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[PATCH 4.4 00/86] 4.4.12-stable review

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  [PATCH 4.4 00/86] 4.4.12-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-30 23:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 83/86] hpfs: implement the show_options method Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-30 23:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 80/86] SIGNAL: Move generic copy_siginfo() to signal.h Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-30 23:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 70/86] serial: samsung: Reorder the sequence of clock control when call s3c24xx_serial_set_termios() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-30 23:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 63/86] tty: vt, return error when con_startup fails Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-30 23:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 54/86] USB: leave LPM alone if possible when binding/unbinding interface drivers Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-30 23:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 75/86] ALSA: hda - Fix headphone noise on Dell XPS 13 9360 Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-30 23:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 73/86] mcb: Fixed bar number assignment for the gdd Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-30 23:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 77/86] ALSA: hda - Fix headset mic detection problem for one Dell machine Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-30 23:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 78/86] IB/srp: Fix a debug kernel crash Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-30 23:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 01/86] Btrfs: dont use src fd for printk Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-30 23:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 49/86] USB: serial: option: add more ZTE device ids Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-30 23:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 86/86] kbuild: move -Wunused-const-variable to W=1 warning level Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-30 23:20 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 55/86] usb: gadget: udc: core: Fix argument of dev_err() in usb_gadget_map_request() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-30 23:50 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 02/86] perf/x86/intel/pt: Generate PMI in the STOP region as well Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 47/86] USB: serial: io_edgeport: fix memory leaks in probe error path Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 11/86] arm/arm64: KVM: Enforce Break-Before-Make on Stage-2 page tables Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 43/86] USB: serial: mxuport: fix use-after-free in probe error path Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 42/86] mei: bus: call mei_cl_read_start under device lock Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 46/86] USB: serial: io_edgeport: fix memory leaks in attach error path Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 51/86] usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix EFAULT generation for async read operations Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 45/86] USB: serial: quatech2: fix use-after-free in probe error path Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 41/86] mei: amthif: discard not read messages Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:00 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 31/86] mmc: mmc: Fix partition switch timeout for some eMMCs Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 15/86] fs/cifs: correctly to anonymous authentication for the LANMAN authentication Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 29/86] irqchip/gic-v3: Configure all interrupts as non-secure Group-1 Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 06/86] arm64: Fix typo in the pmdp_huge_get_and_clear() definition Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 13/86] remove directory incorrectly tries to set delete on close on non-empty directories Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 32/86] mmc: sdhci-acpi: Remove MMC_CAP_BUS_WIDTH_TEST for Intel controllers Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 19/86] ring-buffer: Use long for nr_pages to avoid overflow failures Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 03/86] perf/core: Fix perf_event_open() vs. execve() race Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 20/86] ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 28/86] irqchip/gic: Ensure ordering between read of INTACK and shared data Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 05/86] ext4: iterate over buffer heads correctly in move_extent_per_page() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 12/86] kvm: arm64: Fix EC field in inject_abt64 Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 09/86] arm64: Implement pmdp_set_access_flags() for hardware AF/DBM Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 07/86] arm64: Ensure pmd_present() returns false after pmd_mknotpresent() Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 36/86] mmc: sdhci-pci: Remove MMC_CAP_BUS_WIDTH_TEST for Intel controllers Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 16/86] fs/cifs: correctly to anonymous authentication for the NTLM(v1) authentication Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 33/86] ACPI / osi: Fix an issue that acpi_osi=!* cannot disable ACPICA internal strings Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 18/86] asix: Fix offset calculation in asix_rx_fixup() causing slow transmissions Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 23/86] crypto: sun4i-ss - Replace spinlock_bh by spin_lock_irq{save|restore} Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 38/86] Bluetooth: vhci: purge unhandled skbs Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 27/86] Input: pwm-beeper - fix - scheduling while atomic Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 30/86] can: fix handling of unmodifiable configuration options Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 17/86] fs/cifs: correctly to anonymous authentication for the NTLM(v2) authentication Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 10/86] arm64: cpuinfo: Missing NULL terminator in compat_hwcap_str Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 24/86] clk: qcom: msm8916: Fix crypto clock flags Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 14/86] fs/cifs: correctly to anonymous authentication via NTLMSSP Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 22/86] crypto: talitos - fix ahash algorithms registration Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 08/86] arm64: Implement ptep_set_access_flags() for hardware AF/DBM Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    [PATCH 4.4 26/86] mfd: omap-usb-tll: Fix scheduling while atomic BUG Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-05-31 00:10 +0200
    Re: [PATCH 4.4 00/86] 4.4.12-stable review Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com> - 2016-06-01 16:30 +0200

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#1409627 — [PATCH 4.4 51/86] usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix EFAULT generation for async read operations

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>

commit 332a5b446b7916d272c2a659a3b20909ce34d2c1 upstream.

In the current implementation functionfs generates a EFAULT for async read
operations if the read buffer size is larger than the URB data size. Since
a application does not necessarily know how much data the host side is
going to send it typically supplies a buffer larger than the actual data,
which will then result in a EFAULT error.

This behaviour was introduced while refactoring the code to use iov_iter
interface in commit c993c39b8639 ("gadget/function/f_fs.c: use put iov_iter
into io_data"). The original code took the minimum over the URB size and
the user buffer size and then attempted to copy that many bytes using
copy_to_user(). If copy_to_user() could not copy all data a EFAULT error
was generated. Restore the original behaviour by only generating a EFAULT
error when the number of bytes copied is not the size of the URB and the
target buffer has not been fully filled.

Commit 342f39a6c8d3 ("usb: gadget: f_fs: fix check in read operation")
already fixed the same problem for the synchronous read path.

Fixes: c993c39b8639 ("gadget/function/f_fs.c: use put iov_iter into io_data")
Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com>
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ static void ffs_user_copy_worker(struct
 	if (io_data->read && ret > 0) {
 		use_mm(io_data->mm);
 		ret = copy_to_iter(io_data->buf, ret, &io_data->data);
-		if (iov_iter_count(&io_data->data))
+		if (ret != io_data->req->actual && iov_iter_count(&io_data->data))
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 		unuse_mm(io_data->mm);
 	}

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#1409633 — [PATCH 4.4 45/86] USB: serial: quatech2: fix use-after-free in probe error path

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>

commit 028c49f5e02a257c94129cd815f7c8485f51d4ef upstream.

