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NFS/d_splice_alias breakage

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  NFS/d_splice_alias breakage Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> - 2016-06-03 01:10 +0200
    [PATCH] Allow d_splice_alias to accept hashed dentries green@linuxhacker.ru - 2016-06-03 02:10 +0200
      Re: [PATCH] Allow d_splice_alias to accept hashed dentries Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> - 2016-06-03 02:30 +0200
    Re: NFS/d_splice_alias breakage Trond Myklebust <trondmy@primarydata.com> - 2016-06-03 02:50 +0200
      Re: NFS/d_splice_alias breakage Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> - 2016-06-03 03:00 +0200
        Re: NFS/d_splice_alias breakage Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-03 05:30 +0200
          Re: NFS/d_splice_alias breakage Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-03 05:40 +0200
      Re: NFS/d_splice_alias breakage Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-03 05:30 +0200
    Re: NFS/d_splice_alias breakage Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-03 05:40 +0200
      Re: NFS/d_splice_alias breakage Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> - 2016-06-03 05:50 +0200
        Re: NFS/d_splice_alias breakage Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-03 06:30 +0200
          Re: NFS/d_splice_alias breakage Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-03 06:50 +0200
            Re: NFS/d_splice_alias breakage Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-03 07:00 +0200
          Re: NFS/d_splice_alias breakage Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> - 2016-06-03 07:00 +0200
            Re: NFS/d_splice_alias breakage Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-03 08:00 +0200
              Re: NFS/d_splice_alias breakage Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> - 2016-06-07 01:40 +0200
                Re: NFS/d_splice_alias breakage Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> - 2016-06-10 03:40 +0200
                  Re: NFS/d_splice_alias breakage Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> - 2016-06-10 18:50 +0200
          Dcache oops Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> - 2016-06-03 18:40 +0200
            Re: Dcache oops Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-03 20:30 +0200
              Re: Dcache oops Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> - 2016-06-03 20:40 +0200
                Re: Dcache oops Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-03 22:10 +0200
                  Re: Dcache oops Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> - 2016-06-03 23:20 +0200
                    Re: Dcache oops Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-03 23:30 +0200
                      Re: Dcache oops Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> - 2016-06-04 00:10 +0200
                        Re: Dcache oops Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-04 00:30 +0200
                        Re: Dcache oops Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-04 00:30 +0200
                          Re: Dcache oops Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-04 00:40 +0200
                            Re: Dcache oops Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> - 2016-06-04 00:50 +0200
                            Re: Dcache oops Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> - 2016-06-04 02:00 +0200
                              Re: Dcache oops Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-04 03:00 +0200
                                Re: Dcache oops Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> - 2016-06-04 14:30 +0200
                                Re: Dcache oops Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> - 2016-06-04 18:20 +0200
                                  [PATCH] nfs4: Fix potential use after free of state in nfs4_do_reclaim. green@linuxhacker.ru - 2016-06-04 18:30 +0200
                                    Re: [PATCH] nfs4: Fix potential use after free of state in  nfs4_do_reclaim. Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> - 2016-06-04 22:00 +0200
                          Re: Dcache oops Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> - 2016-06-04 00:40 +0200
                            Re: Dcache oops Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> - 2016-06-04 00:50 +0200
                            Re: Dcache oops Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-04 00:50 +0200
                  Re: Dcache oops Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> - 2016-06-03 23:20 +0200
                    Re: Dcache oops Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-03 23:50 +0200
                      Re: Dcache oops Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2016-06-04 00:20 +0200

Page 1 of 3  [1] 2 3  Next page →

#1412605 — NFS/d_splice_alias breakage

Hello!

   I just came across a bug (trying to run some Lustre test scripts against NFS, while hunting for another nfsd bug)
   that seems to be present since at least 2014 that lets users crash nfs client locally.

   Here's some interesting comment quote first from d_obtain_alias:

>  * Cluster filesystems may call this function with a negative, hashed dentry.
>  * In that case, we know that the inode will be a regular file, and also this
>  * will only occur during atomic_open. So we need to check for the dentry
>  * being already hashed only in the final case.
>  */
> struct dentry *d_splice_alias(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
> {
>         if (IS_ERR(inode))
>                 return ERR_CAST(inode);
> 
>         BUG_ON(!d_unhashed(dentry));
        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ - This does not align well with the quote above.

It got imported here by commit b5ae6b15bd73e35b129408755a0804287a87e041

Removing the BUG_ON headon is not going to work since the d_rehash of old
is now folded into __d_add and we might not want to move that condition there.

doing an
if (d_unhashed(dentry))
   __d_add(dentry, inode);
else
   d_instantiate(dentry, inode);

also does not look super pretty and who knows how all of the previous code
like _d_find_any_alias would react.

Al, I think you might want to chime in here on how to better handle this?

The problem was there at least since 3.10 it appears where the fs/nfs/dir.c code
was calling d_materialise_unique() that did require the dentry to be unhashed.

Not sure how this was not hit earlier. The crash looks like this (I added
a printk to ensure this is what is going on indeed and not some other weird race):

[   64.489326] Calling into d_splice_alias with hashed dentry, dentry->d_inode (null) inode ffff88010f500c70
[   64.489549] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   64.489642] kernel BUG at /home/green/bk/linux/fs/dcache.c:2989!
[   64.489750] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[   64.489853] Modules linked in: loop rpcsec_gss_krb5 joydev pcspkr acpi_cpufreq i2c_piix4 tpm_tis tpm nfsd drm_kms_helper ttm drm serio_raw virtio_blk
[   64.491111] CPU: 6 PID: 7125 Comm: file_concat.sh Not tainted 4.7.0-rc1-vm-nfs+ #99
[   64.492069] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[   64.492489] task: ffff880110a801c0 ti: ffff8800c283c000 task.ti: ffff8800c283c000
[   64.493159] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8124292f>]  [<ffffffff8124292f>] d_splice_alias+0x31f/0x480
[   64.493866] RSP: 0018:ffff8800c283fb20  EFLAGS: 00010282
[   64.494238] RAX: 0000000000000067 RBX: ffff88010f500c70 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   64.494625] RDX: 0000000000000067 RSI: ffff8800d08d2ed0 RDI: ffff88010f500c70
[   64.495021] RBP: ffff8800c283fb78 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[   64.495407] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8800d08d2ed0
[   64.495804] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8800d4a56f00 R15: ffff8800d0bb8c70
[   64.496199] FS:  00007f94ae25c700(0000) GS:ffff88011f580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   64.496859] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   64.497235] CR2: 000055e5d3fb46a4 CR3: 00000000ce364000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[   64.497626] Stack:
[   64.497961]  ffffffff8132154e ffff8800c283fb68 ffffffff81325916 0000000000000000
[   64.498765]  0000000000000000 ffff8801109459c0 0000000000000000 ffff8800d0bb8c70
[   64.499578]  ffff8800c283fba0 ffff8800d08d2ed0 ffff8800cb927080 ffff8800c283fc18
[   64.500385] Call Trace:
[   64.500727]  [<ffffffff8132154e>] ? nfs_lookup+0x17e/0x320
[   64.501103]  [<ffffffff81325916>] ? __put_nfs_open_context+0xc6/0xf0
[   64.501477]  [<ffffffff8132252b>] nfs_atomic_open+0x8b/0x430
[   64.501850]  [<ffffffff81236def>] lookup_open+0x29f/0x7a0
[   64.502222]  [<ffffffff812377ce>] path_openat+0x4de/0xfc0
[   64.502591]  [<ffffffff8123935e>] do_filp_open+0x7e/0xe0
[   64.502964]  [<ffffffff8124877c>] ? __alloc_fd+0xbc/0x170
[   64.503347]  [<ffffffff817f4977>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[   64.503719]  [<ffffffff8124877c>] ? __alloc_fd+0xbc/0x170
[   64.504097]  [<ffffffff81226896>] do_sys_open+0x116/0x1f0
[   64.504465]  [<ffffffff8122698e>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
[   64.504831]  [<ffffffff817f5176>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad
[   64.505218] Code: 01 e8 46 20 5b 00 85 db 74 0b 4c 89 ff 4c 63 fb e8 87 d8 ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 2f 3c 00 00 4c 89 f8 e9 5e fe ff ff 0f 0b 48 89 f8 c3 <0f> 0b 48 8b 43 40 4c 8b 78 58 49 8d 8f 58 03 00 00 eb 02 f3 90 
[   64.508754] RIP  [<ffffffff8124292f>] d_splice_alias+0x31f/0x480
[   64.509176]  RSP <ffff8800c283fb20>

