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[PATCH v2] capabilities.7, prctl.2: Document ambient capabilities

Started byAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
First post2015-09-29 03:10 +0200
Last post2015-09-29 20:00 +0200
Articles 4 — 3 participants

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  [PATCH v2] capabilities.7, prctl.2: Document ambient capabilities Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> - 2015-09-29 03:10 +0200
    Re: [PATCH v2] capabilities.7, prctl.2: Document ambient capabilities Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2015-09-29 19:50 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v2] capabilities.7, prctl.2: Document ambient capabilities Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> - 2015-09-29 20:00 +0200
        Re: [PATCH v2] capabilities.7, prctl.2: Document ambient capabilities Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2015-09-29 20:00 +0200

#1234623 — [PATCH v2] capabilities.7, prctl.2: Document ambient capabilities

FromAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Date2015-09-29 03:10 +0200
Subject[PATCH v2] capabilities.7, prctl.2: Document ambient capabilities
Message-ID<qdRAB-831-1@gated-at.bofh.it>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
 man2/prctl.2        | 12 ++++++++++++
 man7/capabilities.7 | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/man2/prctl.2 b/man2/prctl.2
index e743a6305969..5bcec391c110 100644
--- a/man2/prctl.2
+++ b/man2/prctl.2
@@ -954,6 +954,18 @@ had been called.
 For further information on Intel MPX, see the kernel source file
 .IR Documentation/x86/intel_mpx.txt .
 .\"
+.TP
+.BR PR_CAP_AMBIENT " (since Linux 4.2)"
+Reads or changes the ambient capability set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE,
+then the capability specified in arg3 is added to the ambient set.  This will
+fail, returning EPERM, if the capability is not already both permitted and
+inheritable or if the SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE securebit is set.  If arg2
+is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER, then the capability specified in arg3 is removed
+from the ambient set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET, then
+.BR prctl (2)
+will return 1 if the capability in arg3 is in the ambient set and 0 if not.
+If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL, then all capabilities will
+be removed from the ambient set.
 .SH RETURN VALUE
 On success,
 .BR PR_GET_DUMPABLE ,
diff --git a/man7/capabilities.7 b/man7/capabilities.7
index 616189c881e4..8934d05a5b07 100644
--- a/man7/capabilities.7
+++ b/man7/capabilities.7
@@ -700,13 +700,34 @@ a program whose associated file capabilities grant that capability).
 .IR Inheritable :
 This is a set of capabilities preserved across an
 .BR execve (2).
-It provides a mechanism for a process to assign capabilities
-to the permitted set of the new program during an
-.BR execve (2).
+Inheritable capabilities remain inheritable when executing any program,
+and inheritable capabilities are added to the permitted set when executing
+a program that has the corresponding bits set in the file inheritable set.
+.IP
+Because inheritable capabilities are not generally preserved across
+.BR execve (2)
+when running as a non-root user, applications that wish to run helper
+programs with elevated capabilities should consider using ambient capabilities,
+described below.
 .TP
 .IR Effective :
 This is the set of capabilities used by the kernel to
 perform permission checks for the thread.
+.TP
+.IR Ambient " (since Linux 4.3):"
+This is a set of capabilities that are preserved across an
+.BR execve (2)
+of a program that does not have file capabilities.  The ambient capability
+set obeys the invariant that no capability can ever be ambient if it is
+not both permitted and inheritable.  Ambient capabilities are
+preserved in the permitted set and added to the effective
+set when
+.BR execve (2)
+is called.  The ambient capability set is modified using
+.BR prctl (2).
+Executing a program that changes uid or gid due to the setuid or setgid
+bits or executing a program that has any file capabilities set will clear
+the ambient set.
 .PP
 A child created via
 .BR fork (2)
@@ -788,10 +809,12 @@ the process using the following algorithm:
 .in +4n
 .nf
 
+P'(ambient) = (file has capabilities or is setuid or setgid) ? 0 : P(ambient)
+
 P'(permitted) = (P(inheritable) & F(inheritable)) |
-                (F(permitted) & cap_bset)
+                (F(permitted) & cap_bset) | P'(ambient)
 
-P'(effective) = F(effective) ? P'(permitted) : 0
+P'(effective) = F(effective) ? P'(permitted) : P'(ambient)
 
