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[PATCH v2 00/16] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot

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  [PATCH v2 00/16] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> - 2015-08-11 08:20 +0200
    [PATCH v2 15/16] PM / hibernate: Bypass verification logic on legacy BIOS "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> - 2015-08-11 08:20 +0200
    [PATCH v2 01/16] PM / hibernate: define HMAC algorithm and digest size of hibernation "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> - 2015-08-11 08:20 +0200
    [PATCH v2 03/16] x86/boot: Public getting random boot function "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> - 2015-08-11 08:20 +0200
    [PATCH v2 05/16] x86/efi: Get entropy through EFI random number generator protocol "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> - 2015-08-11 08:20 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v2 05/16] x86/efi: Get entropy through EFI random number  generator protocol Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> - 2015-08-20 16:50 +0200
        Re: [PATCH v2 05/16] x86/efi: Get entropy through EFI random number  generator protocol joeyli <jlee@suse.com> - 2015-08-27 07:00 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v2 05/16] x86/efi: Get entropy through EFI random number  generator protocol Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> - 2015-08-20 22:30 +0200
        Re: [PATCH v2 05/16] x86/efi: Get entropy through EFI random number  generator protocol joeyli <jlee@suse.com> - 2015-08-27 08:20 +0200
    [PATCH v2 09/16] PM / hibernate: Reserve hibernation key and erase footprints "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> - 2015-08-11 08:20 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v2 09/16] PM / hibernate: Reserve hibernation key and  erase footprints "Chen, Yu C" <yu.c.chen@intel.com> - 2015-08-13 04:50 +0200
        Re: [PATCH v2 09/16] PM / hibernate: Reserve hibernation key and  erase footprints joeyli <jlee@suse.com> - 2015-08-13 05:30 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v2 09/16] PM / hibernate: Reserve hibernation key and  erase footprints joeyli <jlee@suse.com> - 2015-08-13 16:40 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v2 09/16] PM / hibernate: Reserve hibernation key and  erase footprints Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> - 2015-08-21 15:30 +0200
        Re: [PATCH v2 09/16] PM / hibernate: Reserve hibernation key and  erase footprints joeyli <jlee@suse.com> - 2015-08-27 12:30 +0200
    [PATCH v2 16/16] PM / hibernate: Document signature verification of hibernate snapshot "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> - 2015-08-11 08:20 +0200
    [PATCH v2 04/16] x86/efi: Generating random number in EFI stub "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> - 2015-08-11 08:20 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v2 04/16] x86/efi: Generating random number in EFI stub Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> - 2015-08-20 16:20 +0200
        Re: [PATCH v2 04/16] x86/efi: Generating random number in EFI stub joeyli <jlee@suse.com> - 2015-08-27 06:10 +0200
    [PATCH v2 08/16] x86/efi: Carrying hibernation key by setup data "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> - 2015-08-11 08:20 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v2 08/16] x86/efi: Carrying hibernation key by setup  data Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> - 2015-08-15 19:10 +0200
        Re: [PATCH v2 08/16] x86/efi: Carrying hibernation key by setup data joeyli <jlee@suse.com> - 2015-08-16 07:40 +0200
        Re: [PATCH v2 08/16] x86/efi: Carrying hibernation key by setup  data Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> - 2015-08-16 23:30 +0200
          Re: [PATCH v2 08/16] x86/efi: Carrying hibernation key by setup data Nigel Cunningham <nigel@nigelcunningham.com.au> - 2015-08-17 09:00 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v2 08/16] x86/efi: Carrying hibernation key by setup data Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> - 2015-08-21 14:50 +0200
        Re: [PATCH v2 08/16] x86/efi: Carrying hibernation key by setup data joeyli <jlee@suse.com> - 2015-08-27 11:30 +0200
    [PATCH v2 06/16] x86/efi: Generating random HMAC key for siging hibernate image "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> - 2015-08-11 08:20 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v2 06/16] x86/efi: Generating random HMAC key for siging  hibernate image Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> - 2015-08-20 22:50 +0200
        Re: [PATCH v2 06/16] x86/efi: Generating random HMAC key for siging  hibernate image joeyli <jlee@suse.com> - 2015-08-27 11:10 +0200
    [PATCH v2 02/16] x86/efi: Add get and set variable to EFI services pointer table "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> - 2015-08-11 08:20 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v2 02/16] x86/efi: Add get and set variable to EFI  services pointer table Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> - 2015-08-19 18:40 +0200
    [PATCH v2 10/16] PM / hibernate: Generate and verify signature of hibernate snapshot "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> - 2015-08-11 08:30 +0200
    [PATCH v2 14/16] PM / hibernate: Allow user trigger hibernation key re-generating "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> - 2015-08-11 08:30 +0200
    [PATCH v2 13/16] PM / hibernate: Add configuration to enforce signature verification "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> - 2015-08-11 08:30 +0200
    [PATCH v2 12/16] PM / hibernate: Forward signature verifying result and key to image kernel "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> - 2015-08-11 08:30 +0200

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#1208125 — Re: [PATCH v2 08/16] x86/efi: Carrying hibernation key by setup data

On Tue 2015-08-11 14:16:28, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> For forwarding hibernation key from EFI stub to boot kernel, this patch
> allocates setup data for carrying hibernation key, size and the status
> of efi operating.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>

Jiri, are you sure you reviewed these? This is not really
english, afaict, and efi/EFI should be spelled consistently.

Could you try reviewing it again? Pointing out 10s of small
bugs is quite boring...

>  	unsigned long key_size;
>  	unsigned long attributes;
> +	struct setup_data *setup_data, *hibernation_setup_data;
>  	struct hibernation_keys *keys;
> +	unsigned long size = 0;
>  	efi_status_t status;
>  
>  	/* Allocate setup_data to carry keys */
> +	size = sizeof(struct setup_data) + sizeof(struct hibernation_keys);
>  	status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
> -				sizeof(struct hibernation_keys), &keys);
> +				size, &hibernation_setup_data);
>  	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
>  		efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to alloc mem for hibernation keys\n");
>  		return;
>  	}
>  
> -	memset(keys, 0, sizeof(struct hibernation_keys));
> +	memset(hibernation_setup_data, 0, size);
> +	keys = (struct hibernation_keys *) hibernation_setup_data->data;
>  

any chance to type stuff correctly so that casts are not
neccessary?

> +clean_fail:
> +	hibernation_setup_data->type = SETUP_HIBERNATION_KEYS;
> +	hibernation_setup_data->len = sizeof(struct hibernation_keys);
> +	hibernation_setup_data->next = 0;
> +	keys->hkey_status = efi_status_to_err(status);
> +
> +	setup_data = (struct setup_data *)params->hdr.setup_data;
> +	while (setup_data && setup_data->next)
> +		setup_data = (struct setup_data *)setup_data->next;

way too many casts here.

							Pavel
-- 
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#1208202 — Re: [PATCH v2 08/16] x86/efi: Carrying hibernation key by setup data

On Sat, Aug 15, 2015 at 07:07:38PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> On Tue 2015-08-11 14:16:28, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > For forwarding hibernation key from EFI stub to boot kernel, this patch
> > allocates setup data for carrying hibernation key, size and the status
> > of efi operating.
> > 
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
> 
> Jiri, are you sure you reviewed these? This is not really
> english, afaict, and efi/EFI should be spelled consistently.
> 
> Could you try reviewing it again? Pointing out 10s of small
> bugs is quite boring...
>

It's my fault, I will find someone help to review my English in all
patch description for next edition.
 
> >  	unsigned long key_size;
> >  	unsigned long attributes;
> > +	struct setup_data *setup_data, *hibernation_setup_data;
> >  	struct hibernation_keys *keys;
> > +	unsigned long size = 0;
> >  	efi_status_t status;
> >  
> >  	/* Allocate setup_data to carry keys */
> > +	size = sizeof(struct setup_data) + sizeof(struct hibernation_keys);
> >  	status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
> > -				sizeof(struct hibernation_keys), &keys);
> > +				size, &hibernation_setup_data);
> >  	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> >  		efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to alloc mem for hibernation keys\n");
> >  		return;
> >  	}
> >  
> > -	memset(keys, 0, sizeof(struct hibernation_keys));
> > +	memset(hibernation_setup_data, 0, size);
> > +	keys = (struct hibernation_keys *) hibernation_setup_data->data;
> >  
> 
> any chance to type stuff correctly so that casts are not
> neccessary?
> 

The data element defined in setup_data struct as u8:
        __u8 data[0];

So I use cast here.

> > +clean_fail:
> > +	hibernation_setup_data->type = SETUP_HIBERNATION_KEYS;
> > +	hibernation_setup_data->len = sizeof(struct hibernation_keys);
> > +	hibernation_setup_data->next = 0;
> > +	keys->hkey_status = efi_status_to_err(status);
> > +
> > +	setup_data = (struct setup_data *)params->hdr.setup_data;
> > +	while (setup_data && setup_data->next)
> > +		setup_data = (struct setup_data *)setup_data->next;
> 
> way too many casts here.
> 
> 							Pavel

I follow setup_efi_pci32() and setup_efi_pci64():

        while (data && data->next)
                data = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)data->next;

That's better I also add (unsigned long) cast as setup_efi_pci. Do
you have good suggestion let the above code more graceful?


Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee

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#1208276 — Re: [PATCH v2 08/16] x86/efi: Carrying hibernation key by setup data

On Sat, 15 Aug 2015, Pavel Machek wrote:

> > For forwarding hibernation key from EFI stub to boot kernel, this patch
> > allocates setup data for carrying hibernation key, size and the status
> > of efi operating.
> > 
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
> 
> Jiri, are you sure you reviewed these? This is not really
> english, afaict, and efi/EFI should be spelled consistently.

Yes, I did review the code and the fact that it is still in compliance 
with my original idea. I think you can blame me on not reviewing 
changelogs super-rigorously though, so all suggestions for improvements 
are absolutely welcome.

Thanks,

-- 
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs

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#1208404 — Re: [PATCH v2 08/16] x86/efi: Carrying hibernation key by setup data

Hi all.

I've rejoined LKML, so I'll try to help with reviewing PM patches. I'd forgotten how much it is a case of sipping at a fire hydrant!

Regards,

Nigel

On 17/08/15 07:23, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Sat, 15 Aug 2015, Pavel Machek wrote:
>
>>> For forwarding hibernation key from EFI stub to boot kernel, this patch
>>> allocates setup data for carrying hibernation key, size and the status
>>> of efi operating.
>>>
>>> Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
>> Jiri, are you sure you reviewed these? This is not really
>> english, afaict, and efi/EFI should be spelled consistently.
> Yes, I did review the code and the fact that it is still in compliance 
> with my original idea. I think you can blame me on not reviewing 
> changelogs super-rigorously though, so all suggestions for improvements 
> are absolutely welcome.
>
> Thanks,
>

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#1211144 — Re: [PATCH v2 08/16] x86/efi: Carrying hibernation key by setup data

On Tue, 11 Aug, at 02:16:28PM, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> For forwarding hibernation key from EFI stub to boot kernel, this patch
> allocates setup data for carrying hibernation key, size and the status
> of efi operating.
 
This could do with some more information, and include that the key is
used to validate hibernate images.

But now that I think about it, is there a reason this patch hasn't
been merged with patch 6? The memory leak I mentioned in patch 6
becomes a non-issue in this one, so it would be good if these two
could be squashed together.
  
> Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
> Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c      | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
>  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h |  1 +
>  2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> index 463aa9b..c838d09 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> @@ -1394,18 +1394,22 @@ static void setup_hibernation_keys(struct boot_params *params)
>  {
>  	unsigned long key_size;
>  	unsigned long attributes;
> +	struct setup_data *setup_data, *hibernation_setup_data;
>  	struct hibernation_keys *keys;
> +	unsigned long size = 0;
>  	efi_status_t status;

One thing to be aware of is that eboot.c has mainly used the
"reverse-christmas-tree" style of variable declarations, with longer
lines first, and shorter ones following. I haven't mentioned it before
because none of your changes seemed to be too different (and it's not
a tree-wide convention), but the above setup_data line goes a bit too
far.

Could you try and keep them ordered, longest line first?

>  
>  	/* Allocate setup_data to carry keys */
> +	size = sizeof(struct setup_data) + sizeof(struct hibernation_keys);
>  	status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
> -				sizeof(struct hibernation_keys), &keys);
> +				size, &hibernation_setup_data);
>  	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
>  		efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to alloc mem for hibernation keys\n");
>  		return;
>  	}
>  
> -	memset(keys, 0, sizeof(struct hibernation_keys));
> +	memset(hibernation_setup_data, 0, size);
> +	keys = (struct hibernation_keys *) hibernation_setup_data->data;
>  
>  	status = efi_call_early(get_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY,
>  				&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID, &attributes,
> @@ -1419,7 +1423,8 @@ static void setup_hibernation_keys(struct boot_params *params)
>  		if (status == EFI_SUCCESS) {
>  			efi_printk(sys_table, "Cleaned existing hibernation key\n");
>  			status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
> -		}
> +		} else
> +			goto clean_fail;

Please add braces for the 'else' clause. Also, please include a
comment stating that the reason you jump to the label instead of
returning is so that the EFI status error code can be recorded in
hibernation_setup_data.

>  	}
>  
>  	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> @@ -1436,6 +1441,21 @@ static void setup_hibernation_keys(struct boot_params *params)
>  		if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
>  			efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to set hibernation key\n");
>  	}
> +
> +clean_fail:
> +	hibernation_setup_data->type = SETUP_HIBERNATION_KEYS;
> +	hibernation_setup_data->len = sizeof(struct hibernation_keys);
> +	hibernation_setup_data->next = 0;
> +	keys->hkey_status = efi_status_to_err(status);
> +
> +	setup_data = (struct setup_data *)params->hdr.setup_data;
> +	while (setup_data && setup_data->next)
> +		setup_data = (struct setup_data *)setup_data->next;
> +
> +	if (setup_data)
> +		setup_data->next = (unsigned long)hibernation_setup_data;
> +	else
> +		params->hdr.setup_data = (unsigned long)hibernation_setup_data;

This label name is a little confusing because you reach it both when
the EFI boot variable was successfully created and when a bogus EFI
variable failed to be deleted, i.e. it's not always reached because of
a failure.

How about 'setup' or simply 'out' ?

-- 
Matt Fleming, Intel Open Source Technology Center
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#1214426 — Re: [PATCH v2 08/16] x86/efi: Carrying hibernation key by setup data

On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 01:40:26PM +0100, Matt Fleming wrote:
> On Tue, 11 Aug, at 02:16:28PM, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > For forwarding hibernation key from EFI stub to boot kernel, this patch
> > allocates setup data for carrying hibernation key, size and the status
> > of efi operating.
>  
> This could do with some more information, and include that the key is
> used to validate hibernate images.
> 
> But now that I think about it, is there a reason this patch hasn't
> been merged with patch 6? The memory leak I mentioned in patch 6
> becomes a non-issue in this one, so it would be good if these two
> could be squashed together.
>

OK, I will merge this patch with patch 6.

Actually the sequence of patches are from the order of my developing.
And, the purpose of code in this patch a bit different with patch 6,
so I didn't merge them together.
   
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
> > Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c      | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
> >  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h |  1 +
> >  2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> > index 463aa9b..c838d09 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> > @@ -1394,18 +1394,22 @@ static void setup_hibernation_keys(struct boot_params *params)
> >  {
> >  	unsigned long key_size;
> >  	unsigned long attributes;
> > +	struct setup_data *setup_data, *hibernation_setup_data;
> >  	struct hibernation_keys *keys;
> > +	unsigned long size = 0;
> >  	efi_status_t status;
> 
> One thing to be aware of is that eboot.c has mainly used the
> "reverse-christmas-tree" style of variable declarations, with longer
> lines first, and shorter ones following. I haven't mentioned it before
> because none of your changes seemed to be too different (and it's not
> a tree-wide convention), but the above setup_data line goes a bit too
> far.
> 
> Could you try and keep them ordered, longest line first?
> 

Sure, sorry for I didn't aware that before.

> >  
> >  	/* Allocate setup_data to carry keys */
> > +	size = sizeof(struct setup_data) + sizeof(struct hibernation_keys);
> >  	status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
> > -				sizeof(struct hibernation_keys), &keys);
> > +				size, &hibernation_setup_data);
> >  	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> >  		efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to alloc mem for hibernation keys\n");
> >  		return;
> >  	}
> >  
> > -	memset(keys, 0, sizeof(struct hibernation_keys));
> > +	memset(hibernation_setup_data, 0, size);
> > +	keys = (struct hibernation_keys *) hibernation_setup_data->data;
> >  
> >  	status = efi_call_early(get_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY,
> >  				&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID, &attributes,
> > @@ -1419,7 +1423,8 @@ static void setup_hibernation_keys(struct boot_params *params)
> >  		if (status == EFI_SUCCESS) {
> >  			efi_printk(sys_table, "Cleaned existing hibernation key\n");
> >  			status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
> > -		}
> > +		} else
> > +			goto clean_fail;
> 
> Please add braces for the 'else' clause. Also, please include a
> comment stating that the reason you jump to the label instead of
> returning is so that the EFI status error code can be recorded in
> hibernation_setup_data.
>

Thanks for suggestions, I will modify it.
 
> >  	}
> >  
> >  	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> > @@ -1436,6 +1441,21 @@ static void setup_hibernation_keys(struct boot_params *params)
> >  		if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
> >  			efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to set hibernation key\n");
> >  	}
> > +
> > +clean_fail:
> > +	hibernation_setup_data->type = SETUP_HIBERNATION_KEYS;
> > +	hibernation_setup_data->len = sizeof(struct hibernation_keys);
> > +	hibernation_setup_data->next = 0;
> > +	keys->hkey_status = efi_status_to_err(status);
> > +
> > +	setup_data = (struct setup_data *)params->hdr.setup_data;
> > +	while (setup_data && setup_data->next)
> > +		setup_data = (struct setup_data *)setup_data->next;
> > +
> > +	if (setup_data)
> > +		setup_data->next = (unsigned long)hibernation_setup_data;
> > +	else
> > +		params->hdr.setup_data = (unsigned long)hibernation_setup_data;
> 
> This label name is a little confusing because you reach it both when
> the EFI boot variable was successfully created and when a bogus EFI
> variable failed to be deleted, i.e. it's not always reached because of
> a failure.
> 
> How about 'setup' or simply 'out' ?
>

I will change the label to 'setup' that match with setting setup_data.
 
> -- 
> Matt Fleming, Intel Open Source Technology Center


Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
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#1204801 — [PATCH v2 06/16] x86/efi: Generating random HMAC key for siging hibernate image

This patch adds codes in EFI stub for generating and storing the
HMAC key in EFI boot service variable for signing hibernate image.

