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Groups > linux.kernel > #1581515
| From | Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: random: /dev/random often returns short reads |
| Date | 2017-02-15 19:00 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <tbc1Y-32F-19@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | (3 earlier) <t0Gd3-1D8-23@gated-at.bofh.it> <t0Gd4-1D8-31@gated-at.bofh.it> <t0Kqm-4mk-13@gated-at.bofh.it> <t10Oz-5VY-23@gated-at.bofh.it> <t12Qj-7py-27@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Wed, Jan 18, 2017 at 7:07 PM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote: > On Wed, Jan 18, 2017 at 04:44:54PM +0100, Denys Vlasenko wrote: >> In this case, what code does is it returns fewer bytes, >> even though *it has enough random bytes to return the full request*. >> >> This happens because the patch which added more conservative >> accounting, while containing technically correct accounting per se, >> it forgot to take in the account another part of the code >> which was relying on the previous, simplistic logic >> "if we add N random bytes to a pool, now it has +N random bytes". >> >> In my opinion, it should have changed that part of code simultaneously >> with introducing more conservative accounting. > > In the ideal world, yes. I've acknowledged this is a bug, in the "be > conservative in what you send, liberal in what you receive" sense.. > But no one complained for three year, and userspace needs to be able > to retry short reads instead of immediately erroring out. > > The problem is changing that code to figure out exactly how many bytes > you need to get in order to have N random bytes is non-trivial. So > our choices are: > > 1) Transfer more bytes than might be needed to the secondary pool ... > 2) Transfer bytes without using the conservative entropy "overwrite" > calculation if the blocking pool is mostly empty. This means we will > be over-estimating the entropy in that pool, which is unfortunate. > One could argue that all of the cases where people have been whining > about this, they are using HAVEGED which is providing pretend entropy > based on the presumed unpredictability of Intel cahce timing, so > careful entropy calculations is kind of silly anyway. However, there > might be some people who really are trying to do carefule entropy > measurement, so compromising this isn't really a great idea.> > I'm leaning a bit towards 1 if we have to do something (which is my > proposed, untested patch). I spend quite some time looking at both your patch which implements #1 and at the commit 30e37ec516ae5a6957596de7661673c615c82ea4 which introduced "conservative accounting" code, and the same thought returns to me: this complexity and problems are self-inflicted by commit 30e37ec516ae5a6957596de7661673c615c82ea4. The code is already conservative elsewhere, adding more conservative code - and more complex code, especially considering that it should be even more complex than it is, since it should be further fixed up in "xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes)" location - it does not look like worthy improvement to me. I propose to simply revert 30e37ec516ae5a6957596de7661673c615c82ea4. If you worry about this accounting more than I do, how about dealing with it in a simpler way, a-la - xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes); + xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes * 5/4); /* be a bit paranoid */
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Re: random: /dev/random often returns short reads Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> - 2017-02-15 19:00 +0100
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