 P'(inheritable) = P(inheritable)    [i.e., unchanged]
 
@@ -1074,6 +1097,10 @@ an effective or real UID of 0 calls
 .BR execve (2).
 (See the subsection
 .IR "Capabilities and execution of programs by root" .)
+.TP
+.B SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE
+Setting this flag disallows
+.BR PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE .
 .PP
 Each of the above "base" flags has a companion "locked" flag.
 Setting any of the "locked" flags is irreversible,
@@ -1082,8 +1109,9 @@ corresponding "base" flag.
 The locked flags are:
 .BR SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED ,
 .BR SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED ,
+.BR SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED ,
 and
-.BR SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED .
+.BR SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE .
 .PP
 The
 .I securebits
-- 
2.4.3

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#1235437

FromKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date2015-09-29 19:50 +0200
Message-ID<qe7cn-50W-21@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1234623
On Mon, Sep 28, 2015 at 6:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> ---
>  man2/prctl.2        | 12 ++++++++++++
>  man7/capabilities.7 | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>  2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/man2/prctl.2 b/man2/prctl.2
> index e743a6305969..5bcec391c110 100644
> --- a/man2/prctl.2
> +++ b/man2/prctl.2
> @@ -954,6 +954,18 @@ had been called.
>  For further information on Intel MPX, see the kernel source file
>  .IR Documentation/x86/intel_mpx.txt .
>  .\"
> +.TP
> +.BR PR_CAP_AMBIENT " (since Linux 4.2)"
> +Reads or changes the ambient capability set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE,
> +then the capability specified in arg3 is added to the ambient set.  This will
> +fail, returning EPERM, if the capability is not already both permitted and
> +inheritable or if the SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE securebit is set.  If arg2
> +is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER, then the capability specified in arg3 is removed
> +from the ambient set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET, then
> +.BR prctl (2)
> +will return 1 if the capability in arg3 is in the ambient set and 0 if not.
> +If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL, then all capabilities will
> +be removed from the ambient set.

In the case of CLEAR_ALL, is arg3 "don't care", or must it be set to 0?

>  .SH RETURN VALUE
>  On success,
>  .BR PR_GET_DUMPABLE ,
> diff --git a/man7/capabilities.7 b/man7/capabilities.7
> index 616189c881e4..8934d05a5b07 100644
> --- a/man7/capabilities.7
> +++ b/man7/capabilities.7
> @@ -700,13 +700,34 @@ a program whose associated file capabilities grant that capability).
>  .IR Inheritable :
>  This is a set of capabilities preserved across an
>  .BR execve (2).
> -It provides a mechanism for a process to assign capabilities
> -to the permitted set of the new program during an
> -.BR execve (2).
> +Inheritable capabilities remain inheritable when executing any program,
> +and inheritable capabilities are added to the permitted set when executing
> +a program that has the corresponding bits set in the file inheritable set.
> +.IP
> +Because inheritable capabilities are not generally preserved across
> +.BR execve (2)
> +when running as a non-root user, applications that wish to run helper
> +programs with elevated capabilities should consider using ambient capabilities,
> +described below.
>  .TP
>  .IR Effective :
>  This is the set of capabilities used by the kernel to
>  perform permission checks for the thread.
> +.TP
> +.IR Ambient " (since Linux 4.3):"
> +This is a set of capabilities that are preserved across an
> +.BR execve (2)
> +of a program that does not have file capabilities.  The ambient capability
> +set obeys the invariant that no capability can ever be ambient if it is
> +not both permitted and inheritable.  Ambient capabilities are
> +preserved in the permitted set and added to the effective
> +set when
> +.BR execve (2)
> +is called.  The ambient capability set is modified using
> +.BR prctl (2).
> +Executing a program that changes uid or gid due to the setuid or setgid
> +bits or executing a program that has any file capabilities set will clear
> +the ambient set.
>  .PP
>  A child created via
>  .BR fork (2)
> @@ -788,10 +809,12 @@ the process using the following algorithm:
>  .in +4n
>  .nf
>
> +P'(ambient) = (file has capabilities or is setuid or setgid) ? 0 : P(ambient)
> +
>  P'(permitted) = (P(inheritable) & F(inheritable)) |
> -                (F(permitted) & cap_bset)
> +                (F(permitted) & cap_bset) | P'(ambient)
>
> -P'(effective) = F(effective) ? P'(permitted) : 0
> +P'(effective) = F(effective) ? P'(permitted) : P'(ambient)
>
>  P'(inheritable) = P(inheritable)    [i.e., unchanged]
>
> @@ -1074,6 +1097,10 @@ an effective or real UID of 0 calls
>  .BR execve (2).
>  (See the subsection
>  .IR "Capabilities and execution of programs by root" .)
> +.TP
> +.B SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE
> +Setting this flag disallows
> +.BR PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE .
>  .PP
>  Each of the above "base" flags has a companion "locked" flag.
>  Setting any of the "locked" flags is irreversible,
> @@ -1082,8 +1109,9 @@ corresponding "base" flag.
>  The locked flags are:
>  .BR SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED ,
>  .BR SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED ,
> +.BR SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED ,
>  and
> -.BR SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED .
> +.BR SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE .
>  .PP
>  The
>  .I securebits
> --
> 2.4.3
>