Per rcf2104, the length of HMAC-SHA1 hash result is 20 bytes, and
it recommended the length of key the same with hash rsult, means
also 20 bytes. Using longer key would not significantly increase
the function strength. Due to the nvram space is limited in some
UEFI machines, so using the minimal recommended length 20 bytes
key that will stored in boot service variable.

The HMAC key stored in EFI boot service variable, GUID is
HIBERNATIONKey-fe141863-c070-478e-b8a3-878a5dc9ef21.

Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h   |  9 ++++++
 include/linux/suspend.h          |  3 ++
 3 files changed, 72 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index 0ffb6db..463aa9b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/efi.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 #include <asm/desc.h>
+#include <asm/suspend.h>
 
 #include "../string.h"
 #include "eboot.h"
@@ -1383,6 +1384,63 @@ free_mem_map:
 	return status;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION
+#define HIBERNATION_KEY \
+	((efi_char16_t [15]) { 'H', 'I', 'B', 'E', 'R', 'N', 'A', 'T', 'I', 'O', 'N', 'K', 'e', 'y', 0 })
+#define HIBERNATION_KEY_ATTRIBUTE	(EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | \
+					EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS)
+
+static void setup_hibernation_keys(struct boot_params *params)
+{
+	unsigned long key_size;
+	unsigned long attributes;
+	struct hibernation_keys *keys;
+	efi_status_t status;
+
+	/* Allocate setup_data to carry keys */
+	status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
+				sizeof(struct hibernation_keys), &keys);
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+		efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to alloc mem for hibernation keys\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	memset(keys, 0, sizeof(struct hibernation_keys));
+
+	status = efi_call_early(get_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY,
+				&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID, &attributes,
+				&key_size, keys->hibernation_key);
+	if (status == EFI_SUCCESS && attributes != HIBERNATION_KEY_ATTRIBUTE) {
+		efi_printk(sys_table, "A hibernation key is not boot service variable\n");
+		memset(keys->hibernation_key, 0, HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		status = efi_call_early(set_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY,
+					&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID, attributes, 0,
+					NULL);
+		if (status == EFI_SUCCESS) {
+			efi_printk(sys_table, "Cleaned existing hibernation key\n");
+			status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+		efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to get existing hibernation key\n");
+
+		efi_get_random_key(sys_table, params, keys->hibernation_key,
+				   HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+		status = efi_call_early(set_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY,
+					&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID,
+					HIBERNATION_KEY_ATTRIBUTE,
+					HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE,
+					keys->hibernation_key);
+		if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+			efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to set hibernation key\n");
+	}
+}
+#else
+static void setup_hibernation_keys(struct boot_params *params) {}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * On success we return a pointer to a boot_params structure, and NULL
  * on failure.
@@ -1420,6 +1478,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
 
 	setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
 
+	setup_hibernation_keys(boot_params);
+
 	status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
 				sizeof(*gdt), (void **)&gdt);
 	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h
index 2fab6c2..ab463c4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h
@@ -3,3 +3,12 @@
 #else
 # include <asm/suspend_64.h>
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION
+#include <linux/suspend.h>
+
+struct hibernation_keys {
+	unsigned long hkey_status;
+	u8 hibernation_key[HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE];
+};
+#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/suspend.h b/include/linux/suspend.h
index 56c6de9..aa88b3b 100644
--- a/include/linux/suspend.h
+++ b/include/linux/suspend.h
@@ -328,6 +328,9 @@ struct platform_hibernation_ops {
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION
 
+#define EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID \
+	EFI_GUID(0xfe141863, 0xc070, 0x478e, 0xb8, 0xa3, 0x87, 0x8a, 0x5d, 0xc9, 0xef, 0x21)
+
 /* HMAC Algorithm of Hibernate Signature */
 #define HIBERNATION_HMAC	"hmac(sha1)"
 #define HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE	20
-- 
2.1.4

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#1210724 — Re: [PATCH v2 06/16] x86/efi: Generating random HMAC key for siging hibernate image

On Tue, 11 Aug, at 02:16:26PM, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> This patch adds codes in EFI stub for generating and storing the
> HMAC key in EFI boot service variable for signing hibernate image.
> 
> Per rcf2104, the length of HMAC-SHA1 hash result is 20 bytes, and
> it recommended the length of key the same with hash rsult, means
> also 20 bytes. Using longer key would not significantly increase
> the function strength. Due to the nvram space is limited in some
> UEFI machines, so using the minimal recommended length 20 bytes
> key that will stored in boot service variable.

I'm having a hard time understanding the middle part of this
paragraph, specifically the part of the key and the hash result.
There's a typo in the subject too s/siging/signing/and "Generating"
should be "Generate".

> The HMAC key stored in EFI boot service variable, GUID is
> HIBERNATIONKey-fe141863-c070-478e-b8a3-878a5dc9ef21.
 
I'd really like to see some of the explanation from your cover letter
included in the commit message for this patch, and in particular why
signing hibernate images is a good thing.

Recording that for posterity in the commit message is going to be
helpful when someone looks at this patch in 2 years time and wonders
why RNG support was added to the EFI stub and why they might want to
sign hibernate images.

> Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
> Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h   |  9 ++++++
>  include/linux/suspend.h          |  3 ++
>  3 files changed, 72 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> index 0ffb6db..463aa9b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
>  #include <asm/efi.h>
>  #include <asm/setup.h>
>  #include <asm/desc.h>
> +#include <asm/suspend.h>
>  
>  #include "../string.h"
>  #include "eboot.h"
> @@ -1383,6 +1384,63 @@ free_mem_map:
>  	return status;
>  }
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION
> +#define HIBERNATION_KEY \
> +	((efi_char16_t [15]) { 'H', 'I', 'B', 'E', 'R', 'N', 'A', 'T', 'I', 'O', 'N', 'K', 'e', 'y', 0 })
> +#define HIBERNATION_KEY_ATTRIBUTE	(EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | \
> +					EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS)
> +
> +static void setup_hibernation_keys(struct boot_params *params)
> +{
> +	unsigned long key_size;
> +	unsigned long attributes;
> +	struct hibernation_keys *keys;
> +	efi_status_t status;
> +
> +	/* Allocate setup_data to carry keys */
> +	status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
> +				sizeof(struct hibernation_keys), &keys);
> +	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> +		efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to alloc mem for hibernation keys\n");
> +		return;
> +	}
> +
> +	memset(keys, 0, sizeof(struct hibernation_keys));
> +
> +	status = efi_call_early(get_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY,
> +				&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID, &attributes,
> +				&key_size, keys->hibernation_key);

Tiny nit, but could you put a new line here please? This is a large
chunk of code.

> +	if (status == EFI_SUCCESS && attributes != HIBERNATION_KEY_ATTRIBUTE) {
> +		efi_printk(sys_table, "A hibernation key is not boot service variable\n");
> +		memset(keys->hibernation_key, 0, HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
> +		status = efi_call_early(set_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY,
> +					&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID, attributes, 0,
> +					NULL);
> +		if (status == EFI_SUCCESS) {
> +			efi_printk(sys_table, "Cleaned existing hibernation key\n");
> +			status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
> +		}
> +	}

Hmm.. it's not clear to me that we should be deleting this EFI
variable if the attributes are bogus. It would be safer to just bail.

> +
> +	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> +		efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to get existing hibernation key\n");
> +
> +		efi_get_random_key(sys_table, params, keys->hibernation_key,
> +				   HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
> +
> +		status = efi_call_early(set_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY,
> +					&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID,
> +					HIBERNATION_KEY_ATTRIBUTE,
> +					HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE,
> +					keys->hibernation_key);
> +		if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
> +			efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to set hibernation key\n");

You're leaking 'keys' here.

> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h
> index 2fab6c2..ab463c4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h
> @@ -3,3 +3,12 @@
>  #else
>  # include <asm/suspend_64.h>
>  #endif
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION
> +#include <linux/suspend.h>
> +
> +struct hibernation_keys {
> +	unsigned long hkey_status;
> +	u8 hibernation_key[HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE];
> +};
> +#endif

Have you given any thought to how things are going to work if we
change the hash function in the future, or provide a choice? That
information doesn't appear anywhere in the above struct.

-- 
Matt Fleming, Intel Open Source Technology Center
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#1214402 — Re: [PATCH v2 06/16] x86/efi: Generating random HMAC key for siging hibernate image

On Thu, Aug 20, 2015 at 09:40:44PM +0100, Matt Fleming wrote:
> On Tue, 11 Aug, at 02:16:26PM, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > This patch adds codes in EFI stub for generating and storing the
> > HMAC key in EFI boot service variable for signing hibernate image.
> > 
> > Per rcf2104, the length of HMAC-SHA1 hash result is 20 bytes, and
> > it recommended the length of key the same with hash rsult, means
> > also 20 bytes. Using longer key would not significantly increase
> > the function strength. Due to the nvram space is limited in some
> > UEFI machines, so using the minimal recommended length 20 bytes
> > key that will stored in boot service variable.
> 
> I'm having a hard time understanding the middle part of this
> paragraph, specifically the part of the key and the hash result.
> There's a typo in the subject too s/siging/signing/and "Generating"
> should be "Generate".
>

In description, I want to explain why the length of key is 20 bytes.
I will try to explain more clear, if it still confuses reviewer then
I will remove the description.
 