The interface read URB is submitted in attach, but was only unlinked by
the driver at disconnect.

In case of a late probe error (e.g. due to failed minor allocation),
disconnect is never called and we would end up with active URBs for an
unbound interface. This in turn could lead to deallocated memory being
dereferenced in the completion callback.

Fixes: f7a33e608d9a ("USB: serial: add quatech2 usb to serial driver")
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/serial/quatech2.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/serial/quatech2.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/quatech2.c
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ static void qt2_release(struct usb_seria
 
 	serial_priv = usb_get_serial_data(serial);
 
+	usb_kill_urb(serial_priv->read_urb);
 	usb_free_urb(serial_priv->read_urb);
 	kfree(serial_priv->read_buffer);
 	kfree(serial_priv);

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#1409634 — [PATCH 4.4 41/86] mei: amthif: discard not read messages

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com>

commit 9d04ee11db7bf0d848266cbfd7db336097a0e239 upstream.

When a message is received and amthif client is not in reading state
the message is ignored and left dangling in the queue. This may happen
after one of the amthif host connections is closed w/o completing the
reading. Another client will pick up a wrong message on next read
attempt which will lead to link reset.
To prevent this the driver has to properly discard the message when
amthif client is not in reading state.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/misc/mei/amthif.c    |    4 +++-
 drivers/misc/mei/interrupt.c |    1 -
 drivers/misc/mei/mei_dev.h   |    2 ++
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/misc/mei/amthif.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/mei/amthif.c
@@ -417,8 +417,10 @@ int mei_amthif_irq_read_msg(struct mei_c
 
 	dev = cl->dev;
 
-	if (dev->iamthif_state != MEI_IAMTHIF_READING)
+	if (dev->iamthif_state != MEI_IAMTHIF_READING) {
+		mei_irq_discard_msg(dev, mei_hdr);
 		return 0;
+	}
 
 	ret = mei_cl_irq_read_msg(cl, mei_hdr, cmpl_list);
 	if (ret)
--- a/drivers/misc/mei/interrupt.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/mei/interrupt.c
@@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ static inline int mei_cl_hbm_equal(struc
  * @dev: mei device
  * @hdr: message header
  */
-static inline
 void mei_irq_discard_msg(struct mei_device *dev, struct mei_msg_hdr *hdr)
 {
 	/*
--- a/drivers/misc/mei/mei_dev.h
+++ b/drivers/misc/mei/mei_dev.h
@@ -782,6 +782,8 @@ bool mei_hbuf_acquire(struct mei_device
 
 bool mei_write_is_idle(struct mei_device *dev);
 
+void mei_irq_discard_msg(struct mei_device *dev, struct mei_msg_hdr *hdr);
+
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_FS)
 int mei_dbgfs_register(struct mei_device *dev, const char *name);
 void mei_dbgfs_deregister(struct mei_device *dev);

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#1409640 — [PATCH 4.4 31/86] mmc: mmc: Fix partition switch timeout for some eMMCs

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>

commit 1c447116d017a98c90f8f71c8c5a611e0aa42178 upstream.

Some eMMCs set the partition switch timeout too low.

Now typically eMMCs are considered a critical component (e.g. because
they store the root file system) and consequently are expected to be
reliable.  Thus we can neglect the use case where eMMCs can't switch
reliably and we might want a lower timeout to facilitate speedy
recovery.

Although we could employ a quirk for the cards that are affected (if
we could identify them all), as described above, there is little
benefit to having a low timeout, so instead simply set a minimum
timeout.

The minimum is set to 300ms somewhat arbitrarily - the examples that
have been seen had a timeout of 10ms but were sometimes taking 60-70ms.

Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/mmc/core/mmc.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/mmc/core/mmc.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/core/mmc.c
@@ -333,6 +333,9 @@ static void mmc_manage_gp_partitions(str
 	}
 }
 
+/* Minimum partition switch timeout in milliseconds */
+#define MMC_MIN_PART_SWITCH_TIME	300
+
 /*
  * Decode extended CSD.
  */
@@ -397,6 +400,10 @@ static int mmc_decode_ext_csd(struct mmc
 
 		/* EXT_CSD value is in units of 10ms, but we store in ms */
 		card->ext_csd.part_time = 10 * ext_csd[EXT_CSD_PART_SWITCH_TIME];
+		/* Some eMMC set the value too low so set a minimum */
+		if (card->ext_csd.part_time &&
+		    card->ext_csd.part_time < MMC_MIN_PART_SWITCH_TIME)
+			card->ext_csd.part_time = MMC_MIN_PART_SWITCH_TIME;
 
 		/* Sleep / awake timeout in 100ns units */
 		if (sa_shift > 0 && sa_shift <= 0x17)

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#1409641 — [PATCH 4.4 15/86] fs/cifs: correctly to anonymous authentication for the LANMAN authentication

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

commit fa8f3a354bb775ec586e4475bcb07f7dece97e0c upstream.

Only server which map unknown users to guest will allow
access using a non-null LMChallengeResponse.

