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Groups > linux.kernel > #1336839 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2016-02-17 23:50 +0100 |
| Last post | 2016-02-23 10:30 +0100 |
| Articles | 2 — 2 participants |
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[PATCH v5 6/7] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-02-17 23:50 +0100
[tip:mm/readonly] x86/vdso: Mark the vDSO code read-only after init tip-bot for Kees Cook <tipbot@zytor.com>@zytor.com - 2016-02-23 10:30 +0100
| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2016-02-17 23:50 +0100 |
| Subject | [PATCH v5 6/7] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init |
| Message-ID | <r3j50-4A2-19@gated-at.bofh.it> |
The vDSO does not need to be writable after __init, so mark it as
__ro_after_init. The result kills the exploit method of writing to the
vDSO from kernel space resulting in userspace executing the modified code,
as shown here to bypass SMEP restrictions: http://itszn.com/blog/?p=21
The memory map (with added vDSO address reporting) shows the vDSO moving
into read-only memory:
Before:
[ 0.143067] vDSO @ ffffffff82004000
[ 0.143551] vDSO @ ffffffff82006000
---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd
0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81800000 8M ro PSE GLB x pmd
0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff819f3000 1996K ro GLB x pte
0xffffffff819f3000-0xffffffff81a00000 52K ro NX pte
0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81e00000 4M ro PSE GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e05000 20K ro GLB NX pte
0xffffffff81e05000-0xffffffff82000000 2028K ro NX pte
0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff8214f000 1340K RW GLB NX pte
0xffffffff8214f000-0xffffffff82281000 1224K RW NX pte
0xffffffff82281000-0xffffffff82400000 1532K RW GLB NX pte
0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff83200000 14M RW PSE GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffc0000000 974M pmd
After:
[ 0.145062] vDSO @ ffffffff81da1000
[ 0.146057] vDSO @ ffffffff81da4000
---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd
0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81800000 8M ro PSE GLB x pmd
0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff819f3000 1996K ro GLB x pte
0xffffffff819f3000-0xffffffff81a00000 52K ro NX pte
0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81e00000 4M ro PSE GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e0b000 44K ro GLB NX pte
0xffffffff81e0b000-0xffffffff82000000 2004K ro NX pte
0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff8214c000 1328K RW GLB NX pte
0xffffffff8214c000-0xffffffff8227e000 1224K RW NX pte
0xffffffff8227e000-0xffffffff82400000 1544K RW GLB NX pte
0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff83200000 14M RW PSE GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffc0000000 974M pmd
Based on work by PaX Team and Brad Spengler.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
index abe961c7c71c..63a03bb91497 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len,
fprintf(outfile, "#include <asm/vdso.h>\n");
fprintf(outfile, "\n");
fprintf(outfile,
- "static unsigned char raw_data[%lu] __page_aligned_data = {",
+ "static unsigned char raw_data[%lu] __ro_after_init __aligned(PAGE_SIZE) = {",
mapping_size);
for (j = 0; j < stripped_len; j++) {
if (j % 10 == 0)
--
2.6.3
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| From | tip-bot for Kees Cook <tipbot@zytor.com>@zytor.com |
|---|---|
| Date | 2016-02-23 10:30 +0100 |
| Subject | [tip:mm/readonly] x86/vdso: Mark the vDSO code read-only after init |
| Message-ID | <r5hs6-3h5-17@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1336839 |
Commit-ID: 018ef8dcf3de5f62e2cc1a9273cc27e1c6ba8de5
Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/018ef8dcf3de5f62e2cc1a9273cc27e1c6ba8de5
Author: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
AuthorDate: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 14:41:17 -0800
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Mon, 22 Feb 2016 08:51:39 +0100
x86/vdso: Mark the vDSO code read-only after init
The vDSO does not need to be writable after __init, so mark it as
__ro_after_init. The result kills the exploit method of writing to the
vDSO from kernel space resulting in userspace executing the modified code,
as shown here to bypass SMEP restrictions: http://itszn.com/blog/?p=21
The memory map (with added vDSO address reporting) shows the vDSO moving
into read-only memory:
Before:
[ 0.143067] vDSO @ ffffffff82004000
[ 0.143551] vDSO @ ffffffff82006000
---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd
0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81800000 8M ro PSE GLB x pmd
0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff819f3000 1996K ro GLB x pte
0xffffffff819f3000-0xffffffff81a00000 52K ro NX pte
0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81e00000 4M ro PSE GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e05000 20K ro GLB NX pte
0xffffffff81e05000-0xffffffff82000000 2028K ro NX pte
0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff8214f000 1340K RW GLB NX pte
0xffffffff8214f000-0xffffffff82281000 1224K RW NX pte
0xffffffff82281000-0xffffffff82400000 1532K RW GLB NX pte
0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff83200000 14M RW PSE GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffc0000000 974M pmd
After:
[ 0.145062] vDSO @ ffffffff81da1000
[ 0.146057] vDSO @ ffffffff81da4000
---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd
0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81800000 8M ro PSE GLB x pmd
0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff819f3000 1996K ro GLB x pte
0xffffffff819f3000-0xffffffff81a00000 52K ro NX pte
0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81e00000 4M ro PSE GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e0b000 44K ro GLB NX pte
0xffffffff81e0b000-0xffffffff82000000 2004K ro NX pte
0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff8214c000 1328K RW GLB NX pte
0xffffffff8214c000-0xffffffff8227e000 1224K RW NX pte
0xffffffff8227e000-0xffffffff82400000 1544K RW GLB NX pte
0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff83200000 14M RW PSE GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffc0000000 974M pmd
Based on work by PaX Team and Brad Spengler.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Brown <david.brown@linaro.org>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455748879-21872-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
index 0224987..3f69326 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len,
fprintf(outfile, "#include <asm/vdso.h>\n");
fprintf(outfile, "\n");
fprintf(outfile,
- "static unsigned char raw_data[%lu] __page_aligned_data = {",
+ "static unsigned char raw_data[%lu] __ro_after_init __aligned(PAGE_SIZE) = {",
mapping_size);
for (j = 0; j < stripped_len; j++) {
if (j % 10 == 0)
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