> > The HMAC key stored in EFI boot service variable, GUID is
> > HIBERNATIONKey-fe141863-c070-478e-b8a3-878a5dc9ef21.
>  
> I'd really like to see some of the explanation from your cover letter
> included in the commit message for this patch, and in particular why
> signing hibernate images is a good thing.
> 
> Recording that for posterity in the commit message is going to be
> helpful when someone looks at this patch in 2 years time and wonders
> why RNG support was added to the EFI stub and why they might want to
> sign hibernate images.
> 

Thanks for suggestion, I will move some description from cover letter
to here and add comment for history and RNG support.

> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
> > Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h   |  9 ++++++
> >  include/linux/suspend.h          |  3 ++
> >  3 files changed, 72 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> > index 0ffb6db..463aa9b 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> > @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
> >  #include <asm/efi.h>
> >  #include <asm/setup.h>
> >  #include <asm/desc.h>
> > +#include <asm/suspend.h>
> >  
> >  #include "../string.h"
> >  #include "eboot.h"
> > @@ -1383,6 +1384,63 @@ free_mem_map:
> >  	return status;
> >  }
> >  
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION
> > +#define HIBERNATION_KEY \
> > +	((efi_char16_t [15]) { 'H', 'I', 'B', 'E', 'R', 'N', 'A', 'T', 'I', 'O', 'N', 'K', 'e', 'y', 0 })
> > +#define HIBERNATION_KEY_ATTRIBUTE	(EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | \
> > +					EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS)
> > +
> > +static void setup_hibernation_keys(struct boot_params *params)
> > +{
> > +	unsigned long key_size;
> > +	unsigned long attributes;
> > +	struct hibernation_keys *keys;
> > +	efi_status_t status;
> > +
> > +	/* Allocate setup_data to carry keys */
> > +	status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
> > +				sizeof(struct hibernation_keys), &keys);
> > +	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> > +		efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to alloc mem for hibernation keys\n");
> > +		return;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	memset(keys, 0, sizeof(struct hibernation_keys));
> > +
> > +	status = efi_call_early(get_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY,
> > +				&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID, &attributes,
> > +				&key_size, keys->hibernation_key);
> 
> Tiny nit, but could you put a new line here please? This is a large
> chunk of code.
>

OK, I will add new line here.
 
> > +	if (status == EFI_SUCCESS && attributes != HIBERNATION_KEY_ATTRIBUTE) {
> > +		efi_printk(sys_table, "A hibernation key is not boot service variable\n");
> > +		memset(keys->hibernation_key, 0, HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
> > +		status = efi_call_early(set_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY,
> > +					&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID, attributes, 0,
> > +					NULL);
> > +		if (status == EFI_SUCCESS) {
> > +			efi_printk(sys_table, "Cleaned existing hibernation key\n");
> > +			status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
> > +		}
> > +	}
> 
> Hmm.. it's not clear to me that we should be deleting this EFI
> variable if the attributes are bogus. It would be safer to just bail.
> 

The purpose of checking attribute of hibernation key variable is 
in case someone created a key variable on runtime environment _before_
this kernel create boot service variable. That causes EFI stub may load
a key that from non-secure environment.

That's why delete non-boot service variable and create new one here.

> > +
> > +	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> > +		efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to get existing hibernation key\n");
> > +
> > +		efi_get_random_key(sys_table, params, keys->hibernation_key,
> > +				   HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
> > +
> > +		status = efi_call_early(set_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY,
> > +					&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID,
> > +					HIBERNATION_KEY_ATTRIBUTE,
> > +					HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE,
> > +					keys->hibernation_key);
> > +		if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
> > +			efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to set hibernation key\n");
> 
> You're leaking 'keys' here.
>

Oh, you are right, I will free keys here.
 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h
> > index 2fab6c2..ab463c4 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend.h
> > @@ -3,3 +3,12 @@
> >  #else
> >  # include <asm/suspend_64.h>
> >  #endif
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION
> > +#include <linux/suspend.h>
> > +
> > +struct hibernation_keys {
> > +	unsigned long hkey_status;
> > +	u8 hibernation_key[HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE];
> > +};
> > +#endif
> 
> Have you given any thought to how things are going to work if we
> change the hash function in the future, or provide a choice? That
> information doesn't appear anywhere in the above struct.
> 

Do you mean the hash function of signing hibernation image changed, so the
hibernation key also need to re-generate for new length?

I will add a field in struct to forward the length of hibernation key variable.
In the future kernel can check the length to handle the change.

> -- 
> Matt Fleming, Intel Open Source Technology Center

Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
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#1204802 — [PATCH v2 02/16] x86/efi: Add get and set variable to EFI services pointer table

Add get variable and set variable function to EFI services pointer
table for supporting later functions of hibernate signature
verification to keep the HMAC key in efi boot service variable.
EFI boot stub needs get/set_variable functions for accessing key.

Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c   | 4 ++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 6 +++---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 8 ++++----
 arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h         | 2 ++
 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index 2c82bd1..0ffb6db 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -30,12 +30,14 @@ static void setup_boot_services##bits(struct efi_config *c)		\
 {									\
 	efi_system_table_##bits##_t *table;				\
 	efi_boot_services_##bits##_t *bt;				\
+	efi_runtime_services_##bits##_t *rt;				\
 									\
 	table = (typeof(table))sys_table;				\
 									\
 	c->text_output = table->con_out;				\
 									\
 	bt = (typeof(bt))(unsigned long)(table->boottime);		\
+	rt = (typeof(rt))(unsigned long)(table->runtime);		\
 									\
 	c->allocate_pool = bt->allocate_pool;				\
 	c->allocate_pages = bt->allocate_pages;				\
@@ -45,6 +47,8 @@ static void setup_boot_services##bits(struct efi_config *c)		\
 	c->locate_handle = bt->locate_handle;				\
 	c->handle_protocol = bt->handle_protocol;			\
 	c->exit_boot_services = bt->exit_boot_services;			\
+	c->get_variable = rt->get_variable;				\
+	c->set_variable = rt->set_variable;				\
 }
 BOOT_SERVICES(32);
 BOOT_SERVICES(64);
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
index 8ef964d..a7db5e3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_pe_entry)
 
 	/* Relocate efi_config->call() */
 	leal	efi32_config(%esi), %eax
-	add	%esi, 88(%eax)
+	add	%esi, 104(%eax)
 	pushl	%eax
 
 	call	make_boot_params
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ ENTRY(efi32_stub_entry)
 
 	/* Relocate efi_config->call() */
 	leal	efi32_config(%esi), %eax
-	add	%esi, 88(%eax)
+	add	%esi, 104(%eax)
 	pushl	%eax
 2:
 	call	efi_main
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ relocated:
 #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
 	.data
 efi32_config:
-	.fill 11,8,0
+	.fill 13,8,0
 	.long efi_call_phys
 	.long 0
 	.byte 0
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
index b0c0d16..471b1c1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_pe_entry)
 	/*
 	 * Relocate efi_config->call().
 	 */
-	addq	%rbp, efi64_config+88(%rip)
+	addq	%rbp, efi64_config+104(%rip)
 
 	movq	%rax, %rdi
 	call	make_boot_params
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ handover_entry:
 	 * Relocate efi_config->call().
 	 */
 	movq	efi_config(%rip), %rax
-	addq	%rbp, 88(%rax)
+	addq	%rbp, 104(%rax)
 2:
 	movq	efi_config(%rip), %rdi
 	call	efi_main
@@ -448,14 +448,14 @@ efi_config:
 #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_MIXED
 	.global efi32_config
 efi32_config:
-	.fill	11,8,0
+	.fill	13,8,0
 	.quad	efi64_thunk
 	.byte	0
 #endif
 
 	.global efi64_config
 efi64_config:
-	.fill	11,8,0
+	.fill	13,8,0
 	.quad	efi_call
 	.byte	1
 #endif /* CONFIG_EFI_STUB */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
index 155162e..a274aa8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ struct efi_config {
 	u64 handle_protocol;
 	u64 exit_boot_services;
 	u64 text_output;
+	u64 get_variable;
+	u64 set_variable;
 	efi_status_t (*call)(unsigned long, ...);
 	bool is64;
 } __packed;
-- 
2.1.4

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#1209949 — Re: [PATCH v2 02/16] x86/efi: Add get and set variable to EFI services pointer table

On Tue, 11 Aug, at 02:16:22PM, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> Add get variable and set variable function to EFI services pointer
> table for supporting later functions of hibernate signature
> verification to keep the HMAC key in efi boot service variable.
> EFI boot stub needs get/set_variable functions for accessing key.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
> Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c   | 4 ++++
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 6 +++---
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 8 ++++----
>  arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h         | 2 ++
>  4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>

-- 
Matt Fleming, Intel Open Source Technology Center
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#1204804 — [PATCH v2 10/16] PM / hibernate: Generate and verify signature of hibernate snapshot

This is the heart of generating and verifying the signature of
snapshot image of hibernate.

When creating hibernation image, HMAC-SHA1 calculates hash result
of all data pages that are copied to image. The signature is stored
in the header of snapshot, and verified by resuming code when it's
writing snapshot image to memory space.

When the signature verification failed, the hibernate code will stop
to recover system to image kernel and system will boots as normal.

Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
---
 kernel/power/power.h    |   5 +
 kernel/power/snapshot.c | 254 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 kernel/power/swap.c     |   4 +
 kernel/power/user.c     |   4 +
 4 files changed, 252 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/power/power.h b/kernel/power/power.h
index 7d8f310..ccc1e72 100644
--- a/kernel/power/power.h
+++ b/kernel/power/power.h
@@ -143,6 +143,11 @@ extern int snapshot_read_next(struct snapshot_handle *handle);
 extern int snapshot_write_next(struct snapshot_handle *handle);
 extern void snapshot_write_finalize(struct snapshot_handle *handle);
 extern int snapshot_image_loaded(struct snapshot_handle *handle);
+#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION
+extern int snapshot_image_verify(void);
+#else
+static inline int snapshot_image_verify(void) { return 0; }
+#endif
 
 /* If unset, the snapshot device cannot be open. */
 extern atomic_t snapshot_device_available;
diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
index 5235dd4..b8c7e2e 100644
--- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c
+++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
 
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+
 #include "power.h"
 
 static int swsusp_page_is_free(struct page *);
@@ -1265,7 +1267,214 @@ static inline void copy_data_page(unsigned long dst_pfn, unsigned long src_pfn)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_HIGHMEM */
 
-static void
+/* Total number of image pages */
+static unsigned int nr_copy_pages;
+
+/*
+ * Signature of snapshot
+ */
+static u8 signature[HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE];
+
+/* Buffer point array for collecting address of page buffers */
+void **h_buf;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION
+static int
+__copy_data_pages(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm)
+{
+	unsigned long pfn, dst_pfn;
+	struct page *d_page;
+	void *hash_buffer = NULL;
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm = NULL;
+	struct shash_desc *desc = NULL;
+	u8 *key = NULL, *digest = NULL;
+	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+	int key_err = 0, ret = 0;
+
+	key_err = get_hibernation_key(&key);
+	if (key_err)
+		goto copy_pages;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(HIBERNATION_HMAC, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		pr_err("PM: Allocate HMAC failed: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(tfm));
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+	}
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, key, HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("PM: Set HMAC key failed\n");
+		goto error_setkey;
+	}
+
+	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+	digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!digest) {
+		pr_err("PM: Allocate digest failed\n");
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto error_digest;
+	}
+
+	desc = (void *) digest + digest_size;
+	desc->tfm = tfm;
+	desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_shash;
+
+copy_pages:
+	memory_bm_position_reset(orig_bm);
+	memory_bm_position_reset(copy_bm);
+	for (;;) {
+		pfn = memory_bm_next_pfn(orig_bm);
+		if (unlikely(pfn == BM_END_OF_MAP))
+			break;
+		dst_pfn = memory_bm_next_pfn(copy_bm);
+		copy_data_page(dst_pfn, pfn);
+
+		/* Generate digest */
+		d_page = pfn_to_page(dst_pfn);
+		if (PageHighMem(d_page)) {
+			void *kaddr = kmap_atomic(d_page);
+
+			copy_page(buffer, kaddr);
+			kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
+			hash_buffer = buffer;
+		} else {
+			hash_buffer = page_address(d_page);
+		}
+
+		if (key_err)
+			continue;
+
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, hash_buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (ret)
+			goto error_shash;
+	}
+
+	if (key_err)
+		goto error_key;
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
+	if (ret)
+		goto error_shash;
+
+	memset(signature, 0, HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	memcpy(signature, digest, HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+	kfree(digest);
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+
+	return 0;
+
+error_shash:
+	kfree(digest);
+error_setkey:
+error_digest:
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+error_key:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int snapshot_image_verify(void)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+	u8 *key, *digest;
+	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+	int ret, i;
+
+	if (!h_buf)
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = get_hibernation_key(&key);
+	if (ret)
+		goto forward_ret;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(HIBERNATION_HMAC, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		pr_err("PM: Allocate HMAC failed: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(tfm));
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+	}
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, key, HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("PM: Set HMAC key failed\n");
+		goto error_setkey;
+	}
+
+	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+	digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!digest) {
+		pr_err("PM: Allocate digest failed\n");
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto error_digest;
+	}
+	desc = (void *) digest + digest_size;
+	desc->tfm = tfm;
+	desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_shash;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nr_copy_pages; i++) {
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, *(h_buf + i), PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (ret)
+			goto error_shash;
+	}
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
+	if (ret)
+		goto error_shash;
+
+	pr_debug("PM: Signature %*phN\n", HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE, signature);
+	pr_debug("PM: Digest %*phN\n", (int) digest_size, digest);
+	if (memcmp(signature, digest, HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE))
+		ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+
+error_shash:
+	kfree(h_buf);
+	kfree(digest);
+error_setkey:
+error_digest:
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+forward_ret:
+	if (ret)
+		pr_warn("PM: Signature verifying failed: %d\n", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void alloc_h_buf(void)
+{
+	h_buf = kmalloc(sizeof(void *) * nr_copy_pages, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!h_buf)
+		pr_err("PM: Allocate buffer point array failed\n");
+}
+#else
+static int
+__copy_data_pages(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm)
+{
+	unsigned long pfn;
+
+	memory_bm_position_reset(orig_bm);
+	memory_bm_position_reset(copy_bm);
+	for (;;) {
+		pfn = memory_bm_next_pfn(orig_bm);
+		if (unlikely(pfn == BM_END_OF_MAP))
+			break;
+		copy_data_page(memory_bm_next_pfn(copy_bm), pfn);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void alloc_h_buf(void) {}
+#endif /* CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION */
+
+static int
 copy_data_pages(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm)
 {
 	struct zone *zone;
@@ -1280,18 +1489,10 @@ copy_data_pages(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm)
 			if (page_is_saveable(zone, pfn))
 				memory_bm_set_bit(orig_bm, pfn);
 	}
-	memory_bm_position_reset(orig_bm);
-	memory_bm_position_reset(copy_bm);
-	for(;;) {
-		pfn = memory_bm_next_pfn(orig_bm);
-		if (unlikely(pfn == BM_END_OF_MAP))
-			break;
-		copy_data_page(memory_bm_next_pfn(copy_bm), pfn);
-	}
+
+	return __copy_data_pages(copy_bm, orig_bm);
 }
 
-/* Total number of image pages */
-static unsigned int nr_copy_pages;
 /* Number of pages needed for saving the original pfns of the image pages */
 static unsigned int nr_meta_pages;
 /*
@@ -1837,6 +2038,7 @@ swsusp_alloc(struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm, struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm,
 asmlinkage __visible int swsusp_save(void)
 {
 	unsigned int nr_pages, nr_highmem;
+	int ret;
 
 	printk(KERN_INFO "PM: Creating hibernation image:\n");
 
@@ -1859,7 +2061,11 @@ asmlinkage __visible int swsusp_save(void)
 	 * Kill them.
 	 */
 	drain_local_pages(NULL);
-	copy_data_pages(&copy_bm, &orig_bm);
+	ret = copy_data_pages(&copy_bm, &orig_bm);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("PM: Copy data pages failed\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * End of critical section. From now on, we can write to memory,
@@ -1914,6 +2120,7 @@ static int init_header(struct swsusp_info *info)
 	info->pages = snapshot_get_image_size();
 	info->size = info->pages;
 	info->size <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
+	memcpy(info->signature, signature, HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
 	return init_header_complete(info);
 }
 
@@ -2076,6 +2283,8 @@ load_header(struct swsusp_info *info)
 	if (!error) {
 		nr_copy_pages = info->image_pages;
 		nr_meta_pages = info->pages - info->image_pages - 1;
+		memset(signature, 0, HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		memcpy(signature, info->signature, HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
 	}
 	return error;
 }
@@ -2414,7 +2623,8 @@ prepare_image(struct memory_bitmap *new_bm, struct memory_bitmap *bm)
  *	set for its caller to write to.
  */
 
-static void *get_buffer(struct memory_bitmap *bm, struct chain_allocator *ca)
+static void *get_buffer(struct memory_bitmap *bm, struct chain_allocator *ca,
+		unsigned long *_pfn)
 {
 	struct pbe *pbe;
 	struct page *page;
@@ -2423,6 +2633,9 @@ static void *get_buffer(struct memory_bitmap *bm, struct chain_allocator *ca)
 	if (pfn == BM_END_OF_MAP)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
 
+	if (_pfn)
+		*_pfn = pfn;
+
 	page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
 	if (PageHighMem(page))
 		return get_highmem_page_buffer(page, ca);
@@ -2469,6 +2682,7 @@ static void *get_buffer(struct memory_bitmap *bm, struct chain_allocator *ca)
 int snapshot_write_next(struct snapshot_handle *handle)
 {
 	static struct chain_allocator ca;
+	unsigned long pfn;
 	int error = 0;
 
 	/* Check if we have already loaded the entire image */
@@ -2491,6 +2705,12 @@ int snapshot_write_next(struct snapshot_handle *handle)
 		if (error)
 			return error;
 