For Samba it's the "map to guest = bad user" option.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11913

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/cifs/sess.c |   28 ++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/cifs/sess.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/sess.c
@@ -678,20 +678,24 @@ sess_auth_lanman(struct sess_data *sess_
 
 	pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 &= ~SMBFLG2_UNICODE;
 
-	/* no capabilities flags in old lanman negotiation */
-	pSMB->old_req.PasswordLength = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
+	if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
+		/* no capabilities flags in old lanman negotiation */
+		pSMB->old_req.PasswordLength = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
 
-	/* Calculate hash with password and copy into bcc_ptr.
-	 * Encryption Key (stored as in cryptkey) gets used if the
-	 * security mode bit in Negottiate Protocol response states
-	 * to use challenge/response method (i.e. Password bit is 1).
-	 */
-	rc = calc_lanman_hash(ses->password, ses->server->cryptkey,
-			      ses->server->sec_mode & SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT ?
-			      true : false, lnm_session_key);
+		/* Calculate hash with password and copy into bcc_ptr.
+		 * Encryption Key (stored as in cryptkey) gets used if the
+		 * security mode bit in Negottiate Protocol response states
+		 * to use challenge/response method (i.e. Password bit is 1).
+		 */
+		rc = calc_lanman_hash(ses->password, ses->server->cryptkey,
+				      ses->server->sec_mode & SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT ?
+				      true : false, lnm_session_key);
 
-	memcpy(bcc_ptr, (char *)lnm_session_key, CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
-	bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
+		memcpy(bcc_ptr, (char *)lnm_session_key, CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
+		bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
+	} else {
+		pSMB->old_req.PasswordLength = 0;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * can not sign if LANMAN negotiated so no need

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#1409642 — [PATCH 4.4 29/86] irqchip/gic-v3: Configure all interrupts as non-secure Group-1

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

commit 7c9b973061b03af62734f613f6abec46c0dd4a88 upstream.

The GICv3 driver wrongly assumes that it runs on the non-secure
side of a secure-enabled system, while it could be on a system
with a single security state, or a GICv3 with GICD_CTLR.DS set.

Either way, it is important to configure this properly, or
interrupts will simply not be delivered on this HW.

Reported-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
@@ -387,6 +387,15 @@ static void __init gic_dist_init(void)
 	writel_relaxed(0, base + GICD_CTLR);
 	gic_dist_wait_for_rwp();
 
+	/*
+	 * Configure SPIs as non-secure Group-1. This will only matter
+	 * if the GIC only has a single security state. This will not
+	 * do the right thing if the kernel is running in secure mode,
+	 * but that's not the intended use case anyway.
+	 */
+	for (i = 32; i < gic_data.irq_nr; i += 32)
+		writel_relaxed(~0, base + GICD_IGROUPR + i / 8);
+
 	gic_dist_config(base, gic_data.irq_nr, gic_dist_wait_for_rwp);
 
 	/* Enable distributor with ARE, Group1 */
@@ -501,6 +510,9 @@ static void gic_cpu_init(void)
 
 	rbase = gic_data_rdist_sgi_base();
 
+	/* Configure SGIs/PPIs as non-secure Group-1 */
+	writel_relaxed(~0, rbase + GICR_IGROUPR0);
+
 	gic_cpu_config(rbase, gic_redist_wait_for_rwp);
 
 	/* Give LPIs a spin */

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#1409643 — [PATCH 4.4 06/86] arm64: Fix typo in the pmdp_huge_get_and_clear() definition

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

commit 911f56eeb87ee378f5e215469268a7a2f68a5a8a upstream.

With hardware AF/DBM support, pmd modifications (transparent huge pages)
should be performed atomically using load/store exclusive. The initial
patches defined the get-and-clear function and __HAVE_ARCH_* macro
without the "huge" word, leaving the pmdp_huge_get_and_clear() to the
default, non-atomic implementation.

Fixes: 2f4b829c625e ("arm64: Add support for hardware updates of the access and dirty pte bits")
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -590,9 +590,9 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear(s
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
-#define __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_GET_AND_CLEAR
-static inline pmd_t pmdp_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm,
-				       unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp)
+#define __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_HUGE_GET_AND_CLEAR
+static inline pmd_t pmdp_huge_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm,
+					    unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp)
 {
 	return pte_pmd(ptep_get_and_clear(mm, address, (pte_t *)pmdp));
 }

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#1409645 — [PATCH 4.4 13/86] remove directory incorrectly tries to set delete on close on non-empty directories

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

commit 897fba1172d637d344f009d700f7eb8a1fa262f1 upstream.

Wrong return code was being returned on SMB3 rmdir of
non-empty directory.

For SMB3 (unlike for cifs), we attempt to delete a directory by
set of delete on close flag on the open. Windows clients set
this flag via a set info (SET_FILE_DISPOSITION to set this flag)
which properly checks if the directory is empty.

With this patch on smb3 mounts we correctly return
 "DIRECTORY NOT EMPTY"
on attempts to remove a non-empty directory.

Signed-off-by: Steve French <steve.french@primarydata.com>
Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/cifs/smb2glob.h  |    1 +
 fs/cifs/smb2inode.c |    8 ++++++--
 fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c   |   16 ++++++++++++++++
 fs/cifs/smb2proto.h |    2 ++
 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/cifs/smb2glob.h
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2glob.h
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
 #define SMB2_OP_DELETE 7
 #define SMB2_OP_HARDLINK 8
 #define SMB2_OP_SET_EOF 9
+#define SMB2_OP_RMDIR 10
 
 /* Used when constructing chained read requests. */
 #define CHAINED_REQUEST 1
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2inode.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2inode.c
@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ smb2_open_op_close(const unsigned int xi
 		 * SMB2_open() call.
 		 */
 		break;
+	case SMB2_OP_RMDIR:
+		tmprc = SMB2_rmdir(xid, tcon, fid.persistent_fid,
+				   fid.volatile_fid);
+		break;
 	case SMB2_OP_RENAME:
 		tmprc = SMB2_rename(xid, tcon, fid.persistent_fid,
 				    fid.volatile_fid, (__le16 *)data);
@@ -191,8 +195,8 @@ smb2_rmdir(const unsigned int xid, struc
 	   struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb)
 {
 	return smb2_open_op_close(xid, tcon, cifs_sb, name, DELETE, FILE_OPEN,
-				  CREATE_NOT_FILE | CREATE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE,
-				  NULL, SMB2_OP_DELETE);
+				  CREATE_NOT_FILE,
+				  NULL, SMB2_OP_RMDIR);
 }
 
 int
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
@@ -2577,6 +2577,22 @@ SMB2_rename(const unsigned int xid, stru
 }
 
 int
+SMB2_rmdir(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
+		  u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid)
+{
+	__u8 delete_pending = 1;
+	void *data;
+	unsigned int size;
+
+	data = &delete_pending;
+	size = 1; /* sizeof __u8 */
+
+	return send_set_info(xid, tcon, persistent_fid, volatile_fid,
+			current->tgid, FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION, 1, &data,
+			&size);
+}
+
+int
 SMB2_set_hardlink(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
 		  u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid, __le16 *target_file)
 {
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2proto.h
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2proto.h
@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ extern int SMB2_query_directory(const un
 extern int SMB2_rename(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
 		       u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid,
 		       __le16 *target_file);
+extern int SMB2_rmdir(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
+		      u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid);
 extern int SMB2_set_hardlink(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
 			     u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid,
 			     __le16 *target_file);

