endif
+
+ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
+	/* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
+	xorl	%ebp, %ebp
+
+	movl	PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %esi
+	leal	-TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-PTREGS_SIZE(%esi), %esp
+
+	call	do_exit
+1:	jmp 1b
+END(rewind_stack_do_exit)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 9ee0da1807ed..b846875aeea6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1423,3 +1423,14 @@ ENTRY(ignore_sysret)
 	mov	$-ENOSYS, %eax
 	sysret
 END(ignore_sysret)
+
+ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
+	/* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
+	xorl	%ebp, %ebp
+
+	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rax
+	leaq	-TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-PTREGS_SIZE(%rax), %rsp
+
+	call	do_exit
+1:	jmp 1b
+END(rewind_stack_do_exit)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
index 70d5aae8b8f7..4592bc4ed3e1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
@@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ unsigned long oops_begin(void)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(oops_begin);
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_begin);
 
+extern void __noreturn rewind_stack_do_exit(int signr);
+
 void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr)
 {
 	if (regs && kexec_should_crash(current))
@@ -245,12 +247,15 @@ void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr)
 		return;
 	if (in_interrupt())
 		panic("Fatal exception in interrupt");
-	if (((current_stack_pointer() ^ (current_top_of_stack() - 1))
-	     & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)) != 0)
-		panic("Fatal exception on special stack");
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
-	do_exit(signr);
+
+	/*
+	 * We're not going to return, but we might be on an IST stack or
+	 * have very little stack space left.  Rewind the stack and kill
+	 * the task.
+	 */
+	rewind_stack_do_exit(signr);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_end);
 
-- 
2.5.5

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#1430767 — Re: [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit

FromBrian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Date2016-06-24 17:40 +0200
SubjectRe: [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit
Message-ID<rNBn4-1op-21@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1430346
On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 11:30 AM, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 09:23:06PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> If we call do_exit with a clean stack, we greatly reduce the risk of
>> recursive oopses due to stack overflow in do_exit, and we allow
>> do_exit to work even if we OOPS from an IST stack.  The latter gives
>> us a much better chance of surviving long enough after we detect a
>> stack overflow to write out our logs.
>>
>> I intentionally separated this from the preceding patch that
>> disables do_exit-on-OOPS on IST stacks.  This way, if we need to
>> revert this patch, we still end up in an acceptable state wrt stack
>> overflow handling.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S   | 11 +++++++++++
>>  arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S   | 11 +++++++++++
>>  arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 13 +++++++++----
>>  3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
>> index 983e5d3a0d27..0b56666e6039 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
>> @@ -1153,3 +1153,14 @@ ENTRY(async_page_fault)
>>       jmp     error_code
>>  END(async_page_fault)
>>  #endif
>> +
>> +ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
>> +     /* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
>> +     xorl    %ebp, %ebp
>> +
>> +     movl    PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %esi
>> +     leal    -TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-PTREGS_SIZE(%esi), %esp
>> +
>> +     call    do_exit
>> +1:   jmp 1b
>> +END(rewind_stack_do_exit)
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> index 9ee0da1807ed..b846875aeea6 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> @@ -1423,3 +1423,14 @@ ENTRY(ignore_sysret)
>>       mov     $-ENOSYS, %eax
>>       sysret
>>  END(ignore_sysret)
>> +
>> +ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
>> +     /* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
>> +     xorl    %ebp, %ebp
>
> s/ebp/rbp/g/ ?

No, this quirk of the x86-64 instruction set will zero-extend to
64-bits without needing a REX prefix.

--
Brian Gerst

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#1430772 — Re: [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit

FromJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Date2016-06-24 17:50 +0200
SubjectRe: [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit
Message-ID<rNBwK-1xi-5@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1430767
On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 11:35:13AM -0400, Brian Gerst wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 11:30 AM, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 09:23:06PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> If we call do_exit with a clean stack, we greatly reduce the risk of
> >> recursive oopses due to stack overflow in do_exit, and we allow
> >> do_exit to work even if we OOPS from an IST stack.  The latter gives
> >> us a much better chance of surviving long enough after we detect a
> >> stack overflow to write out our logs.
> >>
> >> I intentionally separated this from the preceding patch that
> >> disables do_exit-on-OOPS on IST stacks.  This way, if we need to
> >> revert this patch, we still end up in an acceptable state wrt stack
> >> overflow handling.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> >> ---
> >>  arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S   | 11 +++++++++++
> >>  arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S   | 11 +++++++++++
> >>  arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 13 +++++++++----
> >>  3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
> >> index 983e5d3a0d27..0b56666e6039 100644
> >> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
> >> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
> >> @@ -1153,3 +1153,14 @@ ENTRY(async_page_fault)
> >>       jmp     error_code
> >>  END(async_page_fault)
> >>  #endif
> >> +
> >> +ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
> >> +     /* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
> >> +     xorl    %ebp, %ebp
> >> +
> >> +     movl    PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %esi
> >> +     leal    -TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-PTREGS_SIZE(%esi), %esp
> >> +
> >> +     call    do_exit
> >> +1:   jmp 1b
> >> +END(rewind_stack_do_exit)
> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> >> index 9ee0da1807ed..b846875aeea6 100644
> >> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> >> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> >> @@ -1423,3 +1423,14 @@ ENTRY(ignore_sysret)
> >>       mov     $-ENOSYS, %eax
> >>       sysret
> >>  END(ignore_sysret)
> >> +
> >> +ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
> >> +     /* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
> >> +     xorl    %ebp, %ebp
> >
> > s/ebp/rbp/g/ ?
> 
> No, this quirk of the x86-64 instruction set will zero-extend to
> 64-bits without needing a REX prefix.

Ah, so it makes the instruction smaller.  And I see that gcc also does
the same.  In that case:

Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>

-- 
Josh

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#1430768 — Re: [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit

FromJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Date2016-06-24 17:40 +0200
SubjectRe: [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit
Message-ID<rNBn4-1op-23@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1430346
On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 09:23:06PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> If we call do_exit with a clean stack, we greatly reduce the risk of
> recursive oopses due to stack overflow in do_exit, and we allow
> do_exit to work even if we OOPS from an IST stack.  The latter gives
> us a much better chance of surviving long enough after we detect a
> stack overflow to write out our logs.
> 
> I intentionally separated this from the preceding patch that
> disables do_exit-on-OOPS on IST stacks.  This way, if we need to
> revert this patch, we still end up in an acceptable state wrt stack
> overflow handling.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> ---
>  arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S   | 11 +++++++++++
>  arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S   | 11 +++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 13 +++++++++----
>  3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
> index 983e5d3a0d27..0b56666e6039 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
> @@ -1153,3 +1153,14 @@ ENTRY(async_page_fault)
>  	jmp	error_code
>  END(async_page_fault)
>  #endif
> +
> +ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
> +	/* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
> +	xorl	%ebp, %ebp
> +
> +	movl	PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %esi
> +	leal	-TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-PTREGS_SIZE(%esi), %esp
> +
> +	call	do_exit
> +1:	jmp 1b
> +END(rewind_stack_do_exit)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> index 9ee0da1807ed..b846875aeea6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> @@ -1423,3 +1423,14 @@ ENTRY(ignore_sysret)
>  	mov	$-ENOSYS, %eax
>  	sysret
>  END(ignore_sysret)
> +
> +ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
> +	/* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
> +	xorl	%ebp, %ebp

s/ebp/rbp/g/ ?

-- 
Josh

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