Bye,
    Oleg

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#1412621 — [PATCH] Allow d_splice_alias to accept hashed dentries

From: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>

The comment at the top of the function already permits it,
just take out the assetrtion and update __d_add to
be aware of this. Move the BUG_ON to d_add which is the
other user of __d_add and presumably we do not want to
allow hashed dentries as input there.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
---
So seeing how there's only one other __d_add user, I just moved the BUG_ON
to d_add and allowed __d_add to not call _d_rehash if the dentry is
already hashed.
This seems to be working as expected and I don't see any problems with it.
Of course I am probably missing some other important consideration ;)

 fs/dcache.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c
index ad4a542..0e35049 100644
--- a/fs/dcache.c
+++ b/fs/dcache.c
@@ -2565,7 +2565,8 @@ static inline void __d_add(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
 		raw_write_seqcount_end(&dentry->d_seq);
 		__fsnotify_d_instantiate(dentry);
 	}
-	_d_rehash(dentry);
+	if (d_unhashed(dentry))
+		_d_rehash(dentry);
 	if (dir)
 		end_dir_add(dir, n);
 	spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
@@ -2584,6 +2585,8 @@ static inline void __d_add(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
 
 void d_add(struct dentry *entry, struct inode *inode)
 {
+	BUG_ON(!d_unhashed(entry));
+
 	if (inode) {
 		security_d_instantiate(entry, inode);
 		spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
@@ -2986,8 +2989,6 @@ struct dentry *d_splice_alias(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
 	if (IS_ERR(inode))
 		return ERR_CAST(inode);
 
-	BUG_ON(!d_unhashed(dentry));
-
 	if (!inode)
 		goto out;
 
-- 
2.1.0

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#1412638 — Re: [PATCH] Allow d_splice_alias to accept hashed dentries

On Jun 2, 2016, at 7:59 PM, green@linuxhacker.ru wrote:

> From: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
> 
> The comment at the top of the function already permits it,
> just take out the assetrtion and update __d_add to
> be aware of this. Move the BUG_ON to d_add which is the
> other user of __d_add and presumably we do not want to
> allow hashed dentries as input there.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
> ---
> So seeing how there's only one other __d_add user, I just moved the BUG_ON
> to d_add and allowed __d_add to not call _d_rehash if the dentry is
> already hashed.
> This seems to be working as expected and I don't see any problems with it.
> Of course I am probably missing some other important consideration ;)

I guess I was too fast to assume it was fine, or I just hit another bug,
but with the patch below I am now getting:

[ 1120.040403] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880119fc3000
[ 1120.040883] IP: [<ffffffff817f87d4>] bad_gs+0xd1d/0x1ba9
[ 1120.041302] PGD 2dca067 PUD 2dcd067 PMD 11ff31067 PTE 8000000119fc3060
[ 1120.041699] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[ 1120.042019] Modules linked in: loop rpcsec_gss_krb5 joydev pcspkr acpi_cpufreq i2c_piix4 tpm_tis tpm nfsd drm_kms_helper ttm drm serio_raw virtio_blk
[ 1120.042803] CPU: 5 PID: 16997 Comm: file_concat.sh Not tainted 4.7.0-rc1-vm-nfs+ #101
[ 1120.043467] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[ 1120.043826] task: ffff8800c34f40c0 ti: ffff8800c15b8000 task.ti: ffff8800c15b8000
[ 1120.044446] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff817f87d4>]  [<ffffffff817f87d4>] bad_gs+0xd1d/0x1ba9
[ 1120.045099] RSP: 0018:ffff8800c15bbba0  EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 1120.045439] RAX: ffff8800d20f0f30 RBX: ffff8800d20f0f00 RCX: ffff880119fc3000
[ 1120.045815] RDX: ffff880119fc3000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ 1120.046168] RBP: ffff8800c15bbbe8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8800d20f0ed0
[ 1120.046526] R10: 0000000000000059 R11: ffff8800c34f4c38 R12: ffff8800d1de9ed0
[ 1120.046892] R13: ffff8800c15bbdf0 R14: ffff8800d20f0f50 R15: 00000000f7a5b27a
[ 1120.047248] FS:  00007f57e93d8700(0000) GS:ffff88011f540000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1120.047890] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1120.048223] CR2: ffff880119fc3000 CR3: 00000000d4166000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 1120.048596] Stack:
[ 1120.048892]  ffffffff81243a35 0000000000000096 ffff880119fc3000 ffffffff00000001
[ 1120.049537]  000000000000c2aa ffff8800c15bbdf0 ffff8800d1de9ed0 ffff8800c15bbde0
[ 1120.050189]  ffff8800c15bbdf0 ffff8800c15bbc18 ffffffff81243c64 ffffffff81236c4e
[ 1120.050846] Call Trace:
[ 1120.051146]  [<ffffffff81243a35>] ? __d_lookup+0x5/0x1b0
[ 1120.051485]  [<ffffffff81243c64>] d_lookup+0x84/0xb0
[ 1120.051828]  [<ffffffff81236c4e>] ? lookup_open+0xfe/0x7a0
[ 1120.052160]  [<ffffffff81236c4e>] lookup_open+0xfe/0x7a0
[ 1120.052500]  [<ffffffff812377ce>] path_openat+0x4de/0xfc0
[ 1120.052846]  [<ffffffff8123935e>] do_filp_open+0x7e/0xe0
[ 1120.053177]  [<ffffffff81233110>] ? lock_rename+0x100/0x100
[ 1120.053524]  [<ffffffff817f4957>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[ 1120.053874]  [<ffffffff8124875c>] ? __alloc_fd+0xbc/0x170
[ 1120.054202]  [<ffffffff81226896>] do_sys_open+0x116/0x1f0
[ 1120.054540]  [<ffffffff8122698e>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
[ 1120.054878]  [<ffffffff817f5136>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad
[ 1120.055221] Code: e1 03 49 d3 e8 e9 41 ae a4 ff 48 8d 0a 48 83 e1 f8 4c 8b 01 8d 0a 83 e1 07 c1 e1 03 49 d3 e8 e9 00 af a4 ff 48 8d 0a 48 83 e1 f8 <4c> 8b 01 8d 0a 83 e1 07 c1 e1 03 49 d3 e8 e9 7b b3 a4 ff b9 f2 
[ 1120.056560] RIP  [<ffffffff817f87d4>] bad_gs+0xd1d/0x1ba9
[ 1120.056909]  RSP <ffff8800c15bbba0>
[ 1120.057220] CR2: ffff880119fc3000