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#1409646 — [PATCH 4.4 32/86] mmc: sdhci-acpi: Remove MMC_CAP_BUS_WIDTH_TEST for Intel controllers

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>

commit 265984b36ce82fec67957d452dd2b22e010611e4 upstream.

The CMD19/CMD14 bus width test has been found to be unreliable in
some cases.  It is not essential, so simply remove it.

Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-acpi.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-acpi.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-acpi.c
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static const struct sdhci_acpi_slot sdhc
 	.chip    = &sdhci_acpi_chip_int,
 	.caps    = MMC_CAP_8_BIT_DATA | MMC_CAP_NONREMOVABLE |
 		   MMC_CAP_HW_RESET | MMC_CAP_1_8V_DDR |
-		   MMC_CAP_BUS_WIDTH_TEST | MMC_CAP_WAIT_WHILE_BUSY,
+		   MMC_CAP_WAIT_WHILE_BUSY,
 	.caps2   = MMC_CAP2_HC_ERASE_SZ,
 	.flags   = SDHCI_ACPI_RUNTIME_PM,
 	.quirks  = SDHCI_QUIRK_NO_ENDATTR_IN_NOPDESC,
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ static const struct sdhci_acpi_slot sdhc
 		   SDHCI_QUIRK_NO_ENDATTR_IN_NOPDESC,
 	.quirks2 = SDHCI_QUIRK2_HOST_OFF_CARD_ON,
 	.caps    = MMC_CAP_NONREMOVABLE | MMC_CAP_POWER_OFF_CARD |
-		   MMC_CAP_BUS_WIDTH_TEST | MMC_CAP_WAIT_WHILE_BUSY,
+		   MMC_CAP_WAIT_WHILE_BUSY,
 	.flags   = SDHCI_ACPI_RUNTIME_PM,
 	.pm_caps = MMC_PM_KEEP_POWER,
 	.probe_slot	= sdhci_acpi_sdio_probe_slot,
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static const struct sdhci_acpi_slot sdhc
 	.quirks  = SDHCI_QUIRK_NO_ENDATTR_IN_NOPDESC,
 	.quirks2 = SDHCI_QUIRK2_CARD_ON_NEEDS_BUS_ON |
 		   SDHCI_QUIRK2_STOP_WITH_TC,
-	.caps    = MMC_CAP_BUS_WIDTH_TEST | MMC_CAP_WAIT_WHILE_BUSY,
+	.caps    = MMC_CAP_WAIT_WHILE_BUSY,
 	.probe_slot	= sdhci_acpi_sd_probe_slot,
 };
 

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#1409647 — [PATCH 4.4 19/86] ring-buffer: Use long for nr_pages to avoid overflow failures

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

commit 9b94a8fba501f38368aef6ac1b30e7335252a220 upstream.

The size variable to change the ring buffer in ftrace is a long. The
nr_pages used to update the ring buffer based on the size is int. On 64 bit
machines this can cause an overflow problem.

For example, the following will cause the ring buffer to crash:

 # cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
 # echo 10 > buffer_size_kb
 # echo 8556384240 > buffer_size_kb

Then you get the warning of:

 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 318 at kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1527 rb_update_pages+0x22f/0x260

Which is:

  RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, nr_removed);

Note each ring buffer page holds 4080 bytes.

This is because:

 1) 10 causes the ring buffer to have 3 pages.
    (10kb requires 3 * 4080 pages to hold)

 2) (2^31 / 2^10  + 1) * 4080 = 8556384240
    The value written into buffer_size_kb is shifted by 10 and then passed
    to ring_buffer_resize(). 8556384240 * 2^10 = 8761737461760

 3) The size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is then divided by BUF_PAGE_SIZE
    which is 4080. 8761737461760 / 4080 = 2147484672

 4) nr_pages is subtracted from the current nr_pages (3) and we get:
    2147484669. This value is saved in a signed integer nr_pages_to_update

 5) 2147484669 is greater than 2^31 but smaller than 2^32, a signed int
    turns into the value of -2147482627

 6) As the value is a negative number, in update_pages_handler() it is
    negated and passed to rb_remove_pages() and 2147482627 pages will
    be removed, which is much larger than 3 and it causes the warning
    because not all the pages asked to be removed were removed.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=118001

Fixes: 7a8e76a3829f1 ("tracing: unified trace buffer")
Reported-by: Hao Qin <QEver.cn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c |   26 ++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ struct ring_buffer_per_cpu {
 	raw_spinlock_t			reader_lock;	/* serialize readers */
 	arch_spinlock_t			lock;
 	struct lock_class_key		lock_key;
-	unsigned int			nr_pages;
+	unsigned long			nr_pages;
 	unsigned int			current_context;
 	struct list_head		*pages;
 	struct buffer_page		*head_page;	/* read from head */
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ struct ring_buffer_per_cpu {
 	u64				write_stamp;
 	u64				read_stamp;
 	/* ring buffer pages to update, > 0 to add, < 0 to remove */
-	int				nr_pages_to_update;
+	long				nr_pages_to_update;
 	struct list_head		new_pages; /* new pages to add */
 	struct work_struct		update_pages_work;
 	struct completion		update_done;
@@ -1137,10 +1137,10 @@ static int rb_check_pages(struct ring_bu
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int __rb_allocate_pages(int nr_pages, struct list_head *pages, int cpu)
+static int __rb_allocate_pages(long nr_pages, struct list_head *pages, int cpu)
 {
-	int i;
 	struct buffer_page *bpage, *tmp;
+	long i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
 		struct page *page;
@@ -1177,7 +1177,7 @@ free_pages:
 }
 
 static int rb_allocate_pages(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer,
-			     unsigned nr_pages)
+			     unsigned long nr_pages)
 {
 	LIST_HEAD(pages);
 
