Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]
Groups > linux.kernel > #1191410 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2015-07-24 02:30 +0200 |
| Last post | 2015-07-24 14:40 +0200 |
| Articles | 2 — 2 participants |
Back to article view | Back to linux.kernel
This discussion starts older than the indexed window; earlier articles aren't shown. The article labeled Started by
below is the oldest one visible, not the original post.
Re: [RFC][PATCH] ipc: Use private shmem or hugetlbfs inodes for shm segments. Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> - 2015-07-24 02:30 +0200
Re: [RFC][PATCH] ipc: Use private shmem or hugetlbfs inodes for shm segments. Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> - 2015-07-24 14:40 +0200
| From | Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2015-07-24 02:30 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [RFC][PATCH] ipc: Use private shmem or hugetlbfs inodes for shm segments. |
| Message-ID | <pPz29-6bQ-1@gated-at.bofh.it> |
On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 12:28:33PM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> The shm implementation internally uses shmem or hugetlbfs inodes
> for shm segments. As these inodes are never directly exposed to
> userspace and only accessed through the shm operations which are
> already hooked by security modules, mark the inodes with the
> S_PRIVATE flag so that inode security initialization and permission
> checking is skipped.
>
> This was motivated by the following lockdep warning:
> ===================================================
> [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
> 4.2.0-0.rc3.git0.1.fc24.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G W
> -------------------------------------------------------
> httpd/1597 is trying to acquire lock:
> (&ids->rwsem){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffff81385354>] shm_close+0x34/0x130
> (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff81386bbb>] SyS_shmdt+0x4b/0x180
> [<ffffffff81109a07>] lock_acquire+0xc7/0x270
> [<ffffffff81217baa>] __might_fault+0x7a/0xa0
> [<ffffffff81284a1e>] filldir+0x9e/0x130
> [<ffffffffa019bb08>] xfs_dir2_block_getdents.isra.12+0x198/0x1c0 [xfs]
> [<ffffffffa019c5b4>] xfs_readdir+0x1b4/0x330 [xfs]
> [<ffffffffa019f38b>] xfs_file_readdir+0x2b/0x30 [xfs]
> [<ffffffff812847e7>] iterate_dir+0x97/0x130
> [<ffffffff81284d21>] SyS_getdents+0x91/0x120
> [<ffffffff81871d2e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
> [<ffffffff81109a07>] lock_acquire+0xc7/0x270
> [<ffffffff81101e97>] down_read_nested+0x57/0xa0
> [<ffffffffa01b0e57>] xfs_ilock+0x167/0x350 [xfs]
> [<ffffffffa01b10b8>] xfs_ilock_attr_map_shared+0x38/0x50 [xfs]
> [<ffffffffa014799d>] xfs_attr_get+0xbd/0x190 [xfs]
> [<ffffffffa01c17ad>] xfs_xattr_get+0x3d/0x70 [xfs]
> [<ffffffff8129962f>] generic_getxattr+0x4f/0x70
> [<ffffffff8139ba52>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x162/0x670
> [<ffffffff8139cf69>] sb_finish_set_opts+0xd9/0x230
> [<ffffffff8139d66c>] selinux_set_mnt_opts+0x35c/0x660
> [<ffffffff8139ff97>] superblock_doinit+0x77/0xf0
> [<ffffffff813a0020>] delayed_superblock_init+0x10/0x20
> [<ffffffff81272d23>] iterate_supers+0xb3/0x110
> [<ffffffff813a4e5f>] selinux_complete_init+0x2f/0x40
> [<ffffffff813b47a3>] security_load_policy+0x103/0x600
> [<ffffffff813a6901>] sel_write_load+0xc1/0x750
> [<ffffffff8126e817>] __vfs_write+0x37/0x100
> [<ffffffff8126f229>] vfs_write+0xa9/0x1a0
> [<ffffffff8126ff48>] SyS_write+0x58/0xd0
> [<ffffffff81871d2e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
> [<ffffffff81109a07>] lock_acquire+0xc7/0x270
> [<ffffffff8186de8f>] mutex_lock_nested+0x7f/0x3e0
> [<ffffffff8139b9a9>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0xb9/0x670
> [<ffffffff8139bf7c>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x1c/0x20
> [<ffffffff813955f6>] security_d_instantiate+0x36/0x60
> [<ffffffff81287c34>] d_instantiate+0x54/0x70
> [<ffffffff8120111c>] __shmem_file_setup+0xdc/0x240
> [<ffffffff81201290>] shmem_file_setup+0x10/0x20
> [<ffffffff813856e0>] newseg+0x290/0x3a0
> [<ffffffff8137e278>] ipcget+0x208/0x2d0
> [<ffffffff81386074>] SyS_shmget+0x54/0x70
> [<ffffffff81871d2e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
> [<ffffffff81108df8>] __lock_acquire+0x1a78/0x1d00
> [<ffffffff81109a07>] lock_acquire+0xc7/0x270
> [<ffffffff8186efba>] down_write+0x5a/0xc0
> [<ffffffff81385354>] shm_close+0x34/0x130
> [<ffffffff812203a5>] remove_vma+0x45/0x80
> [<ffffffff81222a30>] do_munmap+0x2b0/0x460
> [<ffffffff81386c25>] SyS_shmdt+0xb5/0x180
> [<ffffffff81871d2e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
That's a completely screwed up stack trace. There are *4* syscall
entry points with 4 separate, unrelated syscall chains on that
stack trace, all starting at the same address. How is this a valid
stack trace and not a lockdep bug of some kind?