> 
> fs/dcache.c | 7 ++++---
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c
> index ad4a542..0e35049 100644
> --- a/fs/dcache.c
> +++ b/fs/dcache.c
> @@ -2565,7 +2565,8 @@ static inline void __d_add(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
> 		raw_write_seqcount_end(&dentry->d_seq);
> 		__fsnotify_d_instantiate(dentry);
> 	}
> -	_d_rehash(dentry);
> +	if (d_unhashed(dentry))
> +		_d_rehash(dentry);
> 	if (dir)
> 		end_dir_add(dir, n);
> 	spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
> @@ -2584,6 +2585,8 @@ static inline void __d_add(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
> 
> void d_add(struct dentry *entry, struct inode *inode)
> {
> +	BUG_ON(!d_unhashed(entry));
> +
> 	if (inode) {
> 		security_d_instantiate(entry, inode);
> 		spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
> @@ -2986,8 +2989,6 @@ struct dentry *d_splice_alias(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
> 	if (IS_ERR(inode))
> 		return ERR_CAST(inode);
> 
> -	BUG_ON(!d_unhashed(dentry));
> -
> 	if (!inode)
> 		goto out;
> 
> -- 
> 2.1.0

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#1412651

On 6/2/16, 18:46, "linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org on behalf of Oleg Drokin" <linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org on behalf of green@linuxhacker.ru> wrote:

>Hello!
>
>   I just came across a bug (trying to run some Lustre test scripts against NFS, while hunting for another nfsd bug)
>   that seems to be present since at least 2014 that lets users crash nfs client locally.
>
>   Here's some interesting comment quote first from d_obtain_alias:
>
>>  * Cluster filesystems may call this function with a negative, hashed dentry.
>>  * In that case, we know that the inode will be a regular file, and also this
>>  * will only occur during atomic_open. So we need to check for the dentry
>>  * being already hashed only in the final case.
>>  */
>> struct dentry *d_splice_alias(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
>> {
>>         if (IS_ERR(inode))
>>                 return ERR_CAST(inode);
>> 
>>         BUG_ON(!d_unhashed(dentry));
>        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ - This does not align well with the quote above.
>
>It got imported here by commit b5ae6b15bd73e35b129408755a0804287a87e041
>
>Removing the BUG_ON headon is not going to work since the d_rehash of old
>is now folded into __d_add and we might not want to move that condition there.
>
>doing an
>if (d_unhashed(dentry))
>   __d_add(dentry, inode);
>else
>   d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
>
>also does not look super pretty and who knows how all of the previous code
>like _d_find_any_alias would react.
>
>Al, I think you might want to chime in here on how to better handle this?
>
>The problem was there at least since 3.10 it appears where the fs/nfs/dir.c code
>was calling d_materialise_unique() that did require the dentry to be unhashed.
>
>Not sure how this was not hit earlier. The crash looks like this (I added
>a printk to ensure this is what is going on indeed and not some other weird race):
>
>[   64.489326] Calling into d_splice_alias with hashed dentry, dentry->d_inode (null) inode ffff88010f500c70
>[   64.489549] ------------[ cut here ]------------
>[   64.489642] kernel BUG at /home/green/bk/linux/fs/dcache.c:2989!
>[   64.489750] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
>[   64.489853] Modules linked in: loop rpcsec_gss_krb5 joydev pcspkr acpi_cpufreq i2c_piix4 tpm_tis tpm nfsd drm_kms_helper ttm drm serio_raw virtio_blk
>[   64.491111] CPU: 6 PID: 7125 Comm: file_concat.sh Not tainted 4.7.0-rc1-vm-nfs+ #99
>[   64.492069] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
>[   64.492489] task: ffff880110a801c0 ti: ffff8800c283c000 task.ti: ffff8800c283c000
>[   64.493159] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8124292f>]  [<ffffffff8124292f>] d_splice_alias+0x31f/0x480
>[   64.493866] RSP: 0018:ffff8800c283fb20  EFLAGS: 00010282
>[   64.494238] RAX: 0000000000000067 RBX: ffff88010f500c70 RCX: 0000000000000000
>[   64.494625] RDX: 0000000000000067 RSI: ffff8800d08d2ed0 RDI: ffff88010f500c70
>[   64.495021] RBP: ffff8800c283fb78 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
>[   64.495407] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8800d08d2ed0
>[   64.495804] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8800d4a56f00 R15: ffff8800d0bb8c70
>[   64.496199] FS:  00007f94ae25c700(0000) GS:ffff88011f580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
>[   64.496859] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>[   64.497235] CR2: 000055e5d3fb46a4 CR3: 00000000ce364000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
>[   64.497626] Stack:
>[   64.497961]  ffffffff8132154e ffff8800c283fb68 ffffffff81325916 0000000000000000
>[   64.498765]  0000000000000000 ffff8801109459c0 0000000000000000 ffff8800d0bb8c70
>[   64.499578]  ffff8800c283fba0 ffff8800d08d2ed0 ffff8800cb927080 ffff8800c283fc18
>[   64.500385] Call Trace:
>[   64.500727]  [<ffffffff8132154e>] ? nfs_lookup+0x17e/0x320
>[   64.501103]  [<ffffffff81325916>] ? __put_nfs_open_context+0xc6/0xf0
>[   64.501477]  [<ffffffff8132252b>] nfs_atomic_open+0x8b/0x430
>[   64.501850]  [<ffffffff81236def>] lookup_open+0x29f/0x7a0
>[   64.502222]  [<ffffffff812377ce>] path_openat+0x4de/0xfc0
>[   64.502591]  [<ffffffff8123935e>] do_filp_open+0x7e/0xe0
>[   64.502964]  [<ffffffff8124877c>] ? __alloc_fd+0xbc/0x170
>[   64.503347]  [<ffffffff817f4977>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
>[   64.503719]  [<ffffffff8124877c>] ? __alloc_fd+0xbc/0x170
>[   64.504097]  [<ffffffff81226896>] do_sys_open+0x116/0x1f0
>[   64.504465]  [<ffffffff8122698e>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
>[   64.504831]  [<ffffffff817f5176>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad
>[   64.505218] Code: 01 e8 46 20 5b 00 85 db 74 0b 4c 89 ff 4c 63 fb e8 87 d8 ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 2f 3c 00 00 4c 89 f8 e9 5e fe ff ff 0f 0b 48 89 f8 c3 <0f> 0b 48 8b 43 40 4c 8b 78 58 49 8d 8f 58 03 00 00 eb 02 f3 90 
>[   64.508754] RIP  [<ffffffff8124292f>] d_splice_alias+0x31f/0x480
>[   64.509176]  RSP <ffff8800c283fb20>

That would have to be a really tight race, since the code in _nfs4_open_and_get_state() currently reads:

                d_drop(dentry);
                alias = d_exact_alias(dentry, state->inode);
                if (!alias)
                        alias = d_splice_alias(igrab(state->inode), dentry);

IOW: something would have to be acting between the d_drop() and d_splice_alias() above...

Al, I’ve been distracted by personal matters in the past 6 months. What is there to guarantee exclusion of the readdirplus dentry instantiation and the NFSv4 atomic open in the brave new world of VFS, June 2016 vintage?

