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Re: drivers/s390/char/keyboard.c kernel stack infoleak

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On Fri, Aug 04, 2017 at 11:09:24AM +0200, Thomas Huth wrote:
>  Hi,
> 
> On 03.08.2017 15:59, sohu0106 wrote:
> > 
> > The stack object "kbdiacr" has a total size of 4 bytes. Its last 1 bytes are padding bytes after "result" which are not initialized and leaked to userland via "copy_to_user".
> > 
> > 
> > diff --git a/keyboard.c b/keyboard.c
> > index ba0e4f9..76a6d35 100644
> > --- a/keyboard.c
> > +++ b/keyboard.c
> > @@ -480,6 +480,8 @@ int kbd_ioctl(struct kbd_data *kbd, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> >                 struct kbdiacr diacr;
> >                 int i;
> >  
> > +               memset( &diacr, 0, sizeof(struct kbdiacr) );
> > +
> 
> I think it would be nicer to simply init the struct with "= {}"
> directly, i.e.:
> 
> 		struct kbdiacr diacr = {};
> 
> And by the way, please have a look at the kernel patch submission
> guidelines first, especially the COO part here:

The patch doesn't make sense. There is no padding and therefore no
information leak.

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Thread

drivers/s390/char/keyboard.c kernel stack infoleak sohu0106 <sohu0106@126.com> - 2017-08-03 16:00 +0200
  Re: drivers/s390/char/keyboard.c kernel stack infoleak Thomas Huth <huth@tuxfamily.org> - 2017-08-04 11:10 +0200
    Re: drivers/s390/char/keyboard.c kernel stack infoleak Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> - 2017-08-04 11:30 +0200
      Re: drivers/s390/char/keyboard.c kernel stack infoleak Thomas Huth <huth@tuxfamily.org> - 2017-08-05 09:20 +0200

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