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Groups > linux.kernel > #1581822
| From | Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | [PATCH 3.16 304/306] sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS |
| Date | 2017-02-16 00:20 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <tbh1D-6nD-15@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <tbgRY-6hT-29@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
3.16.40-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
commit 128394eff343fc6d2f32172f03e24829539c5835 upstream.
Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
block/bsg.c | 3 +++
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/block/bsg.c
+++ b/block/bsg.c
@@ -676,6 +676,9 @@ bsg_write(struct file *file, const char
dprintk("%s: write %Zd bytes\n", bd->name, count);
+ if (unlikely(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
bsg_set_block(bd, file);
bytes_written = 0;
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -568,6 +568,9 @@ sg_write(struct file *filp, const char _
sg_io_hdr_t *hp;
unsigned char cmnd[MAX_COMMAND_SIZE];
+ if (unlikely(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if ((!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)) || (!(sdp = sfp->parentdp)))
return -ENXIO;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, printk("sg_write: %s, count=%d\n",
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[PATCH 3.16 304/306] sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> - 2017-02-16 00:20 +0100
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