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Groups > linux.kernel > #1673022
| From | riel@redhat.com |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | [PATCH 2/3] arm64/mmap: properly account for stack randomization in mmap_base |
| Date | 2017-06-22 22:10 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tVgAq-Xd-23@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <tVgAp-Xd-7@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
From: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
When RLIMIT_STACK is, for example, 256MB, the current code results in
a gap between the top of the task and mmap_base of 256MB, failing to
take into account the amount by which the stack address was randomized.
In other words, the stack gets less than RLIMIT_STACK space.
Ensure that the gap between the stack and mmap_base always takes stack
randomization and the stack guard gap into account.
From Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.
Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
---
arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
index 7b0d55756eb1..a0cb6b8ccde7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
* Leave enough space between the mmap area and the stack to honour ulimit in
* the face of randomisation.
*/
-#define MIN_GAP (SZ_128M + ((STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT) + 1))
+#define MIN_GAP (SZ_128M)
#define MAX_GAP (STACK_TOP/6*5)
static int mmap_is_legacy(void)
@@ -64,6 +64,11 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
static unsigned long mmap_base(unsigned long rnd)
{
unsigned long gap = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK);
+ unsigned long pad = (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT) + stack_guard_gap;
+
+ /* Values close to RLIM_INFINITY can overflow. */
+ if (gap + pad > gap)
+ gap += pad;
if (gap < MIN_GAP)
gap = MIN_GAP;
--
2.9.4
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[PATCH 0/3] properly account for stack randomization and guard gap riel@redhat.com - 2017-06-22 22:10 +0200
[PATCH 3/3] powerpc,mmap: properly account for stack randomization in mmap_base riel@redhat.com - 2017-06-22 22:10 +0200
[PATCH 2/3] arm64/mmap: properly account for stack randomization in mmap_base riel@redhat.com - 2017-06-22 22:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH 0/3] properly account for stack randomization and guard gap Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2017-06-23 10:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH 0/3] properly account for stack randomization and guard gap Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> - 2017-06-23 17:20 +0200
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