Cheers
  Trond

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#1412660

On Jun 2, 2016, at 8:44 PM, Trond Myklebust wrote:

> That would have to be a really tight race, since the code in _nfs4_open_and_get_state() currently reads:
> 
> d_drop(dentry);
> alias = d_exact_alias(dentry, state->inode);
> if (!alias)
> alias = d_splice_alias(igrab(state->inode), dentry);

We live in reality where there are no more tight races left.
1 instruction-race is now huge due to commonplace cpu-overcommitted VMs (and hyperthreading), nobody knows
when is your VM cpu going to be preempted by the host (while the other
cpus of the same VM are running ahead full steam).
Stuff that took ages to trigger again to better understand is instant now.

> IOW: something would have to be acting between the d_drop() and d_splice_alias() above…

The other CPU ;)
I checked the readdirplus theory and that's not it, there's some sort of another lookup going, this dentry we crashed on never came through nfs_prime_dcache.

> Al, I’ve been distracted by personal matters in the past 6 months. What is there to guarantee exclusion of the readdirplus dentry instantiation and the NFSv4 atomic open in the brave new world of VFS, June 2016 vintage?

Note this is not a new 2016 vintage bug. I hit this in 3.10 as well (baseline kernel from one well known enterprise vendor, only there we hit it in d_realise_unique).

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#1412735

On Thu, Jun 02, 2016 at 08:54:06PM -0400, Oleg Drokin wrote:

> > Al, I’ve been distracted by personal matters in the past 6 months. What is there to guarantee exclusion of the readdirplus dentry instantiation and the NFSv4 atomic open in the brave new world of VFS, June 2016 vintage?

d_alloc_parallel() use by all parties involved.

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#1412747

On Fri, Jun 03, 2016 at 04:26:25AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 02, 2016 at 08:54:06PM -0400, Oleg Drokin wrote:
> 
> > > Al, I’ve been distracted by personal matters in the past 6 months. What is there to guarantee exclusion of the readdirplus dentry instantiation and the NFSv4 atomic open in the brave new world of VFS, June 2016 vintage?
> 
> d_alloc_parallel() use by all parties involved.

Grr...  That should've been a reply to Trond, obviously.

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#1412728

On Fri, Jun 03, 2016 at 12:44:51AM +0000, Trond Myklebust wrote:

> That would have to be a really tight race, since the code in _nfs4_open_and_get_state() currently reads:
> 
>                 d_drop(dentry);
>                 alias = d_exact_alias(dentry, state->inode);
>                 if (!alias)
>                         alias = d_splice_alias(igrab(state->inode), dentry);
> 
> IOW: something would have to be acting between the d_drop() and d_splice_alias() above...

How?  dentry is
	* negative (it would better be, or we are _really_ fucked)
	* unhashed

How does whoever's rehashing it stumble across that thing?

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#1412741

On Thu, Jun 02, 2016 at 06:46:08PM -0400, Oleg Drokin wrote:
> Hello!
> 
>    I just came across a bug (trying to run some Lustre test scripts against NFS, while hunting for another nfsd bug)
>    that seems to be present since at least 2014 that lets users crash nfs client locally.

> >  * Cluster filesystems may call this function with a negative, hashed dentry.
> >  * In that case, we know that the inode will be a regular file, and also this
> >  * will only occur during atomic_open. So we need to check for the dentry
> >  * being already hashed only in the final case.

Comment is long obsolete and should've been removed.  "Cluster filesystem"
in question was GFS2 and it had been dealt with there.  Mea culpa - should've
removed the comment as soon as that was done.

> Removing the BUG_ON headon is not going to work since the d_rehash of old
> is now folded into __d_add and we might not want to move that condition there.

No, it is not.  It really should not be called that way.

> The problem was there at least since 3.10 it appears where the fs/nfs/dir.c code
> was calling d_materialise_unique() that did require the dentry to be unhashed.
> 
> Not sure how this was not hit earlier. The crash looks like this (I added
> a printk to ensure this is what is going on indeed and not some other weird race):

> [   64.489326] Calling into d_splice_alias with hashed dentry, dentry->d_inode (null) inode ffff88010f500c70

Which of the call sites had that been and how does one reproduce that fun?
If you feel that posting a reproducer in the open is a bad idea, just send
it off-list...

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#1412762

On Jun 2, 2016, at 11:37 PM, Al Viro wrote:

> On Thu, Jun 02, 2016 at 06:46:08PM -0400, Oleg Drokin wrote:
>> Hello!
>> 
>>   I just came across a bug (trying to run some Lustre test scripts against NFS, while hunting for another nfsd bug)
>>   that seems to be present since at least 2014 that lets users crash nfs client locally.
> 
>>> * Cluster filesystems may call this function with a negative, hashed dentry.
>>> * In that case, we know that the inode will be a regular file, and also this
>>> * will only occur during atomic_open. So we need to check for the dentry
>>> * being already hashed only in the final case.
> 
> Comment is long obsolete and should've been removed.  "Cluster filesystem"
> in question was GFS2 and it had been dealt with there.  Mea culpa - should've
> removed the comment as soon as that was done.

Oh, ok. I assumed it was still valid, esp. considering the issue at hand where
what it describes actually happens and NFS is also a cluster filesystem of sorts ;)

>> The problem was there at least since 3.10 it appears where the fs/nfs/dir.c code
>> was calling d_materialise_unique() that did require the dentry to be unhashed.
>> 
>> Not sure how this was not hit earlier. The crash looks like this (I added
>> a printk to ensure this is what is going on indeed and not some other weird race):
> 
>> [   64.489326] Calling into d_splice_alias with hashed dentry, dentry->d_inode (null) inode ffff88010f500c70
> 
> Which of the call sites had that been and how does one reproduce that fun?
> If you feel that posting a reproducer in the open is a bad idea, just send
> it off-list...

This is fs/nfs/dir.c::nfs_lookup() right after no_entry label.

I'll send you the scripts with instructions separately for now.

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#1412781

On Thu, Jun 02, 2016 at 11:43:59PM -0400, Oleg Drokin wrote:

> > Which of the call sites had that been and how does one reproduce that fun?
> > If you feel that posting a reproducer in the open is a bad idea, just send
> > it off-list...
> 
> This is fs/nfs/dir.c::nfs_lookup() right after no_entry label.

Bloody hell...  Was that sucker hashed on the entry into nfs_lookup()?
If we get that with call as a method, we are really fucked.

<greps>

Ho-hum...  One of the goto no_open; in nfs_atomic_open()?  That would
mean a stale negative dentry in dcache that has escaped revalidation...
Wait a minute, didn't nfs ->d_revalidate() skip everything in some
cases, leaving it to ->atomic_open()?

Looks like the right thing to do would be to do d_drop() at no_open:,
just before we call nfs_lookup().  If not earlier, actually...  How
about the following?

diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c
index aaf7bd0..6e3a6f4 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c
@@ -1536,9 +1536,9 @@ int nfs_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 		err = PTR_ERR(inode);
 		trace_nfs_atomic_open_exit(dir, ctx, open_flags, err);
 		put_nfs_open_context(ctx);
+		d_drop(dentry);
 		switch (err) {
 		case -ENOENT:
-			d_drop(dentry);
 			d_add(dentry, NULL);
 			nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
 			break;

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#1412789

On Fri, Jun 03, 2016 at 05:26:48AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:

> Looks like the right thing to do would be to do d_drop() at no_open:,
> just before we call nfs_lookup().  If not earlier, actually...  How
> about the following?