@@ -1202,7 +1202,7 @@ static int rb_allocate_pages(struct ring
 }
 
 static struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *
-rb_allocate_cpu_buffer(struct ring_buffer *buffer, int nr_pages, int cpu)
+rb_allocate_cpu_buffer(struct ring_buffer *buffer, long nr_pages, int cpu)
 {
 	struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
 	struct buffer_page *bpage;
@@ -1302,8 +1302,9 @@ struct ring_buffer *__ring_buffer_alloc(
 					struct lock_class_key *key)
 {
 	struct ring_buffer *buffer;
+	long nr_pages;
 	int bsize;
-	int cpu, nr_pages;
+	int cpu;
 
 	/* keep it in its own cache line */
 	buffer = kzalloc(ALIGN(sizeof(*buffer), cache_line_size()),
@@ -1429,12 +1430,12 @@ static inline unsigned long rb_page_writ
 }
 
 static int
-rb_remove_pages(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer, unsigned int nr_pages)
+rb_remove_pages(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer, unsigned long nr_pages)
 {
 	struct list_head *tail_page, *to_remove, *next_page;
 	struct buffer_page *to_remove_page, *tmp_iter_page;
 	struct buffer_page *last_page, *first_page;
-	unsigned int nr_removed;
+	unsigned long nr_removed;
 	unsigned long head_bit;
 	int page_entries;
 
@@ -1651,7 +1652,7 @@ int ring_buffer_resize(struct ring_buffe
 			int cpu_id)
 {
 	struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
-	unsigned nr_pages;
+	unsigned long nr_pages;
 	int cpu, err = 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -4645,8 +4646,9 @@ static int rb_cpu_notify(struct notifier
 	struct ring_buffer *buffer =
 		container_of(self, struct ring_buffer, cpu_notify);
 	long cpu = (long)hcpu;
-	int cpu_i, nr_pages_same;
-	unsigned int nr_pages;
+	long nr_pages_same;
+	int cpu_i;
+	unsigned long nr_pages;
 
 	switch (action) {
 	case CPU_UP_PREPARE:

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#1409649 — [PATCH 4.4 03/86] perf/core: Fix perf_event_open() vs. execve() race

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit 79c9ce57eb2d5f1497546a3946b4ae21b6fdc438 upstream.

Jann reported that the ptrace_may_access() check in
find_lively_task_by_vpid() is racy against exec().

Specifically:

  perf_event_open()		execve()

  ptrace_may_access()
				commit_creds()
  ...				if (get_dumpable() != SUID_DUMP_USER)
				  perf_event_exit_task();
  perf_install_in_context()

would result in installing a counter across the creds boundary.

Fix this by wrapping lots of perf_event_open() in cred_guard_mutex.
This should be fine as perf_event_exit_task() is already called with
cred_guard_mutex held, so all perf locks already nest inside it.

Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/events/core.c |   52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -946,6 +946,7 @@ static void put_ctx(struct perf_event_co
  * function.
  *
  * Lock order:
+ *    cred_guard_mutex
  *	task_struct::perf_event_mutex
  *	  perf_event_context::mutex
  *	    perf_event_context::lock
@@ -3418,7 +3419,6 @@ static struct task_struct *
 find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid)
 {
 	struct task_struct *task;
-	int err;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	if (!vpid)
@@ -3432,16 +3432,7 @@ find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid)
 	if (!task)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
 
-	/* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. */
-	err = -EACCES;
-	if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
-		goto errout;
-
 	return task;
-errout:
-	put_task_struct(task);
-	return ERR_PTR(err);
-
 }
 
 /*
@@ -8328,6 +8319,24 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 
 	get_online_cpus();
 
+	if (task) {
+		err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+		if (err)
+			goto err_cpus;
+
+		/*
+		 * Reuse ptrace permission checks for now.
+		 *
+		 * We must hold cred_guard_mutex across this and any potential
+		 * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
+		 * serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the
+		 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
+		 */
+		err = -EACCES;
+		if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
+			goto err_cred;
+	}
+
 	if (flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP)
 		cgroup_fd = pid;
 
@@ -8335,7 +8344,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 				 NULL, NULL, cgroup_fd);
 	if (IS_ERR(event)) {
 		err = PTR_ERR(event);
-		goto err_cpus;
+		goto err_cred;
 	}
 
 	if (is_sampling_event(event)) {
@@ -8394,11 +8403,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		goto err_context;
 	}
 
-	if (task) {
-		put_task_struct(task);
-		task = NULL;
-	}
-
 	/*
 	 * Look up the group leader (we will attach this event to it):
 	 */
@@ -8486,6 +8490,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
 
+	/*
+	 * This is the point on no return; we cannot fail hereafter. This is
+	 * where we start modifying current state.
+	 */
+
 	if (move_group) {
 		/*
 		 * See perf_event_ctx_lock() for comments on the details
@@ -8555,6 +8564,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
 	mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
 
+	if (task) {
+		mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+		put_task_struct(task);
+	}
+
 	put_online_cpus();
 
 	event->owner = current;
@@ -8589,6 +8603,9 @@ err_alloc:
 	 */
 	if (!event_file)
 		free_event(event);
+err_cred:
+	if (task)
+		mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
 err_cpus:
 	put_online_cpus();
 err_task:
@@ -8868,6 +8885,9 @@ static void perf_event_exit_task_context
 
 /*
  * When a child task exits, feed back event values to parent events.
+ *
+ * Can be called with cred_guard_mutex held when called from
+ * install_exec_creds().
  */
 void perf_event_exit_task(struct task_struct *child)
 {

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#1409650 — [PATCH 4.4 20/86] ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

commit 59643d1535eb220668692a5359de22545af579f6 upstream.

