Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]
Groups > linux.kernel > #1696054
| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 3/3] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount overflow protection |
| Date | 2017-07-25 21:20 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <u7dx9-6OD-33@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <u6QqR-dR-3@gated-at.bofh.it> <u6QqR-dR-11@gated-at.bofh.it> <u76P0-2BR-15@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 5:03 AM, Li Kun <hw.likun@huawei.com> wrote:
> Hi Kees,
>
>
> on 2017/7/25 2:35, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> +static __always_inline __must_check
>> +int __refcount_add_unless(refcount_t *r, int a, int u)
>> +{
>> + int c, new;
>> +
>> + c = atomic_read(&(r->refs));
>> + do {
>> + if (unlikely(c == u))
>> + break;
>> +
>> + asm volatile("addl %2,%0\n\t"
>> + REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO
>> + : "=r" (new)
>> + : "0" (c), "ir" (a),
>> + [counter] "m" (r->refs.counter)
>> + : "cc", "cx");
>> +
>> + } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg(&(r->refs), &c, new));
>> +
>> + return c;
>> +}
>
> here when the result LT_ZERO, you will saturate the r->refs.counter and make
> the
>
> atomic_try_cmpxchg(&(r->refs), &c, new) bound to fail first time.
>
> maybe we can just saturate the value of variable "new" ?
Oh, good catch! Thanks. Actually, it's even worse than that: we'll
exit this function without the refcount being correctly saturated. The
final result will be INT_MIN / 2 + a. It's not terrible, but I should
have noticed this in testing. (There was a gap in my testing for the
_not_zero() overflows, which I've fixed now...)
I'll figure this out or revert to the logic I was using in v6...
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
Back to linux.kernel | Previous | Next — Previous in thread | Find similar | Unroll thread
[PATCH v8 0/3] x86: Implement fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-07-24 20:40 +0200
[PATCH v8 3/3] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-07-24 20:40 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 3/3] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount overflow protection Li Kun <hw.likun@huawei.com> - 2017-07-25 14:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 3/3] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-07-25 21:20 +0200
csiph-web