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| Started by | Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2015-12-22 22:40 +0100 |
| Last post | 2015-12-22 23:40 +0100 |
| Articles | 2 — 1 participant |
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[PATCH v5 0/2] um: Protect memory mapped file Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2015-12-22 22:40 +0100
[PATCH v5 1/2] um: Do not set unsecure permission for temporary file Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2015-12-22 23:40 +0100
| From | Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2015-12-22 22:40 +0100 |
| Subject | [PATCH v5 0/2] um: Protect memory mapped file |
| Message-ID | <qICFj-JT-9@gated-at.bofh.it> |
This series protect the memory mapped file. This apply on v4.4-rc6. Changes since v4: * fix spelling [1/2] Changes since v3: * add Tristan Schmelcher's ack Changes since v2; addressed Tristan Schmelcher's comment: * remove the whole fchmod call [1/2] Changes since v1; addressed Richard Weinberger's comments: * add attacker model to the patch description [1/2] * remove errno reset [2/2] Regards, Mickaël Mickaël Salaün (2): um: Do not set unsecure permission for temporary file um: Use race-free temporary file creation arch/um/os-Linux/mem.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) -- 2.6.4 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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| From | Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2015-12-22 23:40 +0100 |
| Subject | [PATCH v5 1/2] um: Do not set unsecure permission for temporary file |
| Message-ID | <qIDL3-1mS-3@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1297076 |
Remove the insecure 0777 mode for temporary file to prohibit other users
to change the executable mapped code.
An attacker could gain access to the mapped file descriptor from the
temporary file (before it is unlinked) in a read-only mode but it should
not be accessible in write mode to avoid arbitrary code execution.
To not change the hostfs behavior, the temporary file creation
permission now depends on the current umask(2) and the implementation of
mkstemp(3).
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Tristan Schmelcher <tschmelcher@google.com>
---
arch/um/os-Linux/mem.c | 6 ------
1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/um/os-Linux/mem.c b/arch/um/os-Linux/mem.c
index 897e9ad0c108..840d573f7e38 100644
--- a/arch/um/os-Linux/mem.c
+++ b/arch/um/os-Linux/mem.c
@@ -142,12 +142,6 @@ static int __init create_tmp_file(unsigned long long len)
if (fd < 0)
exit(1);
- err = fchmod(fd, 0777);
- if (err < 0) {
- perror("fchmod");
- exit(1);
- }
-
/*
* Seek to len - 1 because writing a character there will
* increase the file size by one byte, to the desired length.
--
2.6.4
--
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