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Groups > linux.kernel > #1580582
| From | "Dr. Greg Wettstein" <gw@idfusion.org> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [tpmdd-devel] [RFC] tpm2-space: add handling for global session exhaustion |
| Date | 2017-02-14 15:50 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <taMAy-35w-15@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <t9hp7-2HH-1@gated-at.bofh.it> <t9nkS-6uq-25@gated-at.bofh.it> <taMAy-35w-17@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 04:13:05PM -0500, Kenneth Goldman wrote:
Good morning to everyone.
> James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> wrote on
> 02/10/2017 11:46:03 AM:
>
> > > quote: 810 milliseconds
> > > verify signature: 635 milliseconds
For those who may be interested in this sort of thing I grabbed a few
minutes and ran these basic verification primitives against a Kaby
Lake system.
Average time for a quote is 600 milliseconds with a signature
verification clocking in at 100 milliseconds. The latter is
consistent with what James found on his Skylake machine.
Latencies are still significant with things like container start
times.
> > Part of the way of reducing the latency is not to use the TPM for
> > things that don't require secrecy:
> Agreed. There are a few times one would verify a signature inside the
> TPM,
> but they're far from mainstream:
>
> 1 - Early in the boot cycle, when there's no crypto library.
>
> 2 - When the crypto library doesn't support the required algorithm.
>
> 3 - When a ticket is needed to prove to the TPM later that it verified
> the signature.
I don't think there is any doubt that running cryptographic primitives
in userspace is going to be faster then going to hardware. Obviously
that also means there is no need for a TPM resource manager which has
been the subject of much discussion here.
The CoreOS paper makes significant reference to increased security
guarantees inherent in the use of a TPM. Obviously whatever uses
those are will have the noted latency constraints.
We have extended our behavior measurement verifications to the
container level so we offer an explicit guarantee that a container has
not operated in a manner which is inconsistent with the intent of its
designer. Getting the security guarantee we need requires that an
linkage to a hardware root of trust hence our concerns about hardware
latency.
Have a good day.
As always,
Dr. G.W. Wettstein, Ph.D. Enjellic Systems Development, LLC.
4206 N. 19th Ave. Specializing in information infra-structure
Fargo, ND 58102 development.
PH: 701-281-1686
FAX: 701-281-3949 EMAIL: greg@enjellic.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"UNIX is simple and coherent, but it takes a genious (or at any rate,
a programmer) to understand and appreciate its simplicity."
-- Dennis Ritchie
USENIX '87
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Re: [tpmdd-devel] [RFC] tpm2-space: add handling for global session exhaustion "Dr. Greg Wettstein" <gw@idfusion.org> - 2017-02-14 15:50 +0100
Re: [tpmdd-devel] [RFC] tpm2-space: add handling for global session exhaustion James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> - 2017-02-14 17:50 +0100
Re: [tpmdd-devel] [RFC] tpm2-space: add handling for global session exhaustion "Dr. Greg Wettstein" <greg@enjellic.com> - 2017-02-16 21:10 +0100
Re: [tpmdd-devel] [RFC] tpm2-space: add handling for global session exhaustion Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> - 2017-02-16 21:40 +0100
Re: [tpmdd-devel] [RFC] tpm2-space: add handling for global session exhaustion "Dr. Greg Wettstein" <greg@enjellic.com> - 2017-02-17 11:00 +0100
Re: [tpmdd-devel] [RFC] tpm2-space: add handling for global session exhaustion Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> - 2017-02-17 13:40 +0100
Re: [tpmdd-devel] [RFC] tpm2-space: add handling for global session exhaustion "Dr. Greg Wettstein" <greg@enjellic.com> - 2017-02-17 23:40 +0100
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