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Groups > linux.kernel > #1670028
| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | [PATCH 16/23] net: copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user() |
| Date | 2017-06-20 01:40 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tUeqZ-QH-11@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <tUeqZ-QH-7@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
From: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> The autoclose field can be copied with put_user(), so there is no need to use copy_to_user(). In both cases, hardened usercopy is being bypassed since the size is constant, and not open to runtime manipulation. This patch is verbatim from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- net/sctp/socket.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 0defc0c76552..e94c141bcf82 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -4883,7 +4883,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_autoclose(struct sock *sk, int len, char __user *optv len = sizeof(int); if (put_user(len, optlen)) return -EFAULT; - if (copy_to_user(optval, &sctp_sk(sk)->autoclose, sizeof(int))) + if (put_user(sctp_sk(sk)->autoclose, (int __user *)optval)) return -EFAULT; return 0; } -- 2.7.4
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[PATCH 16/23] net: copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user() Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-06-20 01:40 +0200
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