If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.

Here's the details:

  # echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb

tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.

 18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520

and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.

 size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);

Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b

BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here

 18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599

where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64

 2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17

But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792

and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360

This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.

Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.

 nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)

but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and

 2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823

Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes

  3823 / 4080 = 0

an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.

There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.

Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c |    9 ++++-----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
@@ -1666,14 +1666,13 @@ int ring_buffer_resize(struct ring_buffe
 	    !cpumask_test_cpu(cpu_id, buffer->cpumask))
 		return size;
 
-	size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
-	size *= BUF_PAGE_SIZE;
+	nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
 
 	/* we need a minimum of two pages */
-	if (size < BUF_PAGE_SIZE * 2)
-		size = BUF_PAGE_SIZE * 2;
+	if (nr_pages < 2)
+		nr_pages = 2;
 
-	nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
+	size = nr_pages * BUF_PAGE_SIZE;
 
 	/*
 	 * Don't succeed if resizing is disabled, as a reader might be

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#1409651 — [PATCH 4.4 28/86] irqchip/gic: Ensure ordering between read of INTACK and shared data

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

commit f86c4fbd930ff6fecf3d8a1c313182bd0f49f496 upstream.

When an IPI is generated by a CPU, the pattern looks roughly like:

  <write shared data>
  smp_wmb();
  <write to GIC to signal SGI>

On the receiving CPU we rely on the fact that, once we've taken the
interrupt, then the freshly written shared data must be visible to us.
Put another way, the CPU isn't going to speculate taking an interrupt.

Unfortunately, this assumption turns out to be broken.

Consider that CPUx wants to send an IPI to CPUy, which will cause CPUy
to read some shared_data. Before CPUx has done anything, a random
peripheral raises an IRQ to the GIC and the IRQ line on CPUy is raised.
CPUy then takes the IRQ and starts executing the entry code, heading
towards gic_handle_irq. Furthermore, let's assume that a bunch of the
previous interrupts handled by CPUy were SGIs, so the branch predictor
kicks in and speculates that irqnr will be <16 and we're likely to
head into handle_IPI. The prefetcher then grabs a speculative copy of
shared_data which contains a stale value.

Meanwhile, CPUx gets round to updating shared_data and asking the GIC
to send an SGI to CPUy. Internally, the GIC decides that the SGI is
more important than the peripheral interrupt (which hasn't yet been
ACKed) but doesn't need to do anything to CPUy, because the IRQ line
is already raised.

CPUy then reads the ACK register on the GIC, sees the SGI value which
confirms the branch prediction and we end up with a stale shared_data
value.

This patch fixes the problem by adding an smp_rmb() to the IPI entry
code in gic_handle_irq. As it turns out, the combination of a control
dependency and an ISB instruction from the EOI in the GICv3 driver is
enough to provide the ordering we need, so we add a comment there
justifying the absence of an explicit smp_rmb().

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c |    7 +++++++
 drivers/irqchip/irq-gic.c    |    8 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
@@ -361,6 +361,13 @@ static asmlinkage void __exception_irq_e
 			if (static_key_true(&supports_deactivate))
 				gic_write_dir(irqnr);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+			/*
+			 * Unlike GICv2, we don't need an smp_rmb() here.
+			 * The control dependency from gic_read_iar to
+			 * the ISB in gic_write_eoir is enough to ensure
+			 * that any shared data read by handle_IPI will
+			 * be read after the ACK.
+			 */
 			handle_IPI(irqnr, regs);
 #else
 			WARN_ONCE(true, "Unexpected SGI received!\n");
--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic.c
@@ -347,6 +347,14 @@ static void __exception_irq_entry gic_ha
 			if (static_key_true(&supports_deactivate))
 				writel_relaxed(irqstat, cpu_base + GIC_CPU_DEACTIVATE);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+			/*
+			 * Ensure any shared data written by the CPU sending
+			 * the IPI is read after we've read the ACK register
+			 * on the GIC.
+			 *
+			 * Pairs with the write barrier in gic_raise_softirq
+			 */
+			smp_rmb();
 			handle_IPI(irqnr, regs);
 #endif
 			continue;

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#1409652 — [PATCH 4.4 05/86] ext4: iterate over buffer heads correctly in move_extent_per_page()

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>

commit 6ffe77bad545f4a7c8edd2a4ee797ccfcd894ab4 upstream.

In commit bcff24887d00 ("ext4: don't read blocks from disk after extents
being swapped") bh is not updated correctly in the for loop and wrong
data has been written to disk. generic/324 catches this on sub-page
block size ext4.

Fixes: bcff24887d00 ("ext4: don't read blocks from disk after extentsbeing swapped")
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/move_extent.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/fs/ext4/move_extent.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/move_extent.c
@@ -390,6 +390,7 @@ data_copy:
 		*err = ext4_get_block(orig_inode, orig_blk_offset + i, bh, 0);
 		if (*err < 0)
 			break;
+		bh = bh->b_this_page;
 	}
 	if (!*err)
 		*err = block_commit_write(pagep[0], from, from + replaced_size);

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#1409654 — [PATCH 4.4 12/86] kvm: arm64: Fix EC field in inject_abt64

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Matt Evans <matt.evans@arm.com>

commit e4fe9e7dc3828bf6a5714eb3c55aef6260d823a2 upstream.

The EC field of the constructed ESR is conditionally modified by ORing in
ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW for a data abort.  However, ESR_ELx_EC_SHIFT is missing
from this condition.

Signed-off-by: Matt Evans <matt.evans@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static void inject_abt64(struct kvm_vcpu
 		esr |= (ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_CUR << ESR_ELx_EC_SHIFT);
 
 	if (!is_iabt)
-		esr |= ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW;
+		esr |= ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW << ESR_ELx_EC_SHIFT;
 
 	vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ESR_EL1) = esr | ESR_ELx_FSC_EXTABT;
 }

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#1409655 — [PATCH 4.4 09/86] arm64: Implement pmdp_set_access_flags() for hardware AF/DBM

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

commit 282aa7051b0169991b34716f0f22d9c2f59c46c4 upstream.

