Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]
Groups > linux.kernel > #1418654 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2016-06-09 23:10 +0200 |
| Last post | 2016-06-09 23:10 +0200 |
| Articles | 1 — 1 participant |
Back to article view | Back to linux.kernel
This discussion starts older than the indexed window; earlier articles aren't shown. The article labeled Started by
below is the oldest one visible, not the original post.
[PATCH 13/14] tile/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-06-09 23:10 +0200
| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2016-06-09 23:10 +0200 |
| Subject | [PATCH 13/14] tile/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace |
| Message-ID | <rIfnc-3pv-39@gated-at.bofh.it> |
Close the hole where ptrace can change a syscall out from under seccomp.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
---
arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c | 11 ++++++-----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
index 8c6d2f2fefa3..d89b7011667c 100644
--- a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -255,14 +255,15 @@ int do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
u32 work = ACCESS_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
- if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+ if ((work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
+ tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) {
+ regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1;
return -1;
-
- if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) {
- if (tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
- regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1;
}
+ if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+ return -1;
+
if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR]);
--
2.7.4
Back to top | Article view | linux.kernel
csiph-web