A bit of rationale: dentry in question is negative and attempt to open
it has just failed; in case it's really negative we did that d_drop()
anyway (and then unconditionally rehashed it).  In case when we proceed to
nfs_lookup() and it does not fail, we'll have it rehashed there (with the
right inode).  What do we lose from doing d_drop() on *any* error here?
It's negative, with dubious validity.  In the worst case, we had open
and lookup fail, but it's just us - the sucker really is negative and
somebody else would be able to revalidate it.  If we drop it here (and
not rehash later), that somebody else will have to allocate an in-core
dentry before doing lookup or atomic_open.  Which is negligible extra
burden.

> diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c
> index aaf7bd0..6e3a6f4 100644
> --- a/fs/nfs/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c
> @@ -1536,9 +1536,9 @@ int nfs_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  		err = PTR_ERR(inode);
>  		trace_nfs_atomic_open_exit(dir, ctx, open_flags, err);
>  		put_nfs_open_context(ctx);
> +		d_drop(dentry);
>  		switch (err) {
>  		case -ENOENT:
> -			d_drop(dentry);
>  			d_add(dentry, NULL);
>  			nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
>  			break;

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#1412797

On Fri, Jun 03, 2016 at 05:42:53AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 03, 2016 at 05:26:48AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> 
> > Looks like the right thing to do would be to do d_drop() at no_open:,
> > just before we call nfs_lookup().  If not earlier, actually...  How
> > about the following?
> 
> A bit of rationale: dentry in question is negative and attempt to open
> it has just failed; in case it's really negative we did that d_drop()
> anyway (and then unconditionally rehashed it).  In case when we proceed to
> nfs_lookup() and it does not fail, we'll have it rehashed there (with the
> right inode).  What do we lose from doing d_drop() on *any* error here?
> It's negative, with dubious validity.  In the worst case, we had open
> and lookup fail, but it's just us - the sucker really is negative and
> somebody else would be able to revalidate it.  If we drop it here (and
> not rehash later), that somebody else will have to allocate an in-core
> dentry before doing lookup or atomic_open.  Which is negligible extra
> burden.

I suspect that it got broken in commit 275bb3078 (NFSv4: Move dentry
instantiation into the NFSv4-specific atomic open code).  Prior to that
commit, d_drop() was there (error or no error).  Looks like 3.10+, indeed.
I agree that we shouldn't drop it on successful open, but it needs to be
done on errors.  All of them, not just ENOENT, as in that commit.

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#1412795

On Jun 3, 2016, at 12:26 AM, Al Viro wrote:

> On Thu, Jun 02, 2016 at 11:43:59PM -0400, Oleg Drokin wrote:
> 
>>> Which of the call sites had that been and how does one reproduce that fun?
>>> If you feel that posting a reproducer in the open is a bad idea, just send
>>> it off-list...
>> 
>> This is fs/nfs/dir.c::nfs_lookup() right after no_entry label.
> 
> Bloody hell...  Was that sucker hashed on the entry into nfs_lookup()?
> If we get that with call as a method, we are really fucked.
> 
> <greps>
> 
> Ho-hum...  One of the goto no_open; in nfs_atomic_open()?  That would
> mean a stale negative dentry in dcache that has escaped revalidation...
> Wait a minute, didn't nfs ->d_revalidate() skip everything in some
> cases, leaving it to ->atomic_open()?
> 
> Looks like the right thing to do would be to do d_drop() at no_open:,
> just before we call nfs_lookup().  If not earlier, actually...  How
> about the following?

This one cures the insta-crash I was having, and I see no other ill-effects so far.

> 
> diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c
> index aaf7bd0..6e3a6f4 100644
> --- a/fs/nfs/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c
> @@ -1536,9 +1536,9 @@ int nfs_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
> 		err = PTR_ERR(inode);
> 		trace_nfs_atomic_open_exit(dir, ctx, open_flags, err);
> 		put_nfs_open_context(ctx);
> +		d_drop(dentry);
> 		switch (err) {
> 		case -ENOENT:
> -			d_drop(dentry);
> 			d_add(dentry, NULL);
> 			nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
> 			break;

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#1412824

On Fri, Jun 03, 2016 at 12:58:10AM -0400, Oleg Drokin wrote:

> This one cures the insta-crash I was having, and I see no other ill-effects so far.

OK...  I can take it through vfs.git, but I think it'd be better off in
NFS tree.  Is everyone OK with something like the following?

make nfs_atomic_open() call d_drop() on all ->open_context() errors.

In "NFSv4: Move dentry instantiation into the NFSv4-specific atomic open code"
unconditional d_drop() after the ->open_context() had been removed.  It had
been correct for success cases (there ->open_context() itself had been doing
dcache manipulations), but not for error ones.  Only one of those (ENOENT)
got a compensatory d_drop() added in that commit, but in fact it should've
been done for all errors.  As it is, the case of O_CREAT non-exclusive open
on a hashed negative dentry racing with e.g. symlink creation from another
client ended up with ->open_context() getting an error and proceeding to
call nfs_lookup().  On a hashed dentry, which would've instantly triggered
BUG_ON() in d_materialise_unique() (or, these days, its equivalent in
d_splice_alias()).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.10+
Tested-by: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c
index aaf7bd0..6e3a6f4 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c
@@ -1536,9 +1536,9 @@ int nfs_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 		err = PTR_ERR(inode);
 		trace_nfs_atomic_open_exit(dir, ctx, open_flags, err);
 		put_nfs_open_context(ctx);
+		d_drop(dentry);
 		switch (err) {
 		case -ENOENT:
-			d_drop(dentry);
 			d_add(dentry, NULL);
 			nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
 			break;

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#1415579

Well, I have some bad news.

This patch does not fix the issue 100% of the time apparently, I just hit it again.

Only this time it's much harder to trigger, but stack is the same
(looks a bit different due to a compiler change). Must be some much narrower race now.

I still don't have a crashdump, though (apparently makedumpfile that is used by
kexec-tools is behind times and does not work with 4.7.0-rc1 kernels) so I cannot
tell you more about the dentry still.