The update to the accessed or dirty states for block mappings must be
done atomically on hardware with support for automatic AF/DBM. The
ptep_set_access_flags() function has been fixed as part of commit
66dbd6e61a52 ("arm64: Implement ptep_set_access_flags() for hardware
AF/DBM"). This patch brings pmdp_set_access_flags() in line with the pte
counterpart.

Fixes: 2f4b829c625e ("arm64: Add support for hardware updates of the access and dirty pte bits")
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h |   10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -543,6 +543,16 @@ extern int ptep_set_access_flags(struct
 				 unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep,
 				 pte_t entry, int dirty);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+#define __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_SET_ACCESS_FLAGS
+static inline int pmdp_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+					unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp,
+					pmd_t entry, int dirty)
+{
+	return ptep_set_access_flags(vma, address, (pte_t *)pmdp, pmd_pte(entry), dirty);
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Atomic pte/pmd modifications.
  */

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#1409656 — [PATCH 4.4 07/86] arm64: Ensure pmd_present() returns false after pmd_mknotpresent()

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

commit 5bb1cc0ff9a6b68871970737e6c4c16919928d8b upstream.

Currently, pmd_present() only checks for a non-zero value, returning
true even after pmd_mknotpresent() (which only clears the type bits).
This patch converts pmd_present() to using pte_present(), similar to the
other pmd_*() checks. As a side effect, it will return true for
PROT_NONE mappings, though they are not yet used by the kernel with
transparent huge pages.

For consistency, also change pmd_mknotpresent() to only clear the
PMD_SECT_VALID bit, even though the PMD_TABLE_BIT is already 0 for block
mappings (no functional change). The unused PMD_SECT_PROT_NONE
definition is removed as transparent huge pages use the pte page prot
values.

Fixes: 9c7e535fcc17 ("arm64: mm: Route pmd thp functions through pte equivalents")
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h |    1 -
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h       |    4 ++--
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h
@@ -117,7 +117,6 @@
  * Section
  */
 #define PMD_SECT_VALID		(_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 0)
-#define PMD_SECT_PROT_NONE	(_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 58)
 #define PMD_SECT_USER		(_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 6)		/* AP[1] */
 #define PMD_SECT_RDONLY		(_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 7)		/* AP[2] */
 #define PMD_SECT_S		(_AT(pmdval_t, 3) << 8)
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -347,6 +347,7 @@ void pmdp_splitting_flush(struct vm_area
 #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE */
 #endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */
 
+#define pmd_present(pmd)	pte_present(pmd_pte(pmd))
 #define pmd_dirty(pmd)		pte_dirty(pmd_pte(pmd))
 #define pmd_young(pmd)		pte_young(pmd_pte(pmd))
 #define pmd_wrprotect(pmd)	pte_pmd(pte_wrprotect(pmd_pte(pmd)))
@@ -355,7 +356,7 @@ void pmdp_splitting_flush(struct vm_area
 #define pmd_mkwrite(pmd)	pte_pmd(pte_mkwrite(pmd_pte(pmd)))
 #define pmd_mkdirty(pmd)	pte_pmd(pte_mkdirty(pmd_pte(pmd)))
 #define pmd_mkyoung(pmd)	pte_pmd(pte_mkyoung(pmd_pte(pmd)))
-#define pmd_mknotpresent(pmd)	(__pmd(pmd_val(pmd) & ~PMD_TYPE_MASK))
+#define pmd_mknotpresent(pmd)	(__pmd(pmd_val(pmd) & ~PMD_SECT_VALID))
 
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_PMD_WRITE
 #define pmd_write(pmd)		pte_write(pmd_pte(pmd))
@@ -394,7 +395,6 @@ extern pgprot_t phys_mem_access_prot(str
 				     unsigned long size, pgprot_t vma_prot);
 
 #define pmd_none(pmd)		(!pmd_val(pmd))
-#define pmd_present(pmd)	(pmd_val(pmd))
 
 #define pmd_bad(pmd)		(!(pmd_val(pmd) & 2))
 

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#1409657 — [PATCH 4.4 36/86] mmc: sdhci-pci: Remove MMC_CAP_BUS_WIDTH_TEST for Intel controllers

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>

commit 822969369482166050c5b2f7013501505e025c39 upstream.

The CMD19/CMD14 bus width test has been found to be unreliable in
some cases.  It is not essential, so simply remove it.

Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-core.c |    5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-core.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-core.c
@@ -361,7 +361,6 @@ static int byt_emmc_probe_slot(struct sd
 {
 	slot->host->mmc->caps |= MMC_CAP_8_BIT_DATA | MMC_CAP_NONREMOVABLE |
 				 MMC_CAP_HW_RESET | MMC_CAP_1_8V_DDR |
-				 MMC_CAP_BUS_WIDTH_TEST |
 				 MMC_CAP_WAIT_WHILE_BUSY;
 	slot->host->mmc->caps2 |= MMC_CAP2_HC_ERASE_SZ;
 	slot->hw_reset = sdhci_pci_int_hw_reset;
@@ -377,15 +376,13 @@ static int byt_emmc_probe_slot(struct sd
 static int byt_sdio_probe_slot(struct sdhci_pci_slot *slot)
 {
 	slot->host->mmc->caps |= MMC_CAP_POWER_OFF_CARD | MMC_CAP_NONREMOVABLE |
-				 MMC_CAP_BUS_WIDTH_TEST |
 				 MMC_CAP_WAIT_WHILE_BUSY;
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static int byt_sd_probe_slot(struct sdhci_pci_slot *slot)
 {
-	slot->host->mmc->caps |= MMC_CAP_BUS_WIDTH_TEST |
-				 MMC_CAP_WAIT_WHILE_BUSY;
+	slot->host->mmc->caps |= MMC_CAP_WAIT_WHILE_BUSY;
 	slot->cd_con_id = NULL;
 	slot->cd_idx = 0;
 	slot->cd_override_level = true;

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#1409659 — [PATCH 4.4 16/86] fs/cifs: correctly to anonymous authentication for the NTLM(v1) authentication

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

commit 777f69b8d26bf35ade4a76b08f203c11e048365d upstream.

