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| Started by | David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2016-02-24 16:00 +0100 |
| Last post | 2016-02-26 14:00 +0100 |
| Articles | 2 — 2 participants |
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Re: [PATCH] X.509: Fix test for self-signed certificate David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-02-24 16:00 +0100
Re: [PATCH] X.509: Fix test for self-signed certificate Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com> - 2016-02-26 14:00 +0100
| From | David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2016-02-24 16:00 +0100 |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH] X.509: Fix test for self-signed certificate |
| Message-ID | <r5J50-62M-17@gated-at.bofh.it> |
Hi Michal,
I have the attached patch already in my queue.
David
---
commit d19fcb825912c67e09e0575b95accaa42899e07f
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Wed Feb 24 14:37:54 2016 +0000
X.509: Don't treat self-signed keys specially
Trust for a self-signed certificate can normally only be determined by
whether we obtained it from a trusted location (ie. it was built into the
kernel at compile time), so there's not really any point in checking it -
we could verify that the signature is valid, but it doesn't really tell us
anything if the signature checks out.
However, there's a bug in the code determining whether a certificate is
self-signed or not - if they have neither AKID nor SKID then we just assume
that the cert is self-signed, which may not be true.
Given this, remove the code that treats self-signed certs specially when it
comes to evaluating trustability and attempt to evaluate them as ordinary
signed certificates. We then expect self-signed certificates to fail the
trustability check and be marked as untrustworthy in x509_key_preparse().
Note that there is the possibility of the trustability check on a
self-signed cert then succeeding. This is most likely to happen when a
duplicate of the certificate is already on the trust keyring - in which
case it shouldn't be a problem.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 9e9e5a6a9ed6..fd76eca902b8 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -255,6 +255,9 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
struct key *key;
int ret = 1;
+ if (!cert->akid_id || !cert->akid_skid)
+ return 1;
+
if (!trust_keyring)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -312,19 +315,23 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo];
cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
- /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
- if ((!cert->akid_skid && !cert->akid_id) ||
- asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->akid_skid) ||
- asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->id, cert->akid_id)) {
- ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error_free_cert;
- } else if (!prep->trusted) {
+ /* See if we can derive the trustability of this certificate.
+ *
+ * When it comes to self-signed certificates, we cannot evaluate
+ * trustedness except by the fact that we obtained it from a trusted
+ * location. So we just rely on x509_validate_trust() failing in this
+ * case.
+ *
+ * Note that there's a possibility of a self-signed cert matching a
+ * cert that we have (most likely a duplicate that we already trust) -
+ * in which case it will be marked trusted.
+ */
+ if (!prep->trusted) {
ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_system_trusted_keyring());
if (ret)
ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_ima_mok_keyring());
if (!ret)
- prep->trusted = 1;
+ prep->trusted = true;
}
/* Propose a description */
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| From | Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2016-02-26 14:00 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <r6q9X-3nl-1@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1342093 |
On 2016-02-24 15:54, David Howells wrote: > Hi Michal, > > I have the attached patch already in my queue. > > David > --- > commit d19fcb825912c67e09e0575b95accaa42899e07f > Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> > Date: Wed Feb 24 14:37:54 2016 +0000 > > X.509: Don't treat self-signed keys specially Hi David, this solves my problem too, obviously. I thought the signature check for self-signed certificates was a sort of consistency check. Thanks, Michal
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