Re: [PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return

From	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Newsgroups	linux.kernel
Subject	Re: [PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return
Date	2017-06-20 22:30 +0200
Message-ID	<tUxWG-4Sn-7@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink)
References	<tSrC1-4gc-3@gated-at.bofh.it>
Organization	linux.* mail to news gateway

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On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 6:12 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> wrote:
> Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to
> user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and elevate
> privileges [1].
>
> The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on
> return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if
> needed.
>
> The addr_limit_user_check function is added as a cross-architecture
> function to check the address limit.
>
> [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>

Thanks for reworking this series!

The bad state correctly BUGs under the LKDTM test:

[   21.171586] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CORRUPT_USER_DS
[   21.172791] lkdtm: setting bad task size limit
[   21.173742] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   21.174641] kernel BUG at ./include/linux/syscalls.h:220!
...
[   21.193166] Call Trace:
[   21.193617]  ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
[   21.194443]  entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25


Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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Re: [PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-06-20 22:30 +0200
  Re: [PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-06-28 20:00 +0200

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