Only server which map unknown users to guest will allow
access using a non-null NTChallengeResponse.

For Samba it's the "map to guest = bad user" option.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11913

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/cifs/sess.c |   41 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/cifs/sess.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/sess.c
@@ -781,26 +781,31 @@ sess_auth_ntlm(struct sess_data *sess_da
 	capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr(ses, pSMB);
 
 	pSMB->req_no_secext.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
-	pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength =
-			cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
-	pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength =
-			cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
+	if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
+		pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength =
+				cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
+		pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength =
+				cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
 
-	/* calculate ntlm response and session key */
-	rc = setup_ntlm_response(ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
-	if (rc) {
-		cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLM authentication\n",
-				 rc);
-		goto out;
-	}
+		/* calculate ntlm response and session key */
+		rc = setup_ntlm_response(ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
+		if (rc) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLM authentication\n",
+					 rc);
+			goto out;
+		}
 
-	/* copy ntlm response */
-	memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
-			CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
-	bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
-	memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
-			CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
-	bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
+		/* copy ntlm response */
+		memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
+				CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
+		bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
+		memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
+				CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
+		bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
+	} else {
+		pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength = 0;
+		pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength = 0;
+	}
 
 	if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
 		/* unicode strings must be word aligned */

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#1409660 — [PATCH 4.4 33/86] ACPI / osi: Fix an issue that acpi_osi=!* cannot disable ACPICA internal strings

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>

commit 30c9bb0d7603e7b3f4d6a0ea231e1cddae020c32 upstream.

The order of the _OSI related functionalities is as follows:

  acpi_blacklisted()
    acpi_dmi_osi_linux()
      acpi_osi_setup()
    acpi_osi_setup()
      acpi_update_interfaces() if "!*"
      <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
  parse_args()
    __setup("acpi_osi=")
      acpi_osi_setup_linux()
        acpi_update_interfaces() if "!*"
        <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
  acpi_early_init()
    acpi_initialize_subsystem()
      acpi_ut_initialize_interfaces()
      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  acpi_bus_init()
    acpi_os_initialize1()
      acpi_install_interface_handler(acpi_osi_handler)
      acpi_osi_setup_late()
        acpi_update_interfaces() for "!"
        >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
  acpi_osi_handler()

Since acpi_osi_setup_linux() can override acpi_dmi_osi_linux(), the command
line setting can override the DMI detection. That's why acpi_blacklisted()
is put before __setup("acpi_osi=").

Then we can notice the following wrong invocation order. There are
acpi_update_interfaces() (marked by <<<<) calls invoked before
acpi_ut_initialize_interfaces() (marked by ^^^^). This makes it impossible
to use acpi_osi=!* correctly from OSI DMI table or from the command line.
The use of acpi_osi=!* is meant to disable both ACPICA
(acpi_gbl_supported_interfaces) and Linux specific strings
(osi_setup_entries) while the ACPICA part should have stopped working
because of the order issue.

This patch fixes this issue by moving acpi_update_interfaces() to where
it is invoked for acpi_osi=! (marked by >>>>) as this is ensured to be
invoked after acpi_ut_initialize_interfaces() (marked by ^^^^). Linux
specific strings are still handled in the original place in order to make
the following command line working: acpi_osi=!* acpi_osi="Module Device".

Note that since acpi_osi=!* is meant to further disable linux specific
string comparing to the acpi_osi=!, there is no such use case in our bug
fixing work and hence there is no one using acpi_osi=!* either from the
command line or from the DMI quirks, this issue is just a theoretical
issue.

Fixes: 741d81280ad2 (ACPI: Add facility to remove all _OSI strings)
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Tested-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/acpi/osl.c |   16 +++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static struct osi_linux {
 	unsigned int	enable:1;
 	unsigned int	dmi:1;
 	unsigned int	cmdline:1;
-	unsigned int	default_disabling:1;
+	u8		default_disabling;
 } osi_linux = {0, 0, 0, 0};
 
 static u32 acpi_osi_handler(acpi_string interface, u32 supported)
@@ -1444,10 +1444,13 @@ void __init acpi_osi_setup(char *str)
 	if (*str == '!') {
 		str++;
 		if (*str == '\0') {
-			osi_linux.default_disabling = 1;
+			/* Do not override acpi_osi=!* */
+			if (!osi_linux.default_disabling)
+				osi_linux.default_disabling =
+					ACPI_DISABLE_ALL_VENDOR_STRINGS;
 			return;
 		} else if (*str == '*') {
-			acpi_update_interfaces(ACPI_DISABLE_ALL_STRINGS);
+			osi_linux.default_disabling = ACPI_DISABLE_ALL_STRINGS;
 			for (i = 0; i < OSI_STRING_ENTRIES_MAX; i++) {
 				osi = &osi_setup_entries[i];
 				osi->enable = false;
@@ -1520,10 +1523,13 @@ static void __init acpi_osi_setup_late(v
 	acpi_status status;
 
 	if (osi_linux.default_disabling) {
-		status = acpi_update_interfaces(ACPI_DISABLE_ALL_VENDOR_STRINGS);
+		status = acpi_update_interfaces(osi_linux.default_disabling);
 
 		if (ACPI_SUCCESS(status))
-			printk(KERN_INFO PREFIX "Disabled all _OSI OS vendors\n");
+			printk(KERN_INFO PREFIX "Disabled all _OSI OS vendors%s\n",
+				osi_linux.default_disabling ==
+				ACPI_DISABLE_ALL_STRINGS ?
+				" and feature groups" : "");
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < OSI_STRING_ENTRIES_MAX; i++) {

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