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Groups > linux.kernel > #1626434

[PATCH 1/3] KEYS: Disallow keyrings beginning with '.' to be joined as session keyrings

From David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Newsgroups linux.kernel
Subject [PATCH 1/3] KEYS: Disallow keyrings beginning with '.' to be joined as session keyrings
Date 2017-04-19 18:20 +0200
Message-ID <ty0uK-5Cb-15@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink)
References <ty0l4-5yM-21@gated-at.bofh.it>
Organization Red Hat UK Ltd. Registered Address: Red Hat UK Ltd, Amberley Place, 107-111 Peascod Street, Windsor, Berkshire, SI4 1TE, United Kingdom. Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903

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This fixes CVE-2016-9604.

Keyrings whose name begin with a '.' are special internal keyrings and so
userspace isn't allowed to create keyrings by this name to prevent
shadowing.  However, the patch that added the guard didn't fix
KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING.  Not only can that create dot-named keyrings,
it can also subscribe to them as a session keyring if they grant SEARCH
permission to the user.

This, for example, allows a root process to set .builtin_trusted_keys as
its session keyring, at which point it has full access because now the
possessor permissions are added.  This permits root to add extra public
keys, thereby bypassing module verification.

This also affects kexec and IMA.

This can be tested by (as root):

	keyctl session .builtin_trusted_keys
	keyctl add user a a @s
	keyctl list @s

which on my test box gives me:

	2 keys in keyring:
	180010936: ---lswrv     0     0 asymmetric: Build time autogenerated kernel key: ae3d4a31b82daa8e1a75b49dc2bba949fd992a05
	801382539: --alswrv     0     0 user: a


Fix this by rejecting names beginning with a '.' in the keyctl.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---

 security/keys/keyctl.c |    9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 52c34532c785..ab082a2e8fdd 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -273,7 +273,8 @@ long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
  * Create and join an anonymous session keyring or join a named session
  * keyring, creating it if necessary.  A named session keyring must have Search
  * permission for it to be joined.  Session keyrings without this permit will
- * be skipped over.
+ * be skipped over.  It is not permitted for userspace to create or join
+ * keyrings whose name begin with a dot.
  *
  * If successful, the ID of the joined session keyring will be returned.
  */
@@ -290,12 +291,16 @@ long keyctl_join_session_keyring(const char __user *_name)
 			ret = PTR_ERR(name);
 			goto error;
 		}
+
+		ret = -EPERM;
+		if (name[0] == '.')
+			goto error_name;
 	}
 
 	/* join the session */
 	ret = join_session_keyring(name);
+error_name:
 	kfree(name);
-
 error:
 	return ret;
 }

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Thread

[PATCH 0/3] KEYS: Fixes David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-19 18:10 +0200
  [PATCH 2/3] KEYS: Change the name of the dead type to ".dead" to  prevent user access David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-19 18:10 +0200
  [PATCH 1/3] KEYS: Disallow keyrings beginning with '.' to be joined  as session keyrings David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-19 18:20 +0200
  Re: [PATCH 0/3] KEYS: Fixes David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-19 18:20 +0200

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