[12470.365211] kernel BUG at /home/green/bk/linux/fs/dcache.c:2989!
[12470.366336] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[12470.366927] Modules linked in: loop rpcsec_gss_krb5 joydev pcspkr acpi_cpufreq i2c_piix4 tpm_tis virtio_console tpm nfsd ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm serio_raw virtio_blk floppy
[12470.368917] CPU: 7 PID: 15952 Comm: cat Not tainted 4.7.0-rc1-vm-nfs+ #115
[12470.369554] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[12470.370137] task: ffff8800447447c0 ti: ffff880049a48000 task.ti: ffff880049a48000
[12470.371214] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81288061>]  [<ffffffff81288061>] d_splice_alias+0x1e1/0x470
[12470.372340] RSP: 0018:ffff880049a4bab8  EFLAGS: 00010286
[12470.372906] RAX: ffff8800393372a8 RBX: ffff88003c781000 RCX: 0000000000000001
[12470.373525] RDX: 0000000000001895 RSI: ffff88003c781000 RDI: ffff8800393372a8
[12470.374145] RBP: ffff880049a4baf0 R08: 00001353641935c2 R09: 0000000000000000
[12470.374777] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88003a7b9300
[12470.375407] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003bf0d2a8 R15: 0000000000000000
[12470.376016] FS:  00007fbb07feb700(0000) GS:ffff88006b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[12470.377106] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[12470.377693] CR2: 000055a498c7bdc8 CR3: 00000000479b3000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[12470.378311] Stack:
[12470.378823]  ffff880040008f00 0000000029e67876 ffff88003c781000 ffff88003a7b9300
[12470.379946]  0000000000000000 ffff88003bf0d2a8 0000000000000000 ffff880049a4bb48
[12470.381075]  ffffffff8137d63c ffffffffffffffeb ffff880000000000 0000000000000000
[12470.382228] Call Trace:
[12470.382766]  [<ffffffff8137d63c>] nfs_lookup+0x15c/0x420
[12470.383363]  [<ffffffff8137f681>] nfs_atomic_open+0xb1/0x700
[12470.383961]  [<ffffffff812792ea>] lookup_open+0x2ea/0x770
[12470.384570]  [<ffffffff8127c76f>] path_openat+0x7ff/0x1030
[12470.385169]  [<ffffffff8127d15f>] ? getname_flags+0x4f/0x1f0
[12470.385770]  [<ffffffff8104a485>] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x25/0x40
[12470.386361]  [<ffffffff8127e1d1>] do_filp_open+0x91/0x100
[12470.386945]  [<ffffffff8188aa97>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[12470.387559]  [<ffffffff8128f810>] ? __alloc_fd+0x100/0x200
[12470.388158]  [<ffffffff8126a230>] do_sys_open+0x130/0x220
[12470.388758]  [<ffffffff8126a33e>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
[12470.389327]  [<ffffffff8188b3fc>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbd
[12470.389929] Code: 83 c4 10 4c 89 f8 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 48 89 df e8 f1 d6 ff ff 4c 89 f7 e8 19 2a 60 00 45 31 ff eb d9 49 89 ff eb d4 <0f> 0b 48 8b 43 50 4c 8b 78 68 49 8d 97 c8 03 00 00 eb 02 f3 90 
[12470.392299] RIP  [<ffffffff81288061>] d_splice_alias+0x1e1/0x470


On Jun 3, 2016, at 1:56 AM, Al Viro wrote:

> On Fri, Jun 03, 2016 at 12:58:10AM -0400, Oleg Drokin wrote:
> 
>> This one cures the insta-crash I was having, and I see no other ill-effects so far.
> 
> OK...  I can take it through vfs.git, but I think it'd be better off in
> NFS tree.  Is everyone OK with something like the following?
> 
> make nfs_atomic_open() call d_drop() on all ->open_context() errors.
> 
> In "NFSv4: Move dentry instantiation into the NFSv4-specific atomic open code"
> unconditional d_drop() after the ->open_context() had been removed.  It had
> been correct for success cases (there ->open_context() itself had been doing
> dcache manipulations), but not for error ones.  Only one of those (ENOENT)
> got a compensatory d_drop() added in that commit, but in fact it should've
> been done for all errors.  As it is, the case of O_CREAT non-exclusive open
> on a hashed negative dentry racing with e.g. symlink creation from another
> client ended up with ->open_context() getting an error and proceeding to
> call nfs_lookup().  On a hashed dentry, which would've instantly triggered
> BUG_ON() in d_materialise_unique() (or, these days, its equivalent in
> d_splice_alias()).
> 
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.10+
> Tested-by: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
> ---
> diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c
> index aaf7bd0..6e3a6f4 100644
> --- a/fs/nfs/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c
> @@ -1536,9 +1536,9 @@ int nfs_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
> 		err = PTR_ERR(inode);
> 		trace_nfs_atomic_open_exit(dir, ctx, open_flags, err);
> 		put_nfs_open_context(ctx);
> +		d_drop(dentry);
> 		switch (err) {
> 		case -ENOENT:
> -			d_drop(dentry);
> 			d_add(dentry, NULL);
> 			nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
> 			break;

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#1418982

On Jun 6, 2016, at 7:36 PM, Oleg Drokin wrote:

> Well, I have some bad news.
> 
> This patch does not fix the issue 100% of the time apparently, I just hit it again.

Ok, so now finally a piece of good news.
Whatever was causing this other much harder to hit crash is gone in -rc2, gone are
some other disturbing things I saw.

Hopefully this patch will get propagated everywhere soonish.

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#1419582

On Jun 9, 2016, at 9:33 PM, Oleg Drokin wrote:

> 
> On Jun 6, 2016, at 7:36 PM, Oleg Drokin wrote:
> 
>> Well, I have some bad news.
>> 
>> This patch does not fix the issue 100% of the time apparently, I just hit it again.
> 
> Ok, so now finally a piece of good news.
> Whatever was causing this other much harder to hit crash is gone in -rc2, gone are
> some other disturbing things I saw.

Famous last words, I guess.
It all returned overnight.

But this time it's different from the past couple.

0xffffffff813aa8bb is in nfs4_do_open (/home/green/bk/linux/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c:2482).
2477                    d_drop(dentry);
2478                    alias = d_exact_alias(dentry, state->inode);
2479                    if (!alias)
2480                            alias = d_splice_alias(igrab(state->inode), dentry);
2481                    /* d_splice_alias() can't fail here - it's a non-directory */

So it appears the dentry that was negative turned positive in the middle of
d_exact_alias call… and also despite us doing d_drop(dentry), it's also already
hashed?
If this can happen in the middle of our operations here, same thing
presumably can happen in the other place we patched up in nfs_atomic_open - 
we do d_drop there, but by the time we get into d_splice_alias it's now
all hashed again by some racing thread, that would explain
some of the rarer earlier crashes I had in -rc1 after the initial fix.

I wonder if it could be a remote-fs specific open vs open race?

Say we have atomic open for parent1/file1, this locks parent1 and proceeds to lookup
file1.
Now before the lookup commences, some other thread moves file1 to parent2
and yet some other thread goes to open parent2/file1.
Eventually it all converges with two threads trying to instantiate file1,
if we get it "just wrong" then a clash like what we see can happen, no?
Hm, I guess then both opens would have their own dentry and it's only inode that's
shared, so that cannot be it.
How can anything find a dentry we presumably just allocated and hash it while we
are not done with it, I wonder?
Also I wonder if all of this is somehow related to this other problem I am having
where drop_nlink reports going into negative territory on rename() call, I hit this
twice already and I guess I just need to convert that to BUG_ON instead for a
closer examination.


