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[PATCH v2 0/7] kasan: various fixes

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  [PATCH v2 0/7] kasan: various fixes Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> - 2015-09-14 15:50 +0200
    [PATCH v2 3/7] kasan: accurately determine the type of the bad access Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> - 2015-09-14 15:50 +0200
    [PATCH v2 7/7] kasan: update reference to kasan prototype repo Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> - 2015-09-14 15:50 +0200
    [PATCH v2 2/7] kasan: update reported bug types for kernel memory accesses Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> - 2015-09-14 15:50 +0200
    [PATCH v2 5/7] kasan: various fixes in documentation Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> - 2015-09-14 15:50 +0200

#1224161 — [PATCH v2 0/7] kasan: various fixes

This patchset contains various fixes for KASAN. That includes:

1. Improving reported bug types.

Making KASAN distinguish and report the following types of bugs:
slab-out-of-bounds, stack-out-of-bounds, global-out-of-bounds
use-after-free, null-ptr-deref, user-memory-access, wild-memory-access.

2. Making references to the tool name consistent.

We decided to use KASAN as the short name of the tool since a lot of
people already use it, and KernelAddressSanitizer as the full name
to be consistent with the userspace AddressSantizer.

Changes since v1:
- rebased on top of the latest -mm

Andrey Konovalov (7):
  kasan: update reported bug types for not user nor kernel memory
    accesses
  kasan: update reported bug types for kernel memory accesses
  kasan: accurately determine the type of the bad access
  kasan: update log messages
  kasan: various fixes in documentation
  kasan: move KASAN_SANITIZE in arch/x86/boot/Makefile
  kasan: update reference to kasan prototype repo

 Documentation/kasan.txt     | 43 +++++++++++-----------
 arch/x86/boot/Makefile      |  4 +-
 arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c |  2 +-
 mm/kasan/kasan.c            | 12 ++----
 mm/kasan/kasan.h            |  3 --
 mm/kasan/report.c           | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 6 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)

-- 
2.6.0.rc0.131.gf624c3d

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#1224164 — [PATCH v2 3/7] kasan: accurately determine the type of the bad access

Makes KASAN accurately determine the type of the bad access. If the shadow
byte value is in the [0, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) range we can look at
the next shadow byte to determine the type of the access.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
---
 mm/kasan/report.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
index cdf4c31..be53a8f 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -50,15 +50,26 @@ static const void *find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size)
 static void print_error_description(struct kasan_access_info *info)
 {
 	const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash";
-	u8 shadow_val;
+	u8 *shadow_addr;
 
 	info->first_bad_addr = find_first_bad_addr(info->access_addr,
 						info->access_size);
 
-	shadow_val = *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
+	shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
 
-	switch (shadow_val) {
+	/*
+	 * If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) we can look
+	 * at the next shadow byte to determine the type of the bad access.
+	 */
+	if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
+		shadow_addr++;
+
+	switch (*shadow_addr) {
 	case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
+		/*
+		 * In theory it's still possible to see these shadow values
+		 * due to a data race in the kernel code.
+		 */
 		bug_type = "out-of-bounds";
 		break;
 	case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
-- 
2.6.0.rc0.131.gf624c3d

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#1224168 — [PATCH v2 7/7] kasan: update reference to kasan prototype repo

Update the reference to the kasan prototype repository on github,
since it was renamed.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
---
 mm/kasan/kasan.c  | 2 +-
 mm/kasan/report.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
index 61c9620..48fe48b 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
  * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
  *
- * Some of code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/linux by
+ * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by
  *        Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
index ae6bd36..f5e068a 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
  * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
  *
- * Some of code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/linux by
+ * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by
  *        Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
-- 
2.6.0.rc0.131.gf624c3d

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#1224169 — [PATCH v2 2/7] kasan: update reported bug types for kernel memory accesses

