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Re: RFC: Audit Kernel Container IDs

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Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> writes:

> The trigger is a pseudo filesystem (proc, since PID tree already exists)
> write of a u64 representing the container ID to a file representing a
> process that will become the first process in a new container.
> This might place restrictions on mount namespaces required to define a
> container, or at least careful checking of namespaces in the kernel to
> verify permissions of the orchestrator so it can't change its own
> container ID.

Why a u64?

Why a proc filesystem write and not a magic audit message?
I don't like the fact that the proc filesystem entry is likely going to
be readable and abusable by non-audit contexts?

Why the ability to change the containerid?  What is the use case you are
thinking of there?

Eric

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Thread

RFC: Audit Kernel Container IDs Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> - 2017-09-13 19:20 +0200
  Re: RFC: Audit Kernel Container IDs Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com> - 2017-09-13 21:40 +0200
    Re: RFC: Audit Kernel Container IDs Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> - 2017-09-14 07:40 +0200
      Re: RFC: Audit Kernel Container IDs Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> - 2017-09-15 12:20 +0200
  Re: RFC: Audit Kernel Container IDs ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) - 2017-09-14 19:40 +0200
    Re: RFC: Audit Kernel Container IDs Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> - 2017-09-14 20:10 +0200
      Re: RFC: Audit Kernel Container IDs ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) - 2017-09-19 04:50 +0200
        Re: RFC: Audit Kernel Container IDs Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> - 2017-09-19 06:20 +0200

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