Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]
Groups > linux.kernel > #1616157
| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check |
| Date | 2017-04-04 18:10 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tszbP-78Z-5@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | (1 earlier) <tsuYy-4fH-13@gated-at.bofh.it> <tsyfM-6vk-23@gated-at.bofh.it> <tsypr-6A1-1@gated-at.bofh.it> <tsySu-6KL-9@gated-at.bofh.it> <tsz2a-6Qd-1@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Tue, Apr 4, 2017 at 8:58 AM, Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> wrote: > On Tue 04-04-17 08:46:02, Kees Cook wrote: >> On Tue, Apr 4, 2017 at 8:16 AM, Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> wrote: >> > On Tue 04-04-17 10:07:23, Cristopher Lameter wrote: >> >> On Tue, 4 Apr 2017, Michal Hocko wrote: >> >> >> >> > NAK without a proper changelog. Seriously, we do not blindly apply >> >> > changes from other projects without a deep understanding of all >> >> > consequences. >> >> >> >> Functionalitywise this is trivial. A page must be a slab page in order to >> >> be able to determine the slab cache of an object. Its definitely not ok if >> >> the page is not a slab page. >> > >> > Yes, but we do not have to blow the kernel, right? Why cannot we simply >> > leak that memory? >> >> I can put this behind CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() instead of BUG(), which >> allows the system builder to choose between WARN and BUG. Some people >> absolutely want the kernel to BUG on data corruption as it could be an >> attack. > > CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION sounds as better fit to me. This would, however > require to handle the potenial corruption by returning and leaking the > memory. IIUC, that would be the "return s" path? I should likely change the WARN_ON_ONCE there to be CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION too. I'll add this to my series. -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
Back to linux.kernel | Previous | Next — Previous in thread | Next in thread | Find similar | Unroll thread
[PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-03-31 18:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> - 2017-03-31 23:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-04-01 02:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> - 2017-04-03 05:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> - 2017-04-03 16:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> - 2017-04-03 17:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> - 2017-04-04 13:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> - 2017-04-04 17:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> - 2017-04-04 17:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-04-04 17:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> - 2017-04-04 18:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-04-04 18:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> - 2017-04-04 21:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> - 2017-04-04 21:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> - 2017-04-04 22:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> - 2017-04-04 22:20 +0200
csiph-web