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[PATCH v2] xen: fix potential integer overflow in queue_reply

Started byInsu Yun <wuninsu@gmail.com>
First post2016-01-18 18:00 +0100
Last post2016-01-18 18:00 +0100
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  [PATCH v2] xen: fix potential integer overflow in queue_reply Insu Yun <wuninsu@gmail.com> - 2016-01-18 18:00 +0100

#1311676 — [PATCH v2] xen: fix potential integer overflow in queue_reply

FromInsu Yun <wuninsu@gmail.com>
Date2016-01-18 18:00 +0100
Subject[PATCH v2] xen: fix potential integer overflow in queue_reply
Message-ID<qSljT-3pb-55@gated-at.bofh.it>
When len is greater than UINT_MAX - sizeof(*rb), in next allocation,
it can overflow integer range and allocates small size of heap.
After that, memcpy will overflow the allocated heap.
Therefore, it needs to check the size of given length.

Signed-off-by: Insu Yun <wuninsu@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_dev_frontend.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_dev_frontend.c b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_dev_frontend.c
index 9433e46..912b64e 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_dev_frontend.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_dev_frontend.c
@@ -188,6 +188,8 @@ static int queue_reply(struct list_head *queue, const void *data, size_t len)
 
 	if (len == 0)
 		return 0;
+	if (len > XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	rb = kmalloc(sizeof(*rb) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rb == NULL)
-- 
1.9.1

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