+		/* Allocate buffer point array for generating
+		 * digest to compare with signature.
+		 * h_buf will freed in snapshot_image_verify().
+		 */
+		alloc_h_buf();
+
 		error = memory_bm_create(&copy_bm, GFP_ATOMIC, PG_ANY);
 		if (error)
 			return error;
@@ -2513,20 +2733,24 @@ int snapshot_write_next(struct snapshot_handle *handle)
 			chain_init(&ca, GFP_ATOMIC, PG_SAFE);
 			memory_bm_position_reset(&orig_bm);
 			restore_pblist = NULL;
-			handle->buffer = get_buffer(&orig_bm, &ca);
+			handle->buffer = get_buffer(&orig_bm, &ca, &pfn);
 			handle->sync_read = 0;
 			if (IS_ERR(handle->buffer))
 				return PTR_ERR(handle->buffer);
+			if (h_buf)
+				*h_buf = handle->buffer;
 		}
 	} else {
 		copy_last_highmem_page();
 		/* Restore page key for data page (s390 only). */
 		page_key_write(handle->buffer);
-		handle->buffer = get_buffer(&orig_bm, &ca);
+		handle->buffer = get_buffer(&orig_bm, &ca, &pfn);
 		if (IS_ERR(handle->buffer))
 			return PTR_ERR(handle->buffer);
 		if (handle->buffer != buffer)
 			handle->sync_read = 0;
+		if (h_buf)
+			*(h_buf + (handle->cur - nr_meta_pages - 1)) = handle->buffer;
 	}
 	handle->cur++;
 	return PAGE_SIZE;
diff --git a/kernel/power/swap.c b/kernel/power/swap.c
index 2f30ca9..ff2b36f 100644
--- a/kernel/power/swap.c
+++ b/kernel/power/swap.c
@@ -1085,6 +1085,8 @@ static int load_image(struct swap_map_handle *handle,
 		snapshot_write_finalize(snapshot);
 		if (!snapshot_image_loaded(snapshot))
 			ret = -ENODATA;
+		if (!ret)
+			ret = snapshot_image_verify();
 	}
 	swsusp_show_speed(start, stop, nr_to_read, "Read");
 	return ret;
@@ -1440,6 +1442,8 @@ out_finish:
 				}
 			}
 		}
+		if (!ret)
+			ret = snapshot_image_verify();
 	}
 	swsusp_show_speed(start, stop, nr_to_read, "Read");
 out_clean:
diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c
index 526e891..9b891d5 100644
--- a/kernel/power/user.c
+++ b/kernel/power/user.c
@@ -268,6 +268,10 @@ static long snapshot_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd,
 			error = -EPERM;
 			break;
 		}
+		if (snapshot_image_verify()) {
+			error = -EPERM;
+			break;
+		}
 		error = hibernation_restore(data->platform_support);
 		break;
 
-- 
2.1.4

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#1204805 — [PATCH v2 14/16] PM / hibernate: Allow user trigger hibernation key re-generating

This patch provides a ioctl for triggering hibernation key re-generating
process. It's allow user call ioctl to raise the flag of key re-generating.
Kernel writes a flag to a efi runtime variable, the GUID is
S4SignKeyRegen-fe141863-c070-478e-b8a3-878a5dc9ef21, then EFI stub will
re-generates hibernation key when queried flag.

To aviod the hibernation key changes in hibernating cycle that causes hiberne
restoring failed, this flag is only available when system runs normal
reboot or shutdown. The hibernate code will clean the flag when it raised
in a hiberante cycle.

Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c          | 19 ++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/power/hibernate_keys.c           |  2 ++
 drivers/firmware/Makefile                 |  1 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig              |  4 ++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile             |  1 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi-hibernate_keys.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/suspend.h                   | 16 +++++++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/suspend_ioctls.h       |  3 ++-
 kernel/power/Kconfig                      |  1 +
 kernel/power/hibernate.c                  |  2 ++
 kernel/power/user.c                       | 10 ++++++++
 kernel/reboot.c                           |  3 +++
 12 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/efi-hibernate_keys.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index c838d09..3228820 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -1394,10 +1394,12 @@ static void setup_hibernation_keys(struct boot_params *params)
 {
 	unsigned long key_size;
 	unsigned long attributes;
+	unsigned long ignore;
 	struct setup_data *setup_data, *hibernation_setup_data;
 	struct hibernation_keys *keys;
+	bool regen_key = false;
 	unsigned long size = 0;
-	efi_status_t status;
+	efi_status_t status, reg_status;
 
 	/* Allocate setup_data to carry keys */
 	size = sizeof(struct setup_data) + sizeof(struct hibernation_keys);
@@ -1427,12 +1429,16 @@ static void setup_hibernation_keys(struct boot_params *params)
 			goto clean_fail;
 	}
 
-	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
-		efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to get existing hibernation key\n");
+	reg_status = efi_call_early(get_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY_REGEN_FLAG,
+				&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID, NULL, &ignore, &regen_key);
+	if ((status != EFI_SUCCESS) ||
+	   (reg_status == EFI_SUCCESS && regen_key)) {
+		efi_printk(sys_table, "Regenerating hibernation key\n");
 
 		efi_get_random_key(sys_table, params, keys->hibernation_key,
 				   HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
+		/* Set new hibernation key to bootservice non-volatile variable */
 		status = efi_call_early(set_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY,
 					&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID,
 					HIBERNATION_KEY_ATTRIBUTE,
@@ -1440,6 +1446,13 @@ static void setup_hibernation_keys(struct boot_params *params)
 					keys->hibernation_key);
 		if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
 			efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to set hibernation key\n");
+
+		efi_call_early(get_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY, &EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID,
+				NULL, &key_size, keys->hibernation_key);
+
+		/* Clean key regenerate flag */
+		efi_call_early(set_variable, HIBERNATION_KEY_REGEN_FLAG,
+				&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID, 0, 0, NULL);
 	}
 
 clean_fail:
diff --git a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_keys.c b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_keys.c
index 51e808a..4fac9ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_keys.c
+++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_keys.c
@@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ static int __init init_hibernation_keys(void)
 	memblock_free(keys_phys_addr, sizeof(struct hibernation_keys));
 	keys_phys_addr = 0;
 
+	set_hibernation_key_regen_flag = false;
+
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/Makefile
index 4a4b897..4474437 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/Makefile
@@ -19,3 +19,4 @@ obj-y				+= broadcom/
 obj-$(CONFIG_GOOGLE_FIRMWARE)	+= google/
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)		+= efi/
 obj-$(CONFIG_UEFI_CPER)		+= efi/
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_HIBERNATION_KEYS)	+= efi/
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig
index 54071c1..bef29da 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig
@@ -69,3 +69,7 @@ endmenu
 
 config UEFI_CPER
 	bool
+
+config EFI_HIBERNATION_KEYS
+	bool
+	select EFI_VARS
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
index 6fd3da9..d472c02 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= efi.o vars.o reboot.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_VARS)			+= efivars.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_ESRT)			+= esrt.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_VARS_PSTORE)		+= efi-pstore.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_HIBERNATION_KEYS)	+= efi-hibernate_keys.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_UEFI_CPER)			+= cper.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RUNTIME_MAP)		+= runtime-map.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RUNTIME_WRAPPERS)	+= runtime-wrappers.o
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-hibernate_keys.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-hibernate_keys.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a50bf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-hibernate_keys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/* EFI variable handler of hibernation key regen flag
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/suspend.h>
+
+void create_hibernation_key_regen_flag(void)
+{
+	struct efivar_entry *entry = NULL;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (!set_hibernation_key_regen_flag)
+		return;
+
+	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!entry)
+		return;
+
+	memcpy(entry->var.VariableName,
+		HIBERNATION_KEY_REGEN_FLAG, sizeof(HIBERNATION_KEY_REGEN_FLAG));
+	memcpy(&(entry->var.VendorGuid),
+		&EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID, sizeof(efi_guid_t));
+
+	err = efivar_entry_set(entry, HIBERNATION_KEY_SEED_ATTRIBUTE,
+				sizeof(bool), &set_hibernation_key_regen_flag, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		pr_warn("PM: Set flag of regenerating hibernation key failed: %d\n", err);
+
+	kfree(entry);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(create_hibernation_key_regen_flag);
diff --git a/include/linux/suspend.h b/include/linux/suspend.h
index d318b72..dcca7ae 100644
--- a/include/linux/suspend.h
+++ b/include/linux/suspend.h
@@ -330,6 +330,11 @@ struct platform_hibernation_ops {
 
 #define EFI_HIBERNATION_GUID \
 	EFI_GUID(0xfe141863, 0xc070, 0x478e, 0xb8, 0xa3, 0x87, 0x8a, 0x5d, 0xc9, 0xef, 0x21)
+#define HIBERNATION_KEY_REGEN_FLAG \
+	((efi_char16_t [20]) { 'H', 'I', 'B', 'E', 'R', 'N', 'A', 'T', 'I', 'O', 'N', 'K', 'e', 'y', 'R', 'e', 'g', 'e', 'n', 0 })
+#define HIBERNATION_KEY_SEED_ATTRIBUTE	(EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | \
+					EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | \
+					EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS)
 
 /* HMAC Algorithm of Hibernate Signature */
 #define HIBERNATION_HMAC	"hmac(sha1)"
@@ -338,6 +343,16 @@ struct platform_hibernation_ops {
 /* kernel/power/hibernate.c */
 extern int sigenforce;
 
+/* kernel/power/user.c */
+extern bool set_hibernation_key_regen_flag;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION
+/* drivers/firmware/efi/efi-hibernate_keys.c */
+extern void create_hibernation_key_regen_flag(void);
+#else
+static inline void create_hibernation_key_regen_flag(void) {}
+#endif
+
 /* kernel/power/snapshot.c */
 extern void __register_nosave_region(unsigned long b, unsigned long e, int km);
 static inline void __init register_nosave_region(unsigned long b, unsigned long e)
@@ -370,6 +385,7 @@ static inline void hibernation_set_ops(const struct platform_hibernation_ops *op
 static inline int hibernate(void) { return -ENOSYS; }
 static inline bool system_entering_hibernation(void) { return false; }
 static inline bool hibernation_available(void) { return false; }
+static inline void create_hibernation_key_regen_flag(void) {}
 #endif /* CONFIG_HIBERNATION */
 