Update the names of the bad access types to better reflect the type of
the access that happended and make these error types "literals" that can
be used for classification and deduplication in scripts.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
---
 mm/kasan/report.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
index 964aaf4..cdf4c31 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static const void *find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size)
 
 static void print_error_description(struct kasan_access_info *info)
 {
-	const char *bug_type = "unknown crash";
+	const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash";
 	u8 shadow_val;
 
 	info->first_bad_addr = find_first_bad_addr(info->access_addr,
@@ -58,21 +58,25 @@ static void print_error_description(struct kasan_access_info *info)
 	shadow_val = *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
 
 	switch (shadow_val) {
-	case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
-	case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
-		bug_type = "use after free";
+	case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
+		bug_type = "out-of-bounds";
 		break;
 	case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
 	case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE:
+		bug_type = "slab-out-of-bounds";
+		break;
 	case KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE:
-	case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
-		bug_type = "out of bounds access";
+		bug_type = "global-out-of-bounds";
 		break;
 	case KASAN_STACK_LEFT:
 	case KASAN_STACK_MID:
 	case KASAN_STACK_RIGHT:
 	case KASAN_STACK_PARTIAL:
-		bug_type = "out of bounds on stack";
+		bug_type = "stack-out-of-bounds";
+		break;
+	case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
+	case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
+		bug_type = "use-after-free";
 		break;
 	}
 
-- 
2.6.0.rc0.131.gf624c3d

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#1224172 — [PATCH v2 5/7] kasan: various fixes in documentation

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
---
 Documentation/kasan.txt | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/kasan.txt b/Documentation/kasan.txt
index 0d32355..d2f4c8f 100644
--- a/Documentation/kasan.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kasan.txt
@@ -1,32 +1,31 @@
-Kernel address sanitizer
-================
+KernelAddressSanitizer (KASAN)
+==============================
 
 0. Overview
 ===========
 
-Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It provides
+KernelAddressSANitizer (KASAN) is a dynamic memory error detector. It provides
 a fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and out-of-bounds
 bugs.
 
-KASan uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
-therefore you will need a gcc version of 4.9.2 or later. KASan could detect out
-of bounds accesses to stack or global variables, but only if gcc 5.0 or later was
-used to built the kernel.
+KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
+therefore you will need a GCC version 4.9.2 or later. GCC 5.0 or later is
+required for detection of out-of-bounds accesses to stack or global variables.
 
-Currently KASan is supported only for x86_64 architecture and requires that the
-kernel be built with the SLUB allocator.
+Currently KASAN is supported only for x86_64 architecture and requires the
+kernel to be built with the SLUB allocator.
 
 1. Usage
-=========
+========
 
 To enable KASAN configure kernel with:
 
 	  CONFIG_KASAN = y
 
-and choose between CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE. Outline/inline
-is compiler instrumentation types. The former produces smaller binary the
-latter is 1.1 - 2 times faster. Inline instrumentation requires a gcc version
-of 5.0 or later.
+and choose between CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE. Outline and
+inline are compiler instrumentation types. The former produces smaller binary
+the latter is 1.1 - 2 times faster. Inline instrumentation requires a GCC
+version 5.0 or later.
 
 Currently KASAN works only with the SLUB memory allocator.
 For better bug detection and nicer report, enable CONFIG_STACKTRACE and put
@@ -42,7 +41,7 @@ similar to the following to the respective kernel Makefile:
                 KASAN_SANITIZE := n
 
 1.1 Error reports
-==========
+=================
 
 A typical out of bounds access report looks like this:
 
@@ -119,14 +118,16 @@ Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff8800693bc800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ==================================================================
 
-First sections describe slub object where bad access happened.
-See 'SLUB Debug output' section in Documentation/vm/slub.txt for details.
+The header of the report discribe what kind of bug happend and what kind of
+access caused it. It's followed by the description of the accessed slub object
+(see 'SLUB Debug output' section in Documentation/vm/slub.txt for details) and
+the description of the accessed memory page.
 
 In the last section the report shows memory state around the accessed address.
-Reading this part requires some more understanding of how KASAN works.
+Reading this part requires some understanding of how KASAN works.
 
-Each 8 bytes of memory are encoded in one shadow byte as accessible,
-partially accessible, freed or they can be part of a redzone.
+The state of each 8 aligned bytes of memory is encoded in one shadow byte.
+Those 8 bytes can be accessible, partially accessible, freed or be a redzone.
 We use the following encoding for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
 of the corresponding memory region are accessible; number N (1 <= N <= 7) means
 that the first N bytes are accessible, and other (8 - N) bytes are not;
@@ -139,7 +140,7 @@ the accessed address is partially accessible.
 
 
 2. Implementation details
-========================
+=========================
 
 From a high level, our approach to memory error detection is similar to that
 of kmemcheck: use shadow memory to record whether each byte of memory is safe
-- 
2.6.0.rc0.131.gf624c3d

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