The dentry is (I finally have a crashdump):

crash> p *(struct dentry *)0xffff880055dbd2e8
$4 = {
  d_flags = 4718796, 
  d_seq = {
    sequence = 4, 
    dep_map = {
      key = 0xffffffff8337b1c0 <__key.41115>, 
      class_cache = {0x0, 0x0}, 
      name = 0xffffffff81c79c66 "&dentry->d_seq", 
      cpu = 6, 
      ip = 6510615555426900570
    }
  }, 
  d_hash = {
    next = 0x0, 
    pprev = 0xffffc900000fd9c0
  }, 
  d_parent = 0xffff8800079d1008, 
  d_name = {
    {
      {
        hash = 2223188567, 
        len = 2
      }, 
      hash_len = 10813123159
    }, 
    name = 0xffff880055dbd358 "10"
  }, 
  d_inode = 0xffff880066d8ab38, 
  d_iname = "10\000ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ", 
  d_lockref = {
    {
      {
        lock = {
          {
            rlock = {
              raw_lock = {
                val = {
                  counter = 0
                }
              }, 
              magic = 3735899821, 
              owner_cpu = 4294967295, 
              owner = 0xffffffffffffffff, 
              dep_map = {
                key = 0xffffffff8337b1c8 <__key.41114>, 
                class_cache = {0xffffffff82c1c3a0 <lock_classes+47616>, 0x0}, 
                name = 0xffffffff81c65bc8 "&(&dentry->d_lockref.lock)->rlock", 
                cpu = 3, 
                ip = 18446744071583760701
              }
            }, 
            {
              __padding = "\000\000\000\000╜N╜чЪЪЪЪZZZZЪЪЪЪЪЪЪЪ", 
              dep_map = {
                key = 0xffffffff8337b1c8 <__key.41114>, 
                class_cache = {0xffffffff82c1c3a0 <lock_classes+47616>, 0x0}, 
                name = 0xffffffff81c65bc8 "&(&dentry->d_lockref.lock)->rlock", 
                cpu = 3, 
                ip = 18446744071583760701
              }
            }
          }
        }, 
        count = 3
      }
    }
  }, 
  d_op = 0xffffffff81a46780 <nfs4_dentry_operations>, 
  d_sb = 0xffff88004eaf3000, 
  d_time = 6510615555426956154, 
  d_fsdata = 0x0, 
  {
    d_lru = {
      next = 0xffff880066d7e3e8, 
      prev = 0xffff8800036736c8
    }, 
    d_wait = 0xffff880066d7e3e8
  }, 
  d_child = {
    next = 0xffff8800268629b8, 
    prev = 0xffff8800079d1128
  }, 
  d_subdirs = {
    next = 0xffff880055dbd408, 
    prev = 0xffff880055dbd408
  }, 
  d_u = {
    d_alias = {
      next = 0x0, 
      pprev = 0xffff880066d8ad20
    }, 
    d_in_lookup_hash = {
      next = 0x0, 
      pprev = 0xffff880066d8ad20
    }, 
    d_rcu = {
      next = 0x0, 
      func = 0xffff880066d8ad20
    }
  }
}

[22845.516232] kernel BUG at /home/green/bk/linux/fs/dcache.c:2989!
[22845.516864] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[22845.517350] Modules linked in: loop rpcsec_gss_krb5 acpi_cpufreq joydev tpm_tis tpm virtio_console i2c_piix4 pcspkr nfsd ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm virtio_blk serio_raw floppy
[22845.519236] CPU: 0 PID: 2894259 Comm: cat Not tainted 4.7.0-rc2-vm-nfs+ #122
[22845.519843] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[22845.520259] task: ffff8800640d8e40 ti: ffff88004665c000 task.ti: ffff88004665c000
[22845.520975] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81287811>]  [<ffffffff81287811>] d_splice_alias+0x1e1/0x470
[22845.521746] RSP: 0018:ffff88004665fa08  EFLAGS: 00010286
[22845.522122] RAX: ffff880066d8ab38 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
[22845.522524] RDX: 000000000000191a RSI: ffff880055dbd2e8 RDI: ffff880066d8ab38
[22845.522926] RBP: ffff88004665fa40 R08: 0000235352190a66 R09: ffff880055dbd2e8
[22845.523328] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880072d43c00
[22845.523731] R13: ffff880072d43c00 R14: ffff88004883a580 R15: ffff880052615800
[22845.524131] FS:  00007f3b2c27d700(0000) GS:ffff88006b400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[22845.524846] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[22845.525225] CR2: 000055649285c0d0 CR3: 000000004d961000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[22845.525628] Stack:
[22845.525964]  ffff88004665fa20 ffffffff8188a1f7 0000000000000000 ffff880072d43c00
[22845.526700]  ffff880072d43c00 ffff88004883a580 ffff880052615800 ffff88004665fb20
[22845.527433]  ffffffff813aa8bb ffffffff00000000 ffff8800024000c0 ffff88004665fd80
[22845.528161] Call Trace:
[22845.528504]  [<ffffffff8188a1f7>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[22845.528943]  [<ffffffff813aa8bb>] nfs4_do_open+0xaeb/0xb10
[22845.529331]  [<ffffffff813aa9d0>] nfs4_atomic_open+0xf0/0x110
[22845.529718]  [<ffffffff8137eefc>] nfs_atomic_open+0x1ac/0x700
[22845.530112]  [<ffffffff8127900a>] lookup_open+0x2ea/0x770
[22845.530488]  [<ffffffff8127bee5>] path_openat+0x6e5/0xc20
[22845.530881]  [<ffffffff8104a425>] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x25/0x40
[22845.531268]  [<ffffffff8127d981>] do_filp_open+0x91/0x100
[22845.531645]  [<ffffffff8188a1f7>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[22845.532027]  [<ffffffff8128efc0>] ? __alloc_fd+0x100/0x200
[22845.532405]  [<ffffffff81269f80>] do_sys_open+0x130/0x220
[22845.533157]  [<ffffffff8126a08e>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20

vmcore is at http://knox.linuxhacker.ru/tmp/dentry2/vmcore.gz
vmlinux is at http://knox.linuxhacker.ru/tmp/dentry2/vmlinux.gz

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#1413352 — Dcache oops

I am dropping NFS people since it seems to be converting into a generic VFS/dcache bug even though you need NFS or the like to trigger it - the lookup_open path.

On Jun 3, 2016, at 12:26 AM, Al Viro wrote:

> Looks like the right thing to do would be to do d_drop() at no_open:,
> just before we call nfs_lookup().  If not earlier, actually...  How
> about the following?

So with the below patch applied I get the same crash as with the patch from me
that allowed unhashed dentries to come through.
Same workload, but this time it takes much longer to trigger, so must be some
race.