Looks great, thanks!

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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#1235440

FromAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Date2015-09-29 20:00 +0200
Message-ID<qe7m2-5cj-5@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1235437
On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 10:47 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 28, 2015 at 6:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
>> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
>> ---
>>  man2/prctl.2        | 12 ++++++++++++
>>  man7/capabilities.7 | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>>  2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/man2/prctl.2 b/man2/prctl.2
>> index e743a6305969..5bcec391c110 100644
>> --- a/man2/prctl.2
>> +++ b/man2/prctl.2
>> @@ -954,6 +954,18 @@ had been called.
>>  For further information on Intel MPX, see the kernel source file
>>  .IR Documentation/x86/intel_mpx.txt .
>>  .\"
>> +.TP
>> +.BR PR_CAP_AMBIENT " (since Linux 4.2)"
>> +Reads or changes the ambient capability set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE,
>> +then the capability specified in arg3 is added to the ambient set.  This will
>> +fail, returning EPERM, if the capability is not already both permitted and
>> +inheritable or if the SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE securebit is set.  If arg2
>> +is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER, then the capability specified in arg3 is removed
>> +from the ambient set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET, then
>> +.BR prctl (2)
>> +will return 1 if the capability in arg3 is in the ambient set and 0 if not.
>> +If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL, then all capabilities will
>> +be removed from the ambient set.
>
> In the case of CLEAR_ALL, is arg3 "don't care", or must it be set to 0?

Must be zero.

--Andy
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#1235444

FromKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date2015-09-29 20:00 +0200
Message-ID<qe7m2-5cj-15@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1235440
On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 10:49 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 10:47 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>> On Mon, Sep 28, 2015 at 6:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
>>> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
>>> ---
>>>  man2/prctl.2        | 12 ++++++++++++
>>>  man7/capabilities.7 | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>>>  2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/man2/prctl.2 b/man2/prctl.2
>>> index e743a6305969..5bcec391c110 100644
>>> --- a/man2/prctl.2
>>> +++ b/man2/prctl.2
>>> @@ -954,6 +954,18 @@ had been called.
>>>  For further information on Intel MPX, see the kernel source file
>>>  .IR Documentation/x86/intel_mpx.txt .
>>>  .\"
>>> +.TP
>>> +.BR PR_CAP_AMBIENT " (since Linux 4.2)"
>>> +Reads or changes the ambient capability set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE,
>>> +then the capability specified in arg3 is added to the ambient set.  This will
>>> +fail, returning EPERM, if the capability is not already both permitted and
>>> +inheritable or if the SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE securebit is set.  If arg2
>>> +is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER, then the capability specified in arg3 is removed
>>> +from the ambient set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET, then
>>> +.BR prctl (2)
>>> +will return 1 if the capability in arg3 is in the ambient set and 0 if not.
>>> +If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL, then all capabilities will
>>> +be removed from the ambient set.
>>
>> In the case of CLEAR_ALL, is arg3 "don't care", or must it be set to 0?
>
> Must be zero.

Okay, cool. Probably that should be noted here.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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