 /* Hibernation and suspend events */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/suspend_ioctls.h b/include/uapi/linux/suspend_ioctls.h
index 0b30382..0a08450 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/suspend_ioctls.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/suspend_ioctls.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ struct resume_swap_area {
 #define SNAPSHOT_PREF_IMAGE_SIZE	_IO(SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC, 18)
 #define SNAPSHOT_AVAIL_SWAP_SIZE	_IOR(SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC, 19, __kernel_loff_t)
 #define SNAPSHOT_ALLOC_SWAP_PAGE	_IOR(SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC, 20, __kernel_loff_t)
-#define SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAXNR	20
+#define SNAPSHOT_REGENERATE_KEY		_IO(SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC, 21)
+#define SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAXNR	21
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_SUSPEND_IOCTLS_H */
diff --git a/kernel/power/Kconfig b/kernel/power/Kconfig
index f2a7e21..1a03777 100644
--- a/kernel/power/Kconfig
+++ b/kernel/power/Kconfig
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ config HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION
 	depends on HIBERNATION
 	depends on EFI_STUB
 	depends on X86
+	select EFI_HIBERNATION_KEYS
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
 	help
diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
index 2c2cc90..8bdb4bb 100644
--- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
@@ -653,6 +653,8 @@ int hibernate(void)
 {
 	int error;
 
+	set_hibernation_key_regen_flag = false;
+
 	if (!hibernation_available()) {
 		pr_debug("PM: Hibernation not available.\n");
 		return -EPERM;
diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c
index ffd327a..a183abd 100644
--- a/kernel/power/user.c
+++ b/kernel/power/user.c
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
 
 #define SNAPSHOT_MINOR	231
 
+/* Handler will create HIBERNATIONKeyRegen EFI variable when flag raised */
+bool set_hibernation_key_regen_flag;
+
 static struct snapshot_data {
 	struct snapshot_handle handle;
 	int swap;
@@ -338,6 +341,8 @@ static long snapshot_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd,
 			error = -EPERM;
 			break;
 		}
+		/* clean flag to avoid hibernation key regenerated */
+		set_hibernation_key_regen_flag = false;
 		/*
 		 * Tasks are frozen and the notifiers have been called with
 		 * PM_HIBERNATION_PREPARE
@@ -351,6 +356,7 @@ static long snapshot_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd,
 		break;
 
 	case SNAPSHOT_POWER_OFF:
+		set_hibernation_key_regen_flag = false;
 		if (data->platform_support)
 			error = hibernation_platform_enter();
 		break;
@@ -386,6 +392,10 @@ static long snapshot_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd,
 		}
 		break;
 
+	case SNAPSHOT_REGENERATE_KEY:
+		set_hibernation_key_regen_flag = !!arg;
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		error = -ENOTTY;
 
diff --git a/kernel/reboot.c b/kernel/reboot.c
index d20c85d..f83b88a 100644
--- a/kernel/reboot.c
+++ b/kernel/reboot.c
@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ void migrate_to_reboot_cpu(void)
  */
 void kernel_restart(char *cmd)
 {
+	create_hibernation_key_regen_flag();
 	kernel_restart_prepare(cmd);
 	migrate_to_reboot_cpu();
 	syscore_shutdown();
@@ -240,6 +241,7 @@ static void kernel_shutdown_prepare(enum system_states state)
  */
 void kernel_halt(void)
 {
+	create_hibernation_key_regen_flag();
 	kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_HALT);
 	migrate_to_reboot_cpu();
 	syscore_shutdown();
@@ -256,6 +258,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_halt);
  */
 void kernel_power_off(void)
 {
+	create_hibernation_key_regen_flag();
 	kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_POWER_OFF);
 	if (pm_power_off_prepare)
 		pm_power_off_prepare();
-- 
2.1.4

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#1204817 — [PATCH v2 13/16] PM / hibernate: Add configuration to enforce signature verification

Like kernel module signature checking, there's both a config option and
a boot parameter which control whether we accept or fail with unsigned
hibernate image and image that are signed with an unknown key.

If hibernate signing is enabled, the kernel will be tainted if a snapshot
image is restored that is unsigned or has a signature for which we don't
have the key. When the enforce flag is enabled, then the hibernate
restoring process will be failed and boot as normal.

Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
---
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt |  5 +++++
 arch/x86/power/hibernate_keys.c     | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
 include/linux/kernel.h              |  1 +
 include/linux/suspend.h             |  3 +++
 kernel/panic.c                      |  2 ++
 kernel/power/Kconfig                |  8 ++++++++
 kernel/power/hibernate.c            |  7 +++++++
 kernel/power/snapshot.c             |  6 +++++-
 8 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 1d6f045..86a6916 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3318,6 +3318,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 		noresume	Don't check if there's a hibernation image
 				present during boot.
 		nocompress	Don't compress/decompress hibernation images.
+		sigenforce	When CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION is set, this
+				menas that snapshot image without (valid)
+				signature will fail to restore. Note that if
+				HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION_FORCE is set, that is
+				always true, so this option does nothing.
 		no		Disable hibernation and resume.
 
 	retain_initrd	[RAM] Keep initrd memory after extraction
diff --git a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_keys.c b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_keys.c
index 5e92101..51e808a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_keys.c
+++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_keys.c
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ void fill_forward_info(void *forward_buff_page, int verify_ret)
 	memset(forward_buff_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
 	info = (struct forward_info *)forward_buff_page;
 	info->sig_verify_ret = verify_ret;
+	info->sig_enforce = sigenforce;
 
 	if (hibernation_keys && !hibernation_keys->hkey_status) {
 		info->hibernation_keys = *hibernation_keys;
@@ -106,10 +107,24 @@ void restore_sig_forward_info(void)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	if (forward_buff->sig_verify_ret)
-		pr_warn("PM: Signature verifying failed: %d\n",
+	sigenforce = forward_buff->sig_enforce;
+	if (sigenforce)
+		pr_info("PM: Enforce hibernate signature verifying\n");
+
+	if (forward_buff->sig_verify_ret) {
+		pr_warn("PM: Hibernate signature verifying failed: %d\n",
 			forward_buff->sig_verify_ret);
 
+		/* taint kernel */
+		if (!sigenforce) {
+			pr_warn("PM: System restored from unsafe snapshot - "
+				"tainting kernel\n");
+			add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_HIBERNATE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+			pr_info("%s\n", print_tainted());
+		}
+	} else
+		pr_info("PM: Signature verifying pass\n");
+
 	if (hibernation_keys) {
 		memset(hibernation_keys, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
 		*hibernation_keys = forward_buff->hibernation_keys;
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index 5582410..a620786 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ extern enum system_states {
 #define TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE		13
 #define TAINT_SOFTLOCKUP		14
 #define TAINT_LIVEPATCH			15
+#define TAINT_UNSAFE_HIBERNATE		16
 
 extern const char hex_asc[];
 #define hex_asc_lo(x)	hex_asc[((x) & 0x0f)]
diff --git a/include/linux/suspend.h b/include/linux/suspend.h
index aa88b3b..d318b72 100644
--- a/include/linux/suspend.h
+++ b/include/linux/suspend.h
@@ -335,6 +335,9 @@ struct platform_hibernation_ops {
 #define HIBERNATION_HMAC	"hmac(sha1)"
 #define HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE	20
 
+/* kernel/power/hibernate.c */
+extern int sigenforce;
+
 /* kernel/power/snapshot.c */
 extern void __register_nosave_region(unsigned long b, unsigned long e, int km);
 static inline void __init register_nosave_region(unsigned long b, unsigned long e)
diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index 04e91ff..a53da16 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@ static const struct tnt tnts[] = {
 	{ TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE,	'E', ' ' },
 	{ TAINT_SOFTLOCKUP,		'L', ' ' },
 	{ TAINT_LIVEPATCH,		'K', ' ' },
+	{ TAINT_UNSAFE_HIBERNATE,	'H', ' ' },
 };
 
 /**
@@ -249,6 +250,7 @@ static const struct tnt tnts[] = {
  *  'E' - Unsigned module has been loaded.
  *  'L' - A soft lockup has previously occurred.
  *  'K' - Kernel has been live patched.
+ *  'H' - System restored from unsafe hibernate snapshot image.
  *
  *	The string is overwritten by the next call to print_tainted().
  */
diff --git a/kernel/power/Kconfig b/kernel/power/Kconfig
index 8608b3b..f2a7e21 100644
--- a/kernel/power/Kconfig
+++ b/kernel/power/Kconfig
@@ -79,6 +79,14 @@ config HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION
 	  relies on UEFI secure boot environment, EFI stub generates HMAC
 	  key for hibernate verification.
 