[ 2642.364383] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880113f82000
[ 2642.365014] IP: [<ffffffff817f87d4>] bad_gs+0xd1d/0x1ba9
[ 2642.365590] PGD 2dca067 PUD 2dcd067 PMD 11ff61067 PTE 8000000113f82060
[ 2642.366200] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[ 2642.366719] Modules linked in: loop rpcsec_gss_krb5 acpi_cpufreq tpm_tis joydev i2c_piix4 pcspkr tpm nfsd drm_kms_helper ttm drm virtio_blk serio_raw
[ 2642.367852] CPU: 2 PID: 18446 Comm: cat Not tainted 4.7.0-rc1-vm-nfs+ #103
[ 2642.368372] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[ 2642.368873] task: ffff8800d6956280 ti: ffff8800d7274000 task.ti: ffff8800d7274000
[ 2642.369810] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff817f87d4>]  [<ffffffff817f87d4>] bad_gs+0xd1d/0x1ba9
[ 2642.370750] RSP: 0018:ffff8800d7277ba0  EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 2642.371239] RAX: ffff8800c3a6ff30 RBX: ffff8800c3a6ff00 RCX: ffff880113f82000
[ 2642.371765] RDX: ffff880113f82000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000002
[ 2642.372286] RBP: ffff8800d7277be8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8800c3a6fed0
[ 2642.372818] R10: 0000000000000059 R11: ffff8800d6956dd0 R12: ffff880111567ed0
[ 2642.373415] R13: ffff8800d7277df0 R14: ffff8800c3a6ff50 R15: 0000000084832a57
[ 2642.373940] FS:  00007fa1814a4700(0000) GS:ffff88011f480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 2642.374877] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 2642.375378] CR2: ffff880113f82000 CR3: 00000000d605c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 2642.375881] Stack:
[ 2642.376295]  ffffffff81243a55 0000000000000096 ffff880113f82000 ffffffff00000002
[ 2642.377204]  000000000000bc04 ffff8800d7277df0 ffff880111567ed0 ffff8800d7277de0
[ 2642.378113]  ffff8800d7277df0 ffff8800d7277c18 ffffffff81243c84 ffffffff81236c4e
[ 2642.379022] Call Trace:
[ 2642.379451]  [<ffffffff81243a55>] ? __d_lookup+0x5/0x1b0
[ 2642.379920]  [<ffffffff81243c84>] d_lookup+0x84/0xb0
[ 2642.380388]  [<ffffffff81236c4e>] ? lookup_open+0xfe/0x7a0
[ 2642.380862]  [<ffffffff81236c4e>] lookup_open+0xfe/0x7a0
[ 2642.381374]  [<ffffffff81237c3f>] path_openat+0x94f/0xfc0
[ 2642.381852]  [<ffffffff8123935e>] do_filp_open+0x7e/0xe0
[ 2642.382182]  [<ffffffff81233110>] ? lock_rename+0x100/0x100
[ 2642.382747]  [<ffffffff817f4947>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[ 2642.383324]  [<ffffffff8124877c>] ? __alloc_fd+0xbc/0x170
[ 2642.383864]  [<ffffffff81226896>] do_sys_open+0x116/0x1f0
[ 2642.384230]  [<ffffffff8122698e>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
[ 2642.384569]  [<ffffffff817f5136>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad
[ 2642.398718] Code: e1 03 49 d3 e8 e9 61 ae a4 ff 48 8d 0a 48 83 e1 f8 4c 8b 01 8d 0a 83 e1 07 c1 e1 03 49 d3 e8 e9 20 af a4 ff 48 8d 0a 48 83 e1 f8 <4c> 8b 01 8d 0a 83 e1 07 c1 e1 03 49 d3 e8 e9 9b b3 a4 ff b9 f2 
[ 2642.400892] RIP  [<ffffffff817f87d4>] bad_gs+0xd1d/0x1ba9
[ 2642.401417]  RSP <ffff8800d7277ba0>
[ 2642.401856] CR2: ffff880113f82000

Hm, somehow crashdumping support is broken for the newish kernels on my test box, I guess
I'll try to fix it and then re-reproduce to better understand what's going on here,
this trace is all I have for now in case anybody has any immediate ideas.


> 
> diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c
> index aaf7bd0..6e3a6f4 100644
> --- a/fs/nfs/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c
> @@ -1536,9 +1536,9 @@ int nfs_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
> 		err = PTR_ERR(inode);
> 		trace_nfs_atomic_open_exit(dir, ctx, open_flags, err);
> 		put_nfs_open_context(ctx);
> +		d_drop(dentry);
> 		switch (err) {
> 		case -ENOENT:
> -			d_drop(dentry);
> 			d_add(dentry, NULL);
> 			nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
> 			break;

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#1413384 — Re: Dcache oops

On Fri, Jun 03, 2016 at 12:38:40PM -0400, Oleg Drokin wrote:
> I am dropping NFS people since it seems to be converting into a generic VFS/dcache bug even though you need NFS or the like to trigger it - the lookup_open path.

NFS bug is real; there might very well be something else, but that d_drop()
in nfs_atomic_open() needs to be restored.

> [ 2642.364383] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880113f82000
> [ 2642.365014] IP: [<ffffffff817f87d4>] bad_gs+0xd1d/0x1ba9

*ow*
Could you dump your vmlinux (and System.map) somewhere on anonftp?
This 'bad_gs' is there simply because it's one of the few labels in
.fixup - to say anything useful we'll need to find out where we'd
really come from.

> [ 2642.369810] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff817f87d4>]  [<ffffffff817f87d4>] bad_gs+0xd1d/0x1ba9
> [ 2642.370750] RSP: 0018:ffff8800d7277ba0  EFLAGS: 00010286
> [ 2642.371239] RAX: ffff8800c3a6ff30 RBX: ffff8800c3a6ff00 RCX: ffff880113f82000
> [ 2642.371765] RDX: ffff880113f82000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000002
> [ 2642.372286] RBP: ffff8800d7277be8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8800c3a6fed0
> [ 2642.372818] R10: 0000000000000059 R11: ffff8800d6956dd0 R12: ffff880111567ed0
> [ 2642.373415] R13: ffff8800d7277df0 R14: ffff8800c3a6ff50 R15: 0000000084832a57
> [ 2642.373940] FS:  00007fa1814a4700(0000) GS:ffff88011f480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> [ 2642.374877] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> [ 2642.375378] CR2: ffff880113f82000 CR3: 00000000d605c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
> [ 2642.375881] Stack:
> [ 2642.376295]  ffffffff81243a55 0000000000000096 ffff880113f82000 ffffffff00000002
> [ 2642.377204]  000000000000bc04 ffff8800d7277df0 ffff880111567ed0 ffff8800d7277de0
> [ 2642.378113]  ffff8800d7277df0 ffff8800d7277c18 ffffffff81243c84 ffffffff81236c4e
> [ 2642.379022] Call Trace:
> [ 2642.379451]  [<ffffffff81243a55>] ? __d_lookup+0x5/0x1b0
> [ 2642.379920]  [<ffffffff81243c84>] d_lookup+0x84/0xb0
> [ 2642.380388]  [<ffffffff81236c4e>] ? lookup_open+0xfe/0x7a0
> [ 2642.380862]  [<ffffffff81236c4e>] lookup_open+0xfe/0x7a0
> [ 2642.381374]  [<ffffffff81237c3f>] path_openat+0x94f/0xfc0
> [ 2642.381852]  [<ffffffff8123935e>] do_filp_open+0x7e/0xe0
> [ 2642.382182]  [<ffffffff81233110>] ? lock_rename+0x100/0x100
> [ 2642.382747]  [<ffffffff817f4947>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
> [ 2642.383324]  [<ffffffff8124877c>] ? __alloc_fd+0xbc/0x170
> [ 2642.383864]  [<ffffffff81226896>] do_sys_open+0x116/0x1f0
> [ 2642.384230]  [<ffffffff8122698e>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
> [ 2642.384569]  [<ffffffff817f5136>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad
> [ 2642.398718] Code: e1 03 49 d3 e8 e9 61 ae a4 ff 48 8d 0a 48 83 e1 f8 4c 8b 01 8d 0a 83 e1 07 c1 e1 03 49 d3 e8 e9 20 af a4 ff 48 8d 0a 48 83 e1 f8 <4c> 8b 01 8d 0a 83 e1 07 c1 e1 03 49 d3 e8 e9 9b b3 a4 ff b9 f2 
> [ 2642.400892] RIP  [<ffffffff817f87d4>] bad_gs+0xd1d/0x1ba9
> [ 2642.401417]  RSP <ffff8800d7277ba0>
> [ 2642.401856] CR2: ffff880113f82000
> 
> Hm, somehow crashdumping support is broken for the newish kernels on my test box, I guess
> I'll try to fix it and then re-reproduce to better understand what's going on here,
> this trace is all I have for now in case anybody has any immediate ideas.

PS: Oleg, fix your MUA, please - long lines in mail are bloody annoying.

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