Cheers,
Dave.
--
Dave Chinner
david@fromorbit.com
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
[toc] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2015-07-24 14:40 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <pPKqC-5RA-11@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1191410 |
On 07/23/2015 08:11 PM, Dave Chinner wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 12:28:33PM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> The shm implementation internally uses shmem or hugetlbfs inodes
>> for shm segments. As these inodes are never directly exposed to
>> userspace and only accessed through the shm operations which are
>> already hooked by security modules, mark the inodes with the
>> S_PRIVATE flag so that inode security initialization and permission
>> checking is skipped.
>>
>> This was motivated by the following lockdep warning:
>> ===================================================
>> [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
>> 4.2.0-0.rc3.git0.1.fc24.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G W
>> -------------------------------------------------------
>> httpd/1597 is trying to acquire lock:
>> (&ids->rwsem){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffff81385354>] shm_close+0x34/0x130
>> (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff81386bbb>] SyS_shmdt+0x4b/0x180
>> [<ffffffff81109a07>] lock_acquire+0xc7/0x270
>> [<ffffffff81217baa>] __might_fault+0x7a/0xa0
>> [<ffffffff81284a1e>] filldir+0x9e/0x130
>> [<ffffffffa019bb08>] xfs_dir2_block_getdents.isra.12+0x198/0x1c0 [xfs]
>> [<ffffffffa019c5b4>] xfs_readdir+0x1b4/0x330 [xfs]
>> [<ffffffffa019f38b>] xfs_file_readdir+0x2b/0x30 [xfs]
>> [<ffffffff812847e7>] iterate_dir+0x97/0x130
>> [<ffffffff81284d21>] SyS_getdents+0x91/0x120
>> [<ffffffff81871d2e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
>> [<ffffffff81109a07>] lock_acquire+0xc7/0x270
>> [<ffffffff81101e97>] down_read_nested+0x57/0xa0
>> [<ffffffffa01b0e57>] xfs_ilock+0x167/0x350 [xfs]
>> [<ffffffffa01b10b8>] xfs_ilock_attr_map_shared+0x38/0x50 [xfs]
>> [<ffffffffa014799d>] xfs_attr_get+0xbd/0x190 [xfs]
>> [<ffffffffa01c17ad>] xfs_xattr_get+0x3d/0x70 [xfs]
>> [<ffffffff8129962f>] generic_getxattr+0x4f/0x70
>> [<ffffffff8139ba52>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x162/0x670
>> [<ffffffff8139cf69>] sb_finish_set_opts+0xd9/0x230
>> [<ffffffff8139d66c>] selinux_set_mnt_opts+0x35c/0x660
>> [<ffffffff8139ff97>] superblock_doinit+0x77/0xf0
>> [<ffffffff813a0020>] delayed_superblock_init+0x10/0x20
>> [<ffffffff81272d23>] iterate_supers+0xb3/0x110
>> [<ffffffff813a4e5f>] selinux_complete_init+0x2f/0x40
>> [<ffffffff813b47a3>] security_load_policy+0x103/0x600
>> [<ffffffff813a6901>] sel_write_load+0xc1/0x750
>> [<ffffffff8126e817>] __vfs_write+0x37/0x100
>> [<ffffffff8126f229>] vfs_write+0xa9/0x1a0
>> [<ffffffff8126ff48>] SyS_write+0x58/0xd0
>> [<ffffffff81871d2e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
>> [<ffffffff81109a07>] lock_acquire+0xc7/0x270
>> [<ffffffff8186de8f>] mutex_lock_nested+0x7f/0x3e0
>> [<ffffffff8139b9a9>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0xb9/0x670
>> [<ffffffff8139bf7c>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x1c/0x20
>> [<ffffffff813955f6>] security_d_instantiate+0x36/0x60
>> [<ffffffff81287c34>] d_instantiate+0x54/0x70
>> [<ffffffff8120111c>] __shmem_file_setup+0xdc/0x240
>> [<ffffffff81201290>] shmem_file_setup+0x10/0x20
>> [<ffffffff813856e0>] newseg+0x290/0x3a0
>> [<ffffffff8137e278>] ipcget+0x208/0x2d0
>> [<ffffffff81386074>] SyS_shmget+0x54/0x70
>> [<ffffffff81871d2e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
>> [<ffffffff81108df8>] __lock_acquire+0x1a78/0x1d00
>> [<ffffffff81109a07>] lock_acquire+0xc7/0x270
>> [<ffffffff8186efba>] down_write+0x5a/0xc0
>> [<ffffffff81385354>] shm_close+0x34/0x130
>> [<ffffffff812203a5>] remove_vma+0x45/0x80
>> [<ffffffff81222a30>] do_munmap+0x2b0/0x460
>> [<ffffffff81386c25>] SyS_shmdt+0xb5/0x180
>> [<ffffffff81871d2e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
>
> That's a completely screwed up stack trace. There are *4* syscall
> entry points with 4 separate, unrelated syscall chains on that
> stack trace, all starting at the same address. How is this a valid
> stack trace and not a lockdep bug of some kind?
Sorry, I mangled it when I tried to reformat it from Morten Steven's
original report. Fixed in v2.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
[toc] | [prev] | [standalone]
Back to top | Article view | linux.kernel
csiph-web