+config HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION_FORCE
+	bool "Require hibernate snapshot image to be validly signed"
+	depends on HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION
+	help
+	  Reject hibernate resuming from unsigned snapshot image or signed
+	  snapshot image for which we don't have a key. Without this, such
+	  snapshot image will simply taint the kernel when resuming.
+
 config ARCH_SAVE_PAGE_KEYS
 	bool
 
diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
index 640ca8a..2c2cc90 100644
--- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
@@ -43,6 +43,11 @@ static char resume_file[256] = CONFIG_PM_STD_PARTITION;
 dev_t swsusp_resume_device;
 sector_t swsusp_resume_block;
 __visible int in_suspend __nosavedata;
+#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATE_VERIFICATION_FORCE
+int sigenforce = 1;
+#else
+int sigenforce;
+#endif
 
 enum {
 	HIBERNATION_INVALID,
@@ -1119,6 +1124,8 @@ static int __init hibernate_setup(char *str)
 		noresume = 1;
 	else if (!strncmp(str, "nocompress", 10))
 		nocompress = 1;
+	else if (!strncmp(str, "sigenforce", 10))
+		sigenforce = 1;
 	else if (!strncmp(str, "no", 2)) {
 		noresume = 1;
 		nohibernate = 1;
diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
index 3629249..486dd73 100644
--- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c
+++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
@@ -1469,7 +1469,11 @@ error_digest:
 forward_ret:
 	if (ret)
 		pr_warn("PM: Signature verifying failed: %d\n", ret);
-	snapshot_fill_sig_forward_info(ret);
+	/* forward check result when verifying pass or not enforce verifying */
+	if (!ret || !sigenforce) {
+		snapshot_fill_sig_forward_info(ret);
+		ret = 0;
+	}
 	return ret;
 }
 
-- 
2.1.4

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#1204818 — [PATCH v2 12/16] PM / hibernate: Forward signature verifying result and key to image kernel

Due to the memory space of boot kernel will be overwritten after restoring
snapshot image and switching to image kernel. There have some informations
should be forwarded from boot kernel to image kernel: the result of
signature verifying, flag of enforce verifying signature and hibernation key.
That because those informations did not include in hibernate image or
produced when restoring.

The significant reason is image kernel needs hibernation key to sign image for
next hibernate cycle, otherwise the signature generating will be failed in
next cycle. In additional, it's also useful to expose the verification
result in dmesg after recovery.

The codes in hibernate key handler allocates an empty page as the buffer
of forward information that will be included in snapshot iamge, then keeps
page frame number in image header. When restoring snapshot image to memory
space of boot kernel, snapshot codes will asking key handler to fill forward
informations to buffer page. Then restoring hibernation key data to key page,
and cleaning this page buffer for next cycle.

Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
---
 arch/x86/power/hibernate_keys.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/power/hibernate.c        |  1 +
 kernel/power/power.h            |  6 ++++
 kernel/power/snapshot.c         | 27 +++++++++++++++++-
 kernel/power/user.c             |  1 +
 5 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_keys.c b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_keys.c
index f44823e..5e92101 100644
--- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_keys.c
+++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_keys.c
@@ -19,6 +19,15 @@ static u64 keys_phys_addr;
 /* A page used to keep hibernation keys */
 static struct hibernation_keys *hibernation_keys;
 
+/* Forward information and keys from boot kernel to image kernel */
+struct forward_info {
+	bool            sig_enforce;
+	int             sig_verify_ret;
+	struct hibernation_keys hibernation_keys;
+};
+
+static struct forward_info *forward_buff;
+
 void __init parse_hibernation_keys(u64 phys_addr, u32 data_len)
 {
 	struct setup_data *hibernation_setup_data;
@@ -62,6 +71,55 @@ bool swsusp_page_is_keys(struct page *page)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+unsigned long get_forward_buff_pfn(void)
+{
+	if (!forward_buff)
+		return 0;
+
+	return page_to_pfn(virt_to_page(forward_buff));
+}
+
+void fill_forward_info(void *forward_buff_page, int verify_ret)
+{
+	struct forward_info *info;
+
+	if (!forward_buff_page)
+		return;
+
+	memset(forward_buff_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+	info = (struct forward_info *)forward_buff_page;
+	info->sig_verify_ret = verify_ret;
+
+	if (hibernation_keys && !hibernation_keys->hkey_status) {
+		info->hibernation_keys = *hibernation_keys;
+		memset(hibernation_keys, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+	} else
+		pr_info("PM: Fill hibernation keys failed\n");
+
+	pr_info("PM: Filled sign information to forward buffer\n");
+}
+
+void restore_sig_forward_info(void)
+{
+	if (!forward_buff) {
+		pr_warn("PM: Did not allocate forward buffer\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (forward_buff->sig_verify_ret)
+		pr_warn("PM: Signature verifying failed: %d\n",
+			forward_buff->sig_verify_ret);
+
+	if (hibernation_keys) {
+		memset(hibernation_keys, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+		*hibernation_keys = forward_buff->hibernation_keys;
+		pr_info("PM: Restored hibernation keys\n");
+	}
+
+	/* clean forward information buffer for next round */
+	memset(forward_buff, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
 static int __init init_hibernation_keys(void)
 {
 	struct hibernation_keys *keys;
@@ -76,6 +134,11 @@ static int __init init_hibernation_keys(void)
 	hibernation_keys = (struct hibernation_keys *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (hibernation_keys) {
 		*hibernation_keys = *keys;
+		forward_buff = (struct forward_info *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!forward_buff) {
+			pr_err("PM: Allocate forward buffer failed\n");
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+		}
 	} else {
 		pr_err("PM: Allocate hibernation keys page failed\n");
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
index 690f78f..640ca8a 100644
--- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
@@ -702,6 +702,7 @@ int hibernate(void)
 		pm_restore_gfp_mask();
 	} else {
 		pr_debug("PM: Image restored successfully.\n");
+		restore_sig_forward_info();
 	}
 
  Free_bitmaps:
diff --git a/kernel/power/power.h b/kernel/power/power.h
index 6d1d406..1ea3513 100644
--- a/kernel/power/power.h
+++ b/kernel/power/power.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ struct swsusp_info {
 	unsigned long		image_pages;
 	unsigned long		pages;
 	unsigned long		size;
+	unsigned long		forward_buff_pfn;
 	u8                      signature[HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE];
 } __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
 
@@ -20,8 +21,13 @@ struct swsusp_info {
 /* arch/x86/power/hibernate_keys.c */
 extern int get_hibernation_key(u8 **hkey);
 extern bool swsusp_page_is_keys(struct page *page);
+extern unsigned long get_forward_buff_pfn(void);
+extern void fill_forward_info(void *forward_buff_page, int verify_ret);
+extern void restore_sig_forward_info(void);
 #else
 static inline bool swsusp_page_is_keys(struct page *page) { return false; }
+static inline unsigned long get_forward_buff_pfn(void) { return 0; }
+static inline void restore_sig_forward_info(void) {}
 #endif
 
 /* kernel/power/snapshot.c */
diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
index 5522028..3629249 100644
--- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c
+++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
@@ -1281,6 +1281,14 @@ static unsigned int nr_copy_pages;
  */
 static u8 signature[HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE];
 
+/*
+ * Keep the pfn of forwarding information buffer from resume target.
+ * Writing hibernation keys to this buffer in snapshot image before restoring.
+ */
+unsigned long forward_buff_pfn;
+
+void *forward_buff;
+
 /* Buffer point array for collecting address of page buffers */
 void **h_buf;
 
@@ -1383,13 +1391,24 @@ error_key:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static void snapshot_fill_sig_forward_info(int verify_ret)
+{
+	if (!forward_buff_pfn || !forward_buff) {
+		pr_err("PM: Did not find forward buffer\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Fill hibernation keys to snapshot in memory for next round */
+	fill_forward_info(forward_buff, verify_ret);
+}
+
 int snapshot_image_verify(void)
 {
 	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
 	struct shash_desc *desc;
 	u8 *key, *digest;
 	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
-	int ret, i;
+	int i, ret = 0;
 
 	if (!h_buf)
 		return 0;
@@ -1450,6 +1469,7 @@ error_digest:
 forward_ret:
 	if (ret)
 		pr_warn("PM: Signature verifying failed: %d\n", ret);
+	snapshot_fill_sig_forward_info(ret);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -2126,6 +2146,7 @@ static int init_header(struct swsusp_info *info)
 	info->pages = snapshot_get_image_size();
 	info->size = info->pages;
 	info->size <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
+	info->forward_buff_pfn = get_forward_buff_pfn();
 	memcpy(info->signature, signature, HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
 	return init_header_complete(info);
 }
@@ -2289,6 +2310,7 @@ load_header(struct swsusp_info *info)
 	if (!error) {
 		nr_copy_pages = info->image_pages;
 		nr_meta_pages = info->pages - info->image_pages - 1;
+		forward_buff_pfn = info->forward_buff_pfn;
 		memset(signature, 0, HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
 		memcpy(signature, info->signature, HIBERNATION_DIGEST_SIZE);
 	}
@@ -2757,6 +2779,9 @@ int snapshot_write_next(struct snapshot_handle *handle)
 			handle->sync_read = 0;
 		if (h_buf)
 			*(h_buf + (handle->cur - nr_meta_pages - 1)) = handle->buffer;
+		/* Keep the buffer of hibernation keys in snapshot */
+		if (forward_buff_pfn && pfn == forward_buff_pfn)
+			forward_buff = handle->buffer;
 	}
 	handle->cur++;
 	return PAGE_SIZE;
diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c
index 9b891d5..ffd327a 100644
--- a/kernel/power/user.c
+++ b/kernel/power/user.c
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ static long snapshot_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd,
 		if (!data->frozen || data->ready)
 			break;
 		pm_restore_gfp_mask();
+		restore_sig_forward_info();
 		free_basic_memory_bitmaps();
 		data->free_bitmaps = false;
 		thaw_processes